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This thesis is about two socio-culturally and economically distinct urban locales 
undergoing an ongoing evolution into post-industrial neighbourhoods, and how the 
young men who inhabit them are exploring and constructing new identities in attempts 
to transcend the exclusionary logic of post-industrial living. In expanding this 
argument, this thesis has also comparatively considered the ways in which sports-
based interventions (SBIs) approach the popular manifestations of local-global 
transformations (i.e., unemployment, criminal behaviour, and social exclusion) and 
seeks to alleviate them, and has detailed how my participants experience SBIs and 
whether they offer a sufficient form of intervention to address the aforementioned 
symptoms of post-industrial change. Ultimately, this thesis has explained the ‘lived 
experiences’ of young men residing in the post-industrial inner city and their inevitable 
attempts at adapting to changes in the socio-cultural economy via their use of an SBI. 
The young men described in this thesis are therefore considered cultural products of 
the changes occurring in the post-industrial metropolis, adapting and responding to 
macro-sociological changes. Hence, this thesis has uncovered that contemporary, post-
industrial youth identities are varied, diverse, and heterogeneous across populations, 
shaped and fashioned by global social, political, and economic transformations, and 
the embedded habitus that operate in two distinct post-industrial locales. Youthful 
experiences of unemployment are therefore not singular or homogeneous across the 
UK, and neither is there a standardised or consistent youthful subjectivity within these 
post-industrial neighbourhoods and communities.   
In detailing the transformations and evolving practices of young working-class men, 
this thesis does three things. First, this thesis demonstrates that there is no 
‘standardised’ progression through SBIs and beyond. This is because the divergent 
groups of young men that ‘make use’ of SBIs and the differing cultural contexts, 
labour markets, and habitus of the de-industrialised urban areas in which they reside 
results in deviating and opposing post-SBI pathways. Second, the identification of four 
contrasting ‘types’ of young men means that diverse modalities of SBI work are likely 
to be more effective for different young men at different stages in their unemployment 
‘careers’. Hence, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to SBI policy is hopelessly idealistic 
and destined to fail in making a considerable impact on structural unemployment. 
Finally, I conclude that to address the issue of contemporary urban marginality and 
worklessness, a radical overhaul of SBI work is required. Instead of functioning as a 
conventional educational arena in which young men are socialised and recalibrated 
into a preordained social world without consultation, SBIs need to become a 
transformative context in which its participants recognise and respond to structural 
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Introduction: A Comparative, Sociological Analysis of Advanced Marginality 
Neighbourhoods A and B are two contrasting urban locales, situated in the cities of 
Sunderland and London, respectively. Approximately 25,000 people live in the 
conflated cluster of ‘wards’ that make up Neighbourhood A (Sunderland City Council, 
2013), whilst Neighbourhood B, the focal point of my fieldwork in East London, is 
composed of a number of neighbourhoods where approximately 11,000 people reside 
(Hackney Borough Council, 2013). Both neighbourhoods can be considered de-
industrialised (Winlow, 2001; Hobbs, 2013) and are typified by economic destitution, 
poverty, and a negative public perception. Yet their social composition, ethnic 
diversity, degree of poverty, and historically embedded habitus1 are neither the same 
nor manifest on the same level. Ultimately, this thesis is about the young men that 
reside in these two areas and their efforts to traverse the distinct post-industrial terrains 
that they now inhabit.  
In detailing the lives of the young men living in post-industrial locales, this thesis sets 
out to answer the question of how young men in an era of ‘advanced marginality’2 
(Wacquant, 2008) are forging new identities, experiencing diverse post-school 
transitions, and adopting unique consumer-orientated forms of lawbreaking in 
attempts to transcend the exclusionary logic of post-industrial living. In expanding this 
argument, this thesis seeks to explore how sports-based interventions (SBIs) function 
                                                          
1 In line with Bourdieu, I understand ‘habitus’ as being ‘the conditioning associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, predisposed to act as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 
regulated and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules’ (Bourdieu, 1990:53). 
2 The prefix ‘advanced’ informs us that this new form of marginality is not a feature of past epochal changes that is being gradually 
infused into everyday living in the form of continual neoliberal governance of social life but instead is a form of urban exclusion 
and marginality that stands before us (Wacquant, 1996). Hence, to stop the spread and rise of advanced marginality and the 
associated social problems of criminality, political marginality, and social desertification, new mechanisms of political and social 




as a component of broader neoliberal3 governmental strategies that produce the 
conditions they claim to resolve. In essence, I am exploring the ways in which 
associated contradictions are negotiated by staff and the young men of 
Neighbourhoods A and B who ‘make use’ of the SBI.  
In researching these contemporary post-industrial issues, the work of Loic Wacquant 
(1996; 2008) offers a fruitful theoretical lens through which to explore young men’s 
identities, transitions, lawbreaking, and the responses of interventions to young men 
under conditions of ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 1996; 2008; 2009); that is, a 
new form of post-industrial social exclusion spawned out of the deleterious effects of 
post-industrial restructuring, neoliberal capitalism, and globalisation in advanced 
Western societies and economies. These transformations have come to bear heaviest 
on those located on society’s margins, namely, the lower fractions of the working class 
and those located in the post-industrial inner city (Wacquant, 1996, 2008; Standing, 
2011), the consequences; an increasingly fragmented labour market, the casualisation 
of wage labour, and the ‘churning’ between unstable jobs amongst a youthful 
population making increasingly precarious school-work transitions (Standing, 2011; 
Shildrick et al., 2012).  
Advanced Marginality in the 21st Century Inner City: The Cases of Neighbourhoods 
A and B 
Before detailing in more depth the aims, objectives, and theoretical underpinnings of 
this thesis, I will begin by introducing readers to Neighbourhoods A and B4 and 
                                                          
3 To quote David Harvey, neoliberalism is:‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best 
be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if 
markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, and education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then 
they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these targets, the state should not venture’ (Harvey, 2005:2). 
4 East London and the city of Sunderland are the focal points of this thesis, and although I view contemporary youth cultures as 
cultural constructed phenomenon, I am keen to situate them within the context of the transition from an industrial to a post-
industrial society and the severe economic and political changes that have impacted upon the two fieldwork sites (or 
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highlight the structural similarities and functional differences that exist between them. 
This comparative analysis lays out the context in which the young men of these 
neighbourhoods, described in later chapters, are located and will allow us to consider 
the salient dimensions of everyday life that exist in these two neighbourhoods amongst 
some young men—that is, cultural identities, delinquency , and ‘road’ lives. This 
point-by-point comparison will provide readers with a sense of place and signify the 
sociological factors that have significantly shaped these neighbourhoods and the 
cultural and socially defined identities of the people that reside within them. This will 
allow, in ensuing chapters, to recast the question of contemporary youth cultures, 
social exclusion, and the role of SBIs within this context.  
Neighbourhood A: An Overview of a De-industrialised Locale 
Neighbourhood A is situated within the city of Sunderland, positioned close to the port 
that exists within the area, and where approximately 25,000 people live. It is the focal 
point of my research conducted in the North East of England,5 being where my 
participants were drawn from and where the SBI was situated. The broader area in 
which Neighbourhood A is located is currently de-industrialised, having been 
destabilised by the radical social, economic, and political upheavals that have 
transformed much of the North East over the last thirty years6 (Winlow, 2001). The 
                                                          
‘neighbourhoods’) that are situated within these two cities. I refer to these fieldwork locations as Neighbourhoods A and B to 
preserve anonymity, although given the information I will provide on these localities and the identities that populate them, many 
readers could quite easily predict the exact locality of these neighbourhoods if they so wanted to. Although I realise this represents 
one such ‘ethical dilemma’, I believe that providing sufficient detail on these urban locales is in line with the epistemological 
aims of this research, and ‘frames’ the research findings accordingly. For this, I make no apologies. I feel this is epistemologically 
necessary and imperative to understanding the contemporary cultural identities that populate urban locales (Hobbs, 2013); 
anything else would fail to align itself with the epistemological aims of this research, as detailed in chapter 4. 
5 Most of the research presented as part of the ‘North East’ component of this thesis’s fieldwork has its foundations in 
Neighbourhood A. By this I mean that the SBI ‘studied’ as part of this thesis was situated in this urban area. Most of my 
participants were born and resided in this neighbourhood although their activities, lives, and general daily ‘actions’ were far from 
restricted to these areas, and the nature of the SBI, which had projects located across the North East, meant I also was not restricted 
to these areas. As such, a large part of this fieldwork took me to all major locales in the North East of England: Newcastle, 
Gateshead, Sunderland, Middlesbrough, Stockton, and Durham. Nevertheless, the majority of my time was spent at a project site 
in Neighbourhood A, with participants drawn from its immediate urban environment. 
6 Readers wishing to engage with further literature surrounding the deindustrialisation of the North East and the impact it has had 
on local communities may wish to look to the exhaustive accounts of the region’s industrial past and subsequent industrial decline 
(e.g., Martin and Rowthorn, 1986). Winlow (2001:25–31) gives an excellent description of the decline of traditional industries 
and its effect on ‘North East masculinities’. Beynon, Hudson, and Sadler (1994) also provide an in-depth account of the decline 
of chemical industries on nearby Teesside. 
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major industries located in the immediate surrounding area once provided stable 
employment to many young men who lived in Neighbourhood A.   
Like most the North East of England, Sunderland—and Neighbourhood A—were 
once renowned for their industrial heritage, most notably in relation to shipbuilding, 
coal mining, and heavy engineering.7 Physically, economically, and socially, however, 
it is shipbuilding that has defined Sunderland and Neighbourhood A. At its peak in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, work in the thriving shipbuilding industry 
was the staple of male labour. As Winlow (2001) suggests, shipbuilding determined 
and regulated patterns of life and greatly influenced the self-identity of many of 
Sunderland’s residents. Here was a ‘working-class town’ of ‘industrial masculinities’, 
a network of ‘hardy’, ‘skilled’ young men who ‘express[ed] a desire to prove their 
masculinity through physical labour’ (Winlow, 2001:35–37).  
It is important not to underestimate the importance of shipbuilding to many of the 
working-class men that once resided in Neighbourhood A, and I quote the following 
passage from Winlow (2001) at length to detail the significance of these industries in 
shaping forms of ‘North East industrial masculinity’ that were once found in 
Neighbourhood A (see also Nayak, 2006): 
‘In the heavy industries that dominated the North East, simply 
working was not an end to itself as regards to this particular 
working-class masculinity; a complex system of negotiation and 
confirmation operated within the workplace, which ultimately 
formed significant structures on which this masculinity came to rely. 
The workplace represented an environment where masculinity 
could be re-examined, reinterpreted and reaffirmed. These 
workplaces were almost completely male environments where the 
basic elements of masculinity were accentuated, and where 
behaviour was tested and categorised and took on both specific and 
                                                          
7 Glass cutting, limestone, cement and brick work were also significant industries and forms of employment, although by the mid 
1800’s these industries were dormant, or already in significant decline (Winlow, 2001:28). 
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changing meanings. For example … hard labour in factories and 
mines literally used up workers’ bodies, and that undergoing this 
destruction, as proof of the toughness of the work and the worker, 
can be a method of demonstrating masculinity.’ (Winlow, 2001:35) 
 
For most of the 1900s, then, the industries associated with the region provided 
economic security and stability for many of the men who populated Neighbourhood 
A. These industries also culturally and socially ‘defined’ Neighbourhood A’s male 
population—as they did for many other local working-class communities organised 
around traditional industrial labour—and provided them with a distinctive cultural 
habitus, simply for ‘existing’ in Neighbourhood A’s working-class social and cultural 
environment. Neighbourhood A was once a place where young men attempted to 
prove and express their masculinity via ‘hard’ ‘physical’ labour—its men ‘socialized 
to believe that hard physical labour was a manly pursuit, not only by Victorian and 
Calvinist ideals, but also accordingly to their peers and family’ (Winlow, 2001:36). 
As such, the industries associated with Neighbourhood A—shipbuilding, coal mining, 
and dock work—created a form of ‘industrial masculinity’ amongst its working men. 
Most notably, however, these industries also contributed to the production of ‘one of 
the oldest and most organised working-classes in the world’ (Byrne, 1989:40). 
Yet this period of stable, secure employment proved to be somewhat of an all-too-
brief moment in recent history, and the economic prosperity once associated with the 
North East (and Neighbourhood A) is now almost unrecognisable from what has been 
described here. Shipbuilding, upon which Neighbourhood A was built around, is all 
but gone. The shipyards that once dominated social, political, and cultural forms of 




Between 1971 and 1989 more than half of Neighbourhood A’s industrial jobs were 
lost as shipbuilding and related industries moved elsewhere (Winlow, 2001). This 
coincided with a significant depopulation of the region: 22% of the population out-
migrated between 1978 and 1991 (Nayak, 2003).  Consequently, the industries that 
once shaped and characterised the North East, its habitus, and its communities 
evaporated. Neighbourhood A, along with numerous other localities worldwide, 
became de-industrialised. 
The erosion of once stable industrial forms of labour and shifting socioeconomic 
currents means the broader city of Sunderland is now in a state of flux. This is 
exemplified architecturally by a number of recent developments. Gone are the docks, 
shipyards, and sites of heavy industry. In their place, one can now find a mixture of 
residential, commercial, and leisure facilities, including a new university campus and 
accommodation, a multi-story car park, a luxury riverside housing development, a 
casino, a football stadium, a retail park, and a new Olympic-sized swimming pool and 
aquatic centre. A new shopping centre was also built and extended and contains many 
of the chain stores one can find in any other post-industrial town.  
A thriving post-industrial economy now exists here—immediately south of the city is 
a 125 acre ‘international business park’, home to corporate headquarters and financial 
and customer services, its out-of-town location strategically exploiting open land and 
a major road artery that runs the length of the country. A ‘specialist training facility’ 
is also located on the site, offering employer-led training in customer service, call 
handling and management, and technical skills associated with IT and communication 




However, despite a burgeoning post-industrial economy, the situation in 
Neighbourhood A is relatively bleak. Neighbourhood A is composed of a cluster of 
neighbourhoods located in an area of the city where ‘39 sub-wards are in the most 
deprived 20% of such sub-wards in England, with 8 in the most deprived 10%’ and is 
defined by the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation as being within the 10% ‘most 
deprived’ areas in England (Sunderland City Council, 2013). Recent data from the 
Office of National Statistics (2013) gives us further insight into the present situation 
of Neighbourhood A: 
 Neighbourhood A and its surrounding area have a ‘high’ unemployment rate, 
with 9.3% of its population unemployed compared with 7.8% nationally. 
 The ward in which Neighbourhood A is located has a high proportion of Job 
Seekers Allowance (JSA) claimants: 6.3% compared with 3.2% in Sunderland 
and 1.9% nationally. In Neighbourhood A, 86% of JSA claimants are male.  
 In terms of employee jobs by industry, manufacturing represents 15.3% of all 
jobs, construction 4.9%, and ‘services’ (such as retail, IT and business, and 
jobs within the public sector) make up 77.8% of the total jobs in the local 
authority in which Neighbourhood A is located. (NOMIS, 2011) 
A report produced by the city council (Sunderland City Council, 2013) reported that 
28.5% of children living in the ward in which Neighbourhood A is located are 
classified as living in poverty. This is greater than the overall figure for the whole of 
the city (25.9%) and the highest of all five localities in the city. Within one ward in 




Neighbourhood B: An Alternative Post-industrial Locale 
Neighbourhood B was the focal point of my fieldwork in London. The area is 
composed of a number of neighbourhoods that are located within the same 
geographical location, borough, and postal area. The majority of the SBI’s participants 
for this particular region were drawn from here. My fieldwork was mainly restricted 
to these neighbourhoods and the site of the SBI8. 
Neighbourhood B would be considered an ‘inner city’, i.e., located in one of the 12 
London boroughs that form the interior section of Greater London as defined by the 
London Government Act 1963. It is, or once was, an ‘ideal type’, traditional, 
‘working-class’ territory composed of several ‘wards’ made up of Victorian-style 
terraces and large social housing estates and home to diverse forms of manual skilled 
labour, which the majority of local residents found employment in. Hence, like 
Neighbourhood A, pockets of traditional, manual working-class labour once existed 
in the area, and Neighbourhood B has similarly been ‘shaped’ by the economic and 
industrial forces that once characterised the area. As such, the features of the area that 
strictly defined a sense of strong working-class territoriality and intense local 
patriotism based on neighbourhood identity are found within its industrial past. 
Traditionally, an enduring aspect of London is the extent to which many of its areas 
have been defined by the local economy and industrial culture. The economic and 
industrial base of London during the early to mid-20th century was large, diverse, and 
widely dispersed. As such, ‘the capital’s proletariat evolved as a complex and highly 
individualistic amalgam of multiple, albeit class-specific, identities, gleaned from 
                                                          
8 It is necessary to point out here that the SBI site for participants drawn from Neighbourhood B was located in an adjacent, 
nearby Central London borough; a neutral venue was required because of a recent spate of incidents involving young men from 
conflicting estates in Neighbourhood B’s borough. Nevertheless, my participants were all drawn from nearby Neighbourhood B 
in East London, and most of my ethnographic fieldwork was conducted there.  
9 
 
localities sharing little in common with their neighbours other than socio-economic 
deprivation’ (Hobbs, 2013:83). The localism of urban neighbourhoods within London 
during this period was often forged around working and industrial cultures, 
contributing to the long-established social order and civic identity of specific urban 
neighbourhoods (Hobbs, 2013).9  
Neighbourhood B was initially a small hamlet situated to the east of a small lane, 
which now constitutes the major high road through the area. In the 18th century, the 
high road developed significantly as a number of inns and taverns were constructed 
along it. It wasn’t until the early 19th century that large-scale development of 
residential areas in the district began. The north side of the area was largely home to 
the professional classes and merchants, whilst the poorer classes resided in the small 
side streets that came to characterise the area. In 1849, Neighbourhood B was 
described as ‘a recently increased suburban village, with some handsome old houses’ 
(Baker, 1995).  
A continual urban development of the rural area was constant up the 1900s, a time 
when ‘most of the streets … contained a mixture of people who were well-to-do or 
fairly comfortable’ (Baker, 1995). The outward migration of the more prosperous 
class, as had been occurring elsewhere in London around this time, appears to have 
been partly limited in and around Neighbourhood B, after some returned upon finding 
working-class residents in outer suburban areas (Baker, 1995). Nevertheless, as 
Charles Booth (1902) noted, there remained pockets of deprivation and poverty in the 
                                                          
9 Many of the traditional crime ‘firms’ that existed in these areas prior to the 1970s were formed along dimensions of localised 
culture and employment (see Hobbs, 1988; 2013).  
10 
 
area, particularly in the south of the district. The area was overcrowded, with few 
houses occupied by single families.  
The industries that came to be associated with Neighbourhood B were reflective of the 
wider economy that existed in East London during the post-war period. Here were to 
be found a plethora of small workshops and industries producing the key trades of the 
district—furniture and cabinets; chairs and upholstery (of which were a product of the 
declining silk trade that once flourished in the area); and small-scale industries in 
locks, hinges, and glass.10 Hence, unlike Neighbourhood A, Neighbourhood B was not 
a ‘one-industry town’, but rather a local economy composed of multiple employment 
opportunities in varied industries.11 The economic features of East London were 
vividly described by Young and Wilmott (1957) in their study of Bethnal Green, a 
close-by district that shares a number of common economic, social, and cultural 
characteristics with Neighbourhood B: 
‘You only have to take a bus down the main street, to notice that this 
is a place of many industries. You pass tailors’ workshops, furniture 
makers, Kearley & Tonge’s food warehouse, and near to Allen & 
Hanbury’s big factory. The borough has by itself a more diversified 
economy than some countries…At its heart is the largest port in 
world…and supports on every side a web of connected industries – 
ship repairers and ship-suppliers, docks and litherage, stores and 
depots, railways and motor transport, and the thousands of 
manufacturers, warehousemen, and merchants who process and 
pass tea and coffee, palm oil and wool, spices and hides, meat and 
wheat, from half the world on into the metropolis and the interior’ 
(Young and Wilmott, 1957:7) 
 
                                                          
10 Dock work was also found nearby and served as forms of employment for many East End residents. Neighbourhood B, 
however, is not a dockside community, and its main industries were to be found in those stated here. 
11 These industries shared one common characteristic: manual labour. Hence, the whole of East London and Neighbourhood B 
could be considered ‘working-class’—its working population employed as manual workers in the various local craft workshops 
that once existed in and around Neighbourhood B. 
11 
 
The diversity of the traditional economy of Neighbourhood B meant that much of the 
local community lived and worked in the immediate surrounding area; ‘there was no 
need for them to go outside in search for jobs’ (Cohen, 1972:12). Many of the same 
family were recruited into existing family trades or industries, and even if the youth 
did not follow their parents into similar forms of employment—and this was often the 
case, according to Young and Wilmott’s (1957) analysis—the economic variety of 
East London meant they could be absorbed into one of the many other craft or service 
trades in the area. Hence, as Cohen (1972:913) suggested at the time, ‘the fierce pride 
of being an East ender was often linked to the equally fierce pride of craftsmanship 
and skilled labour’. This was also the case in Neighbourhood B. A strong sense of 
community and a cultural habitus characterised by intense localism and territoriality 
was built around the forms of highly localised and familial, homogeneous manual 
forms of labour.  
In short, Neighbourhood B was once an area that offered an abundance of manual, 
unionised working-class employment, which helped maintain familial stability, where 
young people had relatively stable ‘transitions’ into existing family trades and 
accepted their proletariat position (despite their liminal engagement in transgressive 
behaviour12) and where ‘the situation of the workplace … remained tied to the situation 
outside work’ (Cohen, 1972:13)—all of which contributed to an unparalleled 
steadiness, stability, and assurance amongst the close-knit localised community of 
Neighbourhood B. 
A close-knit community ‘feel’ was deeply entrenched in the area, established in the 
context of stable industrial employment. Extended kinship networks helped produce 
                                                          
12 see Downes (1966) 
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cultural continuity and stability. The economy was stable and diverse, offering all 
forms of trades, which meant people ‘lived and worked in the East End’ (Cohen, 
1972:9) and the ecology of the Neighbourhood functioned as a ‘communal space’ for 
neighbours to converse and socialise in and relate to one another. The working-class 
‘street’ once found in Neighbourhood B—that kind of place so vividly described by 
Cohen in the classic article Subcultural Conflict and Working-class Community 
(1972), where ‘close-packed back to backs, facing each other across alley ways or 
narrow streets, corner shops and local pubs’ functioned and shaped ‘the close textures 
of working-class life’ and served as an informal system of social control; ‘for the street 
is played in, talked in, sat out in, constantly spectated as a source of neighborly interest 
… nothing much can happen—however trivial (a child falling, a woman struggling 
with heavy parcels, etc.) with it becoming a focus of interest and intervention’ (Cohen, 
1972:9). The ecology of the working-class neighbourhood of Neighbourhood B 
facilitated social interaction, a natural setting for socialising. In turn, all these features 
contributed to the stable close-knit society that once existed here.  
The social and economic structure of Neighbourhood B slowly began eroding in the 
1950s and has continued to disintegrate up to the present day.13 An area once 
characterised by its ‘single-class manual communality’ (Hobbs, 2013:116) where 
consumerism was irrelevant and the diverse forms of craftsmanship and skilled labour 
offered stable employment are but a distant memory. This fragmentation of the 
community has coincided with the de-industrialisation of the local area (and in London 
                                                          
13 London has undergone massive deindustrialisation in the last thirty years, particularly in the East End and Docklands areas and 
in the boroughs located eastwards towards Essex that housed industrial factories geared towards the automotive industry and 
once provided a large population of the area with stable, secure forms of employment. For example, The Dagenham Ford plant 
in nearby Barking peaked at around 40,000 workers in 1953 and, globally, was once a major production site for diesel engines. 
To date, it has produced around 1,050,000 engines. Since the 1970s, production at the site decreased, as new Ford models were 
produced at subsidiary plants in mainland Europe. Job losses increased as output decreased, and in October 2012, it was 
announced that the stamping plant in Dagenham would close, amounting to the loss of 1,000 jobs. Currently, around 4,000 




in general) and the shift from urban-based production to the post-industrial economy 
of call centres, IT, and finance (Hobbs, 2013:116).  
The first stages of the dramatic redevelopment of the social and economic structures 
of the East End, which occurred during the 1950s and the 1970s, are detailed in 
Cohen’s (1972) article, and I will briefly relay them here to demonstrate how the de-
industrialisation of the area has continued and gathered momentum up to the present 
day and to show how the situation facing many young men in Neighbourhood B is not 
necessarily a new one.  
In the late 1950s, the British economy gradually recovered from the deleterious effects 
of the Second World War and applied many of the technological advancements 
developed during this era to manufacturing industries with the aim of increasing 
production outputs. Many of the craft workshops and small-scale production industries 
associated with the East End and Neighbourhood B—traditional industries based on 
hand skill and simple divisions of labour—were hit the hardest. Gradually, industries 
relying upon automated techniques replaced many of the workshops in the area, and 
new service sector industries were introduced, i.e., ‘the routine, dead end, low paid’ 
jobs (Cohen, 1972:245). The local economy of the East End became less diverse and 
contracted, and gradually, the close-knit community of the East End was eroded, as 
more and more people had to commute out of the local area to work.   
Occurring alongside the changes in the economic structure of the East End, a basic 
change in the communities’ demographic was taking place. The development of a 
number of new towns and large estates on the outskirts of London meant a large 
number of working-class families were rehoused. Gradually, many communities, like 
Neighbourhood B, underwent a steady depopulation, as the indigenous white working 
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class moved out to the ‘utopian’ new towns and estates on the outskirts of London, 
where new jobs, semi-detached houses, and gardens awaited. Alongside this out-
migration, however, was the rapid repopulation of many of these depopulated East 
End areas, as many West Indian, Turkish, and South Asian migrants who refused 
social housing and on low incomes naturally gravitated to these areas, bringing with 
them their own trades and services. In turn, this only further accelerated the movement 
of the traditional indigenous population outwards (Cohen, 1972:15).  
As the broader effects of the new towns and the migration of foreign nationals took 
hold on many of the traditional white working-class communities, a further 
transformation of the area took place, one which was to shape the social and physical 
makeup of the area for years to come. From the late 1950s, the Conservative 
government redirected the building of social housing back to the inner city. Down 
came the traditional socially facilitative environment of the working-class street, and 
up went the tower blocks and housing estates based on brutalist 1960s architecture that 
now dominates the landscape of much of Neighbourhood B. The argument here was 
that the development of large high-rise buildings would help repopulate the area and 
rehouse the local community close to local employment and leisure opportunities. 
However, instead of countering the social disorganisation that existed in the area 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the production of large-scale high-rise social housing 
estates only exacerbated and accelerated the erosion of the traditional social structures 
that once existed (Cohen, 1972).  
I realise it is important not to sentimentalise this transition. One cannot deny that the 
redevelopment of the area resulted in an improvement in living conditions for those 
that previously resided in traditional slum areas. However, as Cohen clearly pointed 
out, the development of large social housing estates ‘did nothing to improve the real 
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economic situation of many families, and those with low incomes, despite rebate 
schemes [were] worse off … redevelopment meant the destruction of the 
neighbourhood, the breakdown of the extended kinship network, which … exert a 
powerful force for social cohesion in the community’ (Cohen, 1972:16). It could also 
be concluded that the rebuilt areas of East London and Neighbourhood B resemble 
many of the other 1960s social housing estates across London. Neighbourhood B’s 
numerous tower blocks and council estates, for example, are not dissimilar from those 
of the Andover Estate in Holloway or the South Kilburn Estate in Brent. As such, the 
target of civic and collective contentment has resulted in a diminution of local 
identity—the life of Neighbourhood B and the communal spirit that once existed here 
has gone from within.  
Fast forward to the 1980s and 1990s and one can see the contemporary effects of these 
transformations and the impact of de-industrialisation and social change on the area. 
For much of this period the area was characterised by severe unemployment, poverty, 
and economic destitution (Hobbs, 1988). These economic and social changes led to 
the creation of post-industrial proletariat composed of a hybrid mix of the remaining 
indigenous white working class and a mixture of first, second, and third generation 
ethnic minorities from the Caribbean, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. The traditional 
skilled industries that working-class youth assimilated into evaporated, replaced by a 
post-industrial economy of low-paid service work in hotels, catering, and retail 
(Hobbs, 2013).  
In recent years, however, as middle-class bohemians with a taste for an ‘edgy’ inner 
city vibe became priced out of surrounding areas, they soon discovered this once 
previous urban badlands and have attempted to make it their own. The social situation 
in Neighbourhood B has thus become increasingly divided. The progressively 
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vulnerable service workers made up of the traditional white working class and ethnic 
minority groups14 that have populated the area since the 1960s and 1970s now share 
their space with middle-class newcomers, employed in many of the new media and 
digital economies located close by. Evidence of the dramatic changes brought about 
by neoliberal restructuring and global change is felt most strongly on the busy, lively 
strip that runs close by to Neighbourhood B. Here, one can find Lebanese cafes, 
Caribbean hair salons, and Turkish grocery stores alongside Chi-Chi coffee places 
serving babyccinnos and soybean lattes and organic bakeries selling artisan bread. In 
the backstreets surrounding the strip, the small disused workshops that once housed 
manufacturing and production units for skilled manual workers have been 
reconstituted and converted into spaces that cater to this new breed of resident. Here, 
there are now pop-up art galleries and studios in place of furniture workshops or 
locksmiths. Social housing now nestles next to luxury private accommodation and 
gated communities. 
Accordingly, the area has become one of economic opportunity as a result of the 
increased focus on East London as an area for development and gentrification, with 
the post-industrial economy reflecting the influx of qualified middle-class residents. 
According to a recent borough report (Hackney Borough Council, 2012), 48% of the 
borough’s businesses specialise in ‘scientific, technical, information and 
communication services’, followed by ‘retail and hospitality’ (14%), ‘information and 
communications’ (13%), and ‘arts, entertainments, recreation and other services’ 
                                                          
14 The area is culturally diverse. Historically, the area has been one that has welcomed inward migration. In the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the area was populated by a large concentration of Irish migrants, before Jews fleeing persecution in Eastern Europe 
flocked to the area. In the 1950s and 1960s, the area was repopulated by migrants from the Caribbean, Cyprus, Turkey, and South 
Asia, filling the void left by the out-migrating and indigenous white working class (Hobbs, 1989). In recent years, they have been 
joined by migrants from Eastern Europe and Poland. Presently, just over a third of respondents in the 2011 census described 
themselves as white British (36%). Black African (11.4%), Black Caribbean (7.8%), and Turks and Kurds (5.6%) are other well-
represented ethnic groups. Other significant communities include Chinese, Vietnamese, and Eastern Europeans (Hackney 




(10.4%) (Hackney Borough Council, 2012:4). Only 5.6% of the jobs in the borough 
are in manufacturing (ONS, 2013), the traditional form of employment associated with 
the area for much of the 19th and early to mid-20th century (Hobbs, 2013).   
Yet despite the benefits of gentrification impacting upon the area—the stabilisation of 
declining areas, an increased social ‘mix’, increased consumer purchasing and 
consumption at local businesses, a rejuvenation of housing and local amenities and 
reduced vacancy rates (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005)—this growth sits alongside 
significant pockets of deprivation. Recent statistics from the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation15 are a reminder of the deleterious effects of de-industrialisation on 
Neighbourhood B.  
The borough in which Neighbourhood B sits is the second most deprived local 
authority in England (Hackney Borough Council, 2011). In 2010, 57 of its 137 smaller 
lower super output areas (LSOAs) were in the top 10% most deprived in the country. 
This equates to 42% of the boroughs LSOAs in the top 10% most deprived nationally. 
Neighbourhood B is one of these.  
Other findings from the Office of National Statistics (2013) gives a clear 
understanding of Neighbourhood B and the area in which it is situated: 
                                                          
15 The Indices of Deprivation 2010 (ID 2010) is the term given for a collection of 10 indices that all measure different aspects of 
deprivation. The most widely used of these is the Index of Multiple Deprivation, which is a mixture of a number of the other 
indices to give an overall score for the relative level of multiple deprivation experienced in neighbourhoods in England. The 
Indices of Deprivation is based on small geographical areas called lower level super output areas (LSOAs). The advantage of 
using LSOAs is that they are consistent in population size (unlike wards) and are therefore easier to compare. Their smaller 
geographical sizes also allow for a more comprehensive understanding of deprivation.  
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 Compared with the national average of 70.9%, 16 17 63.6% of the population 
are in employment. 
 Of the borough’s residents, 10.8% are unemployed. The national average is 
7.8%. 
 The borough also has a higher than average JSA: 4.9%, whilst the national 
average is 3.3%. 
A borough profile emphasises that ‘a tenth of … adults experience depression, and 
1.2% of residents have severe conditions like schizophrenia. There is a particularly 
high prevalence of severe conditions in the Black population’ (Hackney Borough 
Council, 2013:19). The report also suggests the borough has ‘one of the highest crime 
rates in London’, with ‘violence against the person, motor vehicle crime and burglary’ 
the most common offences in 2011–12 (Hackney Borough Council, 2013:34). 
Accordingly, the ward in which Neighbourhood B is located had the ‘highest crime 
rates in 2011–12’ (Hackney Borough Council, 2013:34). 
It is within this urban post-industrial environment in which part of this thesis is 
rooted. 
In understanding the transitions of youth in a rapidly changing society, it is worth 
considering the implications of the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial 
society and the social consequences of these global alterations. The theoretical debates 
                                                          
16 As of June 2013, 59% of the borough’s residents were employed in ‘managerial, professional, and associate professional and 
technical occupations’, followed by 37% in ‘creative, technology, financial and business services’, 30% in public administration, 
and 18% in retail and high street businesses (Hackney Borough Council, 2013:5).  
17 Employment has risen significantly since 2005, when the area experienced an employment rate of under 55%. This rise, 
however, can be accredited to the increased in the borough’s working age population, who are ‘better educated and more skilled’ 




associated with de-industrialisation are central to the theoretical foundations of this 
study, and it is here that these themes are briefly detailed.   
The de-industrialisation of industrial cities has had profound social consequences for 
many working-class young men forging identities and transitions in the post-industrial 
city. ‘Post-industrialism’ refers to a transformation in the nature of employment, 
‘industrial’ signifying the manufacturing of goods and services by means of waged 
factory labour (Byrne, 2001). The prefix ‘post’, indicating ‘after’, implies that labour 
is no longer structured as such.  
Literature associated with de-industrialisation—e.g., Linkon and Russo’s (2003:7) 
study of Youngstown, Ohio (the ‘poster child’ of de-industrialisation), William Jules 
Wilson’s (1989) analysis of the disappearance of work on the social and cultural life 
of communities in inner city Chicago in When Work Disappears, and, finally, closer 
to home, Beynon’s studies of de-industrialisation in Working for Ford (1973)— 
illustrate the social and economic consequences of de-industrialisation on locality. 
These works detail how de-industrialised areas subsequently experience rising levels 
of unemployment, elevated crime rates, intergenerational unemployment, and the 
‘destruction of the social fabric of the local community’ (Linkon and Russo, 
2003:196). Indeed, as communities seek to adjust to a new ‘post-industrial world’, 
they became destabilised, displaced, and fragmented (Linkon and Russo, 2003). The 
loss of the local industries not only affects those that were employed at the time but 
also severely disrupts the identities and transitions of young men who once forged 
their identities through traditional masculine industrial employment but now have to 
navigate their way through a post-industrial economy populated by ‘table waiting jobs, 




Hence, for many young men residing in post-industrial inner cities in the UK, the loss 
of stable industrial employment has caused a destabilisation of traditional routes from 
education to employment (Nayak, 2006; Shildrick et al., 2012), and many young men 
experiencing these ‘fragmented transitions’ are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
unemployment and its negative social consequences as they attempt to adjust to the 
new post-industrial era. As has been suggested by contemporary UK scholars (e.g., 
MacDonald, 2011), the loss of industry has had the greatest impact on young working-
class men and their identities, personalities, and futures. Beynon goes some way in 
describing the impact of de-industrialisation on the working-class man in the North 
East of England: 
Millions of men in the advanced economies lost their jobs and 
economic authority in the succession of recessions throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s ... for the ordinary working man in areas of 
heavy industry (like the North East of England and South Wales) ... 
the traditional male career was attacked at all levels. The shift from 
... industrialisation to electronic technology was immediately 
damaging for working-class men … what emerged was a hierarchy 
of masculinities based on appearance and which abolished more 
traditional masculinities. (Beynon, 1973:107–108) 
 
Both Neighbourhoods A and B represent two locales that provide an example of the 
way in which regions undergo the transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial 
area and how the socioeconomic context of the region has influenced the identities and 
characters of its working-class community. This thesis provides readers with a sense 
of these changes and the implications they have had for young working-class men. 
These cultural, social, and economic changes have resulted in post-industrial inner city 
areas, like the ones investigated in this research, to become places where high youth 




Although one can cite a magnitude of British studies seeking to explore working-class 
culture during the previous industrial era (e.g., Wilmott and Young, 1957; Beynon, 
1973; Willis, 1977; Robins and Cohen, 1978), contemporary research into inner city 
working-class post-industrial youth remains limited, particularly in terms of firsthand 
ethnographic accounts. Furthermore, the magnitude of industrial change over the last 
50 years renders any industrial-era study of working-class youth cultures redundant in 
the present era: the impact of globalisation, economic restructuring and 
‘modernisation’ has significantly altered the identities and characters of working-class 
communities across the UK and beyond (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2008; Bauman, 
2011).  
A Movement towards Advanced Marginality 
The work of Loic Wacquant is sociologically akin to this thesis in terms of 
epistemological outlook, methodology, and object of analysis. His book Urban 
Outcasts (2008), although dissimilar from this thesis in terms of geographical area, 
documents how, under conditions of ‘advanced marginality’, inner city areas are 
experiencing a movement from the communal ghetto into ‘hyperghettos’; that is, 
‘inner city areas characterised by substantial transformations in territorial and 
organisational structures wrought by increased class (and racial) segregation, and the 
double withdrawal of labour market opportunities and social welfare support’ 
(Wacquant, 2008:3). Yet rather than conforming to popular opinion that these inner 
city areas are experiencing comparable routes and structural descents into 
homogeneous inner city ‘neighbourhoods of relegation’ (Wacquant, 2008:5), 
Wacquant draws out the distinct socio-spatial formations, causal dynamics, and 
contrasting population and demographic structures that have led to distinct 
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heterogeneous experiences and manifestations of urban marginality produced by and 
perpetuated by distinct sociological processes; hence, not everywhere is the same, and 
the patterns with which poor neighbourhoods are experiencing urban marginality do 
not align.  
In dissecting the post-war transformations and economic upheavals that have 
destabilised countless urban locales over the past 30 years, Wacquant (2008) provides 
a theoretical and methodological tool kit through which to comprehend the 
contemporary logic of de-industrialised inner city living and the micro-structural 
determinants that govern the practices of residents. Hence, Wacquant (2008) 
documents how macro-structural impediments interact with everyday micro-level 
interactions and occurrences, thus bypassing the Marxist tendency of economic 
determinism. Here, his theory of ‘advanced marginality’ is particularly illuminating in 
uncovering and rearticulating a contemporary sociology of urban exclusion. For 
Wacquant (2008), advanced marginality refers to an era in which six distinct features 
have converged to unhinge urban locales in the post-war de-industrialised era. These 
are the desocialisation of wage labour, the marginalisation of urban neighbourhoods 
from macro-economic trends, a uniform process of territorial stigmatisation of said 
neighbourhoods, an increased exclusion of urban space and place, a symbolic 
destruction of ‘excluded’ populations, and the loss of a viable hinterland (Wacquant, 
1996; 2008). These features manifest in the common sights of 21st-century urban 
marginality, including persistent joblessness, mounting inequality, deprivation and 
urban blight, and an increasingly fractious youthful population commonly expressing 
their unrest via collective outbreaks of public disorder, unrest, and criminality 
(Wacquant, 2008).  
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Themes of urban marginalisation represent a rich vein of thought within much of 
contemporary urban sociology, and as the core of many cities become increasingly 
dualised by gentrification, wealth, and exclusion (Wacquant, 2008), these 
developments represent an epochal shift in the convergence of ‘patterns of urban 
marginality’ (Wacquant, 1996:39). Yet rather than adopting a standardised, uniform 
pattern of descent into ‘hyperghettoization’, Wacquant (1996; 2008) adopts a position 
that views ‘emerging territories of exclusion’ as heterogeneous rather than 
homogeneous locales that are not, despite first impressions, undergoing uniform 
processes of ‘ghettoization’. Rather, they are experiencing culturally specific 
responses to macro-structural changes. Unique ecologies, structural compositions and 
locations, and organisational characteristics suggest, as Wacquant (2008) neatly 
presents in his analysis of Chicago’s Southside and the Northern Banlieues of Paris, 
that all forms of urban poverty are not analogous with the American concept of the 
urban ghetto. They are, instead, unique socio-spatial urban zones composed of distinct 
manifestations of urban marginality (Wacquant, 2008) produced by different modes 
of segregation and exclusion, diverging urban legacies and cultural inheritances, and 
they are located within sharply contrasting urban zones composed of heterogeneous 
populations (both in terms of race and class), market frameworks, and levels of welfare 
provision (Wacquant, 2008). In essence, these diverging characteristics result in 
departing levels of urban blight and segregation, marginality and poverty. 
In providing a more nuanced understanding of the concept of advanced marginality, it 
is worth considering the distinctive properties of advanced marginality in more detail. 
First, Wacquant (2008) identifies wage labour as being a key contributor to advanced 
marginality, rather than an identifiable solution to it. The growth of part-time, low-
paid insecure ‘flexible’ positions have grown markedly in the post-Fordist era, and the 
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erosion of stable industrial employment, the proliferation of neoliberal forms of 
governance, and the globalisation of key industries have all contributed to ‘the rampant 
desocialisation of wage labour’ (Wacquant, 1996:124). Second, the disconnect of 
urban neighbourhoods from macro-economic trends has led to a situation whereby 
although fluctuations in the economy will appear, their effect on employment, 
deprivation, and social conditions in the inner city remains minimal (Wacquant, 1996; 
2008). Hence, any policy that claims to have any significant impact on reabsorbing 
marginal populations back into the labour market will be insignificant because of the 
hierarchical relationships that exist within policy making and the fact that public 
policies conducted in a top-down manner will always benefit privileged groupings 
before reaching those existing on the fringes of society (Wacquant, 2008). Third, the 
process by which inner city areas have undergone territorial stigmatisation is a direct 
consequence of the changes accorded by post-Fordist restructuring. Indeed, literature 
associated with the restructuring of industrial bases have highlighted the deleterious 
effects of economic change (Beynon, 1973; Wilson, 1989; Linkon and Russo, 2003), 
namely, the idea that the destruction of traditional industrial bases has a devastating 
effect on post-industrial living. Indeed, research into de-industrialisation suggests that 
in neighbourhoods undergoing the movement from industrial to post-industrial living, 
residents experience significant unemployment, a loss of social networks, and find 
themselves in increasingly vulnerable marginalised positions within society. One can 
cite the work of Wilson to validate this relationship, who, in his study of de-
industrialised inner city Chicago, found the correlation between de-industrialisation 
and social problems to hold firm: 
Many of today’s problems in the inner city ghetto 
neighbourhoods—crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of 
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social organisation and so on—are fundamentally a consequence of 
the disappearance of work. (Wilson, 1989:73) 
Towards a Sociological Analysis of Neighbourhoods A and B and SBIs 
Wacquant’s (2008) concept of advanced marginality applies neatly to the de-
industrialised locales researched in this thesis. Both locales represent two post-
industrial neighbourhoods that are experiencing the deleterious effects of the changes 
associated with the process. Over the last ten years, the image of these two areas as 
urban ‘wastelands’ where a growing ‘underclass’ reside, detached from the 
mainstream, a threat to social cohesion and accountable for the ‘social ills’ affecting 
contemporary society, has grown.  As such, the young men residing in these two post-
industrial locales are a prime focus of public attention in the form of stereotypes—‘the 
welfare scrounger’, ‘the single mother’, the ‘lowlife’—an easy focus of hostility. 
Recent outbreaks of collective violence in these neighbourhoods illustrate the extent 
to which these locales have been subjected to dominant media interpretations of urban 
disorder caused chiefly by the youths of these populations, who are caught in a spiral 
of decline fuelled by immoral fecklessness. 
For example, in August 2011 in Tottenham, North London, approximately 200 
protestors gathered outside a police station demanding answers over the death of Mark 
Duggan, a local resident who was shot dead by police two days earlier. With 
apparently limited communication offered by the police, tensions gradually escalated, 
culminating in major disorder and a full-scale riot, with youths rampaging through the 
local area, pelting police with bottles and stones, setting two police cars, a double 
decker bus, and a number of shops on fire, and looting stores across the North London 
area. The confrontation spread to a number of other London boroughs over two 
successive nights, from the leafy suburbs of Enfield and Ealing to the inner city 
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boroughs of Hackney, Lewisham, and Lambeth. Similar large-scale incidents broke 
out during the same week in Birmingham, Manchester, Bristol, Liverpool, and 
Nottingham.  
As Brown (2005:58) argues, rather than representing a ‘generalised panic’ around 
youth crime, the last few years have been characterised by a ‘total panic’ regarding 
young people in general, with a particular focus on the marginalised young people 
who reside in Britain’s ‘throw away places’ (Campbell, 1993). The buildup amongst 
certain pockets of the media—the highly emotive language regarding the behaviour of 
youth, the belief that inner city urban areas are undergoing a process of ‘ghettoization’ 
(Wacquant, 2008) that is growing increasingly akin to US-style inner city areas 
composed of urban street gangs situated in decaying neighbourhoods, increasingly 
segregated and characterised by its unemployment, criminality, and violence—has 
contributed to the swelling of the panic amongst the population. Whether founded or 
not, the moral panic surrounding the behaviour of youth is linked to concerns 
surrounding an ‘emerging British underclass’ (Murray, 1990) of socially excluded 
marginalised working-class youth—in Young’s (2007:201) words, a ‘social residuum’ 
devoid of ‘our’ values and responsible for the social ills plaguing society.  
Indeed, the typical response of media outlets to the outbreaks of collective violence 
represents the idea amongst popular opinion that the riots of 2011 were a symptom of 
the pathologies and moral behaviours amongst those residing in post-industrial 
locales—a sign of impending societal breakdown occurring in these inner city locales. 
Yet Wacquant’s (2008) insights carefully pieces together the macro-sociological 
changes that have led to the relegation of once proud proletariat heartlands into post-
industrial wastelands composed of increasingly marginalised populations. His 
sociologically nuanced analysis of the conditions of advanced marginality considers 
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how outbreaks of collective violence and public disorder are sociological responses to 
economic and sociopolitical agendas that have rendered many working-class 
communities to economic and social marginality. (Wacquant, 2008:24).  
Responses to Advanced Marginality 
These social changes, I argue, have legitimised new alternative forms of intervention 
to ‘deal’ with youth redefined by the conditions of a post-industrial economic base and 
an increasingly socially insecure population (Wacquant, 2008; Young, 2009). This has 
led to the creation of a number of alternative programmes, integrating voluntary 
organisations and community groups alongside statuary organisations as part of an 
expanding crime culture to responsibilise ‘disorderly’ youth, whilst the state ‘govern 
at a distance’ (Garland, 2001).  Within this, SBIs are increasingly used to contribute 
to the ‘regulation’ of inner city youth, thus forming a significant component ‘of the 
neoliberal policy repertoire … aimed at generating social order in disadvantaged inner 
city neighbourhoods’ (Spaaij, 2009:247).  
The questions facing the UK during an age of ‘advanced marginality’ is whether the 
current set of policies and rise of diversionary and intervention programmes that 
attempt to provide ‘routes out’ of criminality via employment, education, and training 
(EET) (HM Government, 2011) have the capacity to address the marginality and 
exclusion spawned out of de-industrialisation and the fragmentation of wage labour. 
It is necessary, then, for academic research to uncover emerging forms of urban 
marginality and criminality that exist in the inner city since the initiation of post-
industrialism as well as analyse the new forms of intervention that are considered 
sufficient remedies for tackling the poplar manifestations of social marginality 
(Wacquant, 2008).  
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This is what this thesis sets out to achieve. Indeed, there has been a call within youth 
studies for a greater understanding of youth cultures, identities, and styles, and their 
implications on youth transitions and pathways into EET (MacDonald, 2011). Much 
of the recent studies on the ‘lived experiences’ of youth tends to view young men as 
one homogeneous cultural formation, thereby missing out on the array of youth 
cultures and identities that exist in the UK today (see Hollands, 2002 and MacDonald, 
2011 for further discussion). Furthermore, research focusing solely on singular groups 
of young men, most commonly working-class youth residing in disadvantaged areas, 
has a tendency to present an overly deterministic view of their identities and lived 
experiences. Young men are routinely seen as passive victims of their cultural and 
social identities and contexts, and little exploration is given into how young men 
actively construct different lives and identities in present-day inner city areas. This is 
not to downplay the role of social and cultural contexts in shaping the identities of 
youth—indeed, the two urban environments explored in this thesis were found to 
construct two very different forms of cultural identity—but rather that youth are 
capable of making their own choices and shaping their own identities, experiences, 
and futures.  
In expanding this argument, this thesis also comparatively considers the ways in which 
SBIs approach the popular manifestations of local-global transformations, (i.e., 
unemployment, criminal behaviour, and social exclusion) and seek to alleviate them 
and how my participants experience SBIs and whether they offer a sufficient form of 
intervention to address the aforementioned symptoms of post-industrial change and 
neoliberal governance.  
Ultimately, this thesis attempts to explain the ‘lived experiences’ of young men 
residing in the post-industrial inner city and their inevitable attempts at adapting to 
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changes in the sociocultural economy via their use of an SBI. Although acknowledging 
that such a focus overlooks the experiences of unemployed females, this approach was 
necessary due to this thesis being a product of a sponsorship award from the SBI under 
investigation. Due to the conditions of this funding, this research is therefore restricted 
to the voices of those that have been involved in the SBI. 
 
Although the SBI was not gender exclusive, the majority of participants who attended 
‘open’ football sessions and progressed through the SBIs ‘academy’ programme were 
male. This is reflected in this thesis, where all but one participant providing ‘data’, 
were male. The reasons for this are multifaceted and complex: academic research 
recognises SBIs as ‘gendered spaces’ (Spandler and McKeown, 2012:388), and the 
appeal of sport, and in particular football, to men is clear. Football, as the UK’s 
‘national sport’, is viewed and played by many young men across the nation every 
day. Men’s football also receives considerably more funding and media coverage than 
woman’s (Messner, 2007). As such, SBIs are well situated to engage young men in 
health and social interventions (both physical and mental) that promote well-being, 
inclusion, and potential employment (Kelly, 2011). Furthermore, SBIs operate as sites 
that can provide an important ‘hook’ for attracting disinclined or unwilling males into 
key support services which they would previously dismiss.  
 
Hence, this overarching perception of sport, and in particular, football, as a significant 
tool for ‘engaging men’ is widespread, and numerous football-base initiatives aiming 
to promote health and social issues amongst men now exist. For example, the 
‘Everyman Appeal’ gained the support of the England football team in their 
promotional material to raise awareness of testicular cancer, accompanied by the 
memorable slogan ‘keep your eye on the ball’. Further public health campaigns have 
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used football as both a tool and metaphor  to promote social progressive aims18, and 
engage marginalised and stigmatised men in social programmes in which they are 
underrepresented (e.g. mental health programs19) (Carless and Douglas, 2008). Men’s 
health issues also continue to gain considerable support from within the game20.  
 
Football is deeply entrenched in social structures of gender, race and class, and, as the 
above research attests, social-cultural connotations of masculinity (Messner, 2007). 
An engagement - both as a spectator and as a player - has specific meaning in 
presenting one in line with the dominant visions of ‘being’ a man. For example, the 
‘hyper-masculine nature of ‘football hooliganism’’ is a largely ‘gendered field’21 
(Poulton, 2012) in which ‘Hooligan[s]…celebrate a hard masculine identity based on 
physical prowess’ (Spaaij, 2008:377). Further, ‘playing’ football actively creates an 
environment in which hegemonic masculinities can be reproduced; the gender 
segregation of professional football denies mixed participation, and is often reflected 
at grassroots level where ‘hegemonic masculinity...[is] constructed through the 
exclusion of female participation’ (Renold, 1997:9). The SBI ‘researched’ in this 
thesis is no exception. SBIs are highly gendered spaces which are both shaped by and 
shape dominant conceptions of masculinity and femininity. Male participants 
reinforced this notion and discouraged girls’ participation ‘to maintain naturalised 
masculine connections to the sport’ (Clark and Paechter, 2007:264).  
  
 
                                                          
18 The men’s health charity ‘Premier League Health’ incorporates tactical aspects of football (for example, defending and 
attacking) to tackle issues related to depression, substance abuse and obesity. 
19 The FA has recently given its support to the mental health charity, ‘Time to Change’ 
20 After being diagnosed with testicular cancer in 2001, the Millwall striker Neil Harris set up ‘The Neil Harris Everyman Appeal’ 
in conjunction with the Institute of Cancer Research to raise awareness of the issue. After the Newcastle United midfielder Jonas 
Gutierrez was diagnosed with testicular cancer in 2014, Newcastle supporters united to hold a minute’s applause during the 17 th 
minute of every Newcastle United game in a show of support. A similar event currently occurs at Aston Villa, where fans applaud 
in the 19th minute in a show of support for ex-captain Stiliyan Petrov, who was diagnosed with leukaemia in 2012.  
21 Not just for female football fans, but in Poulton’s (2012) case, female academics.  
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For some, football is a site for males to reinforce masculinity, and in an urban area 
where having ‘respect’ is an important - and necessary - feature of everyday living 
(Gunter and Watt, 2009), SBIs afford a potential arena in which young males can 
reassert their masculinity (Spandler and McKeown, 2012) and achieve a ‘respected 
masculine status’ (Messner, 1990:106).  
 
However, some SBIs22 are at risk of reproducing prevailing visions of hegemonic 
masculinity. This has a number of practical implications for SBI deliverers, and 
empirical consequences for this thesis, which I will outline here. First, the idea that 
males have an intrinsic relationship with football functions to actively both include 
and exclude. Whilst some SBIs operate to serve the needs of many disadvantaged 
young men, the gendered nature of these SBIs contributes to excluding female 
involvement. SBIs - and indeed research on SBIs - can therefore inadvertently 
contribute to dominant visions of masculinity and sport, reproducing the social 
structures that serve to exclude females from services in the first instance (Kelly, 2011; 
Spandler and McKeown, 2012). At a practical level, the continuation of SBIs 
following such an approach can serve to further exclude females not just from sporting 
participation, but from access to health and social services. As the austerity measures 
of the Conservative/Liberal (2010-2015) and Conservative (2015-present) 
governments continue to cut into welfare for the disadvantaged , the role of charities 
and third sector organisations will become increasingly important in providing social 
support services (Fox and Albertson, 2011). The relative growth of SBIs over recent 
years means they now make up a significant component of delivery services, and it is 
anticipated that more young men will rely on their support given the anticipated cuts 
                                                          
22 Some SBIs, however, are now using football to address gender inequalities. For example ‘GoGirlGo!’ offers education and 
curriculum support for girls via supporting programs and organisations 
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in welfare (The Guardian, 2015). Here, it is important to offer services that at least 
attempt to recognise the dominant visions they continue to reproduce.   
 
Secondly, this thesis can also be construed as contributing to a view of sport as 
privileging a dominant vision of hegemonic masculinity. This is contestable, and a 
collective view of males sharing one homogenous ‘type’ of masculinity fails to 
recognise that ‘not all men will feel comfortable in spaces that privilege hegemonic 
masculinity, and many men, as well as women, may feel excluded by such talk’ 
(Spandler and McKeown, 2012:393-394). The use of sporting metaphors, language, 
and ‘banter’ inherent within sporting culture may be appealing for some, but less so 
for others prioritising distinct forms of masculinity. 
 
Thus, although I concede that the findings from this thesis can be construed as 
providing an overarching of view of young, unemployed men as privileging a 
dominant vision of hegemonic masculinity, I hope that by highlighting these issues 
here, I can encourage future research in the area to explore these issues, and for SBIs 









Chapter 2: Understanding Youth in a Post-industrial Society 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis has detailed how we are now approaching an age of ‘advanced marginality’, 
where young men are making ever-destabilised post-school transitions in the wake of the globalisation 
of the economies that once populated their neighbourhoods. Chapter 2 seeks to advance this argument 
through an analysis of sociological informed studies that have sought to conceptualise the identities, 
experiences, and cultures of young men in rapidly changing social contexts. 
 
Structurally, chapter 2 begins with an overview of the different approaches to cultural analysis, and the 
different conceptualisations of the relationship between power and cultural differentiation. I identity 
two schools of thought that have sought to conceptualise the relationship between cultural 
differentiation, social stratification, and power. These are the Marxist-orientated work associated with 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham, led by Richard 
Hoggart and Stuart Hall; and the ‘post-subcultural’ studies associated with Steve Redhead (1990), Andy 
Bennett (1999), and David Muggleton (2000), which draw upon theories of ‘postmodernity’ to 
comprehend the apparent fluid membership, identity, and styles of contemporary youth cultures. 
Chapter 2 then offers a subsequent summary of the different analyses of the relationship between 
socioeconomic transformations and meanings of class and place before defining how recent global 
changes in production and the rapid diversifications of social experience conveyed by globalised 
communications, the rise of the consumer society, and the erosion of universal welfare have affected 
contemporary cultural forms that were previously kept stable by structural continuities. 
 
In reading this chapter, readers will be provided with the context to the empirical chapters of this thesis, 
which will provide an overview of how young men’s identities and experiences of intervention and 
transition in de-industrialised ‘advanced marginal’ (Wacquant, 2008) locales.  
Cultural Differentiation and Power: An Overview 
This chapter is underpinned by a general appreciation that different approaches to 
cultural analysis emerge in various manifestations within rapidly changing social 
contexts. Hence, although acknowledging a longer history of debate surrounding 
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youth in many countries (Muncie, 2006) owing to the theoretical and methodological 
focus of this research, I concentrate primarily on post-war conceptions of youth 
associated with the different schools of thought introduced in this chapter. This 
reinforces the methodological and analytical foundation of this study that a 
contemporary approach to cultural analyses now requires a method that understands 
the dynamic relationship between the cultural agency of social agents and structural 
experiences of post-Fordism, new forms of global governance, and unrestrained 
consumerism (see MacDonald, 2011). These are issues that I will explore throughout 
this thesis. 
 
To begin with, I will introduce the theoretical underpinnings of cultural studies from 
which British theories of subculture emerged. However, rather than framing 
subcultures as the central issue of this chapter, this chapter situates the object of 
analysis as the objects of study—i.e., the historical and social contexts in which 
cultural differentiation emerges from. Hence, the concern here is with change, unrest, 
and the consequences for young men in terms of identification but also—as in chapter 
3—official responses. I argue that these responses to youth can only be properly 
understood in the context of broader anxieties about youth and social order. Hence, I 
will begin by highlighting the historical development of the subcultural approach to 
locate the different theoretical and methodological techniques utilised before 
expanding this section to consider various schools of thought that have selectively 




Cultural Studies: Theoretical Underpinnings 
Cultural studies have been permeated by a number of influential theoretical and 
methodological paradigms, viz. Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches associated with 
Althusser, Gramsci and the early Frankfurt School, structuralism, post-structuralism, 
and feminism. Contemporary British cultural studies have their traditional roots within 
the establishment of the CCCS at the University of Birmingham in 1964. The work of 
the CCCS offered a Neo-Marxist perspective on how working-class ‘subordinate’ 
groups construct and reconstruct collective identities in the face of contradictory 
structural circumstances.   
The cultural Marxists at the CCCS situated their study of the working class in the 
context of historical circumstances and post-war transformations in an attempt to 
articulate new configurations of resistance in an advanced capitalist society. Their 
work represented a ‘cultural turn’ away from the traditional Marxist theory of the base 
and superstructure that viewed culture as a product of the economic base. Instead, they 
provided a theoretical framework through which to examine popular culture as a 
counter-hegemonic form of resistance amongst the working class. The developments 
within the CCCS, seeking a critical dialogue between structuralism and culturalism 
(see Hall, 1980), were developed through the work of Neo-Marxists Antonio Gramsci 
and Luis Althusser, which I detail below.  
Althusser’s structuralist-Marxist approach views the social formation as a structure of 
interrelated yet ‘relatively autonomous’ superstructures (cultural, social, and political) 
of which the economic base is only a ‘determinant in the last instance’ (1971:136). As 
stated above, for the cultural Marxists, this signified a break from the ‘vulgar 
materialism and economic determinism’ (Hall, 1980:60) associated with the 
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traditional Marxist base and superstructure foundation of culture. For Althusser, the 
interplay between the base and superstructure is not fixed and rigid; rather, a social 
formation is the outcome of a fluid, dynamic interplay between varieties of different 
determinations, none of which are privileged and all of which determine the 
superstructure. Hence, Althusser diverged from Marx’s original claim that cultural 
forms are predetermined by the economic base and, instead, viewed culture as this 
‘relatively autonomous’ product of determinations from different instances of politics, 
economics, and ideology. For Stuart Hall (1972), Althusser’s work was a ‘seminal 
advancement’, as it allowed the social researcher a framework through which to 
analyse social phenomenon as a distinct, detached representative system with its own 
set of determinations. The legacy of Althusserian thinking around ‘relatively 
autonomous’ social formations is apparent within the CCCS’s work (see Hall and 
Jefferson, 1976) and underpins Hall’s suggestion that:  
We must ‘think’ a society or social formation as ever and always 
constituted by a set of complex practices; each with its own 
specificity, its own modes of articulation; standing in an ‘uneven 
development’ to other related practices. (Hall, 1977:237)  
 
Although heavily influential in the CCCS’s move away from economic determinism, 
Althusser’s work was eventually viewed as flawed by Hall and others at the CCCS for 
its structuralist notions of over-determinism. Indeed, his idea of the economic base 
determining ‘in the last instance’ risks returning to the economic determinism it 
attempts to evade. Furthermore, his prioritisation of structures that underplay human 
agency and the possibility of class struggle and political intervention within the field 
of ideology renders individuals as passive components within his framework (Hall, 
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1980). Therefore, the potential for ‘resistance’ amongst social agents remains 
underdeveloped in his work.  
Although the work of Gramsci predates that of Althusser, its influence on cultural 
studies was in response to the shortcomings of Althusser’s theory and therefore 
integrated into the CCCS’s work as a way of navigating the culturalism and 
structuralism divide (see Hall, 1980). Rather than offering a synthesis of the two, Hall 
draws on Gramsci’s conceptualisation of ‘hegemony’ to demonstrate the dialectic 
between the dominant culture and the subordinate working-class culture (Clarke et al., 
1976). ‘Hegemony’ illustrates how power is utilised within society by the dominant 
culture to establish and maintain control. For Gramsci, power is a fluid means of 
control over subordinate classes, located within a hegemonic bloc that forms the 
foundation of a social order that continually produces and reproduces the hegemony 
of the dominant class. Clarke et al., (1976) in Resistance through Rituals provides a 
succinct definition of Gramsci’s concept: 
A hegemonic cultural order tries to frame all competing definitions 
of the world within its range. It provides the horizon of thought and 
action within which conflicts are fought through, appropriated (i.e. 
experienced), obscured (i.e. concealed as a ‘national interest’ which 
should unite all conflicting parties) or contained (i.e. settled to the 
profit of the ruling class). A hegemonic order prescribes, not the 
specific content of ideas, but the limits within which ideas and 
conflicts move and are resolved…Hegemony thus provides the base 
line and base-structures of legitimation for ruling class power. 
(Clarke et al., 1976:39) 
 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is a central feature of much of the CCCS’s writings. 
Through this, they locate youth ‘subcultures’ in their analysis of a dialectic 
relationship between a ‘hegemonic’ dominant culture and the subordinate working-
class culture, in which youth subcultures belong. The approach is therefore an 
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advancement of Althusser’s work (Hall, 1980) by focusing on how a dominant social 
order’s ideology is secured; how subordinate classes are reproduced in their 
subordinate form; and, significantly, how these subordinate classes utilise a number 
of counter-hegemonic strategies in the ideological field: 
The subordinate class brings to this ‘theatre of struggle’ a repertoire 
of strategies and responses—ways of coping as well of resisting. 
Each strategy in the repertoire mobilises certain real material and 
social elements: it constructs these into the supports for the different 
ways the class lives and resists its continuing subordination. (Clarke 
et al., 1976:44–45) 
 
The emphasis here on struggle is reflective of Gramsci’s theoretical influence, which 
underpins much of the influential work found in Resistance through Rituals (Hall and 
Jefferson, 1976) and Policing the Crisis (Hall, Crichter, Jefferson & Roberts, 1979). 
The first publication is a collection of essays based on ethnographic studies of youth 
subcultures. The second publication is an exhaustive study of the ‘moral panic’ 
surrounding mugging in the 1970s and the ensuing ‘folk devilling’ of black inner city 
youth.  
The collection of essays in Resistance through Rituals sheds light on forms of 
working-class resistance. For the CCCS, resistance does not manifest itself in open 
displays of revolutionary force and conflict, what Gramsci would call a ‘war of 
manoeuvre’ but, instead, through continuous hidden conflict, what Gramsci refers to 
as a ‘war of position’. This technique refers to the counter-hegemonic movements 
seeking to undermine the legitimacy of hegemonic power through culture rather than 
direct force to seize state power. Cox (1983) concisely articulates this ‘war of position’ 
as a strategy that ‘slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new 
state’ through the creation of ‘alternative institutions and alternative intellectual 
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resources within existing society’ (Cox, 1983:165). The counter-hegemonic 
programme for radical social change, as described by Gramsci, thus involves the 
development and mobilisation of a counter-hegemonic culture capable of forming the 
required institutions for hegemonic resistance.  
It is through these forms of cultural resistance that a collective group consciousness 
and identity is formed. The CCCS drew directly from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
to detail the strategies of conflict and resistance amongst working-class ‘subcultures’ 
to forms of subordination. The foremost difference between the functionalist 
American perspectives of subculture and Neo-Marxist British theories of subculture 
appears here. Whilst the former provides an over-deterministic view of youth 
formations as intrinsic delinquent reactions to structural inequalities, the latter locate 
their theory in the context of class and power and takes, as its axiom, that subcultures 
arise as solutions for working-class youth. Subcultural affiliation was no longer 
understood as deviant, but rather as a symbolic form of resistance to hegemonic power 
(Cohen, 1972:23). Through the CCCS’s reading of Althusser, although economic 
structures are ‘determining in the last instance’, the ‘relative autonomy’ of class within 
the limits of hegemonic rule allows subcultures to invert and reconstruct the 
behavioural and cultural norms of the working-class parent group and dominant 
bourgeoisie culture. For Cohen, subcultures are understood as a form of resistance that 
reflects a broader class struggle, of which ‘the latent function … is to express and 
resolve, albeit ‘magically’ the contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in 
the parent culture’ (Cohen, 1972:23). Hence, rather than interpreting subcultures 
through the context of strain perspectives, the CCCS located subcultures as formations 
of resistance to cultural hegemony—the struggle between the proletariat working class 
and the bourgeoisie ruling class for cultural and social control.  
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Subcultural youth formed these ‘imaginary’ counter-hegemonic solutions through 
various youth ‘formations’ with distinct ‘styles’ and leisure pursuits. Mods (Hebdige, 
1976), punks (Hebdige, 1979), and skinheads (Clarke, 1976) are examples, amongst 
others, studied by the CCCS. Yet whilst these subcultures and their adoption and 
adaptation of leisure pursuits and urban spaces offered sites of collective identity and 
solidarity, they were no more than an ‘imaginary solution’ to the hegemonic bloc. 
Ultimately, working-class youth were always to return to their ‘dead end jobs’ (Willis, 
1981) or ‘doing nothing’ (Corrigan, 1976), which formed their cultural and social 
existence.  
The distinct forms of subcultural style, however, represented their closest forms of 
resistance to hegemony. Following Althusser, forms of style were utilised as an 
‘imaginary relation’ to real conditions of existence. The CCCS’s semiotic approach, 
most notably expressed in the work of Dick Hebdige (1979), deconstructs the taken-
for-granted assumptions assigned to styles, practices, and lifestyles of subcultural 
identity. The significance of cultural and social styles and practices to the CCCS is 
adopted from Gramsci’s view of culture as a site of ideological contestation where 
hegemony needs to constantly be renegotiated. Within this conflict, youth subcultures 
expropriate and invert the dominant culture’s social meaning of culture in an attempt 
relocate and redefine the commodity as a symbolic marker of the working-class 
subculture (Hebdige, 1979). This is what Hebdige (1979) refers to as Bricolage, a term 
taken from the social anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss to describe how societies 
respond to and reorganise the social world around them. For Hebdige, subcultural 
youth represent a bricoleur through their challenging of conventional norms and codes 
regarding cultural commodities. Hence, Hebdige alludes to the motor scooter and how 
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its adoption by the mod subculture transformed it culturally from an ‘ultra-respectable 
means of transport’ to a ‘menacing symbol of group solidarity’ (Hebdige, 1979:104).  
It is through the adoption and reworking of cultural commodities that a collective 
group identity is formed. However, these commodities are eventually assimilated into 
the hegemonic bloc via a method of ‘diffusion’ and ‘defusion’. The former represents 
a movement of youth styles and commodities from the subculture to the mass 
‘mainstream’ consumer market, whilst the latter represents a dislocation of the 
commodities’ radical context and group from which it originated to make it more 
marketable (Clarke et al., 1976).  
For the early CCCS then, subcultures are understood as the outcome of young people’s 
attempts to ‘magically’ reclaim a sense of collective working-class identity prevalent 
in bygone eras. Phil Cohen’s (1972) analysis of one working-class community in post-
war East London reinforced the relationship between transformations of working-class 
life and structural and economic forces. His study documented the destructive social 
changes that transpired in the immediate post-war period—for example, the 
depopulation of communities for rehousing in post-war new estates and towns located 
on the outskirts of London; the replacement of native manufacturing industries with 
larger businesses located further afield; and the arrival of immigrant labour, which 
further exacerbated the decline of the local workforce. The cohesion, solidarity, and 
practices of traditional working-class life were subsequently eroded as the lower-
working-class were left alone to sustain their traditional neighbourhoods (Cohen, 
1972). Cohen does not arrive at a conclusion that these forces were eroding the 
working class as a social stratum, but rather roots his analysis in an understanding of 
social mobility qua, an account of how different sectors of society are driven into 
different transitional experiences by determining socioeconomic structures. Here, 
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communities became fragmented and socially polarised into two polarised sectors of 
society—either upwards towards a new ‘suburban working-class elite’ or downwards 
into the ‘lumpen underclass’. When viewed in such a light, subcultures are considered 
as a counter-hegemony strategy that attempts to ‘resolve’ the fragmentation of 
community and preserve a sense of working-class parent identity, albeit symbolically, 
dominant in the past: 
Mods, parkers, skinheads, crombies, all represent in their different 
ways, an attempt to retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements 
destroyed in the parent culture, and to combine these with elements 
selected from other class fractions, symbolising one or other of the 
options confronting it. (Cohen, 1972:23) 
 
The attention paid to subculture, class, and resistance is reflective of the studies found 
in the CCCS’s magnum opus, Resistance through Rituals (1976). The Marxist-
inspired essays employ a range of analytical and theoretical techniques to decode the 
cultural significance of youth styles, commodities, and forms of leisure. The majority 
of their studies are framed from a similar perspective to that of the Chicago School23, 
principally, ethnographic methods, press reports, and historical and secondary sources. 
Hebdige (1979) deployed a semiotic analysis of subcultural style in his analysis of 
                                                          
23 Beginning in the 1920s, sociologists at the University of Chicago were innovative in early subcultural investigation. The 
Chicago School’s methodological approach was predominantly ethnographic, led by Robert Park. His earlier career as a journalist 
directed his approach in attempting to focus on and understand the everyday subjective experiences of people’s lives. Park was 
a student of Georg Simmel, whose studies of sociability sought to understand the interaction and formation of social groups. 
Reflecting this, the Chicago School produced a specific ‘brand’ of urban micro-sociology that focused on interactions, conflict, 
and social exchanges through ethnographies of the city and the dynamics of its urban social groups. The Chicago School 
employed the methodological technique of ethnography to chart ethnographic maps of the territories of diverse cultural and social 
groups of the cities’ expanding population, not only to develop an insight into the lived experiences of the population within the 
conditions of daily urban social life but also to illuminate the social and cultural context of deviance. William Foote Whyte’s 
(1943) study of the social structure of an Italian American slum in Boston in Street Corner Society did exactly this, unveiling 
‘not the mysterious dangerous and depressing area’ (1943:xv) it was labelled as but a ‘highly organized and integrated social 
system’ (xvi) formed through its inter-ethnic, immigrant population. The Chicago School’s theory of subculture has huge value 
and was highly influential in the ethnographic work of the CCCS. Methodologically, their long-term, intensive ethnographic 
work is valuable in understanding the social context of human behaviour, as is their theorising of groups or gangs as collective 
responses to social pressures and constraints (See Thrasher, 1927; Whyte, 1943). As they note, forms of delinquency are not 
consistent with psychological theories of criminal behaviour that focus on individual defects or traits. Delinquency itself and 




punk and mod subcultures, Paul Willis’s study of drug use amongst the hippy 
subculture is firmly rooted in the interactionist and ethnographic traditions of the 
Chicago School and scholars with an interest in the sociology of deviance (e.g., 
Becker, 1963; Young, 1972), and McRobbie (1982) provided a feminist critique of the 
early work of the CCCS and subsequently produced an ethnographic account of 
femininity within teenage girls’ youth cultures.    
A key ethnographic study, which deserves discussion for its methodological approach 
and effort to integrate structural and cultural processes in the analysis of young men, 
is Paul Willis’s Learning to Labour (1977). Willis’s work aims to answer the broad 
question of how ‘working-class kids get working-class jobs’. He addresses this 
question through an ethnographic study of a working-class school in the West 
Midlands and its many ‘counter cultures’ of working-class boys. For Willis, the school 
represents an environment through which class relations are reproduced. Stuart Hall 
(1974) had previously alluded to the local school as a mediated class institution where 
varying strategies and ‘solutions’ are developed and adopted in relation to it. Through 
this, Willis is able to describe the various cultures within the school. The ‘lads’ 
adopted an oppositional and resistant stance towards academia and authority in 
contrast to the ‘ear’oles’, a group of conformist, intellectually-orientated youth. The 
antagonism amongst the ‘lads’ towards schooling resonates with the masculine ethos 
of post-school work this group was heading for—industrial labour, an environment in 
which their culture and habitus are mutually understood and recognised. Thus, upon 
arriving at the workplace, ‘he is also welcomed and accepted by his new superiors in 
such a way that seems to allow for the expression of his own personality, where the 
school had precisely been trying to block it’ (Willis, 1977:110).  
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The CCCS’s position demonstrates a number of positive aspects. The situating of 
youth subcultures as a dialectic tension between a hegemonic ruling class and a 
subordinate working-class culture bestows a greater hermeneutic approach to the study 
of the phenomenon, notably in relation to its interpretation of youth subcultures as 
acting out symbolic forms of counter-hegemonic resistance via cultural and stylistic 
forms of collective group expression. Accordingly, youth subcultures are not viewed 
as acting out a predestined, structurally determined form of subordinate class. Rather, 
through Althusser, youth subcultures are rendered a degree of ‘relative autonomy’ 
through which to create a symbolic form of resistance to a hegemonic cultural order.  
The broad contextualisation of subcultures, presented by Cohen (1972), within a 
historical, structural and cultural framework, confers a deeper form of analysis of the 
consequences of wider socio-economic change on different forms of working-class 
strata. This broadens an analysis into the social, familial and cultural consequences of 
post-war change (e.g. rehousing, the redevelopment of working-class estates and the 
abandonment of communities by the upper-working-class) and economic restructuring 
(e.g. increased influx of immigrant labour, relocation of native, traditional forms of 
employment). Cohen advances his argument to highlight the manner in which these 
structural forces have polarised different working-class strata, who are propelled into 
diverging social trajectories. For the sociologist, Cohen’s analysis still provides a 
powerful hermeneutic device for the interpretation of youth today: the de-scaling of 
traditional forms of industrial working-class employment and the move towards a 
post-industrial, service-based economy has undoubtedly affected the identities of 
working-class youth (see, for example Nayak, 2003; 2006; MacDonald and Marsh, 
2005; MacDonald 2011).  
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Finally, Willis (1977) assimilates structural processes with cultural formations in an 
attempt to break from structuralist notions of economic determinism. Accordingly, 
young men are seen as fashioning responses to socio-economic forces and forging new 
pathways, transitional experiences and identities in the face of structural constraints, 
rather than performing preordained class roles. Again, this approach has applicability 
to present day studies of youth when we consider the rapid decline in industrial labour 
and the implications this has had on post-school transitions of many young men in 
working-class, de-industrialised locales (see Nayak, 2003; 2006). Indeed, an approach 
that integrates structural and cultural processes has been called upon by a number of 
researchers within youth studies to understand the relation between ‘masculinities, 
schooling and labour transitions in de-industrial times’ (Nayak, 2003:147).  
However, there are a number of criticisms which weaken the CCCS’ reading of 
contemporary youth identities.   
First, the CCCS’ account of subculture has a propensity to fall into the trap of 
economic determinism, despite the supposed break from structuralist notions. This is 
engendered by the Marxist and neo-Marxist led approach whereby the economic base 
is predicated as primary in the explanation of subcultural solutions. Young people are 
therefore seen as agents of social change, their actions considered ‘rituals of 
resistance’. This, however, produces a somewhat reductionist framework through 
which to view social phenomena associated with subcultures. Nayak (2003) reinforces 
this view when critiquing Pearson’s (1976) observations of ‘paki-bashing’, the 
justification of which is accredited to ‘a primitive form of political and economic 
struggle’ (Pearson 1976:69). Nayak (2003) responds with the suggestion that: 
‘There is also more to some of these antagonistic practices…as the 
perspectives of ‘paki-bashing’ victims…could no doubt inform. As 
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such, the focus on class at the expense of other ‘subordinated’ 
identities can lead to an unabashed celebration of white 
masculinity‘(Nayak, 2003:235) 
 
As such, individual agency within the CCCS’ reading of subculture is absent, viewing 
class position as the primary driver in influencing and generating formations of 
spontaneous expressions of collective action amongst young people to resist authority. 
The issue of why some youth do not identify with specific subcultures and others do 
is never fully considered, and can lead to the assumption that all young people within 
a specific class category are part of the corresponding subculture, and vice versa.  
Secondly, although the CCCS broadened the study of youth to include various and 
distinct youth cultures, their analysis is weakened through the absence of distinct racial 
and cultural identities in their account of subcultural formations. Aside from 
Hebdige’s (1977) study on black youth, a paucity of subcultural research has focused 
on issues of ethnicity, nationality and the localised or regional variations of youth 
identities (Blackman, 1995, Muggleton, 1997). Indeed, in relation to the study of 
present day youth cultures, urban, ‘delinquent’ gangs – itself a modern day subculture 
- are marked by their heterogeneous, multi – ethnic and national membership (Grund 
and Densley, 2012). In light of broader social and economic transformations and the 
move towards a ‘postmodern’ society, subcultures are viewed as transcending 
boundaries of class, age and race (Redhead, 1995; Muggleton 1997) which restrictive, 
class-based subcultural theory fails to consider (Hall and Jefferson, 2006).  
Accordingly, the CCCS portray subcultures as monolithic, homogeneous groupings. 
Research within youth studies has identified the morphology and fluidity of present 
day subcultures (Redhead, 1995; Muggleton, 1997; Bennett, 1999). For those 
associated with these ‘postmodern’ approaches, the weakness of the CCCS’ approach 
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lies in their belief that young people are personifications of the subcultures they 
correspond to, revealed only through the subjective imagery of the researcher. Here, 
there is a propensity to label young people based on ‘sociological types’ which may 
function to reinforce social stereotypes by interpreting young people only through this 
restrictive subcultural technique. Indeed, the CCCS’ tendency to label subcultures 
based on typologies has led the ‘post-subculturalists’ to suggest that subcultures were 
‘produced by the sub-cultural theorists, not the other way round’ (Redhead, 1990:25).  
As I will go on to detail, the idea of subcultures as fixed, monolithic typologies is now 
rejected by theorists associated with ‘post-subcultural’ studies of youth cultures. For 
Redhead (1993), widespread shifts in social and economic change and the increasing 
amount of free time available to young people has led to a move away from the 
localised, Marxist, class-based subcultures portrayed in Resistance through Rituals 
(1976), towards an understanding of the hybridity of contemporary youth identities. It 
is these ‘post-subcultural’ studies that I will now turn to in the following section.  
The ‘Postmodern’ Youth: From Modernist Grand Narratives to the Fragmentation of 
Postmodernity 
In the previous section I have outlined some of the underlying principles of the Marxist 
and neo-Marxist orientated CCCS and their thinking on youth ‘subcultures’ and 
identity. Whereas this narrative focused, in short, on the production side of collective 
youth identities, in the late 1970’s, post-Gramscian perspectives, supported by 
emerging theories of post-structualism and postmodernity24, have focused on the 
consumption side of collective youth identities. Theories of postmodernity, assisted by 
the thought of European poststructuralists, have largely contributed to this debate 
                                                          
24 I will provide a full explanation of the term ‘postmodernity’ in pages 62-66 of this chapter. 
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through various theorising of the significance of a new society in which contemporary 
Western society now inhabits (Bauman, 2002; Harvey, 2005). 
 The analytical advantages of postmodern, ‘post-subcultural’ perspectives for the 
contemporary sociologist lie in their promotion of human agency within collective 
youth cultural identities, and the capacity of individuals to mediate and translate 
commodities for further consumption amongst collective ‘groupings’.  Indeed, Andy 
Bennett’s (1999:600) assertion that modern day youth cultures should now be 
theorised as ‘a series of temporal gatherings characterised by fluid boundaries and 
floating memberships’ is in line with the post-subcultural idea that hermeneutically 
sealed, class-based subcultures no longer represent the ‘pluralistic and shifting 
sensibilities of style’ (Bennett, 1999:599) evident in contemporary youth cultures. In 
the context of a move into ‘postmodernity’, attempts have been made to describe these 
fluid, amorphous youth formations, most notably; Andy Bennett (1999), who draws 
on the work of Michael Maffesoli to introduce the term ‘neo-tribes’ to capture the 
‘unstable and shifting cultural affiliations which characterise late modern consumer-
based identities (Bennett, 1999:605); Steve Miles reworks Max Weber’s concept of 
‘lifestyles’ to examine the consumption patterns of youth, suggesting that the onset of 
postmodernism has engendered ‘a transition from pragmatic and unified subcultural 
identities into a shifting mosaic and juxtaposition of styles’ (Miles, 1995:36); and 
Steve Redhead and associated researchers at Manchester Metropolitan University 
called for a new postmodern theorisation of youth, suggesting that the CCCS’s Marxist 
orientated approach is outdated in the contemporary context of a new neoliberal order 
and individualist political environment, that has engendered a cultural movement 
away from ‘subcultures to club cultures’ (Redhead, 1997). Hence, the result of these 
developments was an attempt to understand the hybridity of postmodern youth 
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groupings and provide a new conceptual tool to replace the outdated, modernist 
approach of the CCCS.     
The theoretical impetus for the post-subculturalists comes from Max Weber, Michael 
Maffesoli, and theories of postmodernity associated with Baudrillard, Jameson, and 
Lyotard (Muggleton, 1997; Redhead, 1997; 2000). Indeed, in recent years a significant 
debate within the Social Sciences has centred on the cultural, aesthetic, economic and 
social changes that have taken place over preceding decades. One argument is that we 
are entering a new epoch of ‘postmodernity’ (e.g. Baudrillard, 1981; Jameson, 1984; 
Lyotard, 1984) although critiques of the approach  tend to use alternative prefixes, 
favouring terms such as ‘high’ or ‘late’ modernity to discuss the social and economic 
transformations that characterise this epoch (e.g., Beck 1992; Giddens, 1984; 1990). 
Post-subculturalists have drawn on these theories to illuminate a post-industrial social 
order characterised by structural and cultural transformations that emerged as a result 
of post-war de-industrialisation, and the social consequences of these transformations 
on cultural identities.  
In the UK, the most productive academics in this field are Steve Redhead and 
associated researchers at Manchester Metropolitan University (1995; 1997; 2000) and 
David Muggleton (1997; 2000). Redhead’s work draws upon Baudrillard and his 
notion of simulation that has engendered a ‘hyperreal’ society, that is; ‘…the 
generation by models of a real without origin or reality… (Baudrillard, 1983:2). For 
Baudrillard, society is based upon the hyperreal, where the distinction between reality 
and the simulation of reality is increasingly blurred, with simulations being 
experienced as reality itself. As representations and simulations of the real become 
dominant, hyperreality represents a society of surface images and real yet distorted, 
simulated experiences; common features of the postmodern vision (see, Bauman, 
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2002).  On this basis, the post-subculturalists view subcultures as inhabiting 
Baudrillard’s vision of hyperreality. They are what Baudrillard refers to as simulacra, 
that is; ‘reproductions of objects or events’ (Kellner, 1989:78). For the post-
subculturalists then, subcultures now ‘simulate the simulation of the media, becoming 
mere models themselves’ (Muggleton, 1997:179). The superficial methods of self-
identification amongst postmodern youth has led post-subculturalists to proclaim there 
are no longer ‘authentic’ subcultures (Redhead, 2000:47), but instead ‘subcultural 
simulacra’ as young people increasingly consume ‘hyperreal’ commodities that are 
simulations of reality (Baudrillard, 1983). Post-subcultural styles are no longer 
structured around ‘relations of class, gender and ethnicity’ (Muggleton, 2000:48) but 
rather, fluid, ‘free-floating’ cultures detached from social structures (Redhead, 
1993:17), which stylistically, leads to: 
‘a glut of revivals, hybrids and transformation, and the co-existence 
of myriad styles at any one point in time and individual 
subculturalists moving quickly and freely from one style to another 
as they wish’ (Muggleton, 1997:180). 
 
At the centre of the post-subculturalists argument, then, is that modernist 
understandings of youth are out-dated in the postmodern epoch. In contrast to the 
modern identities associated with the work of the CCCS that harbour homologous 
forms of identity to connote collective identity, post-subculturalists maintain that 
postmodern youth cultures are characterised by a hybridity of styles and identities. 
Redhead and Muggleton have regularly emphasised the fragmented, heterogeneous 
and individualistic cross-over of ‘styles’ found in postmodernity: for example, 
Redhead (1993) noted the breakdown of homogenous youth cultures in his studies of 
‘club cultures’. These ‘styles’ display autonomy from external, deterministic modes 
of structuration as new features of postmodern style, in which individualism outstrips 
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collective forms of identity, are the means through which cultural identities are 
constructed. Similarly, Muggleton (1997; 2000) has noted how as postmodernity 
dissolves modern boundaries, subcultures are ‘constituted through consumption’ 
which engenders ‘an individualistic rather than a subcultural identity’ (Muggleton, 
1997:181). Similarly, the theory of ‘lifestyle’ proposed by Steve Miles is comparable 
to that of Bennett (1999; 2000) and Muggleton (1997; 2000) in that he argues 
consumer culture produces new, hybrid forms of individual identity for young people. 
Based on a critique of the CCCS’s theorisation of subculture, Miles locates his 
conceptualisation in the context of postmodernity, arguing that ‘lifestyles are, in effect, 
lived cultures in which individuals actively express their identities, but in direct 
relation to their position as regards the dominant culture’ (Miles, 2000:16). This 
appears a reconfiguration of the CCCS’s Neo-Gramscian approach that views youth 
cultures as a symbolic, ‘imaginary’ form of resistance to the hegemonic bloc. Miles, 
however, encourages an individualistic reading of youth cultures that proffers 
individual agency, yet views collective forms of identity as transient in the context of 
postmodernity.   
 
Elsewhere, Andy Bennett (1999) endorses a similar view that consumerism functions 
as an intended method through which identity is self-constructed. For Bennett: ‘a fully 
developed mass society liberates rather than oppresses individuals by offering avenues 
for individual expression through a range of commodities and resources which can be 
worked into particular lifestyle sites and strategies’ (Bennett, 1999:607). In 
postmodernity, identities are a ‘freely chosen game’, in which commodities act as 




Bennett draws on the work of Michel Maffesoli to derive a reading of tribus (tribes) 
as a theoretical framework through which to describe ‘groupings’ of youth in 
postmodernity. Underpinning Maffesoli’s concept of tribes is the notion of new forms 
of collective unity and sociality arising in the context of a postmodern, consumer 
orientated society. According to Maffesoli, the tribe is viewed ‘without the rigidity of 
the forms of organization with which we are familiar, it refers more to a certain 
ambience, a state of mind, and is preferably to be expressed through lifestyles that 
favour appearance and form’ (Maffesoli, 1996:98). Thus, as Featherstone (1995:120), 
in discussing Maffesoli suggests, neo-tribes represent the ‘movement from 
individualism to collectivism, from rationality to emotionality’, that is increasingly 
evident in postmodernity. In this sense, postmodernity has ‘produced’ a new collective 
‘tribalism’ who ‘provide a strong sense of localism and emotional identification 
through the tactile embodied sense of being together’, therefore, ‘they are regarded as 
neo-tribes because they exist in an urban world where relationships are transitory, 
hence their identifications are temporary as people will necessarily move on and 
through the endless flow of sociality to make new attachments’ (Featherstone, 
1995::120). Forms of tribal identity, then, illuminate the instability and temporary 
nature of group identity in a postmodern, consumer orientated society as individuals 
continually move between collective sites of expression that are characterised by 
‘fluidity, occasional gatherings and dispersal’ (Maffesoli, 1996:76).  
 
One definitive difference between the work of the CCCS and post-subcultural 
approaches arises here. Whereas the former associates subcultures with fixity and 
rigidity through a structural Marxist reading of subordinate classes, the latter 
recognises the instability and temporal nature of contemporary youth affiliations in 
postmodern society. Indeed, Maffesoli associates the development of ‘neo-tribes’ with 
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postmodernity, a period in which consumption functions as an ever-increasing marker 
of identity (Bauman, 1992:49). For post-subculturalists then, Maffesoli’s approach 
enables the social researcher to understand contemporary youth cultures which have 
‘become more reflexive, fluid and fragmented due to an increasing flow of cultural 
commodities, images and texts through which more individualised identity projects 
and notions of self could be fashioned’ (Bennett, 2011:493). In reconsidering forms 
of collective expression and identity within a postmodern framework then, the concept 
of ‘neo-tribes’ offers a hermeneutic device through which to understand the ‘lifestyles’ 
of individual identities, that is, how patterns of consumption and the use of certain 
commodities as cultural resources produce patterns of personal and collective 
expression (Bennett, 1999).  
The post-subculturalists postmodern reading of youth cultural identities provides some 
significant components for the analysis of contemporary youth cultures. The broader 
contextualisation of youth within postmodern, consumer orientated ‘New Times’ 
attributes the trajectory of cultural identities to consumption and the ability of young 
people to freely assert their own distinctive characters. Thus, postmodern, post-
subculturalist readings of cultural identity prioritise individual agency over 
deterministic, structural processes. Accordingly, young people are not regarded as 
‘cultural dupes’ acting out structurally determined collective identities; rather, youth 
styles represent expressive forms of individual and cultural identity. Here, Maffesoli’s 
‘neo-tribal’ form of identity reflects the fluid and transitory nature of postmodern 
identities. The introduction of ‘fluid’ over ‘static’ forms of youth cultural identity is 
also a useful analytical tool, given the interchangeable nature of cultural identities that 
inhabit today’s social landscape and the ability of youth to freely move between forms 
of collective and self- identity.  Enveloping these cultural changes is postmodernity, a 
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concept that accurately describes the structural and cultural transformations occurring 
in the post-war era. The post-subculturalists, then, validly attribute their theorisation 
of youth to an overarching postmodern epistemology that considers structural and 
cultural changes and their implications for cultural identities and categories.  
The re-evaluation of youth in postmodernity therefore requires, it would seem, a 
postmodern approach that does not bind itself to a restrictive, deterministic realist 
epistemology, the outcome of which is the imposition of an a priori reading on the 
social phenomenon under investigation (Muggleton, 1997).  Here, post-subcultural, 
postmodern theories of youth expand on the ideas associated with postmodern social 
theory to offer a framework to view youth operating freely in creating cultural 
identities. Whereas the CCCS reduced its explanation of youth cultural identities to a 
class-based teleology which was viewed as ‘creating’ subcultures as part of an 
emancipatory project (Redhead, 1995), Steve Redhead and David Muggleton have 
made a commitment to studying the fluidity of youth in the context of postmodernity 
and the ability of youth to construct forms of collective cultural identity via 
consumption practices. In postmodernity youth cultures transcend social factors of 
ethnicity, age and class and can therefore no longer be accounted for through Marxist, 
class-based analysis. However, there are a number of criticisms that significantly 
weaken the post-subculturalists reading of contemporary youth cultures.  
 
First, the argument that individualism, fluidity and formlessness characterise the 
cultural styles of contemporary youth groupings is difficult to sustain. Whilst these 
features may form the collective identities of some youth cultural practices, notably 
the dance and rave scenes that populate the studies of the post-subculturalists, 
Hodkinson (2002) has argued that the postmodern reading of consumer-orientated, 
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aesthetic, transitory youth cultures is not relevant to all contemporary youth 
formations. Hodkinson alludes to the example of ‘Goth’ culture to underline his 
argument, but one could equally add the example of other forms of contemporary 
youth cultural identities. For example, some contemporary urban youth gangs exhibit 
qualities that follow more closely conventional, modernistic subcultural perspectives; 
some are homogenously formed along borders of nationality and ethnicity; most are 
defined by particularly strict territorial boundaries and drawn for similar geographical 
locations; and a number display their allegiances via symbolic gang ‘colours’ and 
clothing (Densley, 2012a; 2012b; Hobbs, 2013). Additionally, Giulianotti (2004), 
alluding to his studies of football hooligan groups, argues a balance between modern 
and postmodern theories of cultural identities is required in explaining this particular 
social phenomena.  
Empirically, the focus on ‘spectacular’, music and dance scenes (e.g. Redhead, 1997; 
Muggleton & Weinzierl, 2003) comes at the expense of the analysis of the cultural 
identities of ‘ordinary’ youth (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006). Arguably, the stylistic 
and music dance cultures that form the basis of the post-subculturalists theorisation of 
youth cultural identities are predominantly ‘minority’ youth cultures, particularly in 
the contemporary era, and as such are by no means reflective of the wider youth 
cultural landscape. Indeed, this has led Shildrick and MacDonald to conclude that 
post-subcultural studies are ‘in danger of producing a distorted and incomplete 
portrayal of contemporary youth culture’ (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006:128).  
Their position is also weakened by the absence of cultural differences in their 
explanation of cultural groups. Little attention is paid to issues of ethnicity, class, 
nationality, or the influence of locality. Indeed, the analysis of post-subcultural studies 
are conducted by those who had previously participated in these particular ‘scenes’ 
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(Muggleton 1997; Bennett 2000). These ‘insider’ perspectives may be accountable for 
the coverage of predominantly ‘middle-class’, white, youth cultural identities analysed 
in post-subcultural studies and the detached view towards ethnic, working-class youth 
cultural identities.  
Further, the post-subculturalists move towards postmodern individualistic 
understandings of youth where identity is determined, above all, by choice, signifies 
a move away from a modernist, Marxist approach of collective ‘subcultures’ as a form 
of resistance to the hegemonic bloc. This significantly vitiates the political 
understanding of young people in postmodernity, leaving them with a hyperbolic sense 
of individuality that is disconnected from structural forms of exploitation. This 
therefore strays into an over-romanticised view of individual forms of adaptation and 
self-expression, where emancipation is conveyed through forms of self-identity as 
individuals engage with commodities to support their personalized cultural practice, 
as Bennett (1999) would suggest in his reworking of Maffesoli’s ‘Neo-tribes’. 
Accordingly, the individualized take on youth cultural identities overlooks the 
emancipatory forms of collective, cultural responses of youth to structural inequalities 
(Blackman, 2005): the collective response of young people at anti-capitalist 
demonstrations, student protests and climate change marches over recent years is 
testament to this.  
Limiting the analytical value further is the argument amongst post-subculturalists that 
class is redundant in postmodernity. The postmodern theory of the fluid, transitory 
‘Neo-tribe’ for example, is closely tied to the transition from modernity to 
postmodernity, whereby consumerism, individualism and autonomy have engendered 
a more individualistic society via the deconstruction of class hierarchies and static 
forms of collective cultural identity. Hence, the construction of individual and unique 
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identities via consumerism’s array of commodities led Muggleton to conclude that  
‘youths from different social backgrounds can hold similar values that find their 
expression in shared membership of a particular subculture’ (Muggleton, 2000:31). 
The post-subculturalists heuristic for reading new, postmodern forms of cultural 
identities, however, seriously misreads the fact that consumption is not experienced 
by all young people in the same capacity (Nayak, 2003; Blackman, 2005; Shildrick 
and MacDonald, 2006; Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Martin, 2009). Many working-class 
youth remain marginal to cultural commodities and forms of leisure (Nayak, 2003; 
2006; MacDonald and Shildrick, 2005) and are unable to embrace a so-called ‘slice of 
the postmodern experience’ (Redhead, 1997:95). Access to these cultural commodities 
and leisure practices remain deeply bound by structural inequalities, economic 
marginality, class and neighbourhood characteristics (MacDonald and Shildrick, 
2005; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006). As such, post-subcultural theory fails to 
comprehend the extent to which structural inequalities ‘delimit’ access to cultural 
commodities and leisure pursuits, and the way in which these commodities and 
practices formulate various class-based youth cultural identities. For some youth 
cultural writers, class remains a dominant feature of youth cultural identities; Shildrick 
and Macdonald (2006) suggest it is insufficient to conclude that ‘youth culture has 
now somehow become classless when the life phases that precede and follow youth 
continue to be highly socially stratified’ (Shildrick and Macdonald, 2006:129).  
Social Change and Youth Identities 
This thesis is concerned with social change and the consequences for young people in 
terms of identification but also - as will be detailed in Chapter 3 - official responses, 
which in turn can only be properly understood in the context of broader anxieties about 
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social order. As such, the following section considers the different analyses of the 
relationship between cultural and socio-economic transformations, especially how 
changes to employment and production affect, shape and produce meanings of class 
and place for young people. I relate this back to the two different approaches to cultural 
analysis detailed earlier in this chapter.  
The CCCS: Post-war Consumerism and Working-class Continuity 
For the CCCS, the lack of transference of American theories of subculture in the 
context of broader post-war social transformations required a distinct theoretical 
framework through which to analyse embryonic youth subcultures. Indeed, the post-
war period heralded new social and cultural features within Britain which were 
responsible for these new forms of youth culture. These post-war changes are 
documented in the first chapter of Resistance through Rituals (1976) and I will briefly 
relay them here to situate the CCCS’ theory within a social context.  
First, the immediate aftermath of the Second World War heralded a number of social 
transformations, ‘hinged around ‘affluence’, the increased importance of the market 
and consumption, and the growth of the ‘Youth-orientated’ leisure industries’ (Clarke 
et al., 1976:11). The outcome of this new ‘consumer-orientated’ society was the 
teenage consumer: cultural products became readily accessible to many young people 
for the first time and consequently, collective consumption practices provided the 
foundation for unique, self-produced youth cultures. Secondly, youth were subjected 
to new forms of cultural processes, spawned by ‘the spread in mass consumption, plus 
the ‘political enfranchisement’ of the masses, and (above all) the growth in mass 
communications’ (Clarke et al., 1976:11). Mass communication in the form of radio, 
television and publishing led to greater ‘imitation’ and ‘manipulation’ of styles and 
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fashions by teenagers, encouraged by seductive marketing campaigns. Youth cultures 
became marked and characterised by their consumption practices and styles; Vespas, 
Parkas and Italian fashion became symbolic of the mod subculture. All of this, of 
course, could not have existed without a consumer market geared towards youth, and 
a willing and economically prosperous youth consumer (Clarke et al., 1976:42). 
Thirdly, the immediate post-war period witnessed the emergence of new forms of 
delinquency. For the CCCS, the disruptive period following the second World War, 
characterised by ‘absent fathers, evacuation and other breaks in normal family life, as 
well as the constant violence’ (Clarke et al., 1972:12) laid the foundations for a new 
form of delinquent youth culture in contrast to pre-war generations. Fourth, 
developments in education policy, most notably the 1944 Education Act which 
introduced free schooling for all, increased the number of young people in education 
compared with the pre-war period. Higher levels of literacy, trained personnel and 
subsequent social mobility followed, thus creating the conditions for an ‘adolescent 
society’ (Clarke et al., 1976:13). Finally, increased economic prosperity and 
subsequent consumption produced a new range of symbolic styles, fashions and 
leisure. The increased accessibility of these consumable goods and leisure practices 
became the raw materials though which the subcultural identities of youth could be 
constructed. Hence, via the adoption and adaption of specific styles, collective 
identities were formed.  
For some, this period was considered one of prosperity. Youth were at the forefront of 
these post-war changes; ‘direct beneficiaries of the welfare state and new educational 
opportunities; least constrained by older patters of, or attitudes to, spending and 
consumption; [and] most involved in a guilt-free commitment to pleasure and 
immediate satisfactions’ (Clarke et al., 1976:14). Class was seen as gradually eroding 
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as society’s marker of social stratification, replaced by consumption orientated 
attainments, educational achievement and forms of employment. The working-class 
then, were slowly gravitating towards more ‘middle-class’ patterns of life.  
However, in spite of the cultural and social changes that occurred in post-war period, 
the CCCS strongly refuted the view that the working-class was disappearing (Clarke 
et al., 1976). In contrast, the CCCS suggested that these changes had been greatly 
exaggerated; the post-war era was instead a time where greater inequalities of wealth 
occurred, unemployment began to rise, and new forms of working-class ‘resistance’ 
emerged as a response to social inequalities. Stuart Hall (1978) had previously 
suggested that the cultural transformations taking place in the immediate post-war 
period and the increased accessibility of commodities provided only a sense that the 
working-class were assimilating towards middle-class aspirations and values. In this 
sense, classlessness was merely an ideological effect of the emerging consumer 
culture:  
‘The purpose of a great deal of advertising, for example, is to 
condition the worker to the new possibilities for consumption, to 
break down the class resistances to consumer purchase which 
became part of the working-class consciousness at an earlier period. 
This is known in the world of advertising as ‘sales resistance’. 
(‘When you buy your second car, make sure it’s a Morris’). (Hall, 
1958:29) 
 
Hall and his colleagues at the CCCS signify a major departure from the view of the 
working-class as passive receivers of the post-war ideological categories of affluence, 
consensus, and embourgeoisement, components that are required for the ‘spontaneous 
consent’ (Clarke et al., 1976:30) of subordinate classes and the ending of traditional 
working-class values. From Gramsci, they develop an understanding of power as a 
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social resource located within the hegemonic bloc that regulates and reproduces the 
patterns of life of subordinate classes. Hegemony is a site of continuous class struggle 
that has to be fought for, containing ‘relations of forces favourable or unfavourable to 
this or that tendency’ (Clarke et al., 1976:30). For the CCCS, class struggle was 
reflective of the post-war era: 
‘…the 1950’s seem to us a period of true ‘hegemonic domination’, 
it being precisely the role of ‘affluence’ as an ideology, to dismantle 
working-class resistance and deliver the ‘spontaneous consent’ of 
the class to the authority of the dominant class. Increasingly, in the 
1960’s, and more openly in the 1970’s, this ‘leadership’ has again 
been undermined. The society has polarised, conflict has reappeared 
on many levels. The dominant classes retain power, but their 
‘repertoire’ of control is progressively challenged, weakened, 
exhausted’ (Clarke et al., 1976:30) 
 
The CCCS saw this period as representing a shift from consent to coercion (e.g. the 
use of force to maintain hegemonic power and contain emerging forms of resistance). 
Resistance became increasingly prevalent amongst the working-class through forms 
of continuous struggle and rituals, rather than direct, open conflict. The subordinate-
working-class then, was viewed as one that will not disappear; indeed, for Clarke et 
al., (1976:31), ‘English working-class culture is a peculiarly strong, densely-impacted, 
cohesive and defensive structure of this corporate kind’ with ‘its own corporate 
culture, its own forms of social relationship, its characteristic institutions, values, [and] 
modes of life’. For the CCCS, class conflict will always exist between the subordinate 
working-class and dominant hegemonic ruling class until, as Marx suggested, the 
owners of production that produce and sustain the subordinate social and cultural 
formations in the existing subordinate form disappear. As Gramscian hegemony 
suggests that these hegemonic forces are non-permanent, forms of counter-hegemonic 
resistance exist in the hegemonic struggle.   
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Postmodern Times and Cultural Fluidity 
Much of the work within the postmodernist paradigm has directed attention to the 
analysis of a new epoch of ‘postmodernity’ in which many of the certainties associated 
with the modern era have disintegrated. Thus, the advent of postmodernity represents 
a qualitative break from modernity; the features of the modern society have been 
exhausted and declined in importance and meaning.  If characteristics of modernism 
related to ‘universality, homogeneity, monotony and clarity’ (Bauman 1992:188), 
postmodernism represents a new epoch in which these previous ‘modern’ features 
have been replaced by ‘pluralism, variety, contingency and ambivalence’ (Bauman, 
1992:187), all of which have infiltrated the social experiences of the population. 
Society, once stable and established, is now interlaced with individualism, fluidity and 
insecurity (see Young, 2007). Consequently, a new social order has arisen that gives 
prominence to new social relationships and identities structured around consumption 
over production. The concept of postmodernity is used here to sensitize the social 
scientist to the significant transformations and cultural shifts that are occurring in 
contemporary society.  
 
A key component of postmodern thinking, and indeed one way of interpreting the 
approach, is its rejection of metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984). If ‘modern’ knowledge 
associated with grand narratives reflects the structure of the society that produces it 
(hence, the legitimacy of ‘truth’ in modernity is legitimized via ‘modern’ universal 
customs and belief systems), then for Lyotard (1984), postmodern thinking discards 
the idea of any universal truth. The grand narratives that once established and 
legitimised themselves on logical and empirical grounds are rendered untenable in 
postmodern society as the transition to post-industrialism brings in new advancements 
in science, communication and technology. Thus, knowledge is no longer considered 
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a collective ‘truth’ as science can no longer ‘represent the totality of knowledge’ 
(Lyotard, 1984). Instead, in postmodernity there is a difference and diversity of beliefs 
and systems of knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is seen as culturally relative and 
structured around a plurality of ‘language games’ that make no claims about an 
absolute truth. A magnitude of discourses and theoretical frameworks therefore exist 
within postmodern theory, ‘all of which are determined locally, not legitimated 
externally’ (Cilliers, 1998:114).  
 
A second way of interpreting postmodernism is to understand it periodically as a break 
with many of the certainties associated with modernism. This approach has 
significance to the research undertaken here in terms of a move towards ‘disorganised 
capitalism’ (Lash and Urry, 1994) and shifting identities (Bauman, 1992; Maffesoli, 
1996). In contrast to Lyotard’s (1984) rejection of the metanarrative, the neo-Marxists 
Frederic Jameson and David Harvey relate the social transformations associated with 
postmodernity to changes in organised capitalism. For Jameson (1989), 
postmodernism is identified as ‘the cultural logic of late capitalism’, a ‘late’ phase 
characterised by an economic system producing new forms of cultural identity to 
insure its longevity.  Similarly, Harvey (1989) in the Condition of Postmodernity 
grounds his account of societal change in an analysis of the transition from ‘Fordist’ 
to ‘post-Fordist’ modes of production. The restructuring of production methods to new 
‘post-Fordist method of ‘flexible accumulation’, is understood here as being: 
 
‘Marked by a direct confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism. It 
rests on flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour marker, 
products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of 
providing financial services, new markets and above all, greatly 
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intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational 
innovation’. (Harvey, 1989:147)  
 
Post-Fordist production and flexible accumulation, then, is typified by a need to react 
to the demand of fluid, ‘niche’ market place. Traditional, vertically integrated 
manufacturing units are replaced by flexible, smaller production units. New 
technologies are introduced to increase the acceleration of production, whilst the 
previous Fordist employment patterns are replaced by a smaller, short term, de-
unionised workforce. Inevitably, these changes have had the most profound effects on 
former industrial and manufacturing heartlands; the ‘Rustbelt’ states of the 
Midwestern and North Eastern United States, and the North East of England are two 
examples here where the movement from Fordist to post-Fordist economies has 
destabilised the traditional aspects of collective cultural identities (Linkon and Russo, 
2003;  Nayak, 2006).  Although Harvey (1989) sees the transition from a Fordist to a 
post-Fordist epoch as central to postmodernism, he suggests that a continuity exists 
between the two eras. His major contribution is therefore, that although ‘there has 
certainly been a sea-change in the surface appearance of capitalism since 1973…the 
underlying logic of capitalist accumulation and its crisis remains the same’ (Harvey, 
1989:189). Thus, although the economic structure remains unchanged, a new cultural 
logic has materialised in the postmodern world. In connecting these cultural 
transformations to the capitalist system, Jameson suggests that we are witnessing a 
move into ‘late capitalism’ where there is ‘a prodigious expansion of capital into 
hitherto uncommodified areas’ (Jameson, 1984:78). The Marxist framework is thus 
considered necessary to understanding these cultural changes associated with a new 
era of capitalism characterised by modern, multinational enterprise. As others have 
observed (e.g. Featherstone, 1989; Ritzer, 2008), this appears an updated version of 
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Marx’s base-superstructure argument, although Jameson (1984) goes someway to 
describing the relationship between the economy and the cultural in greater 
complexity by arguing that we have progressed from ‘monopoly’ and ‘market’ epochs 
of capitalism to a ‘multinational’ era associated with postmodernity, in which culture: 
‘Has become integrated into commodity production generally: the 
frantic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever greater rates of 
turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function 
to aesthetic innovation and experimentation’. (Jameson, 1984:11)  
 
The Neo-Marxist take on postmodernism, appropriately, connects economy to culture, 
whereby capitalism maintains itself through spawning a new cultural logic. The ‘inner 
logic’ (Harvey, 1989:345) of capitalism therefore produces a society which is 
characterised by consumption. Conflict that was once restricted to production is now 
very much a part of cultural life (Harvey, 1989; Bauman, 1992) as consumption 
becomes the ‘hub around which the life-world rotates’ (Bauman, 1992:49), as Harvey 
goes on to suggest: 
‘The struggles that were once exclusively waged in the arena of 
production have, as a consequence, now spilled outwards to make 
of cultural production an arena of fierce social conflict. Such a shift 
entails a definite change in consumer habits and attitudes as well as 
a new role aesthetic definitions and interventions. While some 
would argue that the counter-culture movements of the 1960’s 
created an environment of unfulfilled needs and repressed desires 
that postmodernist popular cultural production has merely set out to 
satisfy as best it can in commodity form, others would suggest that 
capitalism, in order to sustain its markets, has been forced to 
produce desire and so titillate individual sensibilities as to create a 




Cultural Criminology and Consumer Culture: Understanding Youth in 
Contemporary Post-industrial Society 
The following sections intends to provide an overview of recent takes on the sociology 
of youth, notably, how the globalisation of production (i.e. post-industrialisation) and 
the rapid diversification of social experience brought by globalised communications, 
the rise of the consumer society, and the erosion of universal welfare, has ‘unmade’ 
cultural forms that had previously been kept stable by structural continuities and the 
socially reproductive character of the welfare state. In expanding on this argument, 
this section also considers how in the context of increasingly de-standardised 
trajectories, consumption-facilitated cultural differentiation serves to reproduce 
existing social divisions. Indeed, as this section will explore, the most economically 
disadvantaged, having been denied participation in the consumer economy and the 
promised opportunities for identity construction, must either accommodate ‘spoiled’ 
identities, transcend significant structural boundaries or find alternative strategies. 
Hence, any understanding of contemporary youth and governmental responses, as will 
be explored in the ensuing chapter, requires an engagement with social change.   
In this section I therefore detail two more accounts offering insight into the 
relationship between post-industrial production and its social consequences, market-
driven consumer culture, young people’s cultural practices and crime/transgression. 
To begin with, I discuss the work associated with cultural criminologists, before 
discussing the work of contemporary sociologists working in the field of youth studies. 
Cultural criminologists working in the latest incarnation of this tradition selectively 
build upon the research and principles of the CCCS, although conclude that 
contemporary society ‘is a good deal more intense and indeterminate than the one that 
confronted the members of the Birmingham school in the 1970s, not least because the 
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desire to consume is so universal and pervasive, confronting us at every turn, 
bombarding us with an unprecedented array of aspirational messages’ (Hayward, 
2004:8, cited in Martin, 2009:125).  Theoretically, the main influences come from a 
hybridisation of phenomenology, interactionism, radical criminology and the 
aforementioned Neo-Marxist and postmodern perspectives associated with the 
Birmingham School and post-subculturalists respectively.  
Indeed, cultural criminologists have regularly emphasised the epochal shift from 
modernism to postmodernism (e.g. Baudrillard, 1981; Lyotard, 1984; Jameson, 1991) 
and the subsequent move from ‘industrial to consumer culture’ that has ‘affected the 
practical life-world, moral codes and the habitus’ of a traditional industrial working-
class’ (Winlow, Hall and Ancrum, 2008:21). Hence, new, neoliberal modes of 
governance, the post-industrial terrain characterised by new ‘flexible’, short-term 
forms of employment in place of once stable, traditional working-class forms of 
employment, unregulated consumerism, now a ‘kaleidoscope of choice and presumed 
preference’ (Ferrell et al., 2008:58), and the heightened importance of self-identity 
and individualism have all come to engender new forms of social disruption, 
‘ontological insecurity’ (Young, 1999) and individual precariousness that now 
permeate the sphere of contemporary social life:  
‘On one level…late modern dislocations create great human 
potential…At another level, these late modern uncertainties spawn 
great human misery, forcing into the foreground feelings of 
profound insecurity, social vertigo, even existential emptiness. 
From within this predicament, the choices are twofold: to chance, 
reinvent and resist, or to choose to deny choice itself, retreat to 
essentialist and fundamentalist notions of oneself and others’. 




These transformations underpin the cultural criminologists focus on a number of 
theoretical approaches that encapsulate the key features of cultural criminology. 
Phenomenologically25, cultural criminologists seek to uncover the ‘phenomenology of 
crime’ to help elucidate the cultural responses of those caught in post-industrial 
circumstances. Cultural criminologists therefore reject orthodox criminology’s 
positivistic and rational choice approach (Ferrell et al., 2008), and instead draw on the 
work of Jack Katz (1988) in an attempt to elucidate the ‘pleasure of crime’ and 
existential motives for transgressive behaviour. Katz, in his book Seductions of Crime 
(1988), favours the subjective, lived experience of the individual, viewing forms of 
deviance as a ‘thrill of transgression’ or ‘a way of overcoming the predictability and 
mundane realities typically associated with the banal routines of everyday ‘regular 
life’ (Hayward, 2004:149). Thus, for cultural criminologists, transgression is an 
attempt at regaining a degree of self-awareness and an illusion of control in a 
contradictory social environment:  
‘Teenage criminal practices such as vandalism, theft, and 
destruction of cars, fire starting, mugging, hoax emergency call-
outs, car ‘cruising’, peer group violence and other forms of street 
delinquency all have much to do with youth expression and exerting 
control in neighbourhoods where, more often than not, traditional 
avenues for youthful stimulation and endeavour have long since 
evaporated’. (Hayward, 2004:149-150) 
 
Marginalised by social and economic positions and subject to feelings of 
disillusionment, ontological insecurity and precariousness (Young, 1999), 
transgressive behaviour enables one to ‘seize control of one’s destiny’ (Hayward, 
                                                          
25 As a philosophical ‘movement’, the origins of phenomenology can be traced back to the early 20th century, evolving out of the 
work of its founder, the philosopher and mathematician, Edmund Husserl. In its broadest sense, phenomenology can be described 
as the study of ‘structures of consciousness’ obtained via first-person ‘experiences’ or ‘points of view’ (Husserl, 1999). The 
philosophical approach is therefore concerned with the study of the conscious experiences and reflexive accounts of the 
individual’s social world, and existence. How individuals experience their lives, and attribute subjective, first-hand ‘meaning’ to 
these specific social experiences, characterises the methodology of phenomenology. 
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2004:152). Katz alludes to the examples of shoplifting, armed robbery and murder, 
but one can also apply other forms of ‘transgressive’ behaviour that characterise some 
contemporary youth cultures; gang affiliation, drug taking, hooliganism, graffiti, and 
so forth. These moments neatly capture the spontaneous, pleasurable and creative 
forms of self-actualisation that are often impeded in a highly predictable, mundane 
world. The value of the work associated with cultural criminologists, then, is their 
view that transgressive behaviour functions as a way of exerting control, a route out 
of the ‘hyper-banalisation’ (Hayward, 2004:152) of everyday life and the internal 
contradictions of a consumer society; the tedious, repetitive experiences that become 
more vivid for the ‘subject’ affected by acute changes in the social structure that 
promises self-actualisation, choice and freedom, yet are overcome by the mundanity 
of regulated leisure time and designated ‘play’ areas (Hayward, 2004). 
 
Of equal significance to the cultural criminologists is the impact of unregulated 
consumerism on the cultural, creative and transgressive identities of working-class 
youth. For the cultural criminologists, ‘consumption and consumerism are now 
accepted as key contexts for the constructions of youth identities in de-industrialized 
Britain’ in response to ‘the pressures and anxieties created by enforced adaptation to 
consumer capitalism’ (Winlow and Hall, 2009:91). Here, cultural criminologists offer 
a ‘diluted version of subculture’ (Martin, 2009:125) whereby new, contemporary 
identities are characterised by their free-floating, transient nature (Ferrell et al., 2008; 
Hall et al., 2008; Hall and Winlow, 2009).  The cultural criminologist’s commitment 
to diversity and expression via cultural commodities thus adheres to the post-
subculturalists theorisation of fluid and transitory cultural identities existing in 
postmodernity. Yet, in an attempt to evade ‘failing to recognise the wider social and 
structural contexts within which crime, indeed all individual experience, takes place’ 
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(Hayward, 2004:151), the cultural criminologists remain bounded to the significance 
of structural and social contexts in which identities and criminality arise. Their 
approach therefore does not creep back into a blind post-subcultural overview where 
structural factors are marginalised from social agency.  
 
Accordingly, criminologists working in the latest incarnation of cultural criminology 
(e.g. Hayward, 2004; 2012; Hall et al., 2008; Winlow and Hall, 2008; 2012; Treadwell 
et al., 2013) align their argument with those of postmodern theorists to illustrate the 
damaging effects of unregulated consumerism on the cultural and criminal identities 
of those located on the socioeconomic margins of postmodern, consumer capitalism.  
Hence, the cultural criminologists view society as one characterised by individualism, 
fragmentation and severe social competition that exacerbates the social divisions 
triggered by neoliberal economic restructuring (Harvey, 2011; Zizek, 2011); a society 
in which economic crisis looms as the features of modernity give way to the flux and 
uncertainty of postmodernity (Harvey, 1989; Bauman, 2002);  and a society in which 
those unable to successfully navigate and partake in the consumer culture that now 
defines youth populations find themselves increasingly marginalized (Bauman, 2002; 
2011). The contradictory processes of consumer culture in postmodernity has 
therefore resulted in a distinct polarization between those engaged fully in the 
consumer market, and those who are marginal from it. To illustrate, in their analysis 
of the 2011 summer riots that occurred in several English cities following the police 
shooting of an alleged criminal, Mark Duggan, Treadwell et al., (2013:8) conclude 
that the riots involved youths who were predominantly ‘discarded and left to rot on 
marginalized housing estates, [through being] unable legitimately to acquire the 
lifestyle symbolism validated by consumer culture’. Hence, subjected daily to the 
symbolic violence of ‘the magical success of consumer capitalism’s winners’ and 
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without any collective political unity through which they could articulate their 
disaffection, Treadwell et al., (2013) frankly conclude: 
‘when these young people struggle against consumer-constructed 
images of each other in a political vacuum, they realize that they 
will always fall far short of the spending power required to live the 
lifestyle that they are constantly told they want and feel they must 
have; this generates permanent, corrosive and objectless 
dissatisfaction. The real lesson for these young people….is that, 
lacking cultural and symbolic capital as they struggle to find a place 
in advanced capitalism’s competitive socio-economic relations, the 
majority of them are very likely to be losers and remain so for the 
rest of their lives’. (Treadwell et al., 2013:15) 
 
This reading is strongly related to Bauman’s concept of ‘flawed consumers’, a term 
coined to describe those marginal to the consumer market in postmodern society. The 
following passage neatly summarises the term: 
‘As in all other kinds of society, the poor of a consumer society are 
people with no access to a normal life, let alone a happy one. In a 
consumer society…having no access to a happy or merely a normal 
life means to be consumer’s manquées, or flawed consumers. And 
so the poor of a consumer society are socially defined, and self-
defined…as blemished, defective, faulty and deficient – in other 
words inadequate consumers…Overcoming that consumer 
inadequacy is likely to be seen as the only remedy – the sole exit 
from a humiliating plight’. (Bauman 2002:38) 
 
The cultural criminologists work therefore offers a far more sustained and critical view 
of consumerism than their Marxist and post-subcultural contemporaries. For example, 
the CCCS’ theorisation of consumption was based on ‘symbolic aspects of subcultural 
consumption at the expense of the actual meanings that young consumers have for the 
goods they consume’ (Miles, 1995:8, emphasis in original).  Commodities were thus 
seen as a method to resist structural contradictions, and hence, the CCCS never fully 
considered the extent to which increased economic resources and consumer choice 
72 
 
became available to young people in the post-war era (Bennett, 1999). On the other 
hand, the post-subculturalists appear to over-emphasise the economic resources of 
young people and the degree to which they can readily access cultural commodities. 
In contrast to these positions, the cultural criminologists’ approach documents the 
feelings of bleak disillusionment and precariousness that many marginalized, 
resource-poor youth populations experience in postmodernity (Hall and Winlow, 
2005; Hall et al., 2008; Winlow and Hall, 2008). They also focus on the plight of those 
unable to partake in the consumer economy, the ‘underclass’; ‘a marginalised, 
depoliticised and redundant rump permanently at the bottom of Britain’s supposedly 
fluid social hierarchy’ (Hall et al., 2008:27) who are ‘left behind, disinherited or 
degraded, shut off or excluded from the social feast to which others have gained entry’ 
(Bauman, 2002:38). The work of the cultural criminologists also contextualises their 
argument in an understanding of the often effective solutions employed by those 
excluded from the consumer market not to appear flawed and disqualified (Hall et al., 
2008; Winlow and Hall, 2012; Treadwell et al., 2013). Indeed, for young, working-
class men residing in locales of structural unemployment, permanent recession and 
increasing crime rates, where displaying the symbolic goods ensures cultural and 
social acceptance (see Hall et al., 2008, Winlow and Hall, 2008), to remain fully 
embedded in the consumer culture often means sourcing economic resources through 
any possible means. This view, associated with much of the work of cultural 
criminologists, sees crime as an instrumental resource for achieving positions of social 
merit; techniques of ‘social mobility’ for many young people in economic and socially 
marginalised communities (Hall et al., 2008; Treadwell et al., 2013). According to the 
cultural criminologists then, young people searching for a sense of identity in the 
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postmodern world are resorting to extreme methods of gaining a foothold in the social 
hierarchy of the consumer market place. 
 
The approach of the cultural criminologists has a number of positive features. Firstly, 
they contextualise their argument against the backdrop of neoliberal forms of 
governance, unregulated consumer-driven capitalism, post-industrialisation, and 
individual ontological insecurity and precariousness. The cultural criminologists 
combine this with the phenomenological approach of Jack Katz to understand the 
subjective, lived experience of ‘transgressive’ behaviour within this context. 
Appropriately, the cultural criminologists also recognise the deleterious effects of 
consumerism in postmodernity; the increasing polarization between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’, the relentless means through which people will go to consume, and the 
consequences of unbridled advertising on those marginal, underprivileged members 
of society (see Hall et al., 2008; Winlow and Hall, 2012; Treadwell et al., 2013). 
Importantly, their critical view towards consumerism connects these forces to various 
forms of criminality, identity and the many forms of ‘transgression’ that occur as a 
means of ‘seizing control’ in a postmodern world beset by uncertainty (Hayward, 
2004). Thus, merging Katz idea of ‘thrill of transgression’ with the ideas associated 
with unregulated consumerism, post-industrialism and neoliberal forms of governance 
helps explicate the many changing identities and emotional responses engendered by 
consumerism (Ferrell et al., 2004; Martin, 2009; Winlow and Hall, 2009), and the new 
forms of ‘thrill seeking’ activities and practices that characterise collective youth 
identities (Ferrell et al., 2009; Martin, 2009; see also Hobbs, 2013). Hence, for Martin 
(2009:135), the subcultural ‘solutions’ that enable young people to affirm a degree of 
control over their lives within a post-industrial terrain can be found in ‘acts of 
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transgression (possibly crime-related), the practice of more mundane activities (e.g. 
hanging out in street corner ‘gangs’) as well as expression in dress and ‘style’’.  
Advanced Marginality 
There is no doubt that urban inequalities, relative deprivation and the issue of social 
exclusion which have given rise to crime and the anxieties surrounding it have gained 
in intensity over recent years (Young, 1999). In a neo liberal, globalised world, 
individuals are experiencing acute economic and social changes that preceding 
generations did not encounter (Byrne, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Young, 2007). Occurring, 
is a shift into what Wacquant (2008) refers to as ‘advanced marginality’, whereby new 
forms of physical and social exclusion fashioned and produced out of new modes of 
neoliberal governance. In effect, the deleterious manifestations of neoliberal 
governance relate the repositioning of the working-classes at the foot of a new 
neoliberal social hierarchy, relegated to concentrated areas of urban deprivation that 
bear the brunt of stigmatisation and perceived as ‘spaces of relegation’ (Wacquant, 
2008:232) ‘where residents…and their children have little chance of knowing a future 
other than the poverty and exclusion to which they are consigned at present’ 
(Wacquant, 2008:29). The prefix advanced refers to the process through which 
marginality is advancing; spawned out of the continual global spread and roll out of 
neo liberal governance (Harvey, 2005). Hence, for the sociologist, it is necessary to 
identify the macro sociological structures that maintain the hegemonic order, which 
can subsequently be countered by counter-hegemonic strategies (Freire, 1979; 
Wacquant, 2008:233). 
For Wacquant, these structural processes (referred to as ‘violence from above’) have 
resulted in a polarization of the social structure and ‘produced a dualization of the 
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social and physical structure of the metropolis that has consigned large sections of the 
unskilled labour force to economic redundancy and social marginality’ (Wacquant, 
2008:285). This structural ‘violence’ is formed of three main components. Firstly, 
mass unemployment during the 1980’s and 1990’s brought with it material deprivation, 
hardship and ontological insecurity and anxiety for a number of working-class 
communities. Secondly, the Relegation to decaying neighbourhoods through the 
reduction in public and private resources and increase in immigration has deepened 
competition for admission to limited public services. Finally, intensified 
stigmatization of working-class communities by wider society is connected to the 
former processes and the powerful stigma attached to those residing in these ‘no go 
areas’, and has led to the exclusion of working-class communities both in terms of the 
labour market and civil society. Thus, as White and Cuneen (2006:19-20) argue, 
‘Many young people in ‘modern’ and ‘advanced’ industrial societies are not simply 
marginal to the labour markets, they are literally excluded from it – by virtue of family 
history, structural restrictions on education and job choices, geographical location, 
racial and ethnic segregation, stigmatised individual and community reputation’ 
A sociological approach therefore represents, it would seem, the most ‘reality-
authentic’ approach to the study of contemporary youth cultures in post-industrial, 
post-Fordist, consumer-driven society. In Britain, writers associated with recent 
incarnations of youth cultural studies have espoused such a method. Here, the most 
productive writers towards this end are Robert MacDonald and associates at the 
University of Teesside (2001; 2005; 2007; 2011) and their studies of youth transitions 
in neighbourhoods of urban and socio-economic decay, and Anoop Nayak (2003; 
2006). Nayak’s work is primarily based upon participant observation of young, 
working-class ‘lads’ in Newcastle with emphasis accorded to their ‘displaced’ 
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identities and changing transitions within the context of a move to post-industrial 
forms of employment (Nayak, 2003; 2006). These studies remain loyal to the original 
CCCS approach by focusing on young people drawn from economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds, yet have the ‘sociological nous’ to locate their analysis 
within the deleterious conditions of neoliberalism and post-industrialism. Hence for 
these scholars, the ‘choices’ and identities of young people can only be understood 
through an analysis of the dynamic between individual lifestyles and social-structural 
inequalities: 
‘The movement from school to the labour market, albeit now 
through more circuitous pathways, has been the stock in trade of 
transitions studies but these cannot be understood in isolation from 
the wider domains of young people’s lives, including how youth 
cultural identities shape and are shaped by the transitions people 
make’. (MacDonald, 2011:438) 
 
Nayak’s work offers a rich ethnography of working-class adolescents that provides an 
insightful exploration of one group of ‘lads’ changing experiences of identity, 
employment and forms of leisure vis-à-vis new forms of post-industrial employment. 
Again, his work contains a more critical reading of the structural inequalities shaping 
these communities and identities of young men, concluding that different youth 
cultural identities can only be explained through first understanding their cultural 
identities, before mapping these back to the socio-economic terrain of post-industrial, 
North East England. His work also alludes to the significance of place, locality, 
regional identities and notably, social class in fashioning young groups and identities; 
for Nayak, class ‘is stitched into codes of respect, accent, dress, music, bodily 
adornment and comportment’ (Nayak, 2006:828). He therefore differs from the work 
of post-subculturalists who argue for the erosion of social class in the postmodern 
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epoch due to the identities that can be readily shaped via modes of consumption. 
Instead, Nayak (2006) looks at the various intra-class responses of those to 
postmodern transformations: while some working-class men were found to embrace 
consumer culture, those on the economic margins remained alienated by it and 
gravitated towards those ‘mundane’ activities that cultural criminologists have 
referred to (Ferrell et al., 2008). This included ‘street corner society’ (Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2006) and the eventual pursuit of more ‘exciting’, ‘transgressive’ leisure 
pursuits linked to drug taking and the attending of illegal raves (Nayak, 2006).  
 
Elsewhere, the Teesside studies of youth transitions in neighbourhoods of deprivation 
in the North East of England echo Nayak’s (2003; 2006) claim regarding the 
importance of understanding structural and economic issues in shaping youth cultural 
identities and practices (MacDonald and Marsh, 2005, Shildrick et al., 2013). 
Similarly, they are also critical of the supposed decline of class associated with 
postmodernity. For Shildrick and MacDonald (2006), issues of class that are redundant 
in the post-subculturalists’ account remain a dominant feature of contemporary youth 
cultural identity. Their work therefore questions the relevance and applicability of the 
post-subculturalists’ focus on classless, ‘spectacular’ and transitory youth cultures, 
and instead espouses an approach that focuses on ‘ordinary and less advantaged young 
people’ whose ‘leisure lives and consumption practices remain imbued with the facts 
of material and social circumstances’ (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2007:136). Indeed, 
for working-class youth cultures associated with criminal and drug markets, ‘street 
corner society…remains a central element of working – class subcultural identity’ 




From their ethnography and understanding of youth transitions in post-industrial, post-
Fordist settings, MacDonald and Marsh (2005) also stress the ‘class cultural 
inheritance’ evident within their sample. Hence, although the post-industrial, 
economic base has been significantly reformed from one once associated with 
industrial labour to one now populated by service and self-employed sectors, young 
people in these neighbourhoods, like the previous generation of their parents (who, at 
least, had traditional forms of industrial labour to find employment in) remain 
economically marginal, unemployed or excluded from the labour market (MacDonald 
and Marsh, 2005).  
Their ethnographic focus on youth cultures as regional, class-based responses to 
structural and economic inequality (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2007) is reminiscent of 
the work of the Marxist inspired Birmingham School. It also reflects the recent calls 
of Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts to understand and ‘attempt to connect the 
phenomena of youth subcultures to a general social and cultural historical analysis of 
the social formation’ (Jefferson and Hall, 2006:viii). In this sense, their work continues 
the established, rich ethnographic approaches within British social sciences, and also 
forms part of a resurgence within youth cultural studies linked to the subcultural 
responses of young people to social inequality (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2007). For 
these sociologists, ‘mundane’ activities such as hanging around on street corners and 
the associated ‘exciting’ activities that break the ‘hyper-banality’ (Hayward, 2004) of 
everyday life constitute solutions to ‘subcultural problems’ (Hayward and Young, 
2004; Martin, 2009). As such, youth cultural identities today are interpreted as a 
‘reaction to analogous transformations in working-class identity, community and 
culture, now taking place in the context of consumer capitalism’ (Martin, 2009:138).  
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Hence, their commitments to structural, ‘background’ factors avoids the post-
subculturalists’ thesis on the decline of the significance of class in postmodernity. For 
these recent writers, class is still a useful, analytical category through which to view 
youth identities, as are other structural factors related to ethnicity, gender and place 
(Nayak, 2003; 2006). The ethnographic methods employed by recent scholars in the 
field of youth cultural identities and cultural criminology provides critical insight into 
the everyday lives of those working-class young adults bearing the brunt of post-
industrial transformations, ontological insecurity (Young, 1999) unemployment 
(MacDonald et al., 2005), and the search for a degree of self-identity in conditions of 
unregulated consumerism, which for many young people, is beyond their control. 
Conclusion: Towards a New Reading of Contemporary Young Men 
The cultural, postmodern and ethnographic approaches reviewed in this chapter all 
attempt to analyse young people’s cultural identities under changing social conditions. 
Methodologically, all of the explanations of youth cultural identities locate their 
analysis within rich ethnographic approaches, continuing the ethnographic tradition 
prevalent within British studies of youth cultures. They also provide insights and 
commentaries on the construction of youth identities, albeit from contrasting 
epistemological positions; the CCCS and their Marxist, class-based account of ‘rituals 
of resistance’; the post-subculturalists ‘classless’, transitory, fragmented youth 
cultural identities; and the theoretical hybridization and ethnographic approach of 
cultural criminologists and contemporary writers on youth studies. Apart from the 
post-subculturalists, each school of thought identifies a broader socio-economic 
structure in the construction of young identities. Nevertheless, the post-subcultural 
commitment to defining youth under conditions of postmodernity does provide the 
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sociologist with a framework through which to understand the autonomous, 
individualistic expressions of cultural identity. From this perspective, youth cultural 
groups are seen as a result of individual lifestyle choices; consumption is the ‘chimera 
of choice in constructing subcultural identities’ (Blackman, 2005:12), and is thus 
detached from any explanation of the trajectories of young people engendered by 
social and cultural structures of society. The earlier work of the CCCS however, 
locates subcultures within a Marxist framework, viewing subcultural practices of 
working-class youth as a response to uncontrolled post-war economic restructuring 
and increasing social inequality. The cultural criminologists draw selectively from a 
plethora of theoretical perspectives including interactionism, critical criminology and 
the Marxist inspired work of the CCCS. This is underpinned by theories of 
postmodernity and the hybrid identities that are constructed and reconstructed via the 
broad connections of consumerism, subcultures and crime. The cultural criminologists 
elaborate this reading by identifying the ‘thrill’ of transgressive behaviour in response 
to the mundane, ‘hyper-banal’, postmodern, consumer society. The work of writers 
associated with recent analyses of youth cultures, although not strictly related to 
cultural criminology or the CCCS, shares a number of commonalities with both 
approaches, notably; their contextualisation of youth cultures and behaviour within 
broader socio and structural contexts; a concern with ‘ordinary’, working-class 
cultures; a focus on ‘mundane’ practices such as ‘street corner society’ in response to 
economic and consumer marginality (Nayak, 2006; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006); 
and the significance of social class in shaping youth cultural identities (Nayak, 2003; 
2006, Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006).  
 
As I have noted earlier, the weaknesses of the arguments expounded by each school 
of thought generally relates to issues of structure and agency. The over deterministic 
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Marxist teleology of the CCCS, and the post-subculturalists failure to deal with issues 
of class and socio-economic structures, as well as their uncritical view of consumer 
culture, are the respective flaws of these two positions. The more recent work by 
cultural criminologists and youth researchers have correctly identified these 
weaknesses and have attempted to transcend this dichotomy with an analysis of 
contemporary cultural identities of youth against a backdrop of post-Fordism and 
‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008). The application of this method derives 
from their in depth, qualitative ethnographic engagement.  
 
What is clear, however, is that the political economy that once defined youth 
subcultures - in line with the traditional Birmingham School approach – has now 
disintegrated, gradually fragmenting the traditional youth cultures that were once 
defined by the ecology of the working-class street or neighbourhood (Winlow and 
Hall, 2004; Hobbs, 2013). The gentrification of once working-class neighbourhoods 
has also led to an erosion of working-class cultures and forms of leisure entrenched in 
working-class parochialism. Stripped of the traditional industrial determinants that 
once fashioned the subcultural identities that dominated working-class community and 
street life, and where forms of delinquency and criminal behaviour were reliant upon 
this particular industrial, urban milieu, the subcultural thesis is somewhat outdated in 
the contemporary era. Neighbourhoods that have undergone de-industrialisation and 
subsequent regeneration have enabled the dissolution of once traditional forms of 
youth culture and behaviour, and removed the material foundation upon which 
traditional youth subcultures were established (Hobbs, 1988; 2006; 2013). The 
identities, cultures, and youthful collaborations that were created within the context of 
an industrial period have now changed, and the realities of contemporary post-
industrial life mean that the territorial based youthful cultures that once ‘accepted their 
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proletarian occupational futures and looked forward to traditional forms of leisure’ 
(Hobbs, 2013:115) no longer exist in the contemporary, ‘advanced marginal’ era. 
 
Indeed, we have already seen how Neighbourhoods A and B are now fragmented 
urban outposts of high unemployment, low income, and also immersed in traditional 
established markets of criminality (see Hobbs, 1988; Winlow, 2001). In the void 
created by post-industrialism, young people are now seeking alternative ways to 
construct identity and forge transitions into employment, and in the process adapting 
to the shifting economic terrain by seeking and carving out new niches in which to 
make a post-industrial ‘living’ (see also Hobbs, 2001; 2013).  
 
In this post-industrial context, where youth are making increasingly fragmented 
transitions into employment, forms of youth leisure and delinquent ‘road culture’26 are 
becoming increasingly ‘commodified’ (Winlow, 2004; Hobbs, 2013) within both 
neighbourhoods, as youth seek alternatives to the mundane reality of  post-industrial, 
‘McJobs’ (Hobbs, 2013). Drug dealing, theft, and street robbery are now ‘normalised’ 
activities for some of the participants who ‘make use’ of the SBI; a quick way to make 
a living in an urban context where traditional forms of employment and community 
have dissolved. Such activities also enable one to construct distinct identities that, in 
an era of intense personal competition and unregulated consumerism, enables one to 
gain respect, engender excitement and fun (Ferrell et al., 2008), and in the process, 
gain a foothold in the consumer market place by ‘getting paid’ (Hobbs, 2013:122).  
 
                                                          
26 ‘Road’ culture or ‘Road life’ as it has been referred to elsewhere (Gunter, 2008) refers to the street activities of a collective of 
young males explored in this thesis. I have used the term ‘Road’ in line with the terms application amongst London youth. Hence, 
‘Road’ life can be used interchangeably with ‘Street’ life, as it would be referred to in other urban locales in the UK. I follow 
Gunter’s (2008) definition of ‘Road life’, understood here as being:  ‘not about rebellion or hedonism, rather it is centred upon 
meeting  up with friends, ‘hanging on Road’, attending the youth club, raving, looking ‘links’  and ‘catching joke’. In essence, 
Road life is about friendships, routine and the familiar or doing nothing (Corrigan, 1979)’ 
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Hence, from recent studies associated with the connection between socio-economic 
processes and the production of ‘marginal’ groups (Wacquant, 2008; Shildrick et al., 
2013), I identify two central themes relevant to this thesis, notably: the ethnographic 
methods as a means of representing the lives of young people within microstructural 
settings; and the situating of social agency vis-à-vis youth cultural practices and 
behaviour within the context of advanced marginal societies.  
 The ethnographic methods favoured by Wacquant (2004; 2008) provides an important 
methodological tool for the study of contemporary youth cultures. The approach 
enables one to capture the lived social experiences of social actors and decode the 
symbolic importance of social, cultural and regional factors in their terms (Nayak, 
2003; 2006; MacDonald and Shildrick, 2007). Ethnographic examples focusing on the 
social experiences of young people within a British context include Parker’s (1974) 
study of young men from inner city Liverpool; Robins’ and Cohen’s (1978) research 
on a North London community in Knuckle Sandwich; and Corrigan’s (1979) analysis 
of youth in Sunderland in Smash Street Kids.   
Secondly, in an attempt to transcend the cultural studies’ and post-subcultural studies’ 
respective weaknesses of economic determinism and exaggerated cultural freedom of 
social agents, I seek to contextualise the ‘lived’ experiences of young people within 
an age of ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008). I argue that Wacquant’s concept 
of advanced marginality applies neatly to the de-industrialised locales researched in 
this thesis. Both locales represent two post-industrial neighbourhoods which are 
experiencing the deleterious effects of the changes associated with the process.  
Hence, I draw on ideas associated with advanced marginality to understand cultural 
practices and identities in the context of post-industrialism, unregulated consumerism 
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and new modes of neoliberal governance. I will go on to argue that the North East of 
England and London represent two fascinating case studies through which to explore 
the contemporary identities and transitions of young, working-class men in the context 
of a post-industrial, advanced marginal landscape. For this new epoch presents a 
number of social and cultural consequences for young, working-class men’s identities 
and transitional experiences. In understanding these experiences, I attempt to reveal 




Chapter 3: SBIs and the Regulation of Post-industrial Youth 
In the opening chapter I have examined various academic explanations for youth cultural identities, 
highlighting how these cultural descriptions have been shaped and fashioned by the broader social and 
political transformations associated with the transition from an industrial to post-industrial epoch. We 
have already seen how, against a backdrop of irretrievable economic decline that has impacted 
considerably on youth, the theoretical underpinnings upon which previous scholars have framed their 
work are no longer reliable. Present day young people now populate an increasingly fragmented post-
industrial social terrain in which working-class transitions to adulthood are no longer linear or stable, 
the result of which is the arrival of distinct forms of youthful collaborations, cultures and ‘deviant’ 
behaviours (Hobbs, 2013). As such, I have concluded with a ‘fresh’ approach intending to capture these 
youthful collaborations within the present context of a post-industrial, ‘advance marginal’ urban 
environment.  By following a similar line of enquiry, this chapter charts the evolving forms of youth 
governance that have advanced in England over recent years in the context of social, political and 
cultural transformations. I follow these developments to the present day, juxtaposing forms of youth 
governance with significant social developments which have contributed to the changing political and 
social preferences toward the governance of young people.  
The matters addressed underpin an examination of the role played by SBIs within broader, neoliberal 
strategies of youth governance. Within this chapter, I therefore contribute to the field of SBI analysis 
by locating how the services influencing and determining forms of SBI delivery – criminal justice, sport 
policy and youth work – have been characterised by neoliberal forms of governance that populate the 
era of ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008). These changes, I argue, have legitimised new, 
alternative forms of intervention to ‘deal’ with youth cultures redefined by the conditions of a post-
industrial economic base and an increasingly socially insecure population (Young, 2009; Wacquant, 
2009). Within this, SBIs are increasingly used to contribute to the ‘regulation’ of inner city youth, thus 
forming a significant component ‘of the neoliberal policy repertoire…aimed at generating social order 




Neoliberal Governance and Welfare Retrenchment 
The late 1970’s witnessed a transformation in political and economic practices, as the 
newly elected Thatcher government exerted their neoliberal agenda in a diversity of 
policy areas (Harvey, 2005:22).  Strongly influenced by a theoretical framework 
opposed to Keynesian state interventionist theories, Thatcher’s political agenda was 
‘a revolution in fiscal and social policies’, representing a ‘fierce determination to have 
done with the institutions and political ways of the social democratic state that has 
been consolidated in Britain after 1945’ (Harvey, 2005:22-23). Based on an ideology 
of free market principles that endorsed private property, individual autonomy and 
entrepreneurial freedoms, the Conservative government of the 1980’s sought to reform 
the British economy via: 
‘confronting trade union power, attacking all forms of social 
solidarity that hindered competitive flexibility (such as those 
expressed through municipal governance, and including the power 
of many professionals and their associations), dismantling or 
rollback the commitments of the welfare state, the privatization of 
public enterprises (including social housing), reducing taxes, 
encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and creating a favourable 
business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment’ 
(Harvey, 2005:23) 
 
The social changes that instigated a shift in these policies and a retreat from welfare 
orientated ideologies are neatly detailed in Garland’s (2001) The Culture of Control.  
For Garland (2001), criminal justice transformations were a significant consequence 
of these historical social shifts: social categories and classes that existed in modernity 
and provided support for welfare and state intervention had increasingly unstable 
attitudes toward the issue, instigated by altering demographic terrains, stratification 
and political loyalty that led influential sections of the working and middle class ‘to 
change their attitudes towards many of these policies – to see them as being at odds 
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with their actuarial interests and as benefiting groups that were underserving and 
increasingly dangerous’ (Garland, 2001:76). In this new ‘advanced liberal’ political 
context (see Rose, 2000), welfare policies intended for the most deprived were 
progressively viewed as ‘expensive luxuries that hard-working tax-payers could no 
longer afford’ (Garland, 2001:76). Through challenging the effectiveness of 
established welfare institutions, the politics of post-welfarism fashioned ‘new group 
relations and social attitudes – attitudes that were most sharply defined in relation to 
the problems of crime, welfare, and social order’ (Garland, 2001:76). These were 
‘often experienced and expressed as highly charged emotions of fear, resentment and 
hostility’ and ‘formed the social terrain upon which crime control policies were built 
in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Garland, 2001:76).  
 
The progression into a post-Fordist era of production then, directly influenced the 
terrain of political and social organisation. The political project of Thatcher instilled a 
framework based on the contradictory influences of neoliberalism and neo-
conservatism; on the one hand emphasising individual freedoms and unregulated 
economic markets, whilst on the other emphasising moral discipline (Garland, 
2001:98). Politically, this involved a ‘rolling back of the state’, whilst concurrently 
strengthening state institutions in an effort to become more authoritarian and 
regulatory than the previous Keynesian social framework. Establishing neoliberal 
influenced free markets would reverse the deleterious effects of the interventionist 
state, which was seen as the ‘catch all’ factor behind all of society’s problems: 
‘It’s faulty economic assumptions and permissive styles of thought 
lay at the root of all the new social and economic ills – low 
productivity, high taxes and inflation, the culture of dependency, 
declining respect for authority, the crisis of the family. The 
achievement of the welfare state were systematically discredited or 
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forgotten, and instead its limitations and failures came to stand 
centre-stage’ (Garland, 2001:98). 
 
Throughout the 1980’s then, Thatcher’s reversal of the cohesive elements of the 
welfare state, with its focus on equality and social justice, was characterised by 
neoliberal politics concerned with unregulated markets and ‘an unquestioning faith in 
the value of competition, enterprise, and incentives, as well as in the salutary effects 
of inequality and exposure to risk’ (Garland, 2001:99). Consequently, the political 
terrain of the 1980’s was marked by the dismantling of trade unions, unregulated 
financial markets, the privatization of the public sector, a reduction of welfare benefits, 
and a decrease in labour cost (Garland, 2001, Harvey, 2005). Together with tax cuts 
for the most well off and a new wave of entrepreneurial elites accumulating fortunes, 
the upshot was a widening of social divisions and inequality as a ‘skewed 
structure…encouraged the rich to work by making them richer and compelled the poor 
to work by making them poorer’ (Harvey, 2005:99). 
 
This period was also characterised by new ways of thinking about ‘the underclass’, 
clearly articulated in ‘neo-conservative’ theories of crime and delinquency associated 
with the work of US academics Charles Murray and James Q Wilson, and British 
counterparts Roger Scruton and Norman Dennis. Their brand of neo-conservative 
thinking was opposed to the left wing and liberal thought of the 1960s, which were 
seen as producing the social problems of succeeding years (Garland, 2001). 
Subsequently, the conservatives launched a moral campaign against forms of 
deviance, and political themes emphasising individual responsibility, self-regulated 
social actors and deterrence were firmly established in attempts to fashion a ‘a more 




Conservative proposals for such tighter regulation and control of the population were 
contradictory with their neoliberal economic policies of laissez faire markets, which 
were simultaneously releasing the entrepreneurial freedoms of individuals and 
businesses form political and social regulation. Yet during this period social problems 
were considered heavily class-based, and hence social control become focused and 
targeted on specific social groups, namely, the working-class (Wacquant, 2009). 
Therefore, as the rich enjoyed increased freedom and individualism conveyed through 
post-Fordist, neoliberal economic markets, the poor were to become more disciplined 
and subjected to an upsurge of punitive policies that characterised the majority of post-
war, neoliberal societies (Wacquant, 2008; 2009).  Thus, neo-conservatism 
communicated a moral stance espousing a reappearance of family values, self-control 
and educational achievement, but in reality its approach was located in the regulation 
and control of the behaviour of the so-called ‘underclass’: the unemployed, welfare 
recipients, immigrants, and criminals (Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2008; 2009).  
 
Debates surrounding the ‘behaviour’ of the underclass became an illustrative 
justification for social, economic and political interventions that effectively 
exacerbated the plight of the poor, and legitimised the instalment of a disciplinary, 
punitive state (Wacquant, 2009). Crime was seen as a problem of indiscipline and 
unregulated social and self-control, ‘a matter of wicked individuals who need to be 
deterred and who deserved to be punished’ (Garland, 2001:102). Hence, instead of 
highlighting the social factors behind crime, anti-social behaviour came to be seen as 
a response to negligent and lenient criminal justice policies, and thus individual, 
rational criminal tendencies were able to prosper. In this social context, it was no 
surprise that social problems such as street crime, drug abuse, and violence amplified: 




During this time, the management of offenders was an issue of installing and 
improving crime control methods alongside the punitive management of the ‘most 
dangerous’ sectors of society. Hence: 
‘Instead of idealism and humanity, penal policy discussions 
increasingly evoked cynicism about rehabilitative treatment, a 
distrust of penological experts, and a new righteousness about the 
importance and efficacy of punishment’. (Garland, 2001:102)  
 
This tough stance on law and order was reflected in the Criminal Justice Act of 1982 
and 1988, which introduced punitive measures relating to youth custody and parental 
fines, as well as the revitalisation of youth detention centres.  However, alongside an 
increasingly punitive sentencing structure was the development of ‘administrative 
criminology’ ideals which superseded post-war liberal positivism (Garland, 2001).  
The position, which focused on the prevention rather than the causes of criminality, 
argued for more manageable and situational crime control techniques. Such an 
approach situated crime as a social phenomenon that can be ‘managed’, reflecting the 
Conservatives’ criminological ‘governmental project’ which emphasised their 
commitment to cutting public spending and the idea of the community functioning as 
a crime control strategy (Jefferson and Shapland, 1994). As such, the neoliberal 
political agenda of the conservatives spawned a ‘new culture of crime control’ 
(Garland, 2001:167-192) which sought to minimise criminal opportunities, enhance 
situational crime controls and prevent interactions with crimogenic conditions. This 
incorporated not only the efforts of criminal justice institutions, but also the 
development of ‘a new apparatus of prevention and security’ (Garland, 2001:170). 
This involved crime control agencies ‘beyond the state’, including the mobilisation of 
civil society, public and private partnerships, third sector agencies, and local 
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authorities whose activities focused on issues of crime and control whilst the state 
‘governed from a distance’ (Garland, 2001:167). As Muncie (1999:345) suggests ‘it 
was this ideological shift which opened the door to strategies of prevention, and to the 
incorporation of a whole number of central government departments, local authorities 
and voluntary agencies into the business of crime control’. This subsequently led to 
the resurgence of sport within governmental social policies.  
 
Indeed, the 1981 inner city riots in Liverpool’s Toxteth and South London’s Brixton 
prompted a response from the government which positioned sport within a number of 
community crime prevention agencies to tackle social unrest and unemployment. The 
Scarman Report (1981), published in the immediate aftermath of the riots, referred to 
the public’s mistrust and resentment of the police, noting how policing methods during 
these times ‘can make the tensions which deprivation engenders worse’ (Scarman, 
1981:157). Consequently, sport featured in many police backed youth initiatives 
established to improve community relations (see Robins, 1990), based on the 
recommendations of the report which focused on not only community policing, 
housing, education provision and employment prospects for youth, but also on the 
‘need to educate children in the use of leisure’ (Scarman, 1981:205). Similarly, high 
levels of unemployment in urban areas in the 1980s resulted in the government’s 
approval of co-operative working between the Manpower Services Commission 
(MSC) and the newly installed Sports Council to establish the Action Sport campaign. 
As Houlihan and White (2002) note, at the time the MSC was financially supporting 
a number of youth schemes attempting to tackle inner city youth unemployment, 
including the Community Programme which went on to finance a number of initiatives 
to support Action Sport interventions. At this time, the Sport Council’s focus on inner 
city welfare was minimal. Yet the adoption of Action Sport ideals by the Sports 
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Council, however, was a response to growing concerns within the institution that 
bidding for grants on the basis of existing programmes was failing to attract treasury 
funding. Innovation was therefore needed, and the willingness of the Thatcher 
government to use sport as a tool for social and urban welfare provided the opportunity 
to attract further funding that would previously have been missed (Houlihan and 
White, 2002).  
 
The Action Sport programme, generally considered ‘the forerunner of many 
subsequent sports development projects’ (Coalter, 2007:11), supplied local authorities 
in a number of inner city areas with funding of £1 million a year between 1982 and 
1985. The objective of 15 Action Sport interventions operating in Birmingham and 
London was, in partnership with other social agencies, the development of sustainable 
sporting programmes for low-participant groups, such as the unemployed and ethnic 
minorities (Collins and Kay, 2003). 
 
At the time of the inner city disturbances in 1981, the Sports Council was already 
pioneering a programme of smaller sports programme run in conjunction with local 
authorities and the MSC. Targeting areas of high unemployment with significant 
ethnic minority populations (Houlihan and White, 2002), schemes were established in 
the inner city districts of Leicester and Birmingham with the intention of reducing 
boredom and developing community leaders; an approach designed to produce ‘street 
leadership’ in view of inner city social problems, which could be merged with a sports 
related activity schemes (Robins, 1990:26). Similarly, welfare orientated ideals are 
found in the aims of the Action Sport programmes installed after the riots of 1981. 
Here, the aims included the development of positive attitudes towards sport and 
physical activity amongst ethnic minority, inner city youth along with the development 
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of a multi-agency sport leadership programme, of which the effects on the social 
behaviour and attitudes of target groups could be monitored (Rigg, 1986:9-10). Such 
was the success of programmes, by 1987 there were up to 300 community sports 
leaders employed by local authorities (Houlihan and White, 2002).  
 
The introduction of Action Sport was significant for its promotion of sports 
development as a ‘legitimate local authority activity’ (Houlihan and White, 2002:38). 
The development of specific sport interventions within this agenda also signifies the 
origin of sports development activities within welfare policy. Indeed, a number of 
present-day SBIs, including the Home Office funded ‘Positive Futures’, have their 
organisational heritages within the Action Sport era (Coalter, 2007). During the 1980’s 
a number of football clubs also created community sport schemes that still persist 
today:the Arsenal Community programme was created in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1981 riots and was supported by the Action Sport programme to provide an 
innovative programme to encourage sport participation amongst inner city youth and 
rejuvenate the urban environment. The idea within a number of Action Sport 
programmes that sports interventions can deliver opportunities for the creation of 
improved police and community relations has also continued: the Kickz programme 
continues to offer sporting projects run in conjunction with the police and community 
schemes associated with football clubs.  
 
Criticisms levelled at the Action Sport campaign also reflect a number of 
contemporary concerns when assessing current sport based interventions (Crabbe et 
al., 2006). Coalter’s (1988:6) assertion that Action Sport Interventions were not 
sufficient in increasing participation amongst low participation groups is a common 
concern amongst contemporary sport policy commentators (Crabbe, 2008). Moreover, 
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resembling current studies of the effectiveness of sports based employability 
programmes (Kelly, 2011; 2012; Spaaij et al., 2012), Rigg (1988:6) concluded that the 
programme was ineffective at providing an alternative to paid employment.  
 
The replacement of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative Leader by John Major in 1990 
and the installation of the Labour government in 1997 brought with it a number of 
changes that impacted upon youth justice, sport policy, and ultimately, the application 
of SBIs. Indeed, the early 1990s signified a major transformation in juvenile justice – 
subsequently altered to ‘youth justice’ – as both the Conservatives and the Labour 
party foregrounded tough, punitive stances relating to ‘law and order’ over the 
diversionary and situational measures evident in the preceding decade (Pitts, 2001).  
New Labour, Youth Justice Reform, and a New Role for SBIs 
As Muncie (2006:770-771) notes, during the 1990s the pace of youth justice reform 
in England and Wales was ‘unprecedented’. This era was characterised by its ‘tough’ 
stance on crime and a ‘relentless stream of ‘crackdowns’, initiatives, targets, policy 
proposals, pilot schemes and legislative enactments’ aimed at responsibilising 
‘children, their families, and working-class communities’ (Muncie, 2006:771). The 
catalyst for this re-focus of policy can be accredited to the ‘moral panics’ around youth 
and crime that arose in the early 1990s in response to a number of highly publicised 
events. The murder of  two year old James Bulger in Bootle, Liverpool in 1993 was 
‘the catalyst for the consolidation of an authoritarian shift in youth justice…a shift 
which, in legal and policy initiatives, was replicated throughout all institutional 
responses to children and young people’ (Scraton, 1997:170). At the same time, highly 
emotive media reports regarding the ‘feral behaviour’ of young people and the 
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reference to them in derogatory animalistic tones 27 evoked a general ‘moral panic’ 
and the ‘folk devilling’ of young people amongst the populace regarding their 
perceived threat to society (Cohen, 1974).  
 
Legislation during the 1990’s, beginning with the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994, witnessed a reversal of the philosophy underpinning the 1991 Criminal 
Justice Act, instead espousing a punitive approach toward law and order, and in the 
process appeasing policy makers who believed the criminal justice system to be too 
soft on criminals (Tierney, 2010). New Labour’s motif of ‘tough on crime, tough on 
the causes on crime’ can be traced back to this era (Muncie, 2006).  Although issues 
of law and order diverged significantly between the Conservative and Labour parties 
during the 1980s, these became less pronounced during the 1990’s as New Labour 
developed their ‘third way’ ideology. As such, the old language of Labour – socialism, 
working-class, inclusion, equality – was gradually replaced by ideals attuned to the 
post-industrial era. Within this context, New Labour created a political agenda that 
would appeal to the electorate on a range on political issues, notably crime, which was 
equated with a tough stance on youth and criminals in the context of the emerging, 
aforementioned ‘moral panics’ surrounding youth crime. As such, New Labour 
positioned itself as the party of law and order, establishing a political hegemony 
through the creation of political capital by appealing to populist concerns (Pitts, 2003; 
Goldson and Muncie, 2006). In doing so, New Labour portrayed the treatment of crime 
based on the neoliberal ethos of individual responsibilisation, risk management, early 
intervention, and actuarial justice (Rose, 2000). 
 
                                                          
27  ‘Ratboy’ was the moniker coined by the media to describe a 14 year old ‘persistent criminal’ who lived rough in the ventilation 




New Labour’s flagship legislation – The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 – was based 
on these ideals and attempted to tackle the ‘failings’ of the previous Conservative 
government’s approach to juvenile justice. The act reflected the ‘zero tolerance’ 
approach to crime espoused by Tony Blair in the lead up to the 1997 election, and an 
approach in favour of early intervention to tackle ‘risk factors’ and hold young 
offenders and their parents responsible for their behaviour. A new range of penalties 
aimed at young offenders, such as the anti-social behaviour order (ASBOs) and 
parenting orders where therefore introduced in order to achieve the central tenant of 
the newly formed youth justice system; that is, the prevention of offending by children 
and young people.  
 
Within this new punitive context, SBIs performed as both a ‘prevention’ method for 
youth offending and an early intervention technique targeting ‘at risk’ youth (Kelly, 
2011). For New Labour, however, ‘disaffected’ youth was a ‘cross-cutting’ issue 
which incorporated a range of social problems, including, educational 
underachievement, family breakdown, drug use, and social exclusion, and thus could 
not be tackled via a single government department.  As Coalter (2007) articulates, 
during this time New Labour’s rhetoric of the third way and the idea of a cross cutting 
agenda to tackle wider social and economic problems meant sport now featured as a 
significant vehicle in achieving social policy goals, and in particular, the notion of 
‘social inclusion’.  
The adoption of social inclusion within New Labour policy reflected their movement 
away from traditional notions of ‘equality’ towards the vague concept of ‘social 
inclusion’ (Levitas, 2005). This repackaging of traditional Labour values was a joint 
response to the inequality of Thatcher’s neoliberal economic regime and an 
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increasingly globalised society (Levitas, 2005). At the heart of New Labour’s 
discourse was the creation of opportunities for the ‘socially excluded’ to gain access 
to mainstream society. Here, it is useful to consider Levitas (2005) model of three 
competing ‘discourses’ of social exclusion operating with New Labour policy: 
First, a ‘traditional’ redistributionist discourse (RED) related to left-leaning 
ideological thinking that views social exclusion as a multidimensional process 
spawned by a number of social factors. In contrast, a Moral Underclass Discourse 
(MUD) alters a focus from the structural factors behind poverty to one which equates 
exclusion with the moral behaviour and behavioural inadequacies of the excluded. 
Here, the excluded are culturally and behaviourally distinct from mainstream society 
and their values, and hence inclusion will only arise via behavioural modification. This 
was very much the dominant position of thinking during the Thatcher years, influenced 
by right wing US commentators, notably Charles Murray (1984). Finally, a Social 
Integrationist Theory (SID) relates exclusion to a detachment from the labour market 
and paid employment. Inclusion therefore results from integration into the existing 
social order. This discourse thus foregrounds the economic over the social (Lister, 
2005). For Levitas (2005:28), the social politics of New Labour relocated from a 
traditional Leftist RED discourse to a combination of MUD and SID. Hence, at the 
heart of New Labour’s discourse on social inclusion was to signify the importance of 
economic activity to erode the age old concerns of working-class worklessness and 
welfare dependency. The Social Exclusion Unit, established by New Labour after their 
installation in office in 1997, signified the importance of labour market participation 
amongst the socially excluded over attempts to rectify existing socio-economic 
equalities (Byrne, 2001; Levitas, 2005). As Houlihan and White (2002:216) noted at 
the time ‘this priority is incorporated into many of the contemporary sports-related 
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programmes delivered by SDOs designed, in one way or another, to make young 
people in particular more employable’.  
The Active Communities scheme was launched by the English Sports Council in 1998, 
adopting the recommendations of the PAT 10 Report (discussed below) through 
‘addressing social issues such as community safety, crime, drug abuse, truancy, 
multicultural development and community health’ (Houlihan and White, 2002:93). 
The Active communities programmes subsequently merged with what is now known 
as the ‘Positive Futures’ programme in 1999, the aims of which related to the reduction 
of anti-social behaviour, drug misuse, and crime amongst 10-16 year olds via a 
targeted approach between Sport England, the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordination Unit, 
and the Youth Justice Board (Houlihan and White, 2002). Local Authorities also 
contributed, providing existing activity programmes that could pass as appropriate 
Positive Futures programmes alongside the establishment of new projects in selected 
neighbourhoods. Targeting those ‘at risk of disengagement’, sporting programmes 
were delivered in an attempt to provide an alternative to crime and drug misuse via 
the establishment of educational programmes related to sporting activity and healthier 
lifestyles. As Houlihan and White (2002:215) suggested ‘Sports-specific objectives 
are clearly subordinated to youth welfare objectives.’ Initially funded by the 
government, English Sports Council and Youth Justice Board, the government’s 
support for the intervention was confirmed through an allocation of £5 million extra 
funding in 2001 (Houlihan and White, 2002). 
 
The Positive Futures programme represented a clearer illumination for the role of sport 
within government policy. Similarly, the publication of three significant documents – 
The Policy Action Team (PAT) 10 Report (1999) and the DCMS policy document’s 
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A Sporting Future for All (2000) and Game Plan (2002), provided further clarification 
regarding the role of sport in contribution toward social welfare objectives. Indeed, 
PAT 10 was established on behalf of New Labour’s Social Exclusion Unit in an 
attempt to illustrate the potential of sport towards social inclusion. The potential of 
sport was measured with regard to four key indicators – health, crime, employment 
and education – and how it could contribute to these cross cutting aspects with regard 
to ‘disaffected young people and people from ethnic minorities’ (DCMS, 1999:5). As 
such, programmes targeting disaffected youth involved partnerships between Sport 
England, the Youth Justice Board, the UK Anti-Drugs Coordination Unit and Local 
Authorities in attempts to provide alternatives to crime, drug misuse lifestyles and 
educational underachievement (Houlihan and White, 2002).  
The significance of tackling ‘social exclusion’ and the related ‘cross-cutting’ themes 
of crime, drug abuse and educational underachievement can be understood in terms of 
New Labour’s conception of a ‘social investment state’, whereby young people are 
depicted as ‘citizen workers of the future’ (Lister, 2005, cited in Kelly, 2011:4). A 
future orientated view of young people and their potential as future workers, then, is 
closely aligned with economic investment within New Labour policy, ‘where young 
people are valued for their status as future adults and portrayed as an investment’ 
(Kelly, 2011:4). Underpinning these social investment strategies was the view that 
sport could act as a suitable vehicle to promote the ‘self responsibilising active citizen’ 
through methods to direct the individual ‘into steps to realise well-being, a healthy 
lifestyle and educational benefits in particular’ (Green, 2006:225). This approach to 
policy was emphasised by a focus on ‘sport for good’, with New Labour demanding 
an array of aforementioned ‘cross-cutting’ social benefits arising from social 
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programmes, such as community cohesion, tackling social exclusion and encouraging 
social and economic regeneration (Collins, 2010).  
 
The DCMS document Game Plan’s (2002) focus on providing social exclusion and 
lifelong opportunity for young people epitomized New Labour’s stance towards social 
investment strategies and the broader social welfare agenda, with sport providing a 
‘unique contribution to tackling social exclusion in our society’ (Coalter, 2007:39). 
Game Plan was a landmark document in that it was the first sport policy document to 
be produced by two government departments – the Social Exclusion Unit and the 
DCMS – reflecting the ‘joined up thinking’ and cross cutting agenda of the New 
Labour government to tackle the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion.  Game 
Plan (2002) was thus seen as a more strategic approach to policy, with an emphasis 
on the use of sport to achieve non sporting objectives based on the recommendations 
in the PAT 10 (Bergsgard, et al., 2007).  
  
New Labour’s stance towards the social benefits of sport was further reinforced with 
the recent publication of a series of policy documents entitled Sport Playing its Part, 
in which sport was considered a key vehicle in achieving social outcomes related to 
reduced substance abuse and crime, community development and educational 
attainment (Sport England, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). In November 2008, this 
view was again articulated in Shaping Places through Sport (Sport England, 2008). 
These series of reports communicated the potential of sporting organisations and local 
initiatives and programmes in contributing to community cohesion (Sport England, 
2008a), reducing anti-social behaviour and crime (Sport England, 2008b), and 
developing personal skills and employability of disaffected youth (Sport England, 
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2008c), to produce New Labour’s ‘responsibilised’, ‘self-regulated’ citizen  (Lister, 
2005). 
 
New Labour’s logic of preventing the onset of criminal behaviour and establishing 
interventions, such as the sporting programmes detailed above, to produce 
‘responsibilised’ ‘work ready’ citizens willing to contribute to the neoliberal capitalist 
economy is derived from ‘advanced liberal’ modes of governance that have emerged 
over the last two decades (Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001). For Rose (2000), this neoliberal 
project has fashioned a number of actuarial controls designed to ‘govern at a distance’ 
the conduct of ‘the excluded’: 
‘[They are] subject to strategies of control. On the one hand, there 
are those strategies that seek to reaffiliate the excluded, through a 
principle of activity, and to reattach them to the circuits of civility: 
active labour market policies emphasizing the retraining of the 
unemployed, interventions to regenerate and empower 
disadvantaged communities and individuals, programmes to ‘re-
familiarize’ life in the inner cities. On the other hand, there are the 
strategies which deem affiliation impossible for certain individuals 
and sectors, and seek to manage these anti-citizens and marginal 
spaces through measures which seek to neutralize the dangers they 
pose’. (Rose, 2000:330)  
 
Within this context, an expanding ‘culture of control’ (Garland, 2001), composed of  
not only ‘state agencies of police, courts, prisons, probation and social work’, but also 
‘non-state agencies and organisations and the forces of civil society’ (Muncie, 
2006:773) function to expand the operations of state control in an attempt to fashion 
behaviour capable of navigating a neoliberal, post-welfare social order, that is, self-
governing, regulated ‘prudential subjects’ (O’Malley, 2006).  
The neoliberal ethos of responsibilisation of individuals, then, is evident within the 
New Labour government’s youth justice priorities, of which SBIs featured in a ‘joined 
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up’, multi-agency approach to tackle the ‘cross cutting’ themes of social exclusion and 
crime. Indeed, the expanding ‘culture of control’ has resulted in an amplification of 
community based surveillance programmes aimed at young people ‘at risk’ of 
offending. The emphasis on ‘risk management’ and actuarial justice within New 
Labour policy has subsequently enlarged the number of diversionary and rehabilitative 
community programmes, accomplished through the formation of a number of 
partnerships between criminal justice agencies, third sector and charity organisations, 
and social enterprises. Indeed, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act witnessed the 
establishment of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), subsequently expanding the 
responsibility of intervention beyond probation services and social workers 
(Chamberlain, 2013). The establishment of YOTs consisted of representatives from 
social services, probation, police and educational authorities ‘pulling together’ 
(Muncie, 2006:774) to manage provision and deliver a number of interventions aimed 
at young people (Goldson and Muncie, 2006).  In turn, this led to the creation of a 
number of alternative programmes, integrating voluntary organisations and 
community groups alongside statuary organisations as part of an expanding crime 
culture to responsibilise ‘disorderly’ youth, whilst the state ‘govern at a distance’ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992; Garland, 2001). The expansion of SBIs in the 1990s to tackle 
social objectives such as social inclusion and crime can be considered a natural 
consequence of these changes (Kelly, 2012). Such an interpretation is evident in the 
work of Ramon Spaaij (2009), who argues that SBIs now represent a component of 
‘the neo liberal policy repertoire’ aimed at ‘regulating’ youth within disadvantaged, 
urban areas (Spaaij, 2009:263). Continuation and similarities with this theme can be 
seen in the current Conservative and Liberal Democratic coalition government, 
although, as I will argue, in the context of evolving policies and techniques of control.  
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The Coalition Government: Big Society and Payment by Results 
The installation of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition government in 
May 2010 signalled a further shift in the governance of young people. The Coalition 
Agreement (HM Government, 2010:23) clearly stated the need for an overhaul of the 
previous system of rehabilitation which had resulted in ‘record spending on 
incarceration and the doubling of the prison population since 1993’ (Mythen, Walklate 
and Kemshall, 2012:3). Coined the ‘rehabilitation revolution’, the campaign signalled 
an emphasis on restorative justice to ‘tackle anti-social behaviour and low-level crime’ 
(HM Government, 2010:24) and confront repeat offending, a problem that, according 
to the Ministry of Justice (2010:2), sees almost half of offenders who are released from 
prison reoffend within a year, with up to three quarters reconvicted of an offence 
within a decade. The subsequent publication of the Green Paper, Breaking the Cycle 
in December 2010 (Ministry of Justice, 2010) emphasised a commitment to tackling 
crime via specific components of the ‘rehabilitation revolution’ agenda: reforming the 
‘outdated, criminal justice system, introducing restorative justice based on 
‘punishment and payback’ whereby law breakers ‘face the robust and demanding 
punishments which the public expects’, and the installation of a new ‘payment by 
results’ (Hereafter, PbR) system ‘ to pay providers to reduce reoffending, paid for by 
the savings this will generate for the criminal justice system’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2010:38).  
 
The effective functioning of the proposed PbR system is related to a set of newly 
installed processes within the criminal justice system, notably: the increased 
involvement of voluntary agencies and private sector companies in the rehabilitation 
of criminals; a reworking of sentencing guidelines; more tougher community services; 
the removal of  welfare benefits for offenders who fail to comply with probation and 
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supervision orders; compulsory drug intervention and rehabilitation programmes; 
restorative justice services based on a ‘victims fund’ which offenders pay into via work 
undertaken in custodial sentences; and a decentralisation of probation services (see 
Ministry of Justice, 2010; The Conservative Party, 2010; Mythen et al., 2012).  
 
These criminal justice changes have surfaced within a broader context of changing 
modes of governance installed by the Coalition government following their election 
in May 2010. It is necessary here to highlight these developments to position these 
contemporary criminal justice developments within a broader political context.  
 
The government’s flagship campaign, the ‘Big Society’, represents an increased role 
and responsibility for private companies and voluntary organisations in delivering 
public services. The decentralization of services reflects the Conservatives’ manifesto 
commitment to collective community action through ‘redistributing power from the 
state to society; from the centre to local’ (Conservative Party 2010).  The Big Society 
then, is about empowering communities by passing decision-making powers to local 
groups; opening up public services to give charities, social enterprises and private 
companies the opportunity to offer high-quality services; and promoting social action 
by encouraging individuals to be proactive in local communities (Cabinet Office, 
2011). Alongside local communities and individuals, government sees the voluntary 
sector as essential to producing the Big Society, recognising the potential of voluntary 
organizations to ‘mobilize and support people’ and ‘play an even more influential role 
in shaping a stronger sense of society and improving peoples’ lives’ (Cabinet Office 
2011:3).  
 
Whilst for some, the ideological elements of Big Society rhetoric may sound 
appealing, the reality appears problematic. Indeed, alongside this idealism is the reality 
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of continual austerity measures. For those operating within the context of the economic 
downturn, concerns appear whether third sector organisations, social enterprises and 
charities will have the capacity to deliver quality services and maintain sufficient 
standards on behalf of the state. Sir Stephen Bubb, Head of Association of Chief 
Executives of Voluntary Organizations, adopts such as position: 
‘If you want to build a bigger society you have got to have the 
foundation there and that’s the charities, the social enterprises, the 
community groups and they are the very ones that are being hit. 
They are making redundancies, they are cutting the work they do in 
communities’. (Bubb, 2011:1, cited in Mythen et al., 2012:3)  
 
Whilst The Conservative Party has been quick to champion ‘Big Society’ ideals, they 
appear to represent a continuation of the traditional Conservative governance of a 
smaller interventionist state and the ‘entrepreneurial freedom’ of individuals and 
communities, typified within Thatcher’s neoliberal state in the 1980s. Similarly, 
although New Labour have questioned the reality of achieving the ideals associated 
with the Big Society, the campaign is not dissimilar from their ‘social investment state’ 
and the decentralisation of responsibilities for tackling social and welfare problems as 
part of the ‘joined-up’ approach to social exclusion in the 2000s (Lewis, 2005). The 
development of The Compact, a strategic document that sought to develop a closer 
working partnership between the government and voluntary sector, elevated the third 
sector onto the UK policy agenda during New Labour’s reign, resulting in a more 
‘purposive stance towards the third sector in service delivery and policy 
implementation’ (Kendall, 2003:2) 
 
Within the current context, the process of decentralization as part of the ideological 
pillars of the Big Society has manifested itself in the encouragement of public/private 
partnerships and the ‘mainstreaming’ of voluntary services to bring about social 
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change  (Cabinet Office 2011:3). The use of local and community based interventions 
and programmes to deliver state policies signifies the Coalition government’s ‘desire 
to manage resources in a less hierarchical way and to draw in a broader range of 
stakeholders on the delivery of key services to the public’ (Mythen et al., 2012:4). As 
such, a number of voluntary and third sector organisations, alongside private sector 
organisations and social enterprises, are expected to play their part in supporting and 
delivering services on behalf of the criminal justice system, most notably in relation 
to the aforementioned ‘rehabilitative revolution’ (Fox and Alberton, 2011; Myhten et 
al., 2012).  
 
The ‘rehabilitation revolution’ is based upon a series of measures and principles ‘that 
decentralize provision for offender management and encourage solutions to 
reoffending that are connected to mark principles of competition between providers’ 
(Mythen et al., 2010:4). Orientated towards outcomes, the Coalition government 
proposes that the decentralization of rehabilitation services will provide a cost 
effective, more efficient method of reducing reoffending (Ministry of Justice, 2010).  
 
The approach therefore seeks to develop a more integrated method to the management 
of offenders via reinforced partnerships between the prison and probation service 
(Morgan, 2012) and the launch of more effective interventions to reduce the rate of re-
offending (Ministry of Justice, 2010). The new framework proposes a system whereby 
individualised, tailored programmes replace a ‘one size fits all’ approach to tackling 
re-offending, hence ‘responsibility for the delivery of rehabilitative interventions will 
be transferred to a private company, working with both trained probation officers and 
third sector partners to encourage innovative practice’ (Maguire, 2012:489). Within 
this framework, voluntary organisations are expected to ‘situate and brand themselves 
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and jostle for optimum position’ (Mythen et al., 2012:5) in a developing sector of 
rehabilitative provision.  
 
Significant here, is the economic approach underpinning the ‘rehabilitative 
revolution’, that is, Payments by Results (PbR). Fox and Albertson provide a succinct 
definition, along with the supposed merits of the approach: 
‘PbR allows the government to pay a provider of services on the 
basis of the outcomes their service achieves than the inputs or 
outputs the provider delivers. It is suggested, by focusing reward on 
outcomes and providing minimal prescription as to how these 
outcomes should be achieved, payment by results models will drive 
greater efficiency, innovation and impact in tackling major social 
problems’. (Fox and Albertson, 2011:397) 
 
The use of a PbR schemes within the criminal justice system is not entirely new. The 
first pilot scheme for offender management occurred under the New Labour 
government in 2010 within Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough, where the 
Social Impact Bond was trialled to fund ‘intensive services and mentoring delivered 
by the voluntary and community sector’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010:41) for prisoners 
on short term sentences. The scheme was based on a PbR model, whereby voluntary 
services were paid depending on their ability to achieve ‘outcomes’ relating to the 
offending behaviour of prisoners. Since the launching of the scheme, PbR schemes 
represent ‘the dominant financial mechanism for delivering the coalition’s criminal 
justice reform package’ (Clinks, 2010: 2, cited in Mythen et al., 2012:6).  
 
A further example of PbR services are found in the proposals of the Work Programme 
as set out by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). The innovative 
programme is labelled ‘the centrepiece of the Government’s plans to reform welfare - 
to - work provision in the UK’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010:2). The 
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Work Programme encompasses a range of interventions designed to move the 
unemployed into sustainable employment, delivered by private sector organisations 
across the UK. Contracts are built on a PbR scheme based on the achievement of three 
employability ‘targets’: an initial fee for the successful engagement of a participant; 
an outcome fee for the successful employment of a participant, and a sustainability 
fee; achieved when participants remain in work for a sustained period (Department of 
Work and Pensions, 2010).  
Worklessness, Criminal Justice, and the Management of Risk 
The PbR system reflects an established tradition within neoliberal, advanced industrial 
nations whereby new forms of governance related to social, political and economic 
affairs have emerged (Rose, 1996; Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009). With regard to 
worklessness and criminal justice, recent years have witnessed an erosion of penal-
welfare policies for the ‘correction’ of social problems, to one in which a new ‘culture’ 
of strategies have appeared underpinned by risk assessment and behavioural 
management techniques (Garland, 2001; Muncie and Goldson, 2006; Gray, 2009). 
Governmentality theorists (see for example, Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 2000; 
Garland, 2001), influenced by Foucault’s analysis of the micro-physics of power28 
have provided insights into the governance of young people in contemporary 
neoliberal, global society.  
                                                          
28 For Foucault, the application of political power is distributed via a collection of non-state sites and agencies, rather than through 
a centralized sovereign state. Governmentality, then, refers to an ‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ (Foucualt, 
1975:20). He was interested in how these agencies and sites ‘regulate’ and ‘contain’ individuals and the populace to construct 
these strategies of Governmentality. Post-Foucauldian approaches have built upon these ideas to analyse the techniques of 




Nikolas Rose, for example, rejects any notion of the existence of centralized political 
authority, and instead argues that there are multiple microsites of governance or 
‘centres of calculation and action’ networked across time and space in chains of 
alliance which allow individuals, groups and communities to be governed ‘at a 
distance’. In this process a ‘complex set of actors, powers, institutions and bodies of 
knowledge that comprise expertise have come to play a crucial role’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992:188) in translating or implementing political rationalities and governmental 
technologies into day-to-day practice in a diversity of locations. 
Within the post-Fordist, flexible labour market era then, the combination of low 
wages, insecure employment, and locales of structural unemployment has led to the 
creation of a workforce ‘required for and required to do the poor work that flexible 
labour markets create’ (Shildrick et al., 2012:200). This has similarities with Byrne’s 
(2005) Marxist inspired idea of a ‘reserve army of labour’, a social group ‘intrinsic’ to 
the functioning of the capitalist economy (Byrne, 1995:95). Indeed, from Byrne’s 
perspective, social exclusion and job insecurity is ‘a necessary and inherent 
characteristic of unequal post-industrial capitalism’ (Byrne, 1999:173). Hence, rather 
than being a discarded ‘underclass’, ‘reserve army’ workers are required for the 
effective functioning of post-Fordist, capitalist nations in a competitive, globalised, 
neoliberal world (Byrne, 1999:9).  
 
If neoliberal societies require a reserve army of labourers to operate within post-
Fordist flexible labour markets, then the creation of social policies are required that 
will encourage the development of economic markets that characterise post-Fordist 
capitalism (Byrne, 1999; Shildrick et al., 2012). Hence, the formation of a number of 
‘welfare to work’ schemes under New Labour to create self-regulated, post-Fordist 
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workers capable of navigating the post-industrial economic landscape are evidence of 
Byrne’s idea that: 
‘…Welfare to work is supply side. The interpretation is that workers 
are defective, not morally or even rationally as was the 
understanding in the early 19th Century…but in terms of personal 
deficits. The obligation on them is to redress these personal deficits, 
as a condition of benefit, in order to make themselves fit for labour. 
There is no specification of the conditions of that labour as having 
to represent ‘good work’. The logic of the employment form of 
much of post-industrial capitalism is that the work will not be good 
work. However, people have to do it…Welfare to Work is a 
constitutive process for this’. (Byrne, 1999:99) 
 
In Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (2009), 
Wacqaunt notes the homogenisation of welfare and criminal justice policies under 
advanced neoliberal forms of governance. The convergence of themes underpinning 
these two strands of government – a philosophy of moral behaviourism based on 
deterrence, individual responsibility, stigma and risk management – is viewed as a 
direct response to ‘social insecurity wrought by the fragmentation of wage labour’ 
(Wacquant, 2009: 198). The ‘penalization of poverty’, then, as Wacquant (2009) 
suggests, sees a marrying together of supervisory workfare and penal justice 
partnerships and policies to create a ‘single operational mesh flung at the same 
clientele mired in the fissures and ditches of the dualizing metropolis’ (Wacquant, 
2009:199). Wacquant argues this is a common feature in the politics of social 
insecurity, evident within advanced, western governments. The convergence of 
welfare and justice policies work together to contain the social problems associated 
with inner city neighbourhoods – unemployment, welfare dependency, gang crime – 
and discipline ‘the precarious fractions of post-industrial working-class’ spawned by 
a post-Fordist, capitalist economy (Wacquant, 2009:198). Here, Wacquant (2008; 
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2009) shares similarities with David Byrne’s understanding of welfare to work 
programmes acting as a means to move the ‘precarious’ into secondary, low pay labour 
markets in efforts to sustain an unequal, capitalist economy. The below passage neatly 
clarifies Wacquant’s position: 
 
‘disciplinary ‘workfare’ and castigatory ‘prison fare’ supervise the 
same dispossessed and dishonoured populations destabilized by the 
dissolution of the Fordist-Keynesian compact and concentrated in the 
disparaged districts of the polarizing city…putting the marginalized 
fractions of the post-industrial working-class under stern tutelage 
guided by moral behaviourism offers a prime theatrical stage onto 
which governing elites can project the authority of the state and shore 
up the deficit of legitimacy they suffer whenever they forsake its 
established missions of social and economic protection’. (Wacquant, 
2011:2)  
 
The convergence of welfare and justice policies designed to discipline the precarious 
fractions of the working-class (Wacquant, 2009) is underpinned by a ‘language of risk’ 
based on actuarial understandings and ‘styles of reasoning’ (Gray, 2006:447). 
Discourses of ‘risk’, evident within New Labour’s adherence to early intervention 
programmes that sought to provide scientific approaches to the governance of youth, 
equate social exclusion and criminality with the ‘moral inadequacies’ and ‘personal 
shortcomings’ of individuals. Detached from any external social influences, the 
criminal ‘actor’ is depicted as a ‘rational agent who chooses crime in the light of a 
calculus of potential benefits and costs’ (Rose, 2000:322). Subsequently ‘schemes for 
the retraining of offenders portray the prisoner as one who lacks the entrepreneurial 
skills to actualize himself in a competitive society’ (Rose, 2000:322). Within this 
context, there has been emergence and  increased legitimation of ‘strategies of 
responsibilisation’, designed to ‘transform and reconstruct the ‘young offender’ into 
prudential self-governing ‘young citizens’ ready to manage their risks and take 
responsibility for them in ways that bring their motivations and actions fully into line 
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with the neoliberal project of governing’ (Phoenix and Kelly, 2013:421). The 
underlying design of government sponsored Education, Training, Employment (ETE)  
and the presence of multi-agency Youth Offending Teams within them under the 
previous New Labour government was based on this type of thinking, equating the 
problems of worklessness and anti-social behaviour with the personal shortcomings 
of individuals with regard to attitudes to work and employability ‘skills’ (Gray, 
2006:447).   
The proliferation of forms of intervention, including SBIs, can be considered a 
response to these concerns, often operating as part of broader ‘community safety’ 
strategies attempting to maintain social order (Spaaij, 2009; Kelly, 2011; 2012).   
The Current Context 
It can be argued that a continuation of these ideological preferences are evident within 
the current Coalition’s discourse and policy on worklessness and criminal justice, 
notably via the persistence of neoliberal modes of governance that emphasize 
economic rationality in welfare (see Wiggan, 2012). The supposed ‘greater efficacy’ 
and ‘value for money’ through the decentralising of public services and the 
implementation of a PbR scheme are depicted as  ‘an economic and moral imperative’ 
(Wiggan, 2012:3) for the reversal of the economic downturn, a reduction in the budget 
deficit, and the mending of ‘broken Britain’ (Conservative Party, 2010:13). The 
Coalition’s approach to crime, poverty, and unemployment therefore can be seen as 
emphasising economic rationality and building on New Labour’s punitive welfare 
system, and in the process ‘renew[s] the validity of behavioural explanations for social 
problems and tie[s] this to the supposed failure of ‘statist’ intervention under New 




A continuation of ‘actuarial’, ‘risk-based’ rationalities can also be found in political 
discourse and policy. In 2010, the Independent Commission for Youth Crime 
published a major report Time for a Fresh Start (Independent Commission, 2010), 
which subjected the youth justice system in England and Wales to critical inspection. 
The commission’s report emphasised an overhaul of New Labour’s approach to youth 
justice, calling for a set of proposals to influence subsequent policy. The commission 
detailed the ‘continuing and deep rooted failings’ (Independent Commission, 2010:17) 
of the contemporary system, highlighting the ‘incongruous juxtaposition of stable, if 
not diminishing, patterns of youth crime alongside hyperbolic rhetoric and crude 
political posturing’ (Goldson, 2011:5). However, despite its criticism of the previous 
New Labour approach, the report proposed a set of reforms based on a continuation of 
discourses of prevention and risk prevention that continue to pervade the 
contemporary criminal justice landscape: 
‘Although there is reason to be wary of over-simplistic interpretations or 
applications of the evidence, we believe an understanding of ‘risk’ and 
‘protective’ (or ‘promotive’) factors provides a valuable basis for planning and 
implementing prevention strategies’. (Independent Commission, 2010:39) 
 
Similarly, the Commission states a commitment to the neoliberal logic of 
responsibilisation that informs programmes of early intervention in the youth justice 
system:  
‘We recommend an approach that will encourage young offenders 
to face up the consequences of their actions and accept 
responsibility’. (Independent Commission, 2010:5)  
 
The Commission’s report appears to be influential in the set of changes installed by 
the Coalition Government after their election victory in May 2010 (Goldson, 2011). 
The Green Paper Breaking the Cycle (2010) delineates a range of proposals that 
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continue to pursue an early intervention, actuarial agenda toward the rehabilitation of 
offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2010:7).  Within the paper’s ‘youth justice’ chapter, 
proposals for the prevention of crime are bedded within a conceptual tone stressing 
the importance of early intervention:  
‘Preventing crime by young people is one of the most cost effective 
ways to provide long term benefit for communities. A high 
proportion of the most prolific adult offenders commit their first 
crimes at a very early age. Intervening early in the lives of children 
at risk and their families, before behaviour becomes entrenched, can 
present our best chance to break the cycle of crime’. (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010:67-68) 
 
Inevitably, the paper embraces the notion of ‘risk’ – which has achieved ‘a near 
hegemonic status in contemporary youth justice discourse’ (Goldson, 2011:12) - 
articulating a need to provide interventions and programmes based on the elimination 
of said factors. A particular focus is on interventions geared towards gang crime; a 
recent, prominent concern within youth justice discourse: 
‘When children are involved in low-level crime or anti-social 
behaviour our aim is to intervene effectively to turn them away from 
crime. We are committed to engaging with those at risk – for example 
young people connected with gangs – and creating the opportunities 
for a life away from crime’. (Ministry of Justice, 2010:68) 
 
Similar themes are expressed in the 2011 publication Ending Gang and Youth Violence 
(HM Government, 2011a), published following the disorder in a number of cities 
across England in August 2011, an occurrence the government attributed in part to the 
presence of gangs. The report details a number of programmes aimed at tackling gang 
violence, again espousing an approach reliant on the eradication of risk factors as a 
basis for the success of intervention programmes. Indeed, the report details a number 
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of ‘usual suspects’ all too common within contemporary youth justice discourse 
(Goldson, 2011) - dysfunctional families, truancy, parental substance abuse, exclusion 
from school, repeat offending (HM Government, 2010:17) - which interventions are 
required to tackle. As such, ‘risk assessment’ tools are required to identify the specific 
requirements of each individual that need to be addressed: 
‘At every stage of the young person’s life story, the public sector 
agencies with which they have most contact – from health visitors, 
to GPs, to teachers, to A&E departments and Jobcentre Plus staff – 
need to be alert to the risk factors that may predict future violence 
and know what to do about them. That means simple risk assessment 
tools – like the ones already widely in use for domestic violence: 
clear arrangements for sharing information about risk with other 
agencies; agreed referral arrangements to ensure young people get 
the targeted support they need; and, case management arrangements 
which bring agencies together to share accountability for outcomes 
and track progress’. (HM Government, 2011a:49-50)  
 
Both paper’s fundamental aims are the reduction of reoffending, with an emphasis on 
two core principles: first, the use of restorative justice and, secondly: the need for 
‘multi-agency partnerships’ (HM Government, 2010: 49) to tackle and ‘address the 
multiple disadvantages that many young offenders have’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2010:68). The Green paper also details proposals to simplify out-of-court disposals in 
an attempt to ‘divert [young people] from entering into a life of crime’ and reduce the 
need for custody (Ministry of Justice, 2010:12). The emphasis is clearly on economic 
efficiency, the criminal justice system seen as ‘an expensive way of giving the public 
a break from offenders, before they return to commit more crimes’ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010:1). As such, the use of out-of-court disposals relate to a cost effective 
method of greater discretion provided to the police and local authorities to address 
offending, diverting offenders away from the criminal justice system and toward the 
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decentralised  services and ‘professionals working with the young people on the 
ground’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010:69). This development is underpinned by a PbR 
‘path finding’ approach in an attempt to reduce the use of youth custody. Led by the 
Youth Justice Board and Ministry of Justice, the approach enables a consortia of local 
authorities, voluntary services, and a mixture of public and private services to function 
as ‘pathfinders’ to design and determine community based approaches to 
rehabilitation. The initiative allocates central funds via the Ministry of Justice towards 
local authorities who will be paid based on their ability to meet agreed targets, such as 
a reduction in reoffending. The approach therefore gives ‘local authorities freedom 
and flexibility to develop and implement locally tailored interventions, to respond to 
local needs and demands’ (Youth Justice Board, 2010). In one London borough, this 
approach has been used by Local Authority Children’s services, Local Authority Early 
Intervention teams, and SBIs to design programmes to intercept and intervene in 
young people susceptible to gang activity and membership: indeed, the SBI under 
investigation was part of a broader approach encompassing these partnerships that 
aimed to progress young people into a positive destination, reduce the distance these 
young people were from the labour market, and to impress upon them opportunities 
available beyond gangs   
 
The welfare system is also underpinned by a similar PbR system in attempts to address 
poverty, unemployment and welfare dependency. Both the Green Paper 21st Century 
Welfare (DWP, 2010) and the White paper Universal Credit: Welfare the Works 
(DWP, 2011), reiterate a position that locates the causes of poverty and unemployment 
as a result of individual actions and behaviour driven by a dependency on welfare 
(Wiggan, 2012:6). The forward from 21st Century Welfare is embedded in a discourse 
that reinforces welfare benefits as morally and socially destructive: 
117 
 
‘The benefits system has shaped the poorest in a way that has 
trapped generation after generation in a spiral of dependency and 
poverty. This has cost the country billions of pounds in cash 
payments and billions more in meeting the social costs of failure’. 
(DWP, 2010:1)  
 
The installation of multi-partnership work to welfare schemes to tackle the 
Conservative’s long term commitment to reducing the cost of the welfare system and 
reducing welfare dependency and poverty is symbolic of neoliberal preferences 
toward the withdrawal of state from areas of social provision (Harvey, 2005:3). 
Indeed, the Department for Work and Pensions’ flagship Work Programme, launched 
in 2011, contracts a number of private, voluntary and public sector organisations to 
help both benefits claimants and those ‘at risk of failing into this group…the skills, 
training and experience they need to get a job’ (DWP, 2012:2). These ‘providers’ are 
funded primarily for ‘outcomes’ based on sustainable employment (DWP, 2012) in 
contrast to upfront payments in an attempt to provide ‘better value for the taxpayer’ 
(DWP, 2012:2): After receiving an initial payment for an engagement with a 
participant, providers are paid a Job Outcome Payment after helping the participant 
into 6 months of employment (or 3 months with ‘harder-to-reach’ groups), followed 
by a ‘sustainability’ payment for every 4 weeks the participant is engaged after that 
(DWP, 2012). The approach also adheres to neoliberal ideals of entrepreneurial 
freedom within an institutional framework characterised by competitive markets: 
 
‘We believe competition between providers delivering the Work 
Programme will help produce better results…if one provider is 
performing significantly better than the others in the area, and 
certain other conditions are fulfilled, instead of sending equal 
numbers of jobseekers to each main provider, we have the power to 
refer more participants to the better-performing provider in the area 
and to refer more participants to those providers delivering better 
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results. This means that not only will providers who aren’t helping 
people into work not get paid as they aren’t producing results, they 
will also find that they receive fewer participants. This means that, 
over time, the best performing providers get the most participants to 
work with’. (DWP, 2012:4)  
 
A similar, less well-publicised scheme known as the Flexible Support Fund (FSF) was 
launched in April 2011 to replace the abolished discretionary funds programmes such 
as the Deprived Areas Fund, the Adviser Discretion Fund, and the Travel to Interview 
Scheme. The FSF is aimed at helping benefit claimants progress into employment, 
education or training and provides Jobcentre Plus areas greater freedom and discretion 
in how to support individuals into work. This is based on an assessment of individual 
support needs and the condition of the local labour market, thus resulting in 
geographical variation in how the fund is deployed. Area managers are responsible for 
the distribution of funds within their area, and for the criteria delineating local 
priorities and success factors. Working within these parameters, Jobcentre plus 
Advisers have the option to individually assess jobseekers based on their needs and 
requirements to progress into employment. This includes the awarding of funding to 
local partnerships, activities and services to address worklessness and underlying 
barriers to employment. These ‘partnerships’ include a range of public, private and 
voluntary services, which are awarded by a PbR system linked to their ability to 
engage jobcentre referrals and progress them into areas of employment, education or 
training. Voluntary services involved in these schemes include a number of schemes 
associated with the development of ‘employability’ skills for ‘NEETs’ (not in 
employment, education or training). These involve a number of SBIs that aim to use 
sport as an initial ‘hook’ before providing employability support based on the demands 
119 
 
of the Jobcentre plus. This includes the SBI under investigation in the present piece of 
research.   
 
The rhetoric within the Coalition’s proposals for the criminal justice system (Ministry 
of Justice, 2010; HM Government, 2011a) and tackling welfare (DWP, 2011) both 
espouse a discourse characterised by ‘actuarialism’, ‘individual responsibility’ and 
‘intervention’. Early intervention programmes, evident within the Green Paper 
Breaking the Cycle (2010) and Ending Gang and Youth Violence (HM Government, 
2011), are underpinned by an aetiological understanding that emphasises the 
association between ‘risk factors’ and criminality (Farrington, 1996). Indeed, the 
paper stresses the need for interventions to reduce risk factors and the onset of future 
offending by focusing on those considered ‘at risk’ (see HM Government, 2011:49-
50). Similarly, the government’s ‘welfare to work’ scheme and the newly installed 
FSF are supported by a comparable ‘risk assessment’ logic that aims to ‘remove 
claimants’ barriers to work’ (DWP, 2011:2) via specific programmes or interventions. 
Sport Based Interventions: A New Form of Social Control 
The similarities in political discourse linked to recent reforms in the welfare and the 
criminal justice systems under the present Coalition government, I argue, reflect 
Wacquant’s (2009) vision of a convergence of penal and welfare ideals occurring in 
most post-industrial countries over the last 30 years which has created ‘a single 
apparatus for the cultural capture and behavioural control of marginal populations’ 
Wacquant (2009:xix). For Wacquant, the programmatic convergence and practical 
interlock of welfare and penal policies are a response to rising social insecurity 
developing out of an epoch characterised by post-Fordist, insecure wage labour and 
increased inequality (Wacquant, 2009:xv). This social insecurity has developed within 
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an evolving social and economic context that increasingly links criminal behaviour 
and deviant behaviour to the discourse of personal irresponsibility and immorality 
(Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001). The post-industrial working-class are therefore now 
subjected to the rolling out of a ‘culture of control’ (Garland, 2001), and the ‘double 
regulation’ of social and penal policies (Wacquant, 2009:xviii). This is reminiscent of 
Rose’s suggestion that neoliberal project has fashioned a number of actuarial controls 
designed to ‘govern at a distance’ the conduct of ‘the excluded’: 
‘On the one hand, there are those strategies that seek to reaffiliate 
the excluded, through a principle of activity, and to reattach them to 
the circuits of civility: active labour market policies emphasizing the 
retraining of the unemployed, interventions to regenerate and 
empower disadvantaged communities and individuals, programmes 
to ‘re-familiarize’ life in the inner cities. On the other hand, there 
are the strategies which deem affiliation impossible for certain 
individuals and sectors, and seek to manage these anti-citizens and 
marginal spaces through measures which seek to neutralize the 
dangers they pose’. (Rose, 2000:330) 
 
Within this context, there has been an increased legitimisation of programmes and 
interventions linked to the control of stigmatized populations (Rose, 2000; Garland, 
2001). It can be argued that SBIs now function within strategies of advanced liberal 
‘responsibilisation’ (Spaaij, 2009; Kelly, 2012), expanding the state’s apparatus via 
the regulation of ‘at risk’ youth in attempts to ‘construct’ them into ‘self-regulated’, 
responsibilised citizens capable of contributing to a post-Fordist economy and 
navigating a post-welfare state.  
 
Evidently, most SBIs are voluntary programmes, working with young people not 
primarily involved with the criminal justice system (Kelly, 2012). However, SBIs, as 
Spaaij (2009) suggests, are increasingly shaped by government rationales and now 
represent a significant component of the ‘neoliberal policy repertoire…aimed at 
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generating social order in disadvantaged inner city neighbourhoods’ (Spaaij, 
2009:247, cited in Kelly, 2012). Indeed, in this expanding neoliberal ‘culture of 
control’ (Garland, 2001) there are ‘new modes of exercising power by which the state 
seeks to ‘govern at a distance’ by forming alliances and activating the governmental 
powers of non-state agencies’ (Garland, 2001:173). 
 In the context of the ideological ideals associated with the Big Society then, we are 
witnessing a number of private and voluntary organisations expected to deliver 
services on behalf of the state, most notably in relation to the aforementioned criminal 
justice system’s ‘rehabilitation revolution’ and the interventions that cover the DWP’s 
work programme (Fox and Albertson, 2011).  A number of SBIs can be seen as 
operating within this context. The ‘Positive Futures’ programme targets 10-19 year 
olds in attempts to ‘avoid them becoming drawn into crime, drug and alcohol misuse 
and help them move forward with their lives’ (Catch 22, no date). Before its 
dismantling in March 2013, the Positive Futures programme was funded by the Home 
Office and managed by the charity ‘Catch 22’. Recently, the programme received £10 
million in funding for its ‘prevention and diversionary’ activities that targeted ‘10-19 
year olds on the cusp of offending…to engage them and build positive relationships 
whereby they can be supported to develop the skills needed…to become active and 
responsible citizens’ (HM Government, 2011a). The funding was on behalf of the 
Communities against Guns, Gangs and Knives programme launched in 2011, which 
earmarked £4million to 200 voluntary organisations who are working to tackle gun 
and knife crime linked to gang membership. Further, SBIs were also awarded funding 
based on their commitment to tackling these objectives: The Arsenal Foundation 
received £10,000.00 for its work in Hackney, whilst Bangladeshi Football (UK) was 
also awarded £10,000.00 for their work with Bangladeshi youth in nearby Tower 
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Hamlets. Aside from football based interventions, the Cricket Foundation was 
awarded £9,882.00 for its work across multiple London boroughs. In November 2012, 
the Home Office made an additional 500k available to organisations already delivering 
on behalf of the Communities against Guns, Gangs and Knives Programme. Since 
then, a total of 53 organizations were presented with extra funding to prolong the 
delivery of existing projects. A number of these included the SBIs referred to above 
(HM Government 2011b).  
Aside from diversionary and intervention programmes, a contemporary role for SBIs 
is found in providing ‘routes out’ of criminality via employment, education and 
training (HM Government, 2011a). The government continue to espouse the rhetoric 
that ‘Meaningful work or training is essential in order to break the cycle of violence’ 
(HM Government, 2011a:41) despite failing to recognise or address the socio-
structural causes of unemployment and exclusion (Kelly, 2011). Recently the 
European Social Fund (ESF) has provided the DWP with £200 million worth of 
funding to deliver skills training to 16-24 year olds in an attempt to raise their 
prospective employability (HM Government, 2011a). Here, the neoliberal ideology of 
active citizenship (Harvey, 2005) is emphasised, the government seeking to tackle 
worklessness and provide integration into mainstream society via education, 
employment or training (Levitas, 2005). As such, the government propose to tackle 
worklessness, which is equated with future criminal behaviour and gang membership 
(HM Government, 2011a) via partnership working that attempts to ‘break down’ 
barriers to work. This involves a partnership between private, public and voluntary, 
community based organisations: 
‘The private sector has a key role to play in providing the 
opportunities that young men and women growing up in deprived 
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neighbourhoods need to follow a positive path in life. This includes 
exposure of young people to different roles and careers, work 
experience and apprenticeship opportunities, support for young 
people wanting to set up their own enterprises and investment in 
voluntary and community organisations with a proven track record 
of turning round the lives of disadvantaged young people. Tackling 
gang and youth violence will require a co-ordinated effort by all 
sectors – public, private and voluntary’. (HM Government, 
2011a:42) 
 
Increasingly, SBIs are used as part of the aforementioned ‘voluntary and community 
organisations’ assisting in helping young people ‘with multiple problems overcome 
barriers to work and move closer to the labour market’ (HM Government, 2011a:42). 
The SBI under investigation accesses a funding stream linked to Jobcentre Plus’s FSF 
fund based on a PbR system. The SBI is funded based on its ability to engage and 
deliver services on behalf of the Jobcentre, and subsequently paid a standard fee for 
every 6 weeks a participant is sustained in employment. 
Conclusion  
In the context of this thesis, I argue that SBIs now constitute a key component within 
an expanding ‘culture of control’ made up of partnerships between public, private and 
community groups working together to tackle the ‘problems’ of crime and security in 
advanced liberal societies (Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001). Within the contemporary 
policy context, particularly in relation to the concern regarding the supposed 
‘criminality’ of young people and their links to urban street gangs in the wake of the 
August 2011 riots, responses to youth are increasingly characterised by ‘intervention’ 
and ‘responsibilisation’ as a means of recalibrating young people and turning them 
into citizens capable of contributing to a post-Fordist economy and navigating a post-
welfare terrain. This concern has legitimated a number of community based 
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intervention programmes (see HM Government, 2011a; 2011b) operating under the 
Coalition’s Big Society agenda to deliver services on behalf of the state (Mythen et 
al., 2011). These programmes remain embedded within a behaviourist philosophy 
attempting to ‘correct’ the individual ‘shortcomings’ of those left being by the 
deleterious effects of post-industrial capitalism and ‘connect’ them to the circuits of 
citizenship such as  employment (Young, 2007; Wacquant, 2009) in an attempt to 
diffuse social insecurity instigated by the decline in wage labour and post-industrial 
capitalism (Wacquant, 2009). As Spaaij (2009) goes on to suggest, SBIs now feature 
within this new ‘culture of control’ to regulate and educate those deemed ‘at risk’, 
notably, stigmatized, inner city youth: 
‘It could well be argued that within this context of major political 
concern about social cohesion, immigration and crime, serving 
disadvantaged (ethnic)youth is not the ultimate goal of sport-based 
programs…rather, they are a means through which governmental 
organisations and their partners seek to ‘civilize’ and regulate these 
youth and their neighbourhoods. This strategy reflects the (locally 
adapted) neoliberal agenda that has emerged …around ‘social’ 
issues like crime immigration, urban order and community 
regeneration’. (Spaaij, 2009:252) 
 
The potential of SBIs to contribute to these governmental priorities, however, must be 
viewed with caution. Both Kelly (2011; 2012) and Chamberlain (2013) note that SBIs 
often screen broader social inequalities and exclusionary processes through their 
individualization of criminal behaviour and worklessness. In part, this is achieved 
through a ‘pathways to work’ discourse, which offers educational programmes 
alongside sporting activity in attempts to alter or modify criminal or anti-social 
behaviour (Kelly, 2011). For Kelly, such an approach only succeeds in 
decontextualizing structural inequalities found in neoliberal, post-industrial societies 
that programmes are seeking to address in the first instance. A reductive analysis of 
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exclusionary factors therefore harks back to neoliberal discourse, in which ‘individual 
deficits and ‘self-exclusion’ are highlighted and structural inequalities de-emphasised’ 
(Kelly, 2011:20). Such an approach can thus lead to further stigmatisation and 
exclusion for those that fail to ‘succeed’ in programmes.  
In forming a key component of the new neoliberal policy ‘repertoire’ (Spaaij, 
2009:252), SBIs must also now market and strategically ‘brand’ themselves to gain a 
strategic foothold within a competitive market of provision (Mythen et al., 2011:5). 
The PbR system offers a way of driving up competition based on the most efficient 
delivery of targets relating to a reduction of offending or the movement of young 
people into employment, education or training (DWP, 2012:4). Although on paper this 
proposal sounds appealing, the competitive market instilled by such an approach can 
lead to increased ‘operational insecurity’ amongst service providers (Kelly, 2012). 
This may lead to an over emphasis on the ‘riskiness’ of participants, with deliverers 
often exaggerating participants’ precariousness whilst highlighting the ‘success 
stories’ in attempt to appeal to funding bodies (Kelly, 2012).  
The transfer of funding streams for a number of voluntary sector organisations, such 
as the one researched as part of this thesis, also has further implications for outcome 
driven, preventative programmes in which it is difficult to define outcomes. Not only 
can this exacerbate the aforementioned concern, but can also lead to an occurrence 
whereby participants are ‘cherry picked’ based on their ability to achieve a prospective 
outcome (Mythen et al., 2011; Kelly, 2012) whilst those ‘harder to reach’ are cast aside 
to face further stigmatization and exclusion. Further, the PbR system can affect service 
quality, ‘moving’ participants into non-sustainable outcomes, such as low paid jobs, 
in order to adhere to funding requirements, with little after care or support provided 
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thereafter. These themes are ones which will be explored in the empirical chapters of 




Chapter 4: Methodology 
Chapter 4 introduces readers to the fieldwork methods used to inform the empirical chapters of this 
thesis. This includes a discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of the research, and its 
connection with the research aims and chosen research methods. This chapter also documents my time 
spent ‘in the field’, and the methodological issues and ethical dilemmas that arose during my time 
conducting fieldwork for this thesis.  
I begin chapter 4 by stating and justifying my epistemological and ontological ‘stance’, and its 
connection to the chosen research methods. This chapter then provides an overview of the qualitative 
research methods used to elicit ‘data’ from my participants, namely: semi-structured interviews and 
ethnography. Following this, I then discuss the ‘story’ of my fieldwork, including issues of access, 
objectivity, and the many difficulties I encountered when conducting ethnographic research. I conclude 
this chapter by considering the ethical issues associated with conducting research with young people 
deemed ‘at risk’.  
Epistemological and Ontological Underpinnings 
Epistemologically, this thesis is underpinned by a critical realist approach to acquiring 
‘knowledge’. I therefore begin this chapter by explaining and interpreting the key 
components of critical realism, and its applicability to this piece of research.  
Critical realism is a relatively new research philosophy paradigm that recognises both 
the events and discourses of the natural and social worlds. Primarily associated with 
the work of Roy Bhashkar (2008), critical realism argues that an understanding of 
reality exists independently of social phenomena, and should therefore be the focus of 
inquiry (Jupp, 2006). However, critical realists maintain that events and discourses 
occurring in the social world cannot be measured directly, but only through a mixture 
of empirical investigation and theory construction (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). 
Critical realism is therefore underpinned by an approach which seeks to go beyond the 
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superficial level of observation, to identify the structures that influence the occurring 
social phenomena (Mingers, 2000; McEvoy and Richards, 2006).  
Consequently, research framed from this perspective should not focus primarily on the 
observable, but rather, should seek to understand those deeper structures which shape 
reality and the context of human behaviour. In this sense, critical theorists argue that 
a distinction exists between the social and natural world, and that social structures are 
maintained and reproduced by the activities of agents, whilst the activities of agents 
are shaped by pre-existing social structures (Bhaskar, 2008). 
Reality then, is conceptualised as a multi layered notion that is structured into three 
domains. These include: the empirical (aspects of reality that can be observed directly 
or indirectly); the actual (aspects of reality that occur but which may or may nor not 
necessarily be evident); and finally, the ‘real’ structures that produce social 
phenomena. These mechanisms can only be uncovered through a combination of both 
empirical investigation and theory construction. Critical realism thus conceptualises a 
stratified view of reality, which permits the researcher to uncover findings at empirical 
and real level, and construct theories to clarify findings. 
Critical theorists reject positivist methodologies for their focus solely on observable 
events and their failure to relate how these observations are influenced by prior casual 
mechanisms and external influences (Collier, 1994). Moreover, although critical 
realists acknowledge the potential of interpretivist approaches in the understanding of 
groups through causal mechanisms related to human behaviour, critical theorists are 
disapproving of theorists who fail to take into account the extent to which social 
phenomena is influenced by social structures. Critical theorists thus seek to explain 
social phenomena through underlying causal mechanisms than through empirical 
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generalisations that can occur through positivist methodologies (Bryman, 2012). The 
relationships between human action and the social structures that determine behaviour 
are therefore of significance to researchers guided by a critical realist methodological 
framework, as it is argued that individuals are formed through social structures, and 
therefore social structures are perceived as having the potential to exert power over 
actors and instigate change (Bhaskar, 1989). Critical theorist methodologies therefore 
direct the research to uncover the causal influence of power and social structures on 
social phenomena.  
 
In synch with critical realist thinking, the ‘data’ documented within the empirical 
chapters of this thesis are obtained from the subjective, reflexive views of my 
participants, i.e., their own views and accounts of growing up and ‘transiting’, of 
unemployment, of their experiences of participating in the activities of SBIs. As a 
critical realist, this ‘data’ is merged with an understanding of the underlying factors 
that influence social phenomena. I therefore contextualise these empirical arguments 
in my participants own ascribed meanings, social experiences, and understandings of 
the social world in which they are enveloped. Such an approach fits with the critical 
underpinnings of this research, which attempts to understand the social structures and 
ongoing social, political, and economic changes that have affected the youthful 
populations of Neighbourhood A and B. In doing so, I align myself with a key 
principle of critical realist thinking, that is; the objective critique of social structures 
to instigate social change, the end product being the promotion of human emancipation 
and freedom (Bhaskar, 2008). Hence, the critical aspect of critical realism relates to 
‘the identification of generative mechanisms [that offer] the prospect of introducing 




As this thesis is rooted in the reflexive interpretations, experiences and perspectives 
of my participants, my ontological approach is therefore one that stresses ‘the active 
role of individuals in the social construction of social reality’ (Bryman, 2004:34). 
Ontologically, this thesis is therefore a product of social constructionism, an approach 
adopted by other distinguished ethnographic researchers, notably Becker in his study 
of marijuana users (1963) and the work of Winlow (2001) and Hobbs (Hobbs, 2013), 
who chart the evolving ‘social constructions’ of working-class (criminal) cultures and 
existences, situated in the context of on-going social, political and economic changes 
in the social order (Hobbs, 2013:2).  
 
Like these ethnographers, this thesis provides sociological accounts and descriptions 
of social reality, grounded in the first hand experiences of my participants, rather than 
through my own, subjective interpretations. In this sense, social reality and phenomena 
- such as culture - is seen as indefinite, unfixed and in an on-going reconstruction 
between social actors. Becker neatly illustrates how culture is therefore in ‘an 
emergent state of reality in a continuous state of construction and reconstruction’ 
(Bryman, 2012:34): 
‘people create culture continuously…no set of 
understandings…provides a perfectly applicable solution to any 
problem people have to solve in the course of their day, and they 
therefore must remake those solutions, adapt their understandings to 
the new situation in light of what is different about it’. (Becker, 
1982:521) 
 
It is necessary to note, however, that Becker (1982) does not overemphasise the 
constructionist position. His view is aware that culture ‘persists and antecedes the 
participation of particular people’, yet culture remains a reality that is not external or 
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determining: rather, it is a ‘point of reference…always in the process of being formed’ 
(Bryman, 2012:34). 
 
To produce empirical research, arguments and findings as part of this thesis, informed 
by the conscious, views of my participants on social reality, two qualitative research 
methods were adopted: first, I conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with 
participants who lived in both the North East of England and London, and frequented 
SBI project sites; and secondly, through ethnographic investigation, in which I 
observed and ‘intermingled’ with my participants in the context of the SBI and the 
social spaces in which they inhabited, e.g. bars, cafes, ‘the street’. This chapter justifies 
the use of these approaches, alongside their respective methodological strengths and 
weaknesses. Before this, however, it is first necessary to introduce readers to the 
research site where these methods were deployed. 
The SBI 
The SBI is a third-sector organisation that uses football as a ‘tool’ to progress 
participants into forms of EET, and works with young people between the ages of 16-
25. It runs multiple football sessions and academy programmes within six major cities 
in the UK. This thesis considers two ‘centres’ from the same SBI, one located in 
Sunderland, and one located in East London (there are, however, multiple ‘centres’ 
located in each of these cities)  I will briefly relay the structure of the SBI here to 
position it within its operational context. 
 
The SBI is composed of two components which allows it to achieve the specific 
outcomes of progressing young people into EET. Firstly, it offers ‘open’ football 
sessions once a week at various locations within its operational city. These football 
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sessions operate as the ‘hook’ to prospective participants. Sessions last for two hours, 
and are composed of a warm up, basic football drills, and small sided games. From 
my experience of attending approximately 60+ open football sessions, participant 
numbers range from 6 to 30. However, attendance at sessions was often intermittent, 
and fluctuated over the two and a half years which I spent conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork. 
 
‘Open’ sessions are supported by an 8-week ‘academy’ programme, which runs four 
times a year. Participants attending the open football sessions are encouraged to sign 
up for the academy programme, although attendance is limited to 20 participants. 
Hence, participants considered the ‘most ready’ to benefit from the academy (i.e. more 
likely to achieve progress into EET) are given priority over those who are deemed 
‘harder’ to work with. 
 
The 8-week academy programme consists of educational and employment-based 
support. Participants are encouraged to produce CVs and cover letters, and complete 
a basic college qualifications (Open College Network (OCN) award) delivered by SBI 
staff. Staff also attempt to provide employment or volunteering opportunities with a 
network of external employers linked to the SBI. Local further education colleges are 
also targeted, and participants are encouraged to attend open days with a view to enrol 
on entry level BTEC courses.  
 
Upon ‘graduating’ from the academy programme, participants are expected to have 
already found EET opportunities. The SBI’s website suggests that 74% of participants 
have found EET opportunities within three months of finishing the academy; from 
April 2012 to March 2013, 864 young people enrolled on the academy, and 703 moved 
into employment (391), education (211), or training (SBI website, 2015). As this thesis 
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will show, however, these outcomes are not always progressive, sustainable, or life 
affirming. 
 
Little support is provided post-SBI, and during my time spent with the SBI there was 
no formal strategy in place to support those participants who had not already found 
EET. Participants were encouraged to continue attending ‘open’ SBI sessions in the 
hope that support could continue to be provided (thereby raising their awareness of 
potential job opportunities), although if participants had not found employment within 
two to three months of graduating, they were no longer allowed to continue attending 
sessions. 
 
The SBI can be considered an exemplar plus sport (Coalter, 2007) model, in which 
sport, or in this case, football, is the ‘fly paper’ to attract potential young men onto 
EET. Such an approach is widespread, particularly amongst SBIs operating in the UK 
in the fields of desistance, substance abuse, and unemployment, which give primacy 
to health and social outcomes over sporting ‘outcomes’(Coalter, 2007). A significant 
amount of academic literature has been applied to these types of programmes on a 
global scale (e.g. Spaaij, 2009; Darnell, 2010; Hartmann and Kwuak, 2011) which, 
drawing on critical theory, argue that the dominant vision of sport for development 
essentially reproduces existing structures of hierarchy and does little to alter the 
structural conditions that produce and maintain social inequalities (Hartman and 
Kwauk, 2011; Chamberlain, 2013). In the UK, Kelly (2011; 2012; 2013) and 
Chamberlain (2013) have argued from similar critical perspectives, whilst Nichols 
(2007) and Nichols and Crow (2004) and Coalter (2007; 2010) have provided insight 
into SBIs in the UK context, the former arguing that SBIs risk ‘confusing potential 
micro-level individual outcomes with community and broader macro-level impacts; 
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[and] ignoring wider socio-political contexts within which sport-for development 
organizations have to operate’ (2010: 265) 
Qualitative Interviews 
As specified at the onset of this chapter, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were 
conducted with 30 participants who frequented the SBI ‘researched’ as part of this 
thesis, in an attempt to elicit their reflective views, accounts and experiences of their 
social reality, e.g. their social lives, experiences of unemployment, and encounters 
with the specific SBI project.  
 
Interviews were ‘flexible but controlled’ (Burgess, 1984:107), ‘conversational’ in 
style, and led by an open ended structure based on questions and ‘themes’ generated 
by myself.  This approach produced discussion that ‘flowed’, in part due to its open 
rather than rigid structure, which can often regulate, subdue and structure the 
responses of participants (Bryman, 2012). Hence, I followed an approach that was 
‘guided’ by myself around several ‘themes’ which allowed my participants to express 
views representative of their subjective accounts of social reality. As such, interviews 
were based on the organic, unforced responses of participants, guided by theme-
focused questions, as posed by myself. 
In the earlier stages of research, I found that the themes interviews were loosely 
‘structured’ around – growing up, the influence of the neighbourhood in which they 
resided, ‘crime’, football – were topics my participants could talk in depth about, often 
with zeal and enthusiasm. Consequently, a number of earlier interviews evolved into 
somewhat unfocused – although nevertheless insightful and interesting – discussions, 
deviating from the initial research themes I intended to research. Following these 
initial interviews, I realised I needed an overhaul in my interview ‘technique’, that 
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would not allow my participants to diverge from the original research theme, topic or 
question. Instead, I required an approach that would elicit ‘data’ that reflected the 
epistemological aims of this research. Hence, after this methodological re-evaluation, 
I ensured that responses were pertinent to the research theme in question, often 
‘guiding’ discussion back to the original theme. Yet I also ensured – and even 
encouraged – that my participants were given sufficient freedom to expand on and 
express their opinions, as they originally had done so. I felt that this ‘freedom’ 
provided greater rapport between myself and my participant, and in turn, provoked 
more ‘real’, ‘truthful’ and qualitatively ‘rich’ discussion. Hence, I often allowed my 
participants – within the bounds of good sense – to verbally ‘let loose’ when being 
interviewed (not they that needed much further encouragement to do so, however).   
Hence, I adopted a ‘naturalistic’ approach to interviewing, in line the following 
passage: 
‘‘Naturalism’…has led many ethnographers to favour non-directive 
interviewing, in which the interviewee is allowed to talk at length in 
his or own terms, as opposed to more directive questioning. The aim 
here is to minimize, as far as possible, the influence of the researcher 
on what is said, and this thus to facilitate open expression of the 
informant’s perspective on the world’. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007:243) 
 
The relative strengths of the qualitative interview, as detailed by Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007), and Bryman (2012) are multiple, and adhere to the critical 
underpinning of this thesis. First, elicited ‘data’ is conceptual and theoretical, and is 
based on the lived experiences and occurrences of my participants. As a consequence 
and in line with critical realist thinking, interview ‘data’ is grounded in the subjective 
meanings of my participant’s social reality, rather than my own understandings of 
what social reality may, or may not, be. Thus, one advantage is in the methods ability 
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to provide a more insightful account of the interviewee’s subjective social 
experience(s). Second, the ‘natural’ technique used in my interviews allowed 
unexpected, often ‘unusual’ data to emerge that may not have appeared through more 
structured, quantitative techniques. Third, my participants were able to answer and 
respond in their own time, and as they pleased. Often, my participants were keen to 
talk reflexively, and openly, about their social experiences, and so interviewees 
enabled me to ‘delve deeply into social and personal matters’ (DiCicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree, 2006:314) and provide an account of the ‘social worlds’ of my participants, 
‘through their own eyes’ (Bryman, 2001:277). 
 
On completion of the interview ‘phase’ of my research, I had elicited ‘data’ form my 
participants which represented their social and cultural ‘realities’. Descriptive, 
empirical data was ‘grounded’ akin to the approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
Thus, following the analysis of interview transcripts 29 I was able to present informed 
arguments based on ‘concrete empirical experiences of real human beings’ (Bauman, 
1997:83); which reflected young people’s contemporary cultural identities within 
post-industrial, 21st century urban landscapes, and the role of SBIs as a means to 
alleviate social ‘problems’ for these young people.  
 
                                                          
29 Interviews were transcribed by an external transcribing company. Preceding this, all research material gathered, including 
interview transcripts and reflective notes, were collated and analysed through open and axial coding techniques, in the context of 
a ‘grounded theory’ approach (Glazer and Strauss, 1967). Hence, this thesis was conducted without prior hypothesis, and instead 
relied on the inductive emergence of theory from empirical data. In this sense, theory is generated from the ‘bottom up’. Data 
was therefore analysed and theory redefined in the context of data collection and analysis, as noted by Cresswell (1998). Validity 
of findings are therefore maximised, as research focus and themes are subsequently ‘fixed’ and ‘strengthened’ to match the 
emerging themes in data (Charmaz and Bryant, 2010). Following the guidelines of Bryman (2012) the transcribed text was coded. 
Initially, I used an open coded approach and categorised the transcripts manually into components that were of potential 
significance and salience to the research objective. Following this, I interpreted the transcripts a second time through axial coding 
which rearranged data into further categories and established additionally links between them. I used a detailed selective coding 
approach to further substantiate the relationships between categories by establishing the causes and main concepts within each 
core category, that is, the central issue to which all other categories are integrated (Bryman, 2008).Coding is an established 
process in qualitative research and grounded theory (Bryman, 2008) and its use is required in maximising the validity in 
qualitative research (Silverman, 2004), hence its deployment in this thesis. However, I am aware that coding analysis can 
fragment data so that the narrative flow of dialogue is lost (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996), meaning that if a participant articulates an 
extensive narrative of their experiences this may be misplaced if it is incorrectly positioned within different codes. Moreover, 
open coding can initially lead to a proliferation of codes that may seem perplexing to the researcher (Bryman, 2008). However, 




Qualitative Interviews were conducted between April 2011 and August 2012. 
Although primarily conducted at SBI project sites, for my participant’s ease and 
comfort, alternative interview sites were also used, including: cafes, pubs, park 
benches, football pitches, a car park, and one time, the inside of a bus shelter. 
Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, and were recorded with a 
handheld Dictaphone after receiving verbal consent from my participants. Participants 
were also briefed regarding the nature of the research, and provided with an 
information sheet and consent form to sign, which affirmed full anonymity, and details 
of confidentiality. For some participants, interviews provided an opportunity to voice 
their opinions meaningfully, away from the ears of project staff and peer groups. As 
such, interviews appeared somewhat cathartic for participants, as they expressed their 
views, opinions and experiences in a sociologically ‘open’ and ‘natural’ research 
environment away from the influences (and pressures) of others. 
 
Prior to interviews, it was of course necessary to recruit a collective of potential 
interviewees. Upon attending each individual SBI ‘session’, I would introduce myself 
to participants, explain my attendance, outline details of the research, and the need for 
potential interviewees to ‘come forward’. All interviews, however, were conducted 
toward the end of, or on completion of, the SBI’s 8 week ‘academy programme’ that 
participants underwent. The reasoning behind this was threefold. Firstly, this allowed 
me to spend time with participants, building rapport, trust, and familiarity with the 
group: subsequently, when interviews were conducted, participants felt at ease with 
me in light of the relationship developed between us over the preceding 6 or 7 weeks. 
As such, I believe participants were open and honest in their discussion, safe in the 
knowledge interviews were anonymous and confidential. Second, I was able to explain 
and detail the research in more depth to participants. Often participants were keen to 
138 
 
uncover my role within the SBI, and as such the extended period spent with them 
afforded me the opportunity to outline my constant attendance at football matches and 
educational classes. Thirdly, conducting interviews ‘post-SBI’ meant that participants 
were able answer reflectively, detailing their experiences of the SBI and the 
sociological ‘impact’ it had. It also provided me with opportunities to explore a key 
theme emerging from the data: the sustainability of SBI programmes, and explore my 
participants ‘next steps’ which I ‘researched’ ethnographically. I will detail this 
methodological experience later in this chapter.  
 
Following these procedures, I was able to recruit participants based on ‘snowballing’ 
interest amongst each group: Interest was facilitated by project staff ‘reminding’ 
participants of my role, and the promise of a free can of coke or packet of crisps30.  
Hence, within the first week or my attendance at each project site, I had a significant 
‘pool’ of interviewees.  
 
Interviews and ethnographic observation were conducted with thirty SBI participants. 
Fifteen of these were located in the Neighbourhood A, and fifteen in Neighbourhood 
B. The average age of participants in Neighbourhood A was 19.1, whilst in 
Neighbourhood B, the average age was 18.4.  The ethnicity of participants in the North 
East was predominantly white British (100%), whilst in Neighbourhood B eight 
participants were of Black Caribbean descent (one mixed white Caribbean), five Black 
African, three white, and one South Asian. For clarity, a table of the sample and their 
characteristics is provided below. Within this table I have alluded to the cultural ‘type’ 
                                                          
30 Although initially I considered using incentives, either monetary or in the form of SBI paraphernalia, it was quickly established 
that there would be no such need. Participants were forthcoming and responsive to my calls, and as such, no such enticement was 
required other than the draw of free confectionary, carbonated drinks, or alcoholic beverages 
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these participants have also been categorised into. Although this has not been referred 
to thus far, readers may wish to return to the table after reading Chapter 7. 
 
Table 1. Age and Ethnicity of Sample 
 
Once the research had elapsed, I also had participants contacting me to be interviewed; 
they wanted to be ‘part of that research thing you’re doing’. Seemingly, participants 
were keen to be interviewed and talk about their experiences, and their present social 
situation. Some participants who I had initially interviewed contacted me up to 10 
months after my initial period spent with them had passed. Hence, this significantly 
aided the research process, as I was afforded multiple interviews with participants over 
a prolonged period. My research experience thus confirmed how eager some 
individuals are to talk about themselves, especially when discussing the themes 
researched as part of this thesis. Some were keen to espouse a form of ‘street bravado’ 
in subsequent interviews, detailing and exaggerating their latest crimogenic or 
delinquent conquest. Hence, during interviews I had the task of ‘decoding’ responses: 
were their accounts tinged with this exaggerated, imaginary ‘street bravado’, or was it 
in fact my participants ‘social reality’? 
 
  Ethnicity 
Neighbourhood Age White Black Caribbean Mixed Black 
Caribbean/White 
Black African 
A 20.8 15 (100%)    
B 19.1 1 (6.6%) 8 (53.3%) 1 (6.6%) 5 (33.3%) 
Cultural ‘Type’      
Outcasts 21.1 7 (100%)    
Conformists 20.5 8 (100%)    
Aspirationists 20.1 1 (12.5%) 4 (50%)   3 (37.5%) 
Road Boys 18.2  4 (71.4%) 1 (14.2%)  2 (28.6%) 
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The qualitative approach underpinning this research provided a way through this 
methodological predicament. As previously alluded to, my time ‘in the field’ proved 
to me that ‘social reality’ can never be inherently interpreted as real by myself, but 
only by the perspective of participants whose social reality is under investigation. My 
participant’s experiences and perceptions of ‘road life’, and their social and cultural 
habitus, are only ‘real’ to them. In this sense ‘...everyday life presents itself as a reality 
interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world’ 
(Luckman and Berger, 1967:33). Thus, the research process was informed by an 
understanding of reality based on the inter-subjective interpretations and constructions 
of individual agency, whilst simultaneously interpreting them with a critical view 
point that understands human action and social phenomena as influenced by 
enveloping social structures (Bhaskar, 2008). 
 
The inductive, open-ended approach adopted by this thesis acknowledged the 
subjective, individual understandings of my participant’s social world: understandings 
of ‘road life’, SBIs and unemployment are all relative, experienced differently 
amongst my participants. These social experiences are best understood from a critical 
realist perspective, an epistemological approach that allows one to consider the 
relative social and cultural ‘mechanisms’ behind human behaviour and social reality 
(Bhaskar, 2008). This approach also allowed me to consider individual ‘subcultural’ 
responses, mediated in the context of a globalised, post-industrial era (Hobbs, 2013), 
to SBIs and their relationship to broader, contemporary, urban life and culture. These 
themes, which I will explore in the context of this thesis, could not have been 
uncovered via quantitative, positivistic approaches. I therefore adopted a qualitative 
approach that has similarities with work on contemporary working-class life 
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(Charlesworth, 2000), youth cultures (Hobbs, 2013), and the impact of SBIs (Kelly, 
2012).  
Ethnography 
Alongside the qualitative interviews I conducted, I methodologically ‘fleshed out’ and 
supported my research via ethnography. I will note here that, due to my 
methodological commitment to understanding the subjective opinions and 
interpretations of my participants, ethnographic research was a secondary element 
within my methodological framework, functioning as a research tool to substantiate 
my detailed, qualitative interviews. Nevertheless, in spite of its secondary application, 
ethnographic research represented a key component of my methodology, and I will 
now justify its use, its connection with the epistemological ‘underpinning’ of this 
research, and its relative advantages.  
 
As I have suggested, epistemologically, this thesis is a derivative of the critical realist 
tradition: hence, my methodological and epistemological underpinnings meant that 
my research was to understand the unobservable generative mechanisms and social 
structures ‘that promote or impede the operation of the causal mechanism’ (Bryman, 
2012:29). It was clear that to escape the literature and research on SBIs and young 
people dominated by approaches without knowledge,  understanding, or consideration 
of the context and reality of post-industrial, urban landscapes, I required a 
methodology that reported the behaviours of contemporary, urban working-class 
youth in their ‘natural habitat’ that uncovers the unobservable ‘mechanisms’ that 
structure human action. In short, I deemed it epistemologically ‘impossible’ to ‘do’ 
research on my participants without gaining first-hand knowledge of their social 
contexts and habitus’, and becoming part of their social world; anything else would 
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produce work that suffers from an ‘ecological fallacy’ (see Robinson, 1950). Hence, I 
intended to grasp an understanding of young people and SBIs ‘through its least known 
and least spectacular side’ (Wacquant, 2004:6) the minute and mundane activities of 
everyday life in the inner city: the realities of unemployment and criminal behaviour; 
the monotonous routine of employment training programmes and SBIs; the endless 
‘kick abouts’ and experiences of urban ‘leisure life’. Via an ethnographic approach, I 
was therefore able to participate in the activities of the SBI, which provided a ‘platform 
for observation’ (Wacquant, 2012) into the realities of ‘road life’, and the social world 
of post-industrial, working-class youth 31  
Hence, this study adopted an ethnographic approach that several other researchers 
have implemented successfully in researching the lived experiences of youth, namely: 
Ilan’s (2010) study of an inner city youth club in Dublin; Nayak’s (2006) work on 
masculinities and working-class culture in Newcastle; Hobbs’s (Hobbs, 2013) 
research on criminal cultures in de-industrialised, inner city London; and Densley’s 
(2012) ethnography of London street gangs. In a similar tradition to the work of 
Winlow (2001), Nayak (2006) and Hobbs (2013) then, this study implements a 
methodology that attempts to understand the cultural and context specific lives of its 
participants. In line with their work, and my critical realist position, I therefore intend 
                                                          
31 Admittedly, this thesis began as an ethnographic investigation into the social impact and sustainability of SBIs, with little 
consideration of the wider social context or lives of its participants. However, very quickly it became evident that the SBI 
functioned as a wonderful window into the daily life of the young men that made use of it, and the social realities of the immediate 
neighbourhood in which it was located. Loic Wacquant’s (2004) ethnographic study of a boxing gym in a black neighbourhood 
in Chicago’s South Side is strongly influential here, and I heeded the advice Pierre Bourdieu offered him that ‘you will learn 
more about the ghetto in this gym than you can from all the surveys in the world’ (Wacquant, 2011:86). Hence, as fieldwork 
progressed I soon discovered the research ‘themes’ of the daily work and functioning of the SBI, the sociology of youth cultural 
identities, and the post-industrial transformation of locales in which SBIs were situated ‘were elaborated together and at the same 
time,  they are all woven together (Wacquant, 2011:87). Hence, like gang membership or street crime – two possible trajectories 
which SBIs offer a potential ‘route’ out of – the true functioning of SBIs can only be uncovered, sociologically, with regard to 
the social context in which it is situated: the market changes instigated by a post-industrial economy, the shrinking of welfare 
provision, and the youthful street cultures and collaborations that make up the predatory organisation of contemporary ‘road life’. 
They are all ‘connected’. Hence, I follow Wacquant’s work on the ‘sociology of the gym’, and his suggestion that ‘one cannot 
understand the relatively closed world of boxing outside of the human and ecological context in which it is anchored and the 
social possibilities of which this context is the bearer. Indeed it is in its double relation of symbiosis and opposition to the 




to present ethnographic ‘data’ that explains ‘the foundations and dynamics of a social 
and cultural life world which exists in the post-traditional, post-industrial…urban 
milieu’ (Winlow, 2001:11).  
Accordingly, a recently published source which shares similarities with this research 
in terms of its methodological approach, geographical location of research, and 
‘sample’ of participants is James Densley’s How Gangs Work: Ethnography of Youth 
Violence (2012). His work is an ethnographic account of contemporary urban youth 
cultures (notably youth ‘gangs’ in London) and the ‘evolution’ of ‘gang’ membership, 
the desistance process, and impact of gang prevention and intervention techniques. 
Due to the similarities in our methodologies32, it is necessary to briefly consider 
Densley’s work here, to demonstrate how I seek to advance the study of urban youth 
via my own critical realist approach.  
Densley’s work, like mine, attempts to provide an account of ‘contemporary urban 
life’ via an ethnographic approach. He addresses this research aim via research in six 
London boroughs to demonstrate how contemporary youthful ‘collaborations’ 
(Hobbs, 2013:110–136) are ‘to a large extent rational agents who operate under the 
constraints of their harsh life conditions’ (Densley, 2012:3). Thus, Densley conducted 
ethnographic research and a series of interviews with ‘gang’ members in an attempt to 
produce an account of urban social life ‘in the spirit of suspending what you thing 
about others and seeing the world through their eyes’ (Densley, 2012:6). 
Here, I would like to highlight that I consider Densley’s (2012) work into youth 
‘gangs’ in London to be pioneering in the context of limited academic debate in this 
area, and I applaud his methodological commitment to understanding this particular 
                                                          
32 Like me, Desnley states a methodological commitment to ethnography within ‘communities and neighbourhoods’ , and an 
effort to ‘to take into account their (his participants) perspective and to understand… [their] view of the world’ (Densley, 2012:6) 
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social phenomena within its natural habitat, rather than based on the secondary 
accounts of youth workers, police, and third sector agencies (e.g. Pitts, 2008).   
Yet despite my admiration for his work, I believe Densley’s (2012) work fails to fully 
comprehend critically the realities of contemporary urban life, and he is unsuccessful 
in illustrating the influence of cultural, social, political and geographical ‘variables’ 
that ethnographers and critical realists must be sensitive to (Bhaskar, 2008; Hobbs, 
2013). Instead, his insights into contemporary urban youth rely on ‘data’ that simply 
documents urban life in a deterministic, non-sociological, and generic way. This 
inhibits him from providing a ‘valid’ or ‘reliable’ ‘ethnography of youth’, rooted in 
the conscious experience of individuals (his participants) within the specific 
situational and cultural context studied. I therefore challenge his work, based on three 
main methodological criticisms. I will highlight these here to demonstrate how I seek 
advance the study of youth via my own methodological approach, which is based on 
an epistemological and ontological commitment to obtaining reflexive, ‘first-hand’ 
critical accounts of my participants, grounded and contextualised in their ‘social 
worlds’ (Bryman, 2008:277). 
Firstly, Densley’s (2012) ethnographic work highlights the difficulties (or 
ineffectiveness) of making inferences about the nature of post-industrial, urban life 
deduced from cross-sectional data33. Although he analyses some common 
characteristics that can be observed among many contemporary urban youth ‘gangs’ 
(notably the organisational ‘structure’ of gangs, and their use of media and 
technology), he presents urban youth, and ‘gangs’, as one homogenous group, when 
in fact, as I will argue in the context of this thesis, a number of different ‘forms’ of 
                                                          
33 See Robinson (1950) on the ‘ecological fallacy’ 
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post-industrial, urban youth exist today. Densley fails to consider that each borough is 
composed of unique social, cultural and ethnic characteristics. Therefore, the youthful 
‘cultures’ he describes cannot be gauged accurately from the triangulation of interview 
responses from all six boroughs he studied. To counter this, I have therefore made a 
methodological commitment to studying youth cultures within their own specific, 
microstructural setting (hence the comparative element to this research), taking into 
account regional, ethnic and structural variations. I have also attempted to explain how 
experiences in youthful ‘collaborations’ are more fluid and dynamic than Densley 
suggests, by highlighting the significance of the cultural setting (i.e. the local area, 
estate, borough), whilst recognising the prevalence of different, indeed oppositional, 
youth cultures (or ‘gangs’) within a shared social context who may diverge in terms 
of organisational structures, ethnicities, memberships and crimes committed34. 
Similarly, Densley views youth ‘gangs’ – a contemporary, urban, cultural 
‘collaboration’ (see Hobbs, 2013:110-136) – as homogenous collectives. In the 
context of this study, I can confirm that there are huge variations in terms of their 
existences, and they should not be considered as one homogenous group: Notably, my 
approach to fieldwork uncovered the distinctions that exists amongst ‘gangs’ in terms 
of: i) how long they have existed ii) what ‘activities’ they are involved in (although 
there is room for further contest here as many crimes perpetrated by gang members 
are not committed collectively) iii) how ‘established’ and embedded they are within 
the local community, and IV) their ethnic and racial composition. Hence, Densley 
makes the methodological mistake of applying the findings of his research to the whole 
                                                          
34 I demonstrate this in the context of ‘gangs’, highlighting how some are more ‘entrepreneurial’ than others, in the sense they 




of London, and makes assumptions and conclusions as if there is a singular ‘type’ of 
‘youth gang’ operating within this urban context.  
My final criticism of Densley’s methodological approach is his failure to recognise 
the impact of broader structural factors, notably the impact of de-industrialisation, 
unregulated consumerism, and the specific characteristics of the political and 
economic environment, all of which have impacted considerably on working-class 
locales and the youthful cultures, collaborations and identities that populate 
contemporary urban milieus (Hall et al., 2008; Hobbs, 2013). If one is to provide a 
sociological reliable, critical account of youth - as I intend to do so - it is a necessity 
to present arguments grounded in my participant’s relative habitus and conscious 
experience. In this sense, it is my methodological intention to uncover how individuals 
make sense of the world around them (Bryman, 2012), in the context of a post-
industrial-era, urban landscape. Anything else ignores the realities of contemporary 
working-class, urban life (Hobbs, 2013)35.  
Hence, in utilising an ethnographic approach, I have elicited ‘data’ and produced 
grounded ‘knowledge’ that I consider being more ‘valid’ and ‘truthful’ than has 
previously been presented. In doing so, I adhere to my epistemological framework that 
views social reality (e.g. culture) as something that can only be uncovered from the 
views of those rooted in the social reality being ‘researched’. Hence, I researched this 
thesis ethnographically, and critically, through the eyes of my participants, yet 
interpreted in light of the social structures in which they are enveloped.  
                                                          
35 As an aside, Densley’s work is also peppered with inaccurate references to gangs obtained from discredited sources, including 
misinformation from Daily Mail articles. For example, the ‘Younger 28s’ (Y28s) gang from Brixton did not change their name 
to the Peel Dem Crew (PDC) as Densley writes (2013:47). PDC was a completely different gang, and a well-known, highly 
publicised founding member of PDC was befriended by members of the real Y28s, who were formed in 1993. However, the PDC 
did not begin until 1995/96. Founding members of PDC confirmed this in the semi-biographical book Street Boys (2007), written 




Undertaking ethnographic research meant I regularly attended SBI sessions alongside 
participants, spending between 2-5 times a week over a two and a half year period on 
either the football pitch or in the classroom, training and participating in all phases of 
the SBI programme. I gradually became taken in by the programme, to the point where 
I would often be participating in up to two, two-hour football sessions a day at different 
research sites. I would accompany and participate in matches, tournaments and also 
partake in various classroom and education activities offered by the SBI, often 
travelling to and from sessions with participants and staff, which allowed for 
continuous and limitless access to my participants.  
Due to the comparative nature of the research, the first ‘phase’ of research was 
conducted in the North East of England between November 2010 and April 2012, and 
the second ‘phase’ in London between March 2012 and October 2012. However, the 
open-ended nature of the research meant contact with participants was maintained 
after October 2012, even though I no longer attended SBI sessions as frequently as I 
had once done. I ‘researched’ three main research sites and locations during my time 
in the North East, and two in London. Different participants existed at each research 
sites, although it was not uncommon to see some participants ‘turn up’ at open access 
football sessions in different locations. As such, my contact with participants was not 
restricted to the confines of one SBI location, but rather, contact was made at a variety 
of SBI locations across the two research areas.  
The trust and social capital generated over months of research with SBI ‘regulars’ 
meant that I was fortunate enough to not only observe and interact with participants in 
the surroundings of the SBI programme, but also accompany them on their daily 
rounds outside of it. I would escort participants to the local jobcentre, go shopping 
with them in the local Tesco, catch up over a pint in the local pub, or simply ‘hang 
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about’ at their usual haunts; the flat, the shops or the street36. I was fortunate enough 
to gain access to the social contexts of participants first hand, an experience that served 
well in eliciting authentic, honest and reliable data regarding the lived experiences of 
participants, in line with my epistemological position.  
Hence, I found my ethnographic experience to be informative, somewhat enjoyable, 
and practical to the epistemological ‘leaning’ of the research (Bryman, 2012). Via 
ethnography, I was able to ‘capture’ the changing social and cultural formations of 
contemporary urban life for unemployed, young adults: a ‘clear, first hand picture’ of 
the ‘life of ordinary people, on their grounds and on their terms’ (Liebow, 1967). 
Retreating to the ‘ethnographers lavatory’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:143) as 
Styles (1979:151) done so to write his field notes, wasn’t required in this particular 
ethnography: instead, frequent breaks in SBI educational programmes and football 
sessions provided an opportunity for me to jot down scribbled notes in my field diary, 
before converting them into lengthier documents upon arriving home. This subsequent 
transcription provided more in depth analysis to the day’s events, recording details of 
those present and the context in which events occurred. This process of writing field 
notes was in synchrony with the recommendations of Hammersley and Atkinson: 
‘It is…important that records of speech and action should be located 
in relation to who was present, where, at what time, and under what 
circumstances. When it comes to the analysis stage, when one will 
be gathering together, categorizing, comparing and constraining 
instances, it may be crucial that ‘context’ (participants, audience, 
setting, etc.) can be identified’. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007:146-147) 
                                                          
36 I am aware that ethnographic research conducted in this manner brings with it a number of ethical and moral issues and 
challenges (see Giulianotti, 1995; Yates, 2004; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Bryman, 2008). The protocols set out to ensure 





Following the guidelines of Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), field notes were 
‘analysed’ via open and axial coding techniques, where ‘themes’ or ‘concepts’ were 
developed based on grounded theorizing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). During this 
process, there is a constant interplay between ‘data’ and theory; first, open coding 
techniques identify emergent ‘themes’ or ‘concepts’ within data; second, axial coding 
techniques connect these ‘themes’ to construct a net of interactive conceptual factors; 
finally, selective coding techniques ensure there is a constant revision and rethinking 
of ‘themes’, or ‘theory’, in line with the emerging grounded ‘data’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967).    
It is these field notes, along with the interview transcriptions, which provide the 
material for this thesis.  
Acceptance, Rapport and Ethnographic Difficulties 
Issues of initial access are crucial to effective ethnographic research; for Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007:41), the ‘problem of obtaining access to the data looms large in 
ethnography’. In this section, I will address the processes through which I have 
achieved entrée to my research group. 
Before detailing these experiences ‘in the field’ however, it is worth noting that during 
my time as a PhD student I was in the fortunate position of having my research 
sponsored by the SBI agency partner. Consequently, prior to beginning ‘fieldwork’ I 
had already met a large number of both local and national stakeholders who 
highlighted suitable SBI projects that could function as research sites. I was granted 
access to their basic quantitative data, facilities, and a network of potential research 
participants. In return, I would keep the team up to date with the research, presenting 
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at weekly meetings any ‘updates’ or significant findings I had come across. I was 
fortunate to have the help and support of the SBI; the research appealed to them and 
they took a keen interest in how I was progressing. Consequently, I was able to bypass 
many of the ‘messy realities’ (Maguire, 2000; Hobbs, 2001) experienced when 
seeking entrée to proposed research groups. Nor did I face the ‘numerous physical 
risks and professional dilemmas’ (Giulianotti, 1995:8) experienced during these initial 
stages of ethnographic research. Hence, this thesis is not a derivative of ‘pure’, 
grassroots ethnography in the manner of Hobbs (2013), Winlow, (2001) or Ilan (2012), 
where access and subsequent acceptance within the research group is awkward, 
complex, and in a constant state of uncertainty (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). I 
did not experience the difficulties these ethnographers faced, and I cannot overstate 
my ethnographic problems here in light of their experiences.  Rather, my ethnography 
is better characterised by anxieties existing between ‘top-down’ support and ‘bottom-
up’ relationship building with participants, i.e. I was conscious of giving ‘something 
back’ to the organisation who were facilitating my research, yet mindful of my 
‘official role’ jeopardising my position as ‘one of the lads’ which was, as I will discuss, 
indispensable to eliciting truthful, valid data from my participants. Moreover, although 
I did not face the aforementioned ‘access’ issues experienced by contemporary 
ethnographers (e.g. Giulianotti, 1995; Hobbs, 2001; Wacquant, 2001), I still 
experienced tensions with regard to my ‘acceptance’ within the research group: it is 
the processes by which I overcame these ethnographic ‘difficulties’, which will be 
detailed in this section. 
 I was first introduced to project staff in October 2010. During this initial meeting 
project workers identified SBI project sites that I could potentially ‘use’ for research 
purposes. The comparative element of this research meant I required research sites in 
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two distinct cultural and social environments, hence the focus on both the North East 
of England and East London. Within these two regions, I attended project sites where 
there were sufficient numbers of participants to make the research possible; indeed, 
some project sites were characterised by low numbers and the frequent cancelling of 
sessions, making any potential research at these sites untenable. Hence, three locations 
were used in the North East of England, and two in London.  
At the outset of research it was my intention to become ‘fully embedded’ within each 
project location to ensure I elicited grounded, ‘situated’ findings. I could not be, as 
had previously been intended, an ‘official’ member of staff; such a position would 
prevent any meaningful data from arising. Instead, I had to be ‘one of them’ becoming 
‘both known and popular’ yet remaining ‘an unobtrusive part of the scene’ 
(Armstrong, 1993); someone who could be trusted, who would not ‘grass’ back to the 
project their disclosed experiences, admissions and confessions. Yet I realised I could 
not become a full ‘member’ of my research group, like Armstrong (1993), or Winlow 
(2001); for one, I wasn’t ‘unemployed, out of education, or training’, as my 
participants were; and two, I still needed to be recognised as a researcher; I was not 
acting ‘covertly’, and my research was sponsored by the SBI I was conducting 
research ‘on’. 
Due to the support and access to data the SBI offered me at the outset of the research, 
I was confident I would find the research straightforward enough, gathering data and 
going about my business with relative ease. However, I quickly became aware of the 
many ‘stresses and strains’ associated with fieldwork37 (see Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007:89). I was struck by how unstructured, uncomfortable and at times 
                                                          
37 For a further discussion of the stresses associated with fieldwork, see Wintrob (1969). 
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socially awkward (and embarrassing) the process of ethnography can be, perhaps 
exacerbated by my unfamiliarity with the research, but no doubt due to the nature of 
ethnographic research that inevitably impinges on the lives of those being ‘researched’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007).  
My initial efforts to bond with my participants were met with resistance and hostility, 
and attempts to engage in informal conversation and ‘banter’ only resulted in me 
becoming the subject of mockery myself. Explaining my research and the process of 
conducting my PhD was met with blank faces, and so I eventually adopted 
Giulianotti’s (1995:7) explanation of his research that my interest in them was simply 
‘for a book’. I was mistaken for a journalist, youth worker, counsellor and fellow 
participant on a number of occasions, and was reminded of Armstrong’s (1993) 
ethnography of Sheffield United’s ‘firm’ where he was similarly mistaken as one of 
either a ‘psychoanalyst’, ‘social worker’ or ‘author’.  
Participants were often wary of my motives, suspicious of my presence and mindful 
of why I was so interested in spending time with them. I found it difficult to justify to 
my participants the need to ‘sample the mundane, the routine, or perhaps the boring 
aspects of everyday life’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007:52). These issues were 
exacerbated by the high turnover of participants on the programmes: attendance at 
sessions was intermittent; one or two new participants would turn up one week, only 
to later drop out and turn up two months later38. Others would simply show up 
whenever they wanted; the open nature of football sessions meant participants were 
free to attend whenever they wanted.  
                                                          
38 It was not uncommon for participants to be absent for several months before returning. Often, this was due to either (i) personal 
circumstance, e.g. new employment, family commitments such as new-born children, return to education, or physical injury from 
football sessions, or (ii) ‘deviant’ circumstances, e.g. imprisonment, substance abuse relapses, mental health issues and the 
intervention of other agencies, or physical injury due to violent behaviour.   
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Hence, I found myself constantly re-introducing and reminding participants of my 
role, only to be asked again and again what exactly I was doing at sessions. A number 
of participants simply refused to talk to me despite my guarantees of confidentiality 
and anonymity (which I will discuss these later in the chapter) and I soon found myself 
on the wrong end of a number of ‘receivers’ during football matches. Some 
participants were unwilling to talk to me and clearly hostile to my presence, accusing 
me of being an ‘insider’ or ‘spy’ for the SBI or youth justice service, who would go 
back and inform on their behaviour, as recorded in one of my field notes:  
‘Why are you always here…you’re just a spy for them (the SBI). I bet 
you go back and tell them everything we’ve been up to!’  
                  Mark, Neighbourhood A, January 2011 
I became aware that should I ever gain any form of acceptance within the group, the 
legitimacy of my presence would always be questioned (Lee, 1993). The following 
quotation from Giulianotti (1995:9) thus sums up my initial access experience: 
‘The researcher is continuously locked into a form of renegotiation 
with his subjects, no matter how ritualized or repetitious this may be in 
content. New faces are accidentally bumped into before introductions; 
others may retain symbolic autonomy from the influential by ignoring 
or rejecting the stated acceptability of the researcher’. (Giulianotti, 
1995:9) 
 
My ethnographic ‘greenness’ made for an uncomfortable first two months of 
fieldwork. Over time, however, suspicions and tensions eased (Whyte, 1994), and I 
gradually earned the acceptance of my participants. I found that simply turning up 
early at sessions and ‘hanging around’ and ‘watching the action’ (Pearson, 1994) gave 
me a chance to converse informally with participants. Engaging in ‘banter’ 
surrounding typically ‘masculine’ pursuits such as football, women and beer (Nayak, 
2006) and joining in with a game of ‘headers and volleys’ against the sports club doors 
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(much to the annoyance of the staff working there) helped detach myself from the 
‘worker’ tag I had been accredited with. My acceptance within one ‘group’ of research 
participants was sealed one day when travelling to a session with them. On arriving at 
the metro station, I was faced with the moral dilemma of either paying for a metro 
ticket or conforming to the cultural norm of the group of ‘dodging’ the £3 fare. To pay 
the fare would surely be a sign that I was positioning myself as morally superior to 
them, and as a result intensify the social distance between us. I was thus compelled to 
‘dodge’ the fare in an attempt to ‘prove’ myself to the group39.  
Travelling to and from sessions with participants gave me the first opportunity to gain 
an insight into their lives. I would meet with them, play football with them, drink with 
them and generally ‘hang out’ with them in various social contexts. I eventually found 
that some of the most pertinent material presented in this thesis was elicited through 
the informal discussions I had with participants on the bus, in the street or down the 
pub, rather than in the controlled and unnatural environment of the structured 
interview. 
 At this point, it is useful to highlight the main factors that have enabled me to 
overcome these initial difficulties, and gain a grounded, objective view of my 
participant’s lives. As Hobbs (2013:9) suggests, it is necessary that ‘all ethnographers 
bring their biographies to the research table’.  
As discussed, my intention to uncover the lives of young men from ‘the ground up’ 
via the observation of everyday activities and ‘mundane occurrences’ (see Wacquant, 
2004) meant I required an approach that reported the behaviours of contemporary, 
urban working-class youth in their ‘natural habitat’.  As a white, University educated, 
                                                          
39 We were later caught at Newcastle’s Central Station and charged £20; however I believe this a small price to pay for sealing 
my acceptance within the group.  
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PhD student however, my intellectual and social experiences made me somewhat of a 
stranger to this milieu, and deepened my feelings to acquire some familiarity with the 
research setting. The comparative element of my fieldwork exacerbated this 
methodological dilemma; in the North East, I had the disadvantage of being a 
‘southerner’ from the Home Counties, whilst my participants were brought up in the 
working-class inner cities of Sunderland and East London. In London, I had the 
disadvantage of being a ‘white southerner’ (see Spiegel, 1969) from the Home 
Counties, my participants predominantly drawn from the working-class, multi-ethnic 
housing estates of Hackney. My social class, exposed through my dialect and 
University educated background, and my racial and ethnic distinctions from the 
majority of SBI participants in London, could have constituted a significant obstacle 
to my integration and ability to understand and comprehend the social reality of my 
participants.  
Preceding literature on ethnography however, informed me that these methodological 
dilemmas could potentially be defied: Wacquant (2004) successfully overcame racial 
differences in his ethnography of a predominantly black, urban boxing gym in Chicago 
via the ‘egalitarian ethos and pronounced colour-blindness of pugilistic culture’ which 
‘everyone is fully accepted into it so long as he submits to the common discipline and 
‘pays his dues’’ (2004:10). Liebow (1967) and Bourgois (2003) also overcame similar 
racial and social distinctions; the former successfully ‘dulling’ his ‘professional 
background’ in his attempt to become ‘more acceptable to others, and certainly more 
acceptable to myself’ (Liebow, 1967:255). Nevertheless, although I was aware of the 
cultural norms, customs and habits displayed by young, working-class men, I did not 
belong to a similar cultural habitus. 
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The social distinctions between myself, and my participants, can be considered a 
methodological weakness for two reasons: first, in terms of access, both Armstrong’s 
(1993) and Hobbs’s (1988; 2013) ‘native’ links were conducive in accessing Sheffield 
United’s ‘firm’ and the sub-criminal world in London’s East End in their respective 
ethnographies; and second, often rapport and ‘banter’ exists that only a ‘local’ can 
understand and be part of. Armstrong (1993:27) details the pitfalls of research 
conducted by ‘non-natives’ in his ethnography of hooliganism in Sheffield: 
‘How anyone outside of Sheffield, considerably older than myself or 
speaking with would have been considered, a posh accent, would have 
managed I do not know.  I think the research would have been 
impossible or, at best, superficial. While a few Blades might well have 
agreed to give interviews, these would not even have scratched the 
surface of events’. (Armstrong, 1993:27) 
 
Ethnographically, I would admit at times this statement rung true; local slang, argot 
and places of reference were often alien to me. I was often mocked for my accent, 
described as a ‘cockney’ whilst in the North East and ‘posh’ during my time in 
London. 
One must remember, however, that to conduct ethnographic research ‘neutrally’ and 
without bias, a degree of objective distance must be maintained (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007). Hence, although the elicited ‘data’ is derived from my participants 
reflexive views, this ‘data’ still requires an analysis that is impartial, and objective in 
nature (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Although I acknowledge the work of 
ethnographers who have used their knowledge and familiarity of the culture studied to 
good effect (e.g. Polsky, 1971; Parker, 1974; Hobbs, 1988; 1995; 2013; Winlow, 
2004), I believe that being a product of a different cultural habitus has allowed me to 
retain a critical, neutral perspective in the research; ultimately, it has allowed me to 
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produce an ‘unbiased’ piece of research, untainted by my own subjective views. I 
viewed ‘the action’ as an ‘outsider’ and was therefore not ‘insensitive’ to the 
happenings going on around me, a weakness later acknowledged by Armstrong 
(1993). I was familiar with the social milieu under investigation, yet distant enough to 
observe the people and events I was researching objectively. I was able to remove 
myself ‘from the field’ by travelling back to Durham or the outskirts of North London 
each day, where I would write up my fieldworks, reflect on the day’s events and retain 
a sense of objectivity. Hence, my work is distinct from that of those who have shared 
similarities with the culture they have ‘researched’ (e.g. Polsky, 1971; Parker, 1974; 
Hobbs, 1988, 1995, 2013; Winlow, 2004), and more aligned with ethnographers who 
have completed successful ethnographies of culturally and socially distinct sections of 
society (e.g. Bourgois, 2004; 2009; Wacquant, 2004; Densley, 2013).  
Paradoxically, I would even argue that being a southerner in the North East (which is 
usually equated with being a cockney) - which could have constituted a serious 
obstacle to conducting the research in itself – was somewhat advantageous to me 
methodologically. I am again reminded of Wacquant’s study of a black urban boxing 
gym in inner city Chicago, where his French, Caucasian heritage offered him a form 
of ‘statutory exteriority’ amongst the group: similarly, I took comfort in Paul 
Corrigan’s (1979) explanation in Schooling the Smash Street Kids, of how he utilised 
his London connections in gaining access to a group of working-class kids in 
Sunderland:   
‘In most south of England schools my south London working-class would 
have O.K’d me with the boys; but, given a well-founded northern distrust 
of anyone south of Teesside as incipient ‘southern cream-puffs’, this would 
not work here. Over time though, my London-ness assisted me in getting 
through to the kids, since they were interested in such places as West Ham, 




Methodologically, this approach also worked for me. Participants were interested in 
places ‘Down South’ and in London, its football teams, music, and places they had 
visited. Similarly, those in London were interested in my life in Durham, what it was 
like being at University and most commonly, what it offered in terms of ‘gettin’ 
zooted’, and somewhat predictably, ‘gyals’.  Although by no means an expert in these 
fields, the interest shown by my participants in my own cultural and social habitus 
allowed me, as Corrigan (1979) states, to ‘get through’ to the group.  
It was also the case that my own personal characteristics aided my research, and the 
rapport that I subsequently established with my participants. I was fortunate enough 
to have conducted this research in my mid-twenties, a time when my age or appearance 
was not distinct from my participants40. I had a keen interest in both playing and 
watching football, and was conversant with the cultural norms exhibited by my 
participants. Similar to Parker (1974:11), I was also - to an extent - ‘suitably dressed 
and ungroomed, playing football well enough to survive and badly enough to be 
funny’. Engaging in ‘banter’ with the group became second nature; in a sense, I knew 
‘how to drink (or in my case, play football), when and what to talk about, when to say 
the appropriate thing, and more importantly, when to say nothing’ (Armstrong, 1993: 
63).  
I was also in the fortunate position of having accumulated a degree of ‘sporting capital’ 
(Wacquant, 2004:9) during my formative years to help ease my access into research 
group: at my time of entry, I was thus able to engage in football sessions, tournaments 
and matches, which subsequently earned me the esteem of my participants, and the 
                                                          
40 I had been mistaken as a participant on a number of occasions, including once by a local journalist at a session who attempted 
to interview and take a photo of me because I apparently ‘looked like one of them’. 
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recognition that I was ‘one of them’. I took part as a member of the SBI’s North East 
team in the regional ‘Homeless FA Cup’, somehow scoring the winning goal in the 
final which contributed to my legitimacy amongst one group of participants. I was 
‘scouted’ by another group of participants as a potential recruit for their local team 
outside of the SBI, and trained with them for a short while only for me to drop out due 
to PhD commitments. My enthusiasm for football established my status with the 
group, as I was able to participate and engage with them via this.  Just as Becker’s 
(1963) ethnography on jazz music was facilitated by him being a musician, the same 
could be said of my work being aided by my (albeit distinctly average) football skills 
and knowledge of the game. I built rapport and relationships of trust which I believe I 
would not have been able to develop had we not shared this familiarity with the game; 
indeed, ‘banter’ regarding the frequently poor results of the London team I support 
was one of the first points of contact I had with participants 
Overtime the group appeared less suspicious of me, rarely questioned my motives, and 
acted and behaved naturally in my company. The fact that I was ‘doing’ what they did 
- to the point that I was travelling to and from sessions with participants, joining in 
matches and showing up at regular regional tournaments – greatly contributed to 
establishing my status amongst groups of participants, and sealed my legitimacy as a 
fellow participant. Playing football and spending time with participants, I would often 
have to remind myself that I wasn’t there to enjoy myself, but to conduct research as 
part of my PhD. The group became interested in my work and were willing to come 
forward and openly talk to me. The rapport and trust that I eventually built up with the 
group proved crucial in seeking to elicit truthful and honest data from my participants.  
The participants seemed to enjoy talking about their lives, showing me around the 
areas they grew up in, and pointing out particular areas of interest to the research. 
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Spending time and engaging in banter and rapport with them enabled data to emerge 
that was authentic and accurate, reflecting the lived experiences of the young men who 
participated in this research. The experience was one I enjoyed thoroughly, even if it 
meant becoming easy prey for loose change, my phone, and rounds at the pub.  
Ethical Issues and Challenges.  
Research utilising ethnography and participant observation methods brings with it a 
series of ethical issues and challenges. (Giulianotti, 1995; Yates, 2004; Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007; Bryman, 2012). When formulating the ethical procedures for the 
study, I was aware of the issues associated with ethnographic research and, depending 
on which ethical position I took, the implications it may have had on data collection. 
Hence, it is now necessary to detail the ethicality of my methodology, and of this 
thesis.  
I deem this piece of research to be ethical, and in alignment with the Economic and 
Social Research Council’s guidelines for ethical research (ESRC, 2010). Prior to 
conducting fieldwork, I prepared a suitable ethical framework based on the 
aforementioned ESRC guidelines, to which I adhered to at all times.  
My ‘ethical position’, is based on the following ethical procedures, which are as 
follows: 
Firstly, in ensuring ‘integrity, quality and transparency’ (ESRC, 2010:3) in my 
research, and minimising any ‘risk’ to participants, my role as an ethnographer was 
one which would be referred to as ‘overt’. This is characterised by a ‘participant as 
observer’ (Bryman, 2008) role, whereby I was fully involved in the SBI activities and 
situations but resumed back to a position of researcher once the session or situation 
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had concluded. Obviously, this immersion often led to a blurring of roles whereby new 
participants were unaware of my position. However, I countered this by introducing 
myself to participants, outlining my role and providing a brief outline of the project.  
Second, all participants who took part in this research have remained ‘anonymous’, 
and were aged 18 years or over. This was outlined in the informed consent form I 
provided to participants, which set out how far they were afforded anonymity and 
confidentiality. Again, this position was guided by the principles set out in the ESRC 
ethics framework (2010), ensuring full confidentiality and anonymity, except in the 
case where a participant, or indeed any other person, is perceived to be in ‘significant 
or immediate danger’ (ESRC, 2010:24). Should this have ever occurred, I was 
required to contact the participant’s key worker and inform them of the risk. This 
conforms to ESRC guidelines for researchers who work with ‘vulnerable’ populations, 
as this research was considered to do so.  
Of course, there are those who argue that the use of providing informed consent to 
participants risks jeopardising and limiting the efficacy of qualitative research, as 
participants may be unwilling to disclose relevant information knowing that they are 
being ‘researched’ (Walters, 2003; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Nevertheless, 
on a personal level I was more comfortable with being ‘transparent’ and allowing 
participants to understand the nature of the study and their involvement as fully as 
possible, thereby following the ESRC guidelines of ethical good practice of ‘providing 
sufficient information about the research and ensuring that there is no explicit or 
implicit coercion’ (ESRC, 2010:28). Moreover, whilst it is correct to assume that this 
may have affected the quality of data elicited, I had, as stated earlier, followed the 
advice as advocated by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:210) of building rapport and 
trust with participants to ensure they were comfortable with me during fieldwork. 
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The third area of ethical concern that I had to consider before fieldwork was my 
position on participants disclosing an involvement in a criminal activity. Although this 
thesis is not primarily concerned with such activity, the nature of participants who 
make use of the SBI I ‘researched’ meant that I didn’t have to search far for unethical 
confessions or details of criminal activity; during my time ‘in the field’, I witnessed 
and observed ‘ethically’ challenging behaviour ranging from open drug use and 
dealing, violence, racism, and the ‘fleecing’ of stolen goods, and listened to the 
criminal confessions of some participants during interviews. 
Although such behaviour is by no means remarkable, but indeed a normalised, rational 
response amongst working-class youth to the contemporary social conditions of post-
industrialism, poverty and ethnic and economic marginality (see Hobbs, 2013:110-
136), in considering whether I had a duty to report statements of law breaking I became 
aware that by doing so would break an ‘unwritten rule’ amongst the young men I 
encountered, that you do not ‘grass’ to authorities regarding criminal activities (Yates, 
2006; Morris, 2010). Obviously,  this could have potentially put me in a position where 
I had ‘dirty hands’ (Klockers, 1979:269); holding valuable information of interest to 
legal authorities and where not reporting the criminal transgressions of participants 
could lead to allegations that I was not following moral and ethical responsibilities 
(Yates, 2004).  
In the end, I decided to omit a great deal of information regarding more ‘serious’, 
‘criminal behaviour’ elicited in interviews, or observed during ethnographic research. 
Where I have disclosed any information on these activities, however, it is because any 
exclusion of said details would jeopardise the quality of reflexive ‘data’ presented in 
this piece of work. Where I have detailed any accounts or information on ‘unethical’ 
behaviour, I have presented them as descriptive, simplistic and unelaborated accounts. 
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Here, readers should be aware that these accounts are well known to SBI staff and I 
assume, the police (participants are required to list any criminal convictions when 
registering with the SBI), and so any discussions of ‘criminal’ behaviour described in 
this thesis are common knowledge. I am therefore not describing any forms of 
behaviour that are not ‘already known’ by others, nor am I placing anyone in a position 
where they may face subsequent lawful action. Being considered a ‘grass’ would no 
doubt have also broken the trust that I had built with participants, making the research 
unachievable as participants would be discouraged from engaging in the research 
My position on this ethical dilemma was further confirmed by the fact that I was also 
wary of jeopardising the role of the SBI who sponsored part of this research. I believe 
that future participants may have been deterred from attending SBI sessions if they 
suspected the environment to be one which is distrustful. Disclosing ‘deviant’ 
information participants shared with me may have also reflected negatively on the 
staff who had granted me access to the research sites. I thus followed the advice of 
Yates (2004), that any disclosure of information would breach ethical guidelines as 
stated in the British Society of Criminology (BSC) code of ethics, whereby researchers 
are required to ‘be sympathetic to the constraints on organisations participating in 
research and not inhibit their functioning by imposing any unnecessary burdens on 
them’ (BSC, 2006:3).  Hence, ‘informing’ on participants would have seriously 
impeded the functioning of the SBI through destabilising relationships of trust 
between the project worker and participants.   
My position within the organisation, i.e. a funded research student, required that I 
completed a Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check prior to commencing fieldwork. 
I was also provided with general organisational guidelines for working with people 
deemed ‘at risk’, and how to manage or deal with any participant protection issues, 
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should they have ever arose. Both organisational staff, who I worked with and 
conversed with on a daily basis, and my University supervisory team, also offered 
their support in any case of encountering occurrences with which I was unsure to deal 
with. Having committed to offering full ‘transparency’ with my fieldwork (ESRC, 
2010:3), I feel obliged to share one occasion when it was necessary for me to approach 
both organisational and University staff to ensure my safety and prevent any ‘risk’ to 
participants (ESRC, 2010:3). This reflective, awakening research experience occurred 
after a participant accused me of alternative motives in my fieldwork episode, and 
took concern with my attendance at SBI sessions in light of his misinterpreted notions 
of my sexual orientation. His subsequent complaint to SBI staff left me feeling a form 
of vain personal unease at having been misidentified in both a personal and 
professional sense; at this time I considered myself to be ‘at least minimally streetwise’ 
(Bourgois, 2003:44) and fully established - and respected - amongst participants in 
terms of my research and personal credentials41. Although the organisation were 
unconcerned with the substance of the complaint and satisfied with my attendance and 
research motives, both my ethical position that required me to minimise any harm or 
‘risk’ to participants and my personal discomfort at the situation obligated me to 
inform my University supervisory team of the incident. A subsequent series of 
meetings between myself, supervisory team, head of ethics committee, and 
organisational staff provided an opportunity to ensure a shared understanding of 
ethical procedures, which included considering the safety of myself and participants, 
existed. Despite my heightened sense of personal self-consciousness that arose from 
the incident42 I continued conducting research, albeit in line with the requirements set 
                                                          
41 Following this incident, the participant who lodged this complained was subsequently ‘referred out’ due to ‘mental health 
issues’ (which of course raises interesting questions about the meaning of ‘hard to reach’, as will be discussed in the context of 
this thesis). 
42 I witnessed and listened to countless homophobic comments and jokes by definition of being and spending time in the 
‘homophobic context of the street’ (Bourgois, 2003:44). SBIs can be considered a natural extension of this social context, and as 
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out in the aforementioned meetings. This included an updated CRB check, the 
appointing of a main ‘point of contact’ within the organisation who I could discuss 
ethical parameters with, and the revision of participant consent and information forms 
to remove my contact telephone number. Although the latter may have jeopardised the 
contact I had with participants, I was still able to maintain comparable levels of 
interaction via my continued attendance at sessions.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 has introduced readers to the epistemological, methodological, and ethical 
underpinnings of this thesis. It has highlighted the processes through which I ‘elicited’ 
the reflexive, subjective views of my research participants, namely: qualitative 
interviews and ethnographic observation, and signified that this thesis is a derivative 
of the critical realist tradition. Given the complexity, diversity and evolving manner 
of working-class youth formations as highlighted in Chapter 2, this chapter has 
signified that the epistemological and methodological approach that I have adopted is 
necessary to bypass the weaknesses of other academic research into SBIs and young 
men. This work is therefore strongly influenced and informed by critical realist and 
ethnographic research into working-class life (Charlesworth, 2000; Hobbs, 2013), the 
sociology of urban life (Wacquant, 2004; 2011) and qualitative research into SBIs 
(Kelly, 2012). 
Chapter four has also provided readers with a sense of how this research unfolded, and 
the numerous issues of access I faced when attempting to establish relationships with 
my research participants. Within this, I have been instructive in pointing out the main 
                                                          
such represent a similar, hyper masculine cultural context in which it was not uncommon to hear similar forms of homophobic 




factors that facilitated this research, and how I was able to establish and maintain 
meaningful relationships with my participants, given the distinct disparities in social 
and cultural habitus’ that define myself, and my research group: Here, I have reasoned 
that my ‘alien’ position has allowed me to maintain objectivity in the research process, 
and that my distinct social and cultural position in relation to my participants did not 
constitute a serious obstacle to obtaining grounded data. Primarily, this was due to my 
‘personal’ characteristics: my ability to converse in and play football, or ‘my total 
‘surrender’ to the exigencies of the field’ (Wacquant, 2004:11), which enabled me to 
establish my status with groups of research participants, and seal my legitimacy as 
‘one of them’. Methodologically, I conclude that I would not have been able to obtain 
grounded, accurate data, if I did not share similar personal interests, or if I did not have 
a sufficient degree of ‘sporting capital’ at my disposal.  Although I believe that having 
‘native’ links to research groups is advantageous for a number of reasons (see 
Armstrong, 1993; Hobbs, 1991, 2013), given that I was able to obtain such ‘rich’ data, 
and the success of similar ethnographic work conducted by ‘outsiders’ (Bourgois, 
2003; Wacquant, 2004), I believe that future ethnographic research should recognise 
this potential, and not necessarily be ‘put off’ by any distinctions in habitus, race, or 
social background.  
The ‘ethicality’ of this research has also been considered in this chapter, and I have 
detailed the framework established to ensure this thesis remains ethical at all times. I 
have signified my adherence to the ESRC guidelines on research ethics, and described 
my position in terms of confidentiality, anonymity, and the disclosure of ‘sensitive’ 
information. I have also highlighted a range of ‘ethical dilemmas’, and how I dealt 
with them. Notably, I have argued for a position that has omitted accounts of serious 
criminal activity, in order to honour the confidentiality and anonymity of my 
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participants, and protect the integrity of my research sponsor. I have also detailed one 
such experience where I felt it necessary to inform my supervisory team of potential 
‘risk’ I was causing to participants, which resulted in the alteration of existing ethical 
protocols.  I have also detailed when issues of confidentiality or anonymity would 
have had to of been broken; that is, if any participant was found to be in ‘significant 
or immediate danger’ (ESRC, 2010:24). I can conclude, however, that no such 





Chapter 5: Post-industrial Youth Identities: Young Men in Neighbourhood A 
and B 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings concerned with the cultural identities of the contemporary youth cultures 
‘researched’ comparatively as part of this thesis. Although the differences between the regional youth identities 
explored in this thesis seem categorical, there are also a number of differences that exist between and within the 
two regional youth cultures explored in this research. Within this chapter, I therefore situate these two distinct 
youth categories within their own social and regional milieux, to interpret their behaviours, identities, and lifestyles. 
By doing so, chapter 5 also illustrates how these youth cultures have been ‘defined’ by definition of their cultural 
habitus and social ecology. Here, I therefore intend to highlight how these youth cultures have been conditioned 
by the social habitus’ that defines forms of living and existence in Neighbourhoods A and B, and highlight the 
structural properties and features which ‘explain’ forms of leisure and behaviour. This chapter will thus provide 
the context as to ‘why’ these participants are engaging with new forms of social control, that is, the SBI under 
investigation in this thesis.   
 
The opening section of this chapter explores the youth cultures found to exist within Neighbourhood A, and their 
specific activities, behaviours, and leisure lives. The second subsection provides a comparative element to this 
chapter, by exploring the same features within the context of Neighbourhood B, in East London. This will lead on 
to an exploration in further chapters to how young men are ‘perceived’ by SBI practitioners, and ‘make use’ of SBI 
programmes.  
 
By way of introduction, I revisit some points made in the earlier chapters of this thesis regarding the analysis of 
contemporary youth cultures. I refer in particular to the various ‘frameworks’ of youth cultures which have evolved 
alongside the social, political and economic changes that have arisen over the past thirty years.  
 
Youth Identities in an Era of Advanced Marginality 
The political economy that once defined youth subcultures - as proposed by the 
traditional Birmingham School approach – has now disintegrated, gradually 
fragmenting the traditional youth cultures that were once defined by the ecology of 
the working-class street or neighbourhood (Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Winlow and 
Hall, 2004; Hobbs, 2013). The movement to post-Fordist methods of production has 
led to the erosion of working-class cultures and forms of leisure entrenched in 
169 
 
working-class parochialism (Winlow, 2004; Hobbs, 2013). Stripped of the traditional 
industrial determinants that once fashioned the subcultural identities that dominated 
working-class community and street life, and where forms of delinquency and criminal 
behaviour were reliant upon this particular industrial, urban milieu, the subcultural 
thesis is somewhat outdated in the contemporary era. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, neighbourhoods that have undergone de-industrialisation and subsequent 
regeneration have enabled the dissolution of once traditional forms of youth culture 
and behaviour, and removed the material foundation upon which working-class 
identities were established (Hobbs, 1988; 2013; Byrne, 2001; Winlow, 2004). The 
youthful identities and cultures that were created within the context of an industrial 
period have now changed, and the realities of contemporary post-industrial life mean 
that the territorial based youthful cultures that once ‘accepted their proletarian 
occupational futures and looked forward to traditional forms of leisure’ (Hobbs, 
2013:115) no longer exist in the post-industrial era. 
 
The new age of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2008), in which we now reside, is 
perhaps better suited to understanding the more fluid, amorphous, post-industrial 
youth groupings that now congregate within the urban, de-industrialised locales of 
Neighbourhoods A and B (Redhead, 1990; Bennett, 1999; Muggleton, 2000; Ferrell 
et al., 2008). We have seen how Neighbourhoods A and B are now urban areas of high 
unemployment, low income, and immersed in traditional markets of criminality (see 
Hobbs, 1988; Winlow, 2004). In the void created by post-industrialism, young men 
are now seeking alternative ways to construct identity and forge transitions into 
employment, and in the process adapting to the shifting economic terrain by seeking 




In the introductory chapter I have introduced readers to the cultural and social contexts 
of Neighbourhoods A and B. In expansion, this chapter seeks to illustrate how this 
changing post-industrial terrain has destabilized what was a once fairly organised 
context for young males to make stable transitions into adulthood, rooted in a world 
of ‘single-class manual communality’ where consumerism was irrelevant (Hobbs, 
2013:113); and where identities were fashioned by the stable structures of industrial 
society (Winlow, 2004). The transplantation of this once stable era with the 
arrangements of an post-industrial society, whereby the financial, information 
technology and service sectors have replaced traditional forms of industrial labour 
(Ferrell et al., 2008; Wacquant, 2008) poses a number of questions which have 
relevance to an up-to-date analysis of contemporary youth cultures. Answering them 
requires an analysis which takes into account the backdrop of recent global economic, 
political and social changes, and its relationship with social exclusion, and ‘road 
culture’, which are emerging in many urban communities across the UK in the post-
industrial era (Hobbs, 2013). Here, I address these question, in relation to 
Neighbourhoods A and B.  
Neighbourhood A: Retaining a Sense of the Old 
Despite the destruction of its traditional industrial base, Neighbourhood A’s cultural 
habitus is one defined by a static, stable population based upon the traditional, 
working-class conceptions of family and neighbourhood life. The youth cultures I will 
describe in this section reflect this traditional working-class profile, remaining stable 
yet adapting to the new post-industrial market in attempts to gain a position in the void 
created by post-industrialism. Unlike the post-industrial youth of Neighbourhood B, 
contemporary youth in Neighbourhood A have not been subjected to the displacement 
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exacerbated by intense gentrification, and the traditional working-class communities 
and territories remain relatively intact and untouched by the influx of migrant workers 
or large post-war municipal housing projects. Instead, housing policy has contributed 
to retaining a sense of traditional working-class-neighbourhood tradition: the majority 
of the properties in the area are owner occupied, snapped up during the ‘right to buy’ 
scheme, and traditional working-class families have continued to exist in this area for 
generations. There is no ‘churning’ of the population, as has occurred in 
Neighbourhood B: gentrification has occurred primarily in the city centre of 
Sunderland, and also in the dock areas where labour once existed, leaving the terraced 
houses that populate Neighbourhood A reasonably intact with stable, settled 
populations (Sunderland City Council, 2013).  
 
As Hobbs (2013:116) has previously stated, ‘In post-industrial society, youth cultures 
are increasingly market orientated’, and the situation in Neighbourhood A is no 
different. In his study of changing identities in Sunderland, Winlow (2001:40) alluded 
to the ‘thriving entrepreneurial ethic’ that has existed within the city of Sunderland 
during the modern age. Yet in the post-industrial city, de-industrialisation has derailed 
this transition, and the ‘entrepreneurial ethic’ of the neighbourhood’s population is 
seeking alternative forms of enterprise in light of the declining traditional industries. 
As such, the de-industrialisation of the area has produced a vacuum in which some 
young men are adopting practices of consumerism and leisure to construct identity 
(Hayward, 2008), and engaging in forms of entrepreneurial transgressive behaviour to 




Street Life in Neighbourhood A: Transgressive Leisure and Economic Endeavours 
In the void created by post-industrialism, transgressive behaviour provides an 
alternative to the new, forms of leisure that some youth have been excluded from, and 
provides an alternative means of acquiring capital and consumables in an era in which 
social status, and hierarchy, is defined by consumption, rather than production 
(Redhead, 1990; Bennett, 2000). For some, this post-industrial trajectory provides 
stability in a context de-stabilised and ravaged by economic restructuring, offering 
leisure and economic opportunities for some young men seeking alternatives to 
following trajectories into the post-industrial market place. 
 
Seeking alternatives to the formal economy, some young men within Neighbourhood 
A have taken to the streets. A large proportion of their ‘free’ time is spent ‘doing’ 
nothing’ (Corrigan, 1979); playing football, hanging around the local parade of shops, 
street drinking, and dabbling, usually in marijuana but also in cocaine, and sometimes 
harder substances 43. The involvement of a number of participants in these leisure 
‘pursuits’ is reinforced by the exclusionary logic of neoliberal capitalism; an era in 
which many of these young men are excluded, socially and economically, from the 
post-industrial night time economy that operates close by to Neighbourhood A (see 
Nayak, 2006).  
 
Here, a space has been created in which criminality for economic gain thrives. The 
following field note extract provides an account of the way in a subsection of 
Neighbourhood A youth make use of the immediate social space as a source of leisure, 
and subsequent economic gain. In a way, it is a perfect example of Hobbs’ (2013:125) 
                                                          
43 MDMA was used by a number of participants in Neighbourhood A, an alternative to alcohol which was deemed ‘too expensive’.  
During my time in the field, I also came into contact with three local ex-Heroin users, their addiction to the drug thwarted by a 
combination of services of which the SBI was one part.  
173 
 
assertion that youth are now ‘attempting to sidestep the exclusionary logic of 
capitalism by commodifying their leisure and establishing dominance over territory 
that will otherwise dominate and demean them’. At the same time, these forms of 
‘commodified leisure’ function as a means of excitement; a thrill or ‘buzz’ or 
‘edgework’ (Lyng, 2005) that the post-industrial era has devoid them of (Ferrell et al., 
2008:72). The reality of this new form crime in Neighbourhood A, must therefore be 
understood as attempts at economic opportunity, and ‘attempts to achieve a semblance 
of control within ontologically insecure life worlds’ (Hayward, 2004:165).  The 
following fieldwork extract was recorded during the early stages of fieldwork, in 
February 2011: 
We are on the Metro travelling to Newcastle for a football match with 
seven other participants who reside in or around Neighbourhood A. We 
have all ‘bunked’ the train, taking advantage of the lax security at Park 
Lane Station next to the University of Sunderland, and aware that ticket 
inspectors rarely operate at Longbenton during work hours. We sit face 
to face in adjacent seats that line the windows of the carriage. Sitting 
opposite me are Danny and Richie, two participants who are rarely seen 
without one another. Both are unemployed, and have told me they have 
little motivation to work; their primary source of capital coming from 
small jobs ‘on the fiddle’ and the small sale distribution of low grade 
cannabis resin, obtained second hand from an older friend and dealt to 
friends and acquaintances who also reside in Neighbourhood A. Danny 
and Richie have already discussed bringing some along to Newcastle 
with them to sell on the train, but decide against: the low grade quality 
of the resin is unlikely to make them much money within 
Neighbourhood A, let alone in an alien territory of the region of 
Newcastle where their faces are not known and their accents mark them 
out as a much despised ‘Mackem’. Nevertheless, the trip provides an 
opportunity to engage in fun at the ‘Geordie Scums’ expense, and make 
some money in the process. Richie has already succeeded in the theft 
of a box of confectionary from the goods area of a newsagents (to be 
sold ‘back home’) before deciding that the suburban nature of this area 
of Newcastle and the array of reasonably priced cars would provide 
rich pickings for a couple of self-proclaimed young ‘hoods like Danny 
and Richie: ‘We’ll do a few on the way back, don’t wanna get caught 
at the footy with anything before like’…  
 
…Danny and Richie slip off following the football game, brazenly 
lighting up a marijuana spliff once outside the sports complex before 
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setting off for the Audi situated a few streets away, hidden by a large 
bush and away from any immediate sight lines. 
 
      Fieldnotes, Neighbourhood A, February 2011 
 
The fieldwork extract presented above represents a small component of the lives of 
two participants who I came across in my fieldwork. The forms of transgression noted 
here, namely; the evasion of train fares, drug dealing and taking, and petty theft, are 
relatively normalised and unspectacular activities amongst many youth of 
Neighbourhood A seeking to eke profit from the chaotic and fluctuating criminal 
market. The excitement generated by these acts also functions as an alternative to the 
hedonistic pleasure of the post-industrial night time economy of which they are 
excluded (see Nayak, 2006): 
 
‘I tend to just stay in at weekends, not really that interested in going down 
to the bars on [X Street], just full of student wankers! I’ll hang out round 
me mam’s, get stoned, maybe go out and do some robbing; just have a laugh 
hanging around all night with me mates really! Its good fun, a proper laugh 
like’ 
      
                  Richie, Neighbourhood A, February 2012 
 
Hence, for a large proportion of their time, a small proportion of Neighbourhood A 
youth who make use of the SBI are ‘doing nothing’ (Corrigan, 1979): the majority of 
their time is spent in the street, or in the house playing Xbox. Friday or Saturday nights 
are spent ‘getting stoned’ or ‘on the drink’, an alternative means of excitement to the 
night time economy that has excluded many of the young residents of Neighbourhood 
A due to economic reasons (e.g. the price of drink) or social reasons (e.g. the marketing 
of bars towards students, the barring of clientele, or the imposed rules of ‘no 




The sporadic, petty acts of delinquency that characterise a segment of this young 
population functions as a form of leisure that draws upon the ‘entrepreneurial ethic’ 
of the area that has flourished in the post-industrial era (see Winlow, 2001 44). Young 
men like Danny and Richie, although involved in the small scale distribution of low-
grade marijuana, see themselves as businessman, eking out profit from the 
destabilised, post-industrial market place in which they now inhabit; it also represents 
a chance to gain status and respect amongst peers in the face of economic and social 
marginalisation:  
‘Me and Richie, we deal some draw, 20 quid a block if you’re ever 
interested! We got a good little business going, dealing to mates and that. 
Richie looks after the cash, I normally work with the selling.  
We treat it like a proper business almost! We’ve got a list of who we sell to, 
their numbers and all that. They give us a ring when they need stuff, I’ll 
cycle round and drop it off and pick up the money…. We’re getting pretty 
well known in [Neighbourhood A] now! ‘ 
   Danny, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
In the past, the young men of Neighbourhood A followed their fathers into traditional 
industrial employment. Today, this is rarely seen, and now a range of ‘street 
enterprises’ flourish in Neighbourhood A, from the distribution of low grade cannabis, 
the fleecing of stolen goods, vehicle theft, and prostitution, which a small section of 
young men in this community now exploit. 
Street level drug dealing is intermittent and primarily involves the distribution of low 
grade cannabis and marijuana resin, rather than harder opiates which were cited as 
being located within local houses. The drug trade in Neighbourhood A is generally 
low level, however, and the reality of its intensity, sophistication and volume pales in 
comparison to the general public anxiety that often accompanies discussions of the 
                                                          
44 See also Hobbs (1988) on East End criminal entrepreneurship 
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area. The open drug markets described in Bourgois (2003) and observed close by to 
Neighbourhood B are not seen, and dealers are primarily unemployed young men 
whose primary motivation is the fast income generated from profits to cover daily 
consumables. As one local cannabis dealer stated: 
‘I started a couple of years ago, when I moved out after school. Just a 
little bit, ended up buying a few ounces and selling it, 20 quid or 
something like that for an 8th…its OK money I suppose, you could get 
more from selling crack or heroin but I’m not getting involved in that, 
too dodgy, I’ll stick to this stuff me. It’s not enough to cover the basics 
really, helps now the bairn (baby) is on its way too, not as much risk 
involved’ 
       
          Andy, Neighbourhood A, March 2011 
 
Primarily, dealing marijuana and cannabis resin was one method of obtaining money 
alongside other ‘deviant fiddles’ (notably theft, benefit scamming, or fleecing stolen 
goods). The rewards from drug dealing are minimal compared to larger scale 
distribution associated with ecstasy pills and opiates, with the incomes generated 
usually spent on everyday items, child care, or vehicle maintenance. None of the low 
level dealers I came into contact with saw themselves as ‘career criminals’, nor are 
they ‘gang members’; rather, distribution was a fleeting transgressive moment through 
which to make fast money. Richie had alluded to the transitory nature of dealing, 
stating how he ‘began when I was around 13/14’ before giving up, only to return back 
at the age of 18 when ‘he needed money for footie tickets’.  
 
Alongside street dealing, Richie, who has been unemployed since leaving school, 
made money for himself and his mum doing small cash in hand jobs ‘on the fiddle’. 
His involvement in a benefit scam, in which his mother asks him to refrain from legal 
employment to ensure she can continue claiming benefits for him, means he finds 
money for ‘food, booze, and going out with me mates!’. Other participants made use 
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of the SBI to qualify for benefits, as the course functions as part of the ‘job search’ 
criteria required to claim benefits (this issue will be explored in full in chapter 7). 
Nevertheless, deviant ‘fiddles’ have featured as a ‘basic form of entrepreneurial 
activity’ in Sunderland (Winlow, 2001:43) and for some, the practice continues to this 
day; Tony worked ‘on call’ for his uncle’s furniture removal businesses, an unstable 
form of employment which ‘paid well’ when opportunities arose: nevertheless, the 
infrequent nature of these opportunities meant finances had to supplemented with 
additional work, and drug dealing – as we have seen – offers a low paid alternative to 
make ends meet.  
 
The fieldwork extract presented at the onset of this chapter, depicting an SBI excursion 
to the city of Newcastle, is just one example of a ‘street activity’ which, for some 
sections of Neighbourhood A’s youthful population, provides a break from the 
mundanity of everyday life (Ferrell et al., 2004). This is because the majority of this 
theft is opportunistic, spontaneous and petty; small everyday items are pilfered, the 
main purpose not much income but rather more to do with the transgressive thrill and 
‘buzz’ created through minor acts of delinquency (Ferrell et al., 2004). The small 
proceeds eked from the theft of small goods – confectionary, canned drinks and small 
items of clothing 45 – rarely generates sufficient income and are instead either used by 
the young person themselves or sold to cover minor daily expenses (e.g. cigarettes, 
cannabis, and alcohol). This activity was relatively normalised, unspectacular and 
widespread amongst a section of Neighbourhood A’s youth population that I came 
into contact with. Newsagents and supermarkets were prone targets where small scale 
theft occurred, the thrill of pinching a small item – where the rewards, and 
                                                          
45 On one occasion a vending machine was broken into and stripped of its contents at one SBI project site.  
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repercussions if caught, were minimal – has more to do with ‘having a laugh’ than 
entering upon a criminal career (Wacquant, 2008). As such, the practice was common, 
and not seen as anything particularly ‘serious’ amongst many of the young men I had 
contact with. 
 
Although this form of petty delinquency is indeed common and ‘normalised’ for some 
members of Neighbourhood A’s youthful population, it is true that a small proportion 
of participants who I came in to contact with engaged in more extreme cases, and street 
robbery was a common activity through which some youth embraced the ‘predatory 
ethos of entrepreneurial urban culture’ (Hobbs, 2013:166). The theft of mobile phones, 
I-pods, and bicycles either from the street or person was one practice that has become 
more common in Neighbourhood A recently, although compared to the first form of 
delinquent thievery it was minimal, occurring usually between local youths and rarely 
involving the use of ‘tools’: the removal of the particular item from the target more 
down to verbal threats than any violent physical act. Although for some young men 
this activity no doubt provided them with a ‘buzz’, it also demonstrated their 
commitment to illegal entrepreneurial activities in which larger profits are eked from 
street activities in attempts to ‘sidestep the exclusionary logic of capitalism’ (Hobbs, 
2013:125). The majority of this crime was committed by the long term unemployed 
that I came into contact with, who had no willingness or enthusiasm to work and whose 
main motivation for such activity was to generate income to cover larger daily 
expenses (e.g. rent, new family members, large quantities of marijuana that could be 
sold on for a profit, alcohol):  
Bill: ‘I’ve done a couple of street robberies me, a few more serious 
things. Usually just sticking someone up in the street, taking a phone, 
wallet, handbag, whatever. It’s been at times when I’ve been at a bit of 
a loose end, when I’ve had no money and needed something, so I’d sell 
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on like a phone or I-pod or something to get some money to buy draw 
or some clothes or something.  
            TM: How did it feel – is it exciting? 
Bill: Yeah definitely, definitely. I got a proper buzz, like when you have 
it and you’re running off, you’re proper buzzing. It is exciting like, 
yeah’ 
       
                               Billy, Neighbourhood A, December 2011 
 
The profits from small personal items, however, are relatively small – around £20 for 
an ‘unlocked’ I-phone – and so provide minimal income for those wishing to engage 
in such activity. Bicycles, on the other hand, can range from between £20 - £100 
depending on the make, model, and general wear; a full bike can also be stripped down 
and its components sold on to second hand bike shops46.   
 
Theft demonstrates one method through which some young men are commodifying 
forms of street leisure to generate some level of excitement in an increasingly mundane 
urban environment, but at the same time ‘making money’ in attempts to circumvent 
the social marginalisation bought about by the erosion of the traditional industrial 
labour market. It is true that in this era, theft, and other forms of illegal entrepreneurial 
activity, have flourished, and in Neighbourhood A there is an adherence to the 
‘emerging entrepreneurial criminal ethic’ (Winlow, 2004:166) in light of the erosion 
of the traditional labour force, which has resulted in  ‘large armies of unemployed, 
especially among young males’ (Lash and Urry, 1994:133) who are now reshaping 
their identities in the post-industrial era in light of the serious decline in traditional 
opportunities (Winlow, 2004; Nayak, 2006). Hence, although the traditional 
community remains intact and has yet to be de-stabilised by massive gentrification 
                                                          
46 A rear wheel was the favourite target for bike thieves, as the removal of this also bought with it the ‘cog’ mechanism that can 
be removed and sold on for further profit.  
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and successive waves of immigration as witnessed in Neighbourhood B, the lack of 
traditional jobs for the working-class man of Neighbourhood A has led to a situation 
where youth are looking for more entrepreneurial ‘street’ activities as their transitions 
from school to employment become more fractured. This is similar to Winlow’s 
assertion that: 
 
‘Research indicates that the development and entrenchment of a 
continually disadvantaged underclass have slowly eroded the desire of 
some actively to seek employment and have promoted favourable 
attitudes to delinquency, especially as a means of getting money – the 
desire which has not diminished, despite such people’s disadvantaged 
position. We thus begin to see the slow advent of criminality, not just 
as a means of obtaining status (although this function has endured with 
various modifications), or of injecting excitement into an otherwise 
dull social situation, but as an entrepreneurial concern: a means of 
getting money’. (Winlow, 2001:66) 
 
Delinquency and Violence: Territoriality and Regional Specific Activities  
Within post-industrial Neighbourhood A, there is a core group of young men forged 
around the immediate environment of the neighbourhood. They are fiercely territorial, 
having grown up together and attending the same school.  
The favourite delinquent activities committed by this group of young men include 
petty vandalism, such as ‘tagging’ walls of buildings, hanging around ‘doing nothing’, 
low-scale drug dealing and taking, and damage to or theft from motor vehicles. The 
theft of personal items such as Walkmans and mobile phones remains popular, as does 
the act of ‘twocking’ - the theft of a motor vehicle without owner’s consent,- but is 
limited and rarely involves the use of weapons or causes injury to member of the 
public: 
‘We don’t do anything major, like serious like you would get in big cities, 
like in London or something. We don’t really have that mentality up here. 
It’s just a group of lads, we get together, watch the footie, mebbe go out and 
have a bit of a ruck with lads from [Neighbourhood X], but nothing serious. 
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Some of the younger lads go round and do a bit of graffiti, put stuff up on 
the walls and fences, some of ‘em go out robbin’, but just stuff that most of 
them are likely to grow out of’ 
  
                Craig, Neighbourhood A, November 2011 
 
The territorial based youth groups that exist within Neighbourhood A then, engage in 
primarily petty, sporadic acts of violence and delinquency against neighbouring 
factions. The sense of local territory manifests itself in schools, neighbourhoods and 
parks in the area, where local patriotism and loyalty exist, and graffiti is dubbed. 
Hence, whilst some have been quick to note the demise of subcultural  affiliations and 
the move towards more fluid youth grouping not strictly defined by territory  
(Redhead, 1990; Bennett, 2000; Hobbs, 2013), the youth groups of Neighbourhood A 
remain bounded by a sense of traditional intense localism and affiliation. Kintrea et 
al., (2008) and Pickering et al., (2011) have provided similar evidence of territorial 
formed youth groups in Sunderland, the powerful localism ‘perpetuated by older 
family members’ who ‘never leave their territories’ (Pickering et al., 2011:951), and 
the situation in Neighbourhood A is no different. This is not an area that has undergone 
rapid regeneration and gentrification, nor has it been populated by a new urban class 
of middle class ‘hipsters’, as in Neighbourhood B. Instead, this is an area where 60% 
of property is owner occupied and is home to ‘strong and localised families’ who ‘have 
lived in their local areas for long periods of time to promote strong networks’ 
(Sunderland City Council, 2011:3). The traditional community is still intact, and has 
remained long enough to instil a sense of deeply entrenched local patriotism which 
has spread to the local youth that now populate the area, impacting upon their 
collective criminal responses: 
‘Me family lived here all me life…my dad worked in the shipyards, before 
that I think me grandfather did, and before that all the generations in me 
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family did. It was what we done. I think everyone around that time, like, 
knew each other, like a really strong sense of community, and I grew up 
around families that my parents have known for like ages, we all close by 
and grew up with each other, went to the same school. We were all 
[Neighbourhood A] boys, and we always went out looking for fights and 
scraps and stuff with lads Neighbourhood C…it’s just deep rooted, my 
family always did, and it’s sort of just carried over’ 
   
              Craig, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
 
As such, territorial disputes are not uncommon, although rarely involve the use of 
arms. Instead, they are customary and ritualised events formed by historical territorial 
rivalries based upon geographical location and schools, as stated by Craig: 
 
‘There are certain areas where you live within Neighbourhood A that are 
different because you’ve got like top Neighbourhood A, bottom 
Neighbourhood A, and the middle, if you’re in the top you like…hate 
Neighbourhood C (a close by Neighbourhood) and stuff like that.  And the 
rivalry between them two is just ridiculous…you’d be in school and if like 
Neighbourhood C was off while us were in school they’d come down and 
climb over the school fences and fight with everyone…and they’d even 
organise fights for against us outside of school…it’s ridiculous.’ 
      Craig, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
  
Yet despite the intense patriotism of youth in Neighbourhood A, acts of violence, 
delinquency and aggression are limited to petty, minimal endeavours. For example, 
accounts of the school fights were not uncommon, as were descriptions of violence 
amongst local youth with historically embedded rivals on nights out in the post-
industrial, night-time economy situated in Sunderland’s city centre. As such, violence 
is a normalised, unspectacular activity within North East street culture (Winlow, 2001) 
and is an everyday feature of many of the lives of the young participants I came into 
contact with. Violence and threats during SBI sessions were also not uncommon, often 
continuing and extending over into the following week’s football sessions, and 
manifestations of weekend violence on the faces and knuckles of participants were 
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often evident on Monday mornings. The appeal, and attraction of routine violence 
amongst some young men of Neighbourhood A is located in the ‘buzz’, or ‘thrill’ of 
the activity; the pleasure of participating and the excitement generated by ‘self-
transcendence’ that is often foiled in an increasingly mundane, unspectacular urban 
environment (Katz, 1988; Lyng, 1990; Ferrell et al., 2008). Much of this behaviour is 
spontaneous, petty, and opportunistic, displaying an expressive dimension where its 
main function is to generate some form of ‘action’47: 
 
Indeed, Steve provides an account of the ‘seduction’ of violence for some young 
men in Neighbourhood A: 
‘I first started gettin’ into rucks and fights at school and that. Just for a laugh 
really, just smack ‘em in the face if I fancied it like. When I got a bit older 
I started drinking and that, getting into fights at the pub, at the 
football…been nicked loads of times for it …most recent was against 
Newcastle this season, someone swinged at my girlfriend so I hit ‘em, got 
nicked and charged with drunk and disorderly, got a fine and stadium ban 
for three years…It’s just for a laugh though really, fighting, just what I’ve 
always done, something to do ain’t it… every weekend, in town, at the 
footy, I love it!’  
        
            Steve, Neighbourhood A, January 2011 
    
As the following chapter will testify, in comparison to violence in Neighbourhood B, 
acts of violence in Neighbourhood A has more to do with ‘having a laugh’ and the 
transgressive ‘thrill’ it engenders than any form of serious criminal violence that may 
propel one into a criminal career. In Neighbourhood A, the traditional masculine 
pursuits of drinking and violence were inextricably linked to the industrial heritage of 
the town, defined by ‘hard’ ‘industrial masculinities’ Winlow (2001), where violence 
                                                          
47During my fieldwork, only on one occasion did one act of violence escalate to the point where authorities had to be called after 
‘reinforcements’ were telephoned to provide support to two young fighters. A 10 man brawl ensued within a ‘caged’ football 
area, watched by onlookers on the outside. Only after Police arrived did the crowd disperse, with little information or descriptions 
regarding the identities of the fighters who had made off via a hole in a fence provided by observers. Even for me, the event 
provided a brief, fleeting moment of excitement that could be watched first-hand.  
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was seen as ‘crucial signifier of self-image, a reflection upon a culture that favourably 
judged those who maintained a credible threat of violence’ (Winlow 2001:40). 
Although the industrial terrain through which men now define themselves in 
Neighbourhood A has undoubtedly been transformed, ‘the old structural yardsticks of 
masculinity are still present’ (Winlow, 2001:67) and Neighbourhood A retains a large 
proportion of families and men who found employment in the traditional working-
class industries of the modern era. As such, although forms of entrepreneurial 
delinquency are found within the Neighbourhood, it has retained a sense of the old 
working-class pursuits, and violence continues to present a form of transgressive 
behaviour through which status and identity are constructed: Steve utilised his violent 
notoriety to earn respect within Neighbourhood A’s male population; Craig engaged 
with sporadic acts of territorial based violence amongst rival schools; and Danny and 
Richie engaged in acts of violence to impose themselves in more entrepreneurial forms 
of criminality, notably street robbery and to gain status in the low level drug 
distribution market in Neighbourhood A. Robbo has recently been spent 4 months in 
jail for a fight in a town centre, something he puts down to ‘drinking, which is what I 
used to do most days cause there was nothing else to do’.  Violence then, remains 
constant in this post-industrial neighbourhood, and an unchanging transgressive 
pursuit that offers a means of gaining respect, excitement, and provides a ‘consistent 
mode of response to interlocking, market-related disputes, territorial threats, and 
personal slights’ (Hobbs, 2013:128). Indeed, some young men from Neighbourhood 
A are quick to ‘offer out’ anyone who may ‘diss’ them, or anyone who mistimes a 
tackle on the football pitch (as I often found out). They are also keen to exert their 
physicality and ‘bodily capital’ (Wacquant, 2004): honed and toned in local gyms and 
in the context of the SBI, and ready to exert a violent reaction upon anyone, or 
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anything, that comes into their way in the masculine, urban, working-class 
environment in which they inhabit. The frequency of such events suggests that ‘saving 
face’ remains a crucial element in the lives of these young men, and the physical 
violence remains a regularised activity for many of Neighbourhood A’s youthful 
population.  
 
As the traditional structures of Neighbourhood A have disappeared, it is clear that 
some of the criminal practices of the young men that inhabit the area have altered to 
fit the changing terrain. De-industrialisation and unemployment have created a social 
situation where forms of criminal activity are becoming more ‘entrepreneurial’ in their 
practice (Winlow, 2001; Hobbs, 2013), and theft, and drug dealing are but two 
examples of the way Neighbourhood A’s youth are altering to fit with this new post-
industrial era in the form of new ‘criminal entrepreneurs’ (Hobbs, 1998:411). 
However, although the codes and structures associated with the industrial period have 
undeniably changed, the relatively static and intact traditional working-class of 
Neighbourhood A has meant that traditional notions of neighbourhood remain, and 
working-class leisure pursuits grounded in territoriality and violence endure.  As such, 
the once traditional forms of ‘street leisure’ based around stable territorial groupings 
remain here, along with the distinct, traditional cultural habitus that has produced 
them.  
Neighbourhood B: Youth Identities in the Post-industrial Capital City 
As alluded to in the introduction of this thesis, Neighbourhood B has undergone a 
similar de-industrialisation to Neighbourhood A, as well as an intense social 
fragmentation of its traditional working-class neighbourhood (Beck, 1992).  Once an 
area associated with small family-based furniture trades, silk weaving, and craft 
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workshops - all of which employed a large proportion of the local indigenous 
population - the large-scale regeneration and gentrification of parts of East London 
over recent years has effected this particular neighbourhood, and eroded the social and 
neighbourhood context in which the established working-class culture of 
Neighbourhood B was once grounded.    
 
Recent immigration and the middle class infiltration of Neighbourhood B has 
undoubtedly impacted upon the youth cultures found in contemporary Neighbourhood 
B today. The hybrid mix of working-class, ethnic minority youth that now compose a 
large proportion of Neighbourhood B’s youthful population now also reside alongside 
‘bourgeois colonialists’ (Hobbs, 2013) who have populated the area in recent years. 
Hipsters, artists, business types, and IT and media specialists have made this space 
their own owing to the availability of warehouse style studio space and the proximity 
of the area to the financial and IT districts of the capital. As such, Neighbourhood B 
youth are now exposed to the influences of a middle-class culture, and the area is no 
longer the single class commune that Downes (1966) and others spoke of (see also 
Wilmott and Young, 1957).  The gentrification of the area has elevated property prices, 
exploiting the middle-class taste for gritty urban living, alienating the traditional 
community who now face extortionate rent and house prices. For example, in 2013 
the average price for a terraced house in the UK was £202, 972 (BBC, 2013). In 
Neighbourhood B, the average price of an equivalent property is £641,741 (BBC, 
2013). As such, the youthful population of Neighbourhood B are exposed to a social 
environment in which house prices have escalated rapidly over recent years in line 
with the intense gentrification of the area. The area is also estimated to grow in 
population by 30% by 2021, and is now characterised by short term rents; 
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approximately half of the borough’s housing is socially rented and a third is rented 
from a private landlord, with less than 10 percent of properties owner occupied 
(Hackney Borough Council, 2013). As such, residents lack any embedded historical 
connection with the area to establish any form of local parochialism that existed in the 
industrial era. The Olympic Park looms large in the background of the community, as 
does the gleaming buildings of Canary Wharf, further exacerbating the property boom 
of the area. Consequently, the infiltration of the middle class, and the intense 
gentrification of the area, renders the idea of Neighbourhood B being a stereotypical 
working-class community a la the research sites of Wilmott and Young (1957) or 
Downes (1966) outdated in its present form. Half a century later, any sign of a 
homogenous class based community based around single forms of industrial work is 
also redundant, and Neighbourhood B now represents a multi-ethnic, churning 
populace, devoid of any connection to its proud industrial working-class past.  
 
In this newly gentrified area then, where gleaming gated communities sit side by side 
by council housing estates, and where young kids in hooded tops share their space 
with commuting bankers and middle-class hipsters, how do the young men of 
Neighbourhood B experience forms of leisure and construct identities in an area which 
is radically different from the traditional notions of a working-class community 
‘researched’ by previous scholars (Wilmott and Young, 1957; Downes, 1966)? How 
have the changes in the local economy affected them? How do second and third 
generation black and ethnic minority immigrants construct identities in a community 
where their grandparents and parents ‘did not enjoy the relative luxury of temporary 
subcultural membership’ (Hobbs, 2013:126-127)? And what about criminal identities 
– how have the street ‘gangs’ replaced the once territorial, neighbourhood-based 
working-class subcultural groups that once existed in the area? 
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The Gang: A New Form of Subculture? 
Youth gangs in London have received considerable academic attention in recent years 
(Pitts, 2008; Gunter, 2010; Densley, 2011, 2012a, 2012b 2013; Grund and Densley, 
2012; Hobbs, 2013). The current youthful generation of Neighbourhood B are caught 
in a wave of moral panic surrounding ‘youth gangs’, particularly in the wake of the 
2011 summer riots, in which youth gangs were seen responsible for the disorder, 
leading to David Cameron launching a ‘concerted, all-out war on gangs and gang 
culture’ (Cameron, 2011). Neighbourhood B has had a long standing reputation for 
criminality, territorial youth conflict, and street gangs48, and is located within a 
borough which has been identified as having the highest proportion of youth gangs in 
the capital (BBC, 2007). Consequently, many of the current youth of the area have 
become the focus of ‘Britain’s gang problem’ 49and rendered as considerable threats 
to public and community safety50.  
Indeed, for some young men, the ‘gang’ represents an attempt at opposing the 
exclusion, economic marginalisation and intense personal competition of the 
neoliberal era (Ferrell et al., 2008) through exploiting economic opportunities located 
within the post-industrial city (Hobbs, 2013:125); a means through which urban youth 
can ‘sidestep the exclusionary logic of capitalism by commodifying their leisure and 
                                                          
48 Today, the physical landscape of Neighbourhood B has done a lot to contribute to the spate of gang related media reports on 
the area. The area has a large concentration and volume of social housing estates, which has contributed to tightly defined 
boundaries and territorial rivalries. With relatively little ‘open space’ to be contested, the area is often volatile and unstable, with 
graffiti marking ‘gang’ boundaries.  The use of the term ‘postcode war’, latched on to by the media in the mid 2000’s, originated 
from this particular neighbourhood. In the 1980s, a number of ‘modern’ urban street gangs were established in the immediate 
area of Neighbourhood B, fostered in an urban environment suffering from terrible decline in the wake of welfare restructuring, 
and before the area was comprehensively redeveloped and regenerated. This was teamed with the mass unemployment that was 
occurring throughout the 1980s, and the rise of the ecstasy and rave scenes and succeeding crack cocaine endemic that ravaged 
many urban areas during this period (Bourgois, 2003; Wacquant, 2008; Hales and Hobbs, 2010; Daly and Sampson, 2012). 
Indeed, the area has long been regarded as one of the first sites for the production of crack cocaine in the UK (Daly and Sampson, 
2012), an epidemic that brought with it a new wave of crime, notably the rise of organised gangs that could control and exploit 
the lucrative urban drug market. Jamaica has long been a stopover for cocaine exportation for South America, and the arrival of 
West Indian immigrants in Neighbourhood B from the Caribbean in the 1960s and 1970s allowed new arrivals with criminal 
links to exploit links back across the Atlantic.   
49 See BBC (2012) ‘The gang war being waged on Britain's streets’ 
50 See BBC (2010) ‘A man was wounded as two shots were fired in an East London park where hundreds of families were also 
attending a festival. The victim, who was shot in the stomach, was an ‘innocent bystander’, police said’. 
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establishing dominance over territory that will otherwise dominate and demean them’ 
(Hobbs, 2013:125).  
 
In Neighbourhood B, the current situation is one of flux and volatility. There are three 
known street ‘gangs’ that operate within the area51, one of which a number of SBI 
participants self-affiliated with. These gangs have existed for approximately ten years, 
and are a formed of approximately 40-60 members. Although activities do include 
those related to the criminal economy, a large proportion of the ‘social life’ of the gang 
is spend hanging around, ‘doing nothing’ (Corrigan, 1979); it is a form of leisure, 
hence the inclusion of this aspect of everyday ‘road’ life in this chapter. As 
Neighbourhood B’s borough is an area in which street gangs and youth groups identify 
more so with local estates and territories than they do with the specific borough in 
which they reside in, the situation is often volatile and highly territorialised; gang 
graffiti marks boundaries and members are known to ‘flag’ colours or bandanas.  
 
In this urban context, generations of previous fiddles, scams, gangs and illegal activity 
have formed the grounds for street gangs whose territorial rivalries and physical 
toughness have been conditioned by the enduring aspects of territoriality and cultures 
of Neighbourhood B. Indeed, as Hobbs (2013:135) has stated: ‘the importance of local 
conditions to the formation of youth collaborations cannot be overemphasized, 
and…there is often an overlapping of historically linked, territoriality based family 
affiliations and branded local gangs where youthful acquisitive crime is a long-
standing cultural expectation spanning eras’.  Coupled with some of the highest 
poverty and unemployment rates in the country, and without the safety of industrial 
                                                          
51 A number of the original gangs from Neighbourhood B and the surrounding borough were spawned from the original Yardie 
gangs, with members in the 1990s formed of youths British born of West Indian descent. Lately, the ‘glocal’ nature of organised 
crime (Hobbs, 1998) and the growth of Turkish and Kurdish organised crime in the capital connected to heroin importation has 




era employment to full back on, contemporary youth gangs function as a means to 
counter economic and social marginalisation through ‘mutate[ing] into a local 
entrepreneurial institution, merging markets with territories’ as ‘young men continued 
to use violence as a tool with which to create their own masculinity; but now they 
insisted on getting paid’ (Hobbs, 2013:122).   
Entrepreneurial Activities: A Post-industrial Alternative?  
 
‘It’s a laugh really, I don’t think I’ll be doing it forever…but look, right, 
I’m 17, I could be working in some shitty job or in footlocker or 
whatever, or I could be earning a couple of hundred quid a week from 
selling white and brown…there are risks, yeah, but I don’t think I’ll be 
doing it forever. How else can I get all this stuff and not work?’ 
 
      Peter, Neighbourhood B, April 2012 
 
For some young men, drug dealing is an established, normalised activity within 
Neighbourhood B. Amongst this group, it is unspectacular, and youth gangs are now 
seeking to eke a profit from this highly lucrative and instable market (Hales and 
Hobbs, 2011). Peter is a member of a drugs gang who operate in Neighbourhood B. 
He estimates to be able to make £500 a day from dealing ‘white’ and ‘brown’ (cocaine 
and heroin) on a lively strip not far from the estate where his gang is based. Unlike the 
closed drug market found in Neighbourhood A, the situation in Neighbourhood B is 
somewhat different, and an ‘open’ market akin to the one described in Bourgois’ 
(2003) analysis of a street level dealers in East Harlem can be found here. Peter started 
selling ‘product’ around aged 13; he was supported in this endeavour by the help of 
his brother, who was a founding member of the gang that operates on the estate in 
which Peter and his family grew up on. He first started off as a gang ‘younger’, that 
is, traditionally a ‘second – and third – generation gang member’  aged between 10 – 
16 (Densley, 2012:54) who are recruited by ‘elders’, who have some accountability 
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for their new recruit. Peter was recruited by his elder brother, who bestowed his unique 
street name or ‘tag’ to his younger brother52.  
 
As a younger, Peter began working as ‘lookout’ for other youngers openly dealing 
cocaine and heroin on the major strip close by to Neighbourhood B. Eventually, Peter 
progressed into dealing. Here, Peter gives an account of what this involved: 
 
‘Bash (Peter’s brother) and other elders would like buy from some people 
over in Islington…I don’t really know who they were, just like older people, 
more organised, like proper serious. Like you’ve got Turkish mafia and 
some other like proper old school gangsters…that sort of thing…anyway, 
Bash and others would bring it to us, put it in like a backpack or a lunchbox 
or something and get one of us to go and stash it somewhere, like we had 
this place in playground…this other place was around the back of some bins 
in [Neighbourhood B]. Once it was there we’d get a message or something, 
and then youngers would be working the street and getting other youngers 
to go back to the stash to pick up if we, like, made a deal…you can wrap it 
in Clingfilm too you know…we’d hide like 8, 9, 10 wraps right at the back 
of my throat, like right at the back, behind my teeth. Just spit it out when 
someone wants it…we used to do that as well’.  
 
                Peter, Neighbourhood B, July 2012 
 
The majority of youngers in this particular gang are employed by elders to work in 
frontline drug distribution, and for the past two years have been involved in a thriving 
operation openly selling crack cocaine on the major road artery through the borough 
and outside a major train station close by to Neighbourhood B 53. Youngers will openly 
‘tout’ product on the street, before signalling back to a lookout who will either retrieve 
product from a stash of product in a plastic bag, or the consumer will be ordered to 
                                                          
52 This is a common feature for many youngers who will adopt street names or tags from their elders with the moniker ‘little’ 
before their name. For example, Peter’s elder brother was known as ‘Bashy’, and hence Peter became known as ‘Little Bashy’. 
Obviously, this creates a grade of accountability for elders recruiting youngers, as they become intimately tied to their street name 
or tag (Densley, 2012:54). 
53 Open drug markets are not always the norm for London based drug crews. Comparative fieldwork conducted in a 
Neighbourhood Based in North West London found a group of 4 or 5 young men, unconnected to any local gang or in any way 
affiliated to a branded crew, operated a flourishing crack cocaine operation out of a rented terraced house in a well to do 
neighbourhood in an outer London borough. Their operation was unopposed by any other local youth gang or other operation. 
The success of the operation was down to their entrepreneurial ability to seek out an ‘open’ market with little competition or 




approach a second dealer who is watching over the stash to collect their product after 
they have handed cash over to the first dealer. The reasoning behind such a method is 
that on occasions when they are approached by police, no dealer will be found to be 
in possession of any product, and ‘stashed’ goods can be left safe in the knowledge 
that they will be unlikely to be detected; stashes routinely change throughout the day, 
and from my Neighbourhood B experience have included wheel arches, drain pipes, 
toilet cisterns and on any level where product can be thrown onto an adjacent structure 
and retrieved later if police do approach.  
 
Elders will often check by on the ‘count’ or money made for that day, but rarely handle 
the product in which is being dealt (see also Densley, 2012:17). In this particular 
operation, elders purchase drugs from medium level dealers in the north of the borough 
who are one step away from importation and connected to more organised forms of 
crime located in North London. Older youths will then pre pack the product into 
‘wraps’ ready to be dealt before passing them on to Youngers to drop in predetermined 
stash points. Youngers will ‘shot’ in ‘higher risk public networks’ (Densely, 2012:18), 
involving sales in streets, back alleys, parks, and hallways. The ability to maintain an 
effective entrepreneurial ‘open’ drug operation in a highly territorial borough where 
neighbourhoods and estates are bordered by competing drug crews thus depends a 
great deal on the ability of the particular gang or crew to maintain a reputation and 
physical and violent resources to sustain the particular enterprise, as Justin, one of 
Peter’s friends, maintains: 
  
‘Not anyone can just be out shotting on [X street]…we been 
out there like two years, and no one come round or tell us to 
get off road…if they did we have back up, we have muscle or 
someone ready to step up if anyone trying to move in…this 
has always been a [gang name] area, no one dare come in ‘coz 
of the rep, it’s quiet, we stick to this ends, man over there stick 
193 
 
to their ends…it’s no problem, but people know that this is 
our ends and not come round here no more’ 
 
    Justin, Neighbourhood B, June 2012 
 
Dealing is thus a normalised activity for many of the young men residing within 
Neighbourhood B who I came into contact with. It is no surprise that the majority of 
gangs evolved into the ‘enterprise stage’ (Densley, 2012:14) in Neighbourhood B 
during the early 1990s, an era when crack cocaine became readily available. However, 
many participants affiliated to this particular gang had previously engaged in post-
industrial forms of labour – office clerks, temping, call centre work – although these 
remained short lived positions and more often than the young men I interviewed 
returned back to the lure of the informal economy of Neighbourhood B. It should be 
noted however, that many young men cited frustration at not being able to find stable 
employment, as stated by Justin: 
 
Justin: ‘I really want a job…I’ve tried too but it’s hard to find one here, 
trust... 
 
TM: you worked before though, didn’t you? 
 
Justin: Yeah I’ve had like 6 or 7 jobs, in office, shops, Burger 
King…but each time I left. It’s like proper slavery working in those 
places man, proper slavery. Earning like nothing and doing the shittiest 
jobs you can imagine…proper slavery…so each time I left…I really 
want to work but I’m 21, I don’t want to be working in Burger King all 
my life, getting shit off customers, getting shit off some dickhead 
manager. You can make what I made in like a week at BK in like one 
day shotting on road. I’m not saying I’ll do it all my life, that’s why 
I’m here learning things and that, but just when I’m not working and 
young…’ 
 
  Justin, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
 
Some of Neighbourhood B’s young residents would find themselves in a ‘cultural 
confrontation’ (Bourgois, 2003:115) with the ideals of post-industrial, service sector 
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work. Although repeatedly venting their frustration at not being able to locate steady 
legal employment in the midst of a national recession54, the street offers one arena in 
which young men can carve out a living when the local economy fails them and they 
cannot justify several years’ employment hiatus to prospective employers. As such, 
despite holding several GCSEs and considerable work experience, Justin and Peter 
have found refuge in the underground economy of Neighbourhood B, ‘shotting’ drugs 
on the lively strip nearby and outside the station that serves the area. The problem here 
is thus structural, rather than at an individual level; both Justin and Peter state a 
willingness and desire to work, yet in an area where there are fewer than 500 
employment vacancies for more than 8,000 benefit claimants (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013), in a borough which sports the second highest deprivation rates in the 
UK and the second highest reduction in government spending cuts across all London 
boroughs (TUC, 2011), the only realistic means of attaining the ‘spending power 
required to live the lifestyle that they are constantly told they want and feel they must 
have’ (Treadwell et al., 2013:15) is finding a suitable entrepreneurial niche within the 
street economy, and at the moment drug dealing is the current crime de jour for 
disenfranchised, disillusioned, alienated kids seeking to avoid the exclusionary logic 
of consumer capitalism and negotiate their identities in  the post-industrial wasteland 
that is Neighbourhood B (see also Hobbs, 2013:125).  
 
In Neighbourhood B, some young men are commodifying more and more forms of 
leisure in attempts to delay the inevitable tedium of post-industrial service sector. As 
such, they are entrepreneurially suited to the predatory nature of the illegal economy. 
For example, Justin and fellow ‘Youngers’ frequently ‘go country’; that is, according 
                                                          
54 I witnessed many SBI participants from Neighbourhood B actively seeking jobs. One participant, who had previous experience 
of retail work and temping positions, recounted how he had applied for up to fifty entry level positions in the last three months, 
only to hear back from six positions which subsequently declined his application.  
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to Justin ‘anywhere out of Neighbourhood B’. These can be new drugs markets in 
towns and areas located on the London border and easily reachable by the vast 
commuter rail system, where their identities are not known by police and they are 
unopposed by other local collaborations, to inner city areas that have yet to be 
dominated by other local collaborations and where new night-time economies provide 
fresh entrepreneurial opportunity. Operations here are usually ‘closed’ and transitory; 
a house or disused location is found before setting up a flourishing business lasting no 
longer than a week, or when the stash has been exhausted. If the operation is focused 
on exploiting the local night-time economy, Justin would travel down in the evening 
and ‘shot’ class A drugs with fellow dealers who will guard a stash or deal direct from 
mouth. The ability to move about and seek new markets demonstrates how particular 
gangs are not as territorial as they once were in the era of Downes (1966); strictly 
defined, espousing a strong patriotism and limited to the immediate area. In the post-
industrial era however, Justin and his fellow Youngers are fluid and transitory, seeking 
out new markets to exploit in order to make a fast buck in the hyper consumerist 
society we now inhabit. ‘Going country’ is one particular method that has been used 
by a number of UK based gangs for years and is nothing new 55 (Daly and Sampson, 
2012), and Justin and his crew of youngers regularly use commuter services to ‘set up 
shop’ for a few days: 
   
TM: what do you mean by going country? 
 
                                                          
55 Daly and Sampson (2012) refer to the ‘Wolverhampton run’ that has existed since the 1990s when drug gangs from 
Wolverhampton targeted the port city of Aberdeen, where, unopposed by local drug gangs,  set up a lucrative industry selling 
batches of heroin and crack cocaine worth up to £6,000 a day. Other mobile gangs have followed suit, and regularly dispatch 
Youngers to leafier areas - where their identities are not known, where there is little competition, and where police enforcement 
is perceived to less punitive - to set up enterprises and drive trade. See also The Guardian (2014) ‘London Gangs using children 
as drug mules as they seek to expand markets Couriers as young as 11 sent into countryside, police warn, as analysts blame social 




Justin: I mean…anywhere out of [Neighbourhood B], like a few 
months back we went up to [commuter town] and stayed at Jessie’s 
cousin house…we took at up a big stash, sat up there for like a week, 
his cousin has these contacts and people heard we were there, we sold 
for like a week straight. Made like 5 grand in a week. 
 
TM: How often does this happen? 
 
Justin: Just whenever really, if someone has a contact, or if someone is 
staying in a place out of town we can head up there, Bashy sorts us with 
the stuff and we set up: It’s easy, just take an X box, sit about, wait for 
man to come…’ 
 
The substantial gentrification of the local area and the new burgeoning night time 
economy that attracts revellers from across London most nights has also provided new 
markets for Justin and his crew. Most nights several young men from Neighbourhood 
B are posted at positions in the night time centre with several bags of cocaine, 
exploiting the vibrant night-time economy and drinkers with a taste for something 
different. The influx of white, middle class ‘art types’, in Justin’s words, also provides 
a market which is easily exploited:  
 
‘When their pissed you can just charge extra…most of them don’t know the 
price for a rock or a pill or whatever, just charge ‘em whatever…ripped bare 
man off still, ha! It’s easy, man! Hahaha!’ 
 
 Justin, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
 
Although Justin and his crew are involved in violent conflict with a rival crew located 
north of Neighbourhood B in an adjacent housing estate, their ability to seek out 
markets ranging from two miles to twenty miles away from Neighbourhood B shows 
a great deal of entrepreneurial nous. The success of these enterprises depends firstly 
on seeking out markets that are unopposed by conflicting rivals, secondly on a willing 
client base with a disposable income, and thirdly on finding an area where their 
reputations are unrelated or irrelevant to prospective buyers (see Hobbs, 2013:124). 
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Undoubtedly then, the intense gentrification of the area has facilitated the ease through 
which youthful collaborations can successfully achieve successful drug enterprises. 
This is an area which, over the last ten to fifteen years, has witnessed an influx of 
middle class ‘hipsters’ and art types, with ‘good’, stable jobs and a taste for edgier 
forms of leisure at the weekend, and Justin predicts this demographic to be the largest 
buyers of product from Neighbourhood B dealers. Moreover, the nearby night time 
economy, recently redeveloped and rebranded to accommodate Neighbourhood B’s 
new clientele, has provided a ready market and trading base which can be exploited 
by the young men of Neighbourhood B during evenings and weekends. The reason 
that dealers from Neighbourhood B operating in this area, located 3 to 4 miles 
immediately south of Neighbourhood B, can run such a flourishing business 
unopposed is because this is 21st century post-industrial East London and the 
territorially defined area(s) that existed in the industrial period build upon local 
patriotism and a sense of community are redundant in the post-industrial era; the area 
is a gleaming new night time centre which has attempted to distance itself from its 
industrial history, a place with no history or connection to any remaining residents. 
Consequently, for Justin and his crew, this represented a territory which could be 
colonized and inhabited, a place where their reputations are irrelevant and a fresh 
market of middle class customers await.  
Lickin’ and Jackin’: Entrepreneurial Orientated Theft 
Drug dealing however, is not the only economic activity of some of the young men 
from Neighbourhood B who I came into contact with, and theft represents a similar 
means to eke out a profit from the shifting social, cultural and economic terrain that 
has destabilised the traditional working-class culture of Neighbourhood B. Like the 
drugs market that operates across East London and the evolving fluid and flexible 
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nature of youth gangs adapting to the changing social, cultural and economic terrain, 
new markets and areas have been opened that traditional youth gangs are compelled 
to explore in order to adapt to the economic changes that will otherwise marginalise 
them (Ferrell et al., 2008; Hobbs, 2013; Treadwell et al., 2013). The new post-
industrial landscape of Neighbourhood B is entrepreneurially orientated (Hobbs, 
2001) and as such ‘constitute(s) an ideal environment for a range of both legal and 
illegal opportunities’ (Hobbs, 2001:550). The aforementioned night time economy, 
located close by to Neighbourhood B attracts revellers from across the capital most 
weeknights, flushed with cash, mobile phones and other ‘flash’ expensive items. As 
such, the particular street gang explored as part of their research is reflective of the 
social, economic and cultural changes occurring in the area, and are mutating to fit in 
with this new terrain to exploit the new opportunities that this new landscape throws 
up: on nights away from selling class A’s in the night time hub located a few miles 
south of Neighbourhood B, Justin occasionally heads to a nearby street filled with bars 
and late night cafes which attracts a young, middle class ‘arty’ scene. Come closing 
time the area is flooded with inebriated party goers making their way home, and a 
nearby park with little light and clear escape routes into the confines of Neighbourhood 
B provides the perfect opportunity for Justin and his crew to deprive any unfortunate 
young person of their possessions should they take this particular short cut home: 
  
Justin: ‘We’d mob up in [park x] at night, wait for man to come through 
when it quiet and lick’ whatever they got, phones, watches, wallet, 
whatever… 
 
TM: Who do you usually rob? 
 
Justin: ‘just the people that hang out round [street x]…just like rich 
kids, trendy kids innit…you know the ones with like skinny jeans and 
trainers and shit…most of ‘em have got good phones though innit…I 
phone, blackberry, I pods, lots of money. It’s a good spot ‘coz we can 
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just peg it back to [Neighbourhood B] from there…been doin’ it for 
like two or three years… 
 
[Justin sees me looking slightly apprehensive] 
 
Justin: ‘don’t need to be tooled or nothin’ don’t worry!!!’ 
 
Further economic opportunities have been thrown up by the regeneration of the area 
alongside the London 2012 Olympics, and a nearby open space that now hosts music 
events provides a further economic opening for the young men of Neighbourhood B 
to take advantage of; come the end of the night the area is filled with up to 10,000 
young people, who, equipped with phones, cameras, and cash and with little 
knowledge of the topographical terrain of the area, are often soft prey for some young 
men from Neighbourhood B. Bikes are another soft target for some of the young men 
of Neighbourhood B, and the influx of cyclists within the immediate vicinity, and 
indeed London as a whole, has resulted in a new market to be exploited for those 
seeking a fast buck by selling on stolen goods, again to a nearby market which is 
renowned for taking in and selling on stolen bikes. 
 
The rewards from street robbery and preying on the influx of middle class residents in 
and around Neighbourhood B, however, only offers limited rewards, and brings with 
it a great deal of risk. Justin reports that ‘three or four’ members of his crew have been 
‘put away’ after a police crackdown on mobile phone theft in the area. As such, theft 
is merely a fleeting act of transgression for anyone seeking to make a fast buck, a 
moment of excitement in an otherwise mundane urban environment (Katz, 1988), and 
a further ‘transitional possibilities featuring markets offering something more 
interesting than ‘Mc Jobs’’ (Hobbs, 2013:134). Other forms of theft, therefore, are 
making their way into the confines of Neighbourhood B, and although the links with 
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organised crime gangs was never fully explored as part of this research56, according to 
one source many affiliates from local youth gangs operating in the area often graduate 
to organised criminal factions in search of more financially rewarding crimes such as 
burglaries, smash and grabs and car theft rings: 
 
Jimmy: ‘Some of the lads, they used to hang about [Neighbourhood B] and 
deal and do the usual stuff but some do move on, work with more organised, 
do like more serious stuff for proper gangsters and stuff…like smash and 
grabs, hold up shops in the West End, stuff like that. There was a few round 
here yeah, done some jobs robberies and that. A lot of the big ones come 
from Islington, Camden, round that way though…all the shit in the news 
about raids in the West End and that, that’s mainly lads from round that way 
I think, white Irish boys mainly’ 
 
            Jimmy, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
 
Portraying every criminal progression in this way, however is a futile57, as the 
transitory nature of youth gangs in the 21st century means that only a small number 
evolve into more organised, serious factions. The gang of Neighbourhood B, for 
instance, is relatively ‘new’ on the urban scene, having evolved out of a gang of 
‘elders’ who were imprisoned for a number of high profile murders in the early 2000s. 
                                                          
56 The focus of many media reports detailing the graduation of street gang member to organised criminal appears to be on the 
youth gangs of Camden and the Southern end of Islington, where there has been traditional links between white working-class 
youth gangs and more organised, familial forms of crime. This is perhaps due to the traditional white, working-class and Irish 
populations (see Robins and Cohen, 1972:89) found here, and their historical connections with older, organised crime groups 
who are seeking to recruit British born men with significant criminal experience. There are numerous examples of boys originally 
from Islington and Camden street gangs who have been jailed for more financially rewarding smash and grab raids, jewellery 
heists and burglary car rings under the direction of organised crime factions from North London. For example, see: The Guardian, 
(2013). ‘Two brothers jailed for Selfridges raid’.  
57 The links between the youth groups of this area and more organised factions in Neighbourhood B is not clear cut. Partially, 
this is due to the multi-ethnic makeup of the region when compared to the largely white, British born council estates found in 
Islington and across the border in Camden, where older criminal groups composed of members from British and Irish backgrounds 
seek similar British born younger members with familial links and the networks to graduate into a fully-fledged criminal career. 
In Neighbourhood B, however, since the mid 1990’s the majority of organised crime is controlled by organised groups composed 
of members of Turkish and Kurdish extraction (see Hobbs, 2013:205 – 208) who are able to exploit their links back to Turkey, 
the major base for heroin importation into the UK. Although it is naïve to suggest that heroin importation is the domain of purely 
Turkish and Kurdish organised groups when in fact there is a ‘distinctly cosmopolitan flavour to many of these networks’ (Hobbs, 
2013:206), the trade relies heavily on familial networks and a small minority of the self-contained Turkish and Kurdish 
community existing in North and East London (Hobbs, 2013:207) who ‘pervade(s) the social structure and straddle(s) the 
boundary between legality and illegality’ (Hall, 2012:18). As such, there is limited opportunity for the young men of 
Neighbourhood B, who, devoid of any familial or territorial link to precircumscribed organised crime groups, remain at the lower, 
more volatile end of the criminal ladder for a shorter lived career or, in the case of a number of gangs in the area, may evolve 
into larger operations occupying a middle market position and hoping to gain a foothold in the drugs market. For example, the 
Pembury Boys gang based in Hackney evolved out of a larger Borough wide gang, before evolving into an established 
entrepreneurial drugs gang one step away from importation and responsible for the majority of class A importation alongside 
organised Turkish gangs in Hackney. For example, see EastLondonLines (2011) ‘Twenty-three arrested in dawn raids as police 
tackle drug dealing and firearms crime in Hackney’.  
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As such, they lack a historical, reputable crimogenic ‘base’ on the East London scene, 
and links with organised crime groups are limited due to the Neighbourhood B’s 
young, fluctuating and constantly evolving population when compared with nearby 
estates in the area, which has contributed to the distancing of the neighbourhood from 
any familial or transmissible link with organised crime groups. As such, their activities 
are largely restricted to smaller scale dealing in and around Neighbourhood B and in 
the open, free for all night time market located nearby, as well as low scale theft of 
bicycles and electronic goods that the changing, evolving population has flooded 
Neighbourhood B with. Justin explains the current situation in and around 
Neighbourhood B: 
Justin: ‘We are small…we are small. Bigger things are nearby, bigger 
groups with man that have been about for years, [estate A], [estate b], 
[estate c], they are the big players, they are the ones you see in the news, 
like, the ones that have done murders and shit and are in control of the 
drugs round here. Most of our stuff comes from them… 
  TM. Where do they get there stuff from? 
Justin: I dunno, we aren’t involved that high up, but probably like some 
Turks or something, more serious gangsters. We can’t compete with 
them so we just sling around our ends innit…sometimes over at [park]. 
But we haven’t got anyone to step up to them…they have tools, plenty 
of man…we can’t compete…we don’t have any links with other 
groups, we are too young, too new and don’t know any other man’ 
 
Territoriality and Violence 
As we have seen, the local population of Neighbourhood B is one that is transient, 
evolving and constantly churning (Hobbs, 2001; 2006; 2013); de-industrialisation and 
the outward migration of the traditional white, working-class population has erased 
the cultural foundations and organisation of the ‘traditional’ working-class urban 
arena, and with it the basis on which traditional neighbourhood youth groups were 
established. Accordingly, the terrain upon which neighbourhood groups were founded 
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is now redundant, and local youth groups must now reconfigure their territorial 
dominance in an urban arena devoid of any enduring local parochialism. The urban 
landscape, having undergone intense gentrification, outward migration, and the 
erosion of its traditional labour market, means that the neighbourhood groups that were 
once dependent on the features of an industrial period has made it difficult for any 
criminal group ‘to establish the kind of parochial dominance they once enjoyed in the 
1950s and 1960s’ (Hobbs, 2001:550). The new landscape of which Neighbourhood B 
constitutes is now a patchwork of territorial boundaries that exist beyond the confines 
of the traditional neighbourhood terrain, and the new post-industrial, gentrified terrain, 
that in a sense constitutes a territorial vacuum, has brought with it a range of 
entrepreneurial opportunities ready for new settlement. 
 
Consequently, the influx of new inhabitants means this is an area where identities are 
not always known and past territorial reputations are redundant, making it easier for 
newcomers to ‘set-up shop’58. For example, an elder man with links to South London 
has recently moved in to the Neighbourhood, and has brought with him a low scale 
cannabis distribution network which he operates from his flat and sells to a number of 
‘Youngers’ from the area. Pearson, has lived in Neighbourhood B for all his life and 
is an SBI participant:  
‘The place got redeveloped when I was like 5 or 6, can’t really remember 
what it was like before that but you can see pictures of it and stuff, like 
proper grimy and had bad people and stuff, drugs and shootings and that. It 
looks better now, people moved in from different places, you got posh 
people buying stuff as well. But some bits are like still bad, some older 
people come in from different areas and deal and stuff. No one really does 
nothing ‘bout it cause we don’t know who they are, who their fam is, where 
                                                          
58In an area of North West London where fieldwork was also conducted, a local estate that now has a reputation for territorial 
youth violence has incorporated inhabitants from a nearby estate which was undergoing redevelopment in the 1990s. This has 
long been cited as the reason for the increase of violence in this once respectable neighbourhood, and has also resulted in a close 
relationship between the criminal factions of the two areas due to familial links and enduring social relations that now exist 
between the two. See BBC (2011) ‘London shooting: 'Postcode' wars blight Mozart Estate’. 
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they from or whatever. Best just to leave it and let them do it. We do our 
stuff, man does his’. 
 
         Pearson, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
The pre-circumscribed territories that once existed here (see Hobbs, 2013) no longer 
have weight in this post-industrial environment, and has resulted in entrepreneurial 
youth groups branching out from their traditional strongholds, spreading and 
expanding their reach upon a highly contested terrain fraught with competing factions. 
A nearby train station, located close to a major high street and situated between 
Neighbourhood B and an estate with a small volatile mix of young males, has been a 
Neighbourhood B distribution point for the past two years, even though it is located 
in a territory deemed to be ‘no man’s land’ unconnected to any territorial group: the 
area has been a recurring site of conflict between the groups during the fieldwork 
period: A number of stabbings to the upper legs and buttocks occurred – a favorite of 
urban youths seeking maximum pain, minimum risk of serious injury, and ultimate 
humiliation – after which the Neighbourhood B boys were able to defend this thriving 
market which has been engendered by a post-industrial local economy and has been 
entrepreneurially sourced by those seeking to eke profit from this lucrative market.  
Chapter Summary  
The everyday lives of some young men in Neighbourhood A reveals a multifaceted 
and complex picture that is often not seen in descriptions of social exclusion and crime. 
Social and cultural features unique to the North East of England and city of Sunderland 
provide us with the underlying socio-cultural and structural features of contemporary 
youth identities; class, ethnicity, economic opportunities and gentrification all have 
parts of play in the trajectory of working-class (street) leisure and forms of criminality 
over the last thirty years. Individually, family tragedy, social displacement and mental 
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health issues bring to the table an understanding of the complex biographical concerns 
of some young men within Neighbourhood A. Combined, the analysis of structural 
and agentic factors can be interpreted broadly as factors that impel many young men 
into a forms of ‘street’ culture, similar to the observations of Winlow (2001) and 
Hobbs (2013). Forms of delinquent behaviour function as a means of gaining respect, 
status, ‘fun’ and ‘excitement’ (Katz, 1988) in an increasingly mundane social milieu , 
and the activities of petty shoplifting, street theft (both with minimal financial gain) 
and drug taking attest to this. Moreover, the de-industrialisation that has occurred in 
and around Neighbourhood A has resulted in more ‘entrepreneurial’ (Hobbs, 2013) 
forms of street leisure, most notably in the form of drug dealing – the current crime de 
jour – to make ends meet for many unemployed, under skilled young men making 
increasingly fragmented youth transitions (Nayak, 2006; MacDonald, 2011; Shildrick 
et al., 2013).  
The lifestyle adopted by some young men in Neighbourhood A adheres to a cultural 
habitus structured around the traditional working-class, industrial forms of labour that 
have existed in and around Neighbourhood A for generations (Winlow, 2001). This is 
because despite the destruction of the traditional industrial base in Neighbourhood A, 
it has managed to retain its traditional population, and has been relatively untouched 
by immigration and gentrification. In this sense, territorial and localised families have 
remained, and ‘subcultural’ responses and youth groupings continue to exist, formed 
around the relatively static population that exists within Neighbourhood A. Violence 
remains a common feature here, a means of dispute resolution and asserting 
dominance over nearby locales, buttressed by traditional, deep-rooted forms of 




In contrast to Neighbourhood A, Neighbourhood B is characterised by a post-
industrial landscape destabilised by the outward migration of the traditional white, 
working-class community, intense gentrification, and a churning, heterogeneous 
influx of new populations (Dench et al., 2006; Hobbs, 2013). This environment has 
thrown up a range of economic opportunities, consumption practices (Bauman, 2002) 
and ‘fresh modes of locality and identity’ (Hobbs, 2001:554) that have succeeded in 
transforming the territorial based youth gang composed of a fleeting, brief 
membership (Downes, 1966) to one conforming to the backdrop of economic, social 
and cultural changes in the area. Drugs, theft and links to organised crime factions are 
now normalised, unexceptional and everyday activities embedded in the structure of 
Neighbourhood B, and the lifestyles of young men engaged in these activities must be 
understood as a response to the logics of the times; theft and drug dealing as a means 
of income attainment but also leisure pursuits which stimulate some form of 
excitement, fun and adventure in an otherwise mundane, dull and tedious urban 
environment (Katz, 1988; Ferrell et al.¸2008; Hobbs, 2013).  
In Neighbourhood B, the intense social and cultural changes occurring over recent 
years has spread the once territorial youth gang beyond the confines of its traditional 
neighbourhood. The gentrification of the surrounding area has erased the once pre-
circumscribed territorial boundaries, and these ‘non-places’, devoid of any enduring 
historical territorial ownership, now represent urban playgrounds ripe for re-
colonization by entrepreneurial youth groups seeking an appropriate market in which 
to ‘set up’ business. The pace of change around Neighbourhood B, most notably in 
terms of the inward migration and settlement of a new, middle class, young and 
educated population, has also laid the foundations for new forms of entrepreneurial 
crime, and provided the youth gang of Neighbourhood B with a ready-made target, 
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rich for exploitation through lucrative drug markets and opportunistic theft. As a 
consequence, the new youth gangs of Neighbourhood B and the surrounding area have 
been spread across an ‘open’ terrain, with traditional territorial boundaries erased and 
new markets and territories emerging in line with the economic changes of the area. 
The youth gang is now highly entrepreneurial; less territorially inclined and more 
fluid, flexible and adaptive to the surrounding location and habitus that now offers 
multiple illegal opportunities. The success of these operations is dependent on the 
ability of youth groups to seek out markets across the urban landscape unpossessed by 
other local collaborations and where there is a ready customer base. Hence, the 
operational networks of youth gangs have spread across a broad and extensive urban 
and suburban topographical terrain, which has created a disputed space between rival 
factions seeking to colonize these post-industrial places and spaces where violence 
acts a means of establishing any sort of territorial dominance beyond traditional 
established strongholds. Understanding this social context illuminates the range of 
entrepreneurial street activities available to the young men and women of 
Neighbourhood B, and provides an understanding to the backdrop of an area in which 
young men are making increasingly fragmented and non-linear post school transitions; 
certainly these opportunities provide something more interesting and financially 
rewarding then the post-industrial jobs that have come to populate the surrounding 
area.  
Yet despite the intense regeneration and gentrification of the area and the subsequent 
fragmentation of the traditional neighbourhood,  disregarding any form of continuing 
territorial rivalry in this particular neighbourhood is perhaps somewhat hasty, 
particularly as the area has an enduring legacy of youth groups with territorial 
hostilities and a longstanding continuity of ‘generations of informal networks of 
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fiddlers, dealers, scammers, and planners’ (Hobbs, 2013:124), of whom the local 
youth of Neighbourhood B have inherited some sense of established territorial rivalry. 
In Neighbourhood B, violence is thus situated around both entrepreneurship and 
market dominance as well as maintaining the reputation of one’s ‘endz’ and 
establishing ‘respect’ in the face of embedded conflict and rivalries. As such, 
territorial  based violence has become entrenched within  the fabric of many young 
men in Neighbourhood B, and anyone caught ‘slipping’ over symbolic boundaries can 
set in motion the vicious cycle of vengeful violence which has come to characterize 




Chapter 6: Sport Based Interventions: A Comparative Sociological Analysis of 
Operations 
Having mapped out the social, economic and cultural terrains of Neighbourhood’s A and B, alongside the 
respective youth cultures that populate them, this chapter will examine the organisational practices of the SBI 
researched as part of this thesis. To continue the overriding sociological themes illuminated in chapter 5, this 
chapter will present a comparative analysis of two SBI centres located within Neighbourhood A and B’s specific 
social milieux and their identifiable social, economic, and cultural frameworks. I will highlight how SBIs have 
been permeated by neoliberal thought, and how this work interacts with the identities of the post-industrial youth 
in an era of advanced marginality.  
Structurally, this section in segregated into four main parts. I will begin by identifying how Neighbourhood A and 
B have been subjected to processes of ‘territorial stigmatization’ by SBI staff, which has legitimised increased 
intervention of the youthful populations of these respective neighbourhoods. This will be followed by a discussion 
of how SBI work interacts with the identities of post-industrial youth, and how intervention is often at odds with 
the needs of youth seeking to navigate the post-industrial terrain in which they inhabit.  
To expand on this, I will then detail how neoliberal forms of governance have structured the operations of the SBI, 
and the deleterious effects this often has on participants. This will include situating each SBI within their specific 
social, economic and cultural ecologies, and uncovering the commonalities and differences existing between the 
two regional SBI centres in terms of funding streams, which were found to ‘structure’ how each SBI functions. 
Finally, I will discuss the forms of employment, education or training participants were ‘progressed’ into by the 
SBI, which will allow for a full discussion of post-SBI transitions in the chapter 8.  
Ultimately, this chapter will argue that in making up a significant component of the ‘neoliberal repertoire’ (Spaaij, 
2009), contemporary SBI’s approach to intervention fails to comprehend trends of economic and demographic 
structures and the realities of urban marginality in profoundly different de-industrialised locales in the UK. Often, 
this results in harmful social consequences for the participants who make use of SBI programmes. 
Introduction 
By way of introduction I will briefly revisit the social, cultural and economic 
backdrops of Neighbourhood A and B. In doing so, readers will be reminded of the 
context in which each SBI centre functions, which will enable a subsequent full 
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analysis of the implications of these structures on the organisational behaviour of the 
SBI.  
The Neighbourhoods of A and B are distinct urban locales characterised by deep-
rooted structural, economic and cultural differences. Although both neighbourhoods 
can be considered de-industrialised, urban areas (Winlow, 2004; Hobbs, 2006) 
typified by economic destitution, poverty, and a negative public perception, their 
morphological composition, ethnic diversity, degree of poverty, and historically 
embedded cultures at neighbourhood level are neither the same, nor manifest at the 
same level. Hence, the functioning of the SBI within these two structurally, 
economically and culturally diverse locales must recognise that the level of each SBI’s 
engagement with participants, their sustainability, ‘outcomes’, and financing, are all 
affected by the established frameworks of specific social environments (Crabbe, 
2008). Thus, to provide any sociologically nuanced analysis beyond positivistic 
evaluations of SBIs requires situating an analysis of each SBI within their specific 
social milieu, at local and regional levels, taking into account relative needs and social 
ecologies, and notions of regionality and identity as discussed in chapter 5 (see also 
Crabbe, 2008).  
Operations: Targeting 
‘We have projects set up in areas of London, really deprived, gangs, 
lots of crime, that sort of thing…we usually look at areas and think 
about the ones that need help, the ones that are in need of some sort of 
support…like, there is a massive gang and youth crime problem in 
Neighbourhood B, and by going in we are trying to make a difference, 
we get money for that, to set up new projects that are working towards 
the needs of the area’ 
              SBI official, London, March 2012 
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As I have detailed at the onset of this chapter, the social ecology of the surrounding 
area is instructive in informing the operations of the SBI, and the targeting of specific 
areas by the SBI was often found to be a response to public and populist concerns 
surrounding youth crime, unemployment, and urban street ‘gangs’. As this section will 
detail, often this was asserted without empirical or statistical support. The ‘territorial 
stigmatization’59 (Wacquant, 2008:237-238) of particular urban areas and the 
expansion of SBIs and other crime reduction services into these areas has been 
investigated elsewhere (see Kelly, 2012), and in exploring the way in which SBIs 
target particular neighbourhoods, the current thesis adds a contribution to these 
debates.  
As we have seen, both Neighbourhood A and B are areas subjected to significant 
stigmatisation, and known and recognised in public, political and media accounts as 
urban badlands where violence, drugs and urban squalor are common fixtures. I have 
previously stated how both Neighbourhood A and B do suffer from similar features 
spawned out of the de-industrialisation and fragmentation of the local economy and 
destabilisation of the traditional working-class community. Yet the intensity, 
frequency and level of poverty, delinquency, and crime differs markedly between the 
two locales, and the public, political and media representations of the areas - that they 
are tough, unaccommodating hellholes rife with violence, crime and drugs, - bears but 
only a tenuous relation to the actual realities of the areas, particularly in 
Neighbourhood A. Yet this does not matter: the territorial infamy of these areas, long 
                                                          
59 Territorial stigmatization, coined by Wacquant (2008:237-238) refers to how urban areas experiencing ‘advanced marginality’ 
are often ‘perceived by outsiders and insiders as social purgatories, leprous badlands at the heart of the post-industrial metropolis 
where only the refuse of society would agree to dwell. As such, the prejudicial perceptions of these urban places become diffused 
and spread amongst society, both ‘from below’, in the ordinary interactions of daily life, as well as ‘from above’, in the 
journalistic, political and bureaucratic (and even scientific) fields’. 
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embedded within the psyche of the public and media and political officials, means 
that:  
‘Whether or not these areas are in fact dilapidated and dangerous, and their 
population composed essentially of poor people, minorities and foreigners, 
matters little in the end: when it becomes widely shared and diffused, the 
prejudicial belief that they are suffices to set socially noxious consequences’ 
(Wacquant, 2008:239)  
 
As this chapter will attest, the official rationales behind the ‘targeting’ of specific 
neighbourhoods can be viewed as one response to the social insecurity spawned by 
popular social, media, and political representations. For example, despite the striking 
differences outlined above, the SBI adopts a similar homogenous, populist 
representation of these urban areas that fails to consider social, economic and historical 
contexts, justifying it’s ‘targeting’ of these areas without any support of empirical 
enquiry or statistical support. This is because ‘the unanimity of journalists, politicians 
and administrative officials who summon the word of every occasion suffices to 
establish the reality of this ‘harsh segregation’’ (Wacquant, 2008:145).  The following 
discussion with an SBI official neatly illustrates Wacquant’s (2008) point: 
TM: ‘How come you decided to set up a session here?’ 
Brian (SBI coach): ‘It’s exactly the sort of area we should be working 
in, it’s rough, quite deprived, lots of kids and young people hanging 
about round the station, lots of people we could potentially work with. 
It’s exactly what we should be doing, looking at areas where there is a 
need for this sort of thing and where we can find more participants. We 
are doing this all over the country, looking at what areas need to be 
targeted, and setting up in the most run down, deprived parts of the 
country with our unique programme …what we are doing is looking at 
the most deprived urban areas around here, to identify and expand to 
run down areas that could do with help’. 
                        Brian, SBI Official, North East, January 2011 
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Similar territorial stigmatization occurred in London, and the defamation of 
Neighbourhood B and its equivalents across the city has led to a prevalence of SBI 
centres operating in these neighbourhoods,  accentuating the negative image of these 
estates and stimulating the spiral of ‘territorial stigmatisation’ that ‘sap[s] social 
cohesion and aggravate[s] internal dissension’ (Wacquant:2008:217). Indeed,  
Neighbourhood B was often referred to as a ‘ghetto’ and ‘deprived area’ by SBI 
officials, and the view that it housed a number of conflicting gangs meant that the 
project was moved to a venue in a ‘neutral area’ within a bordering borough, where 
territorial rivalries could be put aside 60. Subsequently, this justified increased SBI 
work in and around Neighbourhood B: 
‘We have been working in the job centres, working with probation, trying 
to get kids off the street. When the riots happened it was almost like a 
blessing in disguise as it provided us with more opportunities to set up: And 
with all the gang stuff that goes on round here, it’s easy to justify the work 
we do to potential funders and set up new projects in areas which are 
considered ‘gang’ areas’ 
SBI official, London, June 2012 
I am suggesting here that the unintended consequences of territorial stigmatisation, by 
definition of targeting particular ‘hot spots’ that draws upon populist media and social 
concerns without any empirical or statistical evidence,  justifies intervention in these 
stigmatized areas. Indeed, as the two discussions above show, once a place was 
publically labelled as a dangerous area rife with youth crime, the process of setting up 
projects in these areas could be easily legitimized to potential funders, including local 
authorities, higher education institutions, and central government officials. Thus, in 
the wake of the London 2011 riots and a number of sensationalist media reports on 
                                                          
60 In effect however, this moved participants from Neighbourhood B into unfamiliar territory, where their identities were not 
known, and violence with local youths opposing their incursion was not uncommon. In January 2010, a participant was shot in 
the lower back by a local youth after travelling from South East London to a centre in North West London. See London Evening 
Standard (2012) ‘'Thugs of Stonebridge' jailed for attempted murder of footballer’. 
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increased youth crime and gang activity, a special SBI centre targeting youths from a 
deprived area in South London where widespread disorder occurred was set up; 
thereby essentially labeling young people from this particular area as potential 
‘threats’: 
‘We set this session up here because the kids round here are wild…you 
saw during the riots what happened here, they need help, support, 
something to keep them from getting in to trouble. I don’t know what 
it is but for some reason the kids here have a different mentality, they 
are just hyper. Like at the graduation ceremony we had last week, 
compared to the other sessions they are so difficult to engage, just real 
hyper, gobbing off, not listening. They are a liability, something 
seriously needs to be done because this area has a bad, bad 
reputation…the kids, the gangs they have here, it doesn’t help the 
reputation of the area you know’ 
               SBI Official, London, April 2012 
Such a process – although far from the intention of SBI – can lead to further 
marginalization and stigmatisation; a vicious cycle that submits participants from the 
area to dictates of ‘risk management’ (Goldson and Muncie, 2006) that succumbs them 
to the low pay labor market without any consideration of underlying economic and 
social factors, renders them as public threats, and results in further relegation should 
they not comply with project aims: 
‘The aim is to move them into a job, anything, it doesn’t matter, any job is 
better than them hanging about on the street. Cleaning toilets, I’d be happy 
to see them doing that if it means they aren’t out on the street stabbing each 
other. But they are hard work; we kicked off a few for messing around, not 
turning up on time, not doing work. They just end up back doing what they 
were doing before without any help from anyone and getting in to more 
trouble. I spoke with Cameron the other day, he told me that Tyler, the guy 
we kicked off, got nicked for carrying a blade. It’s just like a spiral, they 
don’t help themselves, so we have to get rid of them, and then they just end 
up getting into more trouble and into serious trouble with the police and 
going deeper into the criminal justice system’ 
   Dan, SBI coach, London, March 2012
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I now develop this chapter by suggesting the targeting of specific areas based on 
populist media and social concerns manifests itself within SBI views of participants, 
in the form of individualised, neoliberal perceptions of young people. To clarify, I 
begin with a short extract from field notes.  
Operations and Individualism: An Ethnographic Insight 
I arrive at the project a little after 11am, just as participants begin to 
stumble in from the main road that runs past the entrance to the centre. 
Chris smell of drink, and the half empty bottle of Coke that I saw him 
drinking round the corner from the entrance was evidently laced with 
something stronger than just its usual contents. Ben, the SBI official in 
charge of this particular group, noticing the conspicuous odour, raises 
his eyebrows suspiciously and tells Chris to see him after. This is the 
third time this week Chris has arrived under the influence, and Ben’s 
patience is wearing thin. He has ‘already sent him home a couple of 
weeks back for turning up pissed’. 
I sit down with Nick, a fellow SBI official whilst waiting for the 
remaining participants to arrive. Out of a group of 12, which had begun 
as 18, only 5 are currently present. After waiting a further 20 minutes 
for more participants to turn up, we begin. Today is a motivational job 
search day, an activity that, in Steve’s words, ‘will get them thinking 
about what they want to do, to overcome some of the things that are 
stopping them going out there and getting a job’. Sitting at our desks in 
front of us are a number of computers, and the class log in with the 
passwords provided to them by the owners of the centre. After ten 
minutes of confusion and accusations of incorrect passwords, we are 
finally logged on, ready to complete the activity. 
The task is an adult directions computerized questionnaire, an 
assignment intending to ‘identify the job that is right for you, based on 
your personal traits and responses’. The class respond to a number of 
multiple choice questions relating to preferences of learning; whether 
they prefer manual or physical work, and their choice of working hours. 
After twenty minutes, the results are in. Dion’s ‘career options’ are a 
landscape gardener or horticulturalist; Fiona a physiotherapist or 
masseur; Craig, a psychotherapist or hypnotist. ‘What a waste of 
fuckin’ time, how am I ever going to be a hypnotist?’ Do they think 
I’m fuckin’ David Blaine or something!’ asserts Craig. ‘What do they 
want me to do, go back and re-do like every year at school for the next 
10 years! HA! I only lasted about three weeks in secondary school. 
What a fuckin’ joke’.  
After completing the task, each person is told to present their intended 
career to the group, along with the objectives they need to achieve to 
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reach this destination. I ask if they feel these careers are realistic, and 
also if they are careers they aspire to. The majority mutter that, in 
reality, they have no intention of becoming a hypnotist, horticulturalist, 
or fishmonger. Instead, they are looking to ‘get into fitness, a sports 
coach or something’, for others it’s ‘just anything, something to do 
before I get back into doing what I want to do’.  
Following a discussion of post-SBI career paths, Steve sets up the 
projector screen so that we can watch a number of motivational videos 
following a short presentation: ‘You live in a Western country, not 
Africa. So go out there, you can achieve anything you want to. If 
something is your dream job, go for it’. Fiona, sitting beside me, 
mutters ‘it’s not quite as easy as that’. 
The group next watches a set of motivational videos provided by Steve. 
One is a video with the actor Will Smith telling his ‘story of success’. 
The video is filled with neoliberal rhetoric espousing individual 
responsibility, self –actualization, and the idea that ‘human well-being 
can best be achieved by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms’ 
(Harvey, 2005: 2): ‘Greatness exists in all of us’; ‘you really can make 
what you want’; ‘You have to believe’; ‘nothing is unrealistic’ (‘what’s 
the point in being realistic?’); and ‘protect your dream’ (don’t ever let 
anyone tell you can’t achieve something’) are but a few of the 
motivational pointers stated in the video 61. The group appear fairly 
uninterested in watching the clip, sniggering at a few of the more 
pretentious mantras. After, Steve exclaims to the group ‘yeah, it’s a bit 
cheesy, but I want to get that mentality into your head, that you can 
achieve it if you put your mind to it – what are you going to do next 
week when you finish? If there’s a job in Castletown cleaning toilets, 
go for it. You’ve all got a clear picture what you wanna do long term, 
but short term, you all need to have a good think’.   
       Fieldnotes, Neighbourhood A February 2012 
The above description appraises a random hour at the SBI centre in Neighbourhood 
A, and the neoliberal rhetoric that underpins SBI operations, tasks, and functioning. 
Indeed, as chapter 3 has demonstrated, in most industrial, Western nations, the 
restructuring of economic bases supported by neoliberal modes of governance have 
gradually permeated criminal and youth justice policies (Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001; 
Wacquant, 2009), and SBIs utilising sport as a tool for positive social development 
are also recognized for their compatibility with hegemonic notions of neoliberalism 
                                                          




(see Spaaij, 2009; Chamberlain, 2013) favoring individualism, self-regulated 
responsibility, success and economic prosperity (Harvey, 2005). Spaaij (2009) argues 
that SBI’s now represent a component of ‘the neo liberal policy repertoire’ aimed at 
‘regulating’ youth within disadvantaged, urban areas (Spaaij, 2009:263), an 
understanding drawing upon contemporary theorists associated with the neoliberal 
saturation of the criminal justice system (e.g. Garland, 2001; Rose, 2000; Wacquant, 
2004). Here, SBIs are now seen as part of a ‘culture of control’ (Garland, 2001);  a 
web of interconnected crime prevention agencies composed of ‘public-private 
partnerships, community policing arrangements, and multi-agency working practices 
that link together the different authorities whose activities bear upon the problems of 
crime and security’ (Garland, 2001:170). Instead of pursuing and prosecuting 
individual offenders, this new sector is designed to ‘govern at a distance’ the conduct 
of ‘the excluded’, targeting the aforementioned ‘hot spots’ with situational controls to 
alter criminogenic situations. Its ultimate intention is thus; to organise a web of 
exerting control that succeeds in transforming the capacities of individuals into 
rational, self-governed actors (Garland, 2001:171). Darnell (2010), in employing a 
Gramscian framework to his analysis of international sport for development 
programmes, states that SBI officials are therefore active agents in producing and 
maintaining the hegemony of neoliberal thinking that underpins SBI programmes. 
Here, I contribute to this debate through empirical research, uncovering the ways in 
which neoliberal structural processes interact with the post-industrial identities of 
Neighbourhood A and B youth (see also Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009). 
 
Narratives of individual responsibility, consistent with neoliberal rhetoric, was found 
to be a common theme within SBI projects and amongst SBI staff; videos, 
presentations and motivational speakers espousing individual responsibility, self-
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actualization and ‘success at all costs’ were common features of the 8 week academy 
programme that participants underwent. Such strategies, whilst intending to motivate 
participants and instil aspirations of individual success and achievement, are attempts 
at aligning young people with neoliberal visions of living. As such, the underlying 
principles of these programmes assume that the main barriers to employment reside in 
the ‘individual shortcomings’, attitudes, and skills of young participants, with little 
understanding, or appreciation, of the structural conditions in which they operate 
(Wacquant, 2008). Of course, within both Neighbourhood A and B, employment 
prospects for young men are limited, and so if (and when) a young participant fails to 
progress into employment, they are immediately rendered ‘lazy’, ‘workshy’ or a ‘no 
hoper’: 
‘Tristan, he dropped out last week. To be honest he wasn’t that interested, 
just used to come along, enjoy a kick about and go home.  He’s into street 
stuff, he’s a bit of a waster really, not bothered about finding a job as he’s 
making money dealing or doing whatever. Fair enough if that’s what he 
wants to be doing, but I’m not in to helping people that don’t want to be 
helped’ 
   Ben, SBI coach, North East, March 2012 
 
In this sense, neoliberal underpinnings of SBIs individualise the issue of 
unemployment, concealing and de-emphasising broader structural inequalities that 
contribute to a young person’s position of unemployment or poverty, or apparent 
commitment to law-breaking (Kelly, 2011). Such an underpinning is in several 
respects, fraudulent, even dangerous: not only does this process mask the structural 
deficits engendered by neoliberalism and the implications of structures of power and 
historical context experienced by my participants, but as will be shown in chapter 7, 
can lead participants to misrecognize inequality as the natural order of things and to 
blame themselves for their position in society’s hierarchy; if participants are 
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continually told that their behavioural and attitudinal deficiencies are responsible for 
their own behaviour and lifestyles, inequalities are unacknowledged and appear 
commonsensical. Hence, SBIs can continue existing power relations, and reproduce 
ontological categories within society (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009). Tristan, for 
example, took full responsibility for his criminal record, with little understanding of 
the structural forces that may have exacerbated his situation: 
‘It’s my own fault, I was stupid. I didn’t have to do it, or get a record. 
I just need to sort myself out, get myself clean and try and find a job. 
I’m just being lazy, drinking all the time and bumming about…I’m not 
sure if the course is for me because I don’t think I can be helped really, 
not until I sort myself out first, anyway’. 
         Tristan, Neighbourhood A, November 2011 
Neighbourhood A is an area which has one of the highest unemployment to job 
vacancy ratios in the UK (The Guardian, 2012), and despite his failure to find stable, 
long-term employment in the area, Tristan blamed his own personal characteristics for 
his unemployment and location in society’s hierarchy.  This is because the neoliberal 
agenda that underpins SBIs misrecognises the ways in which every day structural 
power relations generate social inequality (Gray, 2006; Wacquant, 2008; 2009); and 
staff, (as well as my participants) came to consider poverty, drug use, and criminal 
behaviour to be caused by character defects or immoral behaviour. In an attempt to 
deconstruct this generalised misrecognition, I will relay Tristan’s personal history - 
which reads as a checklist for the harmful effects of neoliberal inequality - at length 
here to underline the effects of political, economic, and historically embedded forces 
that legitimise inequality and have constructed Tristan’s habitus: 
Tristan: ‘I’m born and bred in Neighbourhood A.  Neighbourhood A’s 
like an estate in Sunderland, probably the roughest estate in the whole 
of Sunderland’   
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‘You get a lot of crime and in Neighbourhood A, it’s full of crime. Bad 
area, you know, since I’ve been out of prison I’ve known of 11 
stabbings and I’ve only been out three months.  I’ve lost five people 
through drugs, two close mates, it’s just constantly something bad 
happening all the time, you know, just never seems to be good. The 
whole of Neighbourhood A, there’s unemployment, drugs everywhere 
you go.  I mean, you might not have seen it but if you take a walk 
through an estate and you’ve got a telephone line with a pair of trainers 
that marks a drug spot. That’s for people...  that’s for your dealing. If 
you walk into the estate and see a pair of trainers hanging over the line, 
you might walk 100 metres and you’ll see another pair.  In between 
them two pairs of shoes, that’s where you get your drug supply. It was 
just when we were younger, you know, just to keep the place in order 
rather than meeting in back alleys and everything.  If you stay between 
them two pairs of shoes...’ 
TM: ‘What did the police do?’ 
T ‘The police didn’t really pick up on it until about 
2002/2003.’And then there was a thing on the news about it.  Now they 
know.  So, it’s changed a little bit now.  You just phone them and... 
well, I used to phone them and they’d say we’ll go to so-and-so and I’d 
go to so-and-so’. 
[…] ‘Anyway…when I was a kid it was that bad we robbed train out 
there.  That was in about 1996.’ 
  TM ‘Robbed the train?’ 
T ‘We used to have an old freight liner that used to run at the back 
of the estate and we played football one day and a couple of lads just 
jumped on the track.  We didn’t know what was in the cabins or 
anything.  We robbed the cabins and there were thousands and 
thousands of bottles of Newcastle Brown Ale!  I think that’s where my 
crime really started’  
TM […] ‘OK, and how about your family?’ 
T ‘I’ve got a...  Well, my mum had seven brothers and eight 
sisters.  So, she’s got a huge family as well. I mean, I’m not close to 
my family like my brothers and that are.  I mean, I was estranged from 
mum when I was like 14/15…and they always targeted me, so I didn’t 
want... when I was younger 
I’ve got three children….  I had four.  I lost a little girl four years ago.  
I was there, so she was four at the time.  She had meningitis....’  
[…] My first sentence was... I was an 18-year old.  I was going through 
a bad time with my family.  At 18 I tried to commit suicide and... My 
flat and my clothes, photographs, set them all on fire and I was just 
waiting for the flat to burn and... While I was there and my cousin 
kicked the door in, dragged me outside.  I didn’t want to get out.  He 
dragged me out, you know, that kind of thing.  From then on it’s just 
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been...  It’s just been a struggle all the way from then up until now.  It’s 
been a huge struggle.’ 
‘I was 19 because I’d just done a sentence for the arson in the first when 
I set fire to my flat, even though it was a suicide attempt.  Because it 
was Council property, the Council had me charged, so I was done for 
arson in the first.  Arson, set fire to the flat and because I fought with 
the police because I didn’t want to be arrested.’ 
‘I was also...  I took part in a robbery.  Well, I didn’t actually...  I was 
with a lad who instigated a robbery and because he was older than me, 
bigger than me. Two years.  And all I did was took £100 off... out of 
someone’s hand.  That was my only part in the robbery…It was outside 
of a house, so it wasn’t really classed as a street robbery.  It was just 
robbery.  I got 15 months for it.’ 
TM      ‘So, what other things in the past have you been in trouble for?’ 
T ‘Just fighting. I’ve done three other sentences and that’s all 
been for fighting.  One was...  Actually, one was for not fighting.  I got 
caught with some heroin while I was involved in the fight.  Section 20, 
Section 47 and ABH.  So, it’s just all fighting, basically, sticking up for 
my friends and that, you know.’ 
TM The employment that you do get in this sort of area, what sort 
of stuff do people do working-wise? 
T ‘It’s more labour-wise.  I mean, there’s not really any prospects, 
really.  You know, like most of our prospects, it’s not like...  If you 
want a proper job, you’ve got to go out the town a bit.  You know what 
I mean?  It’s all about cheap labour that’s coming in.  You know, we’ve 
got the Polish people.  You get a lot of foreigners, like Polish people 
and the ethnic people, you know, and they’re all doing cheap labour’ 
‘There is some production line work you’ve got a [unclear] factory.  
You’ve got your crisp factory in [Neighbourhood X] which is hard to 
get in there because they don’t take a lot of people on.  The other one, 
just like the only real opportunity you get is Christmas time, you know, 
when they take shifts on.  You maybe get anywhere between 100 quid 
a day’ 
‘I think it’s just the lack of employment.  They turn to crime, well they 
turn to drugs and they turn to crime to feed their own habit.  I know 
mates that have attacked mates for money just to feed a habit, you know 
what I mean?’ 
TM ‘You did mention that you were dabbling in drugs as well, was 
that for a long time?’ 
T ‘I was on drugs, I was on heroin for ten years, so yes, before I 
cleaned myself up:  I used to sell it to feed my own habit.  It’s just as 
bad, you know, still committing crime so I used to just sell, I thought 
it’d be easier to just sell it that way I don’t have to commit crime.  But 
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I’m committing a crime by selling it, you know what I mean, but I 
wasn’t going out robbing people for the money’ 
TM ‘So how did you, you know, come about getting onto drugs; is 
it just hanging around and that sort of people?’ 
T ‘Actually it was more about when I was a kid and getting away 
from the family and I left home at 14.  Me mum and dad didn’t want 
anything to do with us, they stopped me from seeing my brothers and 
sisters.  I started drinking at first and then one day somebody asked me 
if I wanted to try the heroin so I did.  I just kept on trying it and before 
I knew it I had a habit so then I had to feed the habit, so had to find 
some way to feed my habit, so I started to sell it and that’s what I did 
for ten years so I could feed my own.’ 
 
Despite being subjected to numerous personal setbacks exacerbated by a destabilised 
social, political and economic context, Tristan took full responsibility for his 
criminality, drug use and unemployment, with no recognition of the political or 
economic context or growing up in a household destabilised by poverty, violence and 
instability which propelled him into a career of drug taking and criminality. As such, 
for Tristan, the process of transforming himself from a ‘risky’ individual into a ‘self-
regulated citizen’ rested firmly within his individual self. In line with Gray (2006), 
interventions risk introducing technologies of the self that are brought in line with 
dominant political rationalities that propose individual well-being, self-actualisation, 
and responsibilisation (Garland, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Smith, 2006). Tristan had thus 
internalised this neoliberal rhetoric: 
 ‘As I say, I’ve totally flipped the coin on myself now; there’s only one 
way and it’s a positive way now for me…No that was in me.  I decided 
enough was enough. When I finished my last sentence which was 2005 
I said then that I’m not going back to prison and it was only because I 
was in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Prison had been a lot harder 
than I was and thought piss off.  But I said, no I’m going to do it myself.  
So I was in a position where I just had to go with it.’ 
‘I was a menace to society, I was nothing but trouble.  You know, I 
mean I used to be walking down the street and if you looked at me the 
wrong way I’d be like, here, you know, now…You wouldn’t believe 
the change in the last 12 months.  If you’d known me 12 months ago 
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you’d say that’s not the same person.  My whole attitude to life has 
changed; I didn’t give a damn once.  I just didn’t care less.  Did what I 
had to do to survive.  Now, because I’ve got something I budget my 
money; I go out and do my shopping.  I even get up in the morning and 
I clean the house!’ 
      Tristan, Neighbourhood A, November 2011 
 
Tristan’s story was far from unique amongst SBI participants;  Mark was another 
example of a Neighbourhood A resident who has been subjected to a number of 
deleterious social circumstances that have rendered him to a position of instability, the 
result of problematic and chaotic personal circumstances that unfortunately, SBI 
professionals fail to recognise when addressing the ‘shortcomings’ of participants. 
Mark’s social situation was precarious. Since school he had moved around various 
English cities finding work. This included mainly low paid retail work to support rent 
and daily living expenses. When I first met Mark during the early stages of my 
fieldwork he was unemployed, and, somewhat unusually, was living in a ‘luxury 
riverside flat with views over the city, ‘kitted out with a widescreen TV, X box and 
everything!’ Of course, this seemed peculiar for someone who was out of work and 
attending an intervention seeking to address social issues related to unemployment, 
crime, and substance abuse. Over the course of a year or so, I would often meet with 
Mark at SBI sessions, and occasionally travel back into the centre of town where we 
would catch the metro to our respective stops. During this time Mark kept up the story 
of living in a luxury riverside flat, with expensive furnishings and electronic gadgets. 
On one occasion when I questioned how he could afford such luxuries when being 
unemployed, Mark told me he held down a ‘job on the side’, of which he wouldn’t 
disclose any further details in case he was ‘thrown off [the SBI]62‘. After keeping this 
                                                          
62Halfway through my fieldwork a number of participants who were attending open football sessions were asked to leave after 
admitting they were in employment, education or training, and had been for a number of months, yet had not told staff due to the 
fact that they still wanted to play weekly football matches.  
223 
 
up for a number of months, and describing accounts of an increasingly lavish lifestyle 
and nights out in the cities more classier establishments, Mark finally came clean one 
day on a bus: He didn’t live in a luxury riverside flat, but instead resided in a bedroom 
with a sink in a high rise hostel close to the river. Despite my willingness to listen to 
his exuberant stories, I occasionally went along with them as I had no knowledge to 
suggest he lived elsewhere despite being somewhat perplexed by the disconnect 
between his apparent social and housing situation. According to Mark, it was the 
‘shame’ associated with living in a hostel and his current social situation that had 
compelled him to tell these stories; he wanted to appear to be living ‘in a reasonable 
way of life’.  
 
One day Mark told me his story, which contributed to the social situation he found 
himself in. Leaving home at 17, Mark settled in London where he worked ‘in a 
Sainsbury’s for a while, before I sacked it in’. He moved north again after getting in a 
situation where he owed a substantial amount of money to someone over a loan 
payment accrued during a spell of unemployment.  
 
In an effort to establish a ‘social base’ in and around Neighbourhood A, Mark enrolled 
in a local college to undertake a yearlong catering course, which rather than being a 
starting point for a future career in the industry, was more an attempt to ‘meet people 
– perhaps get a bird’. Nevertheless, after a few weeks of enrolling Mark dropped out, 
and found his way into the SBI via an external referral agency. 
 
The isolation and social exclusion that Mark feels in the North East has manifested 
itself in a depression that has lasted ‘a couple of years’; without no immediate next of 
kin or social contacts Mark has found himself in a serious state of mental health which 
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has affected his ability to find work or go about daily life in a normative manner, as 
well as his use of the SBI under investigation.  
 
The recent diffusion of neoliberal rhetoric within youth justice policies and SBI 
organisational strategies (Spaaij, 2009; Kelly, 2011; Chamberlain, 2013) meant that 
participants like Tristan and Mark misrecognised and misunderstood the structurally 
imposed suffering that manifests within everyday practices, and permeates every one 
of their relationships, including their connections and exchanges with individuals, 
family members, labour markets, institutions, and ultimately, themselves. The young 
men of Neighbourhood A and Neighbourhood B did not analyse their personal 
problems in terms of structural inequality, but instead the general consensus amongst 
my participants was that their own ‘ethical reconstruction’ lied firmly within 
themselves (Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). Overcoming unemployment or poverty was 
seen as caused by participant’s own moral deficiencies, and thus the SBI taught 
participants to take responsibility for their lifestyles and position within society.  
At this point, it is worth noting the unintended consequences of the SBI in reducing 
the problem of unemployment to one of individual character deficits.  
Firstly, SBI officials conscientiously educated and assisted participants with CV 
writing skills, interview skills and positive body language techniques. Yet participants 
could do little with this neoliberal based knowledge growing up in environments 
derailed by poverty, drugs, and unemployment. Indeed, in informing participants 
about individual success and achievement, self-regulation, and behavioural change, 
this message inadvertently created a dynamic of unproductive self-blame amongst my 
participants and contributed to the misrecognition of the relationship between 
structural power and social inequalities (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009). No resources 
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were provided to participants other than neoliberal based rhetoric regarding self-
actualization and how to change their ‘risky’ behaviour and lifestyle choices. This 
reflects the neoliberal permeation of SBIs; rather than investing in approaches that can 
alleviate and allow participants to recognise structural constraints, SBIs frame 
unemployment, poverty, and criminal behaviour as individual choices, and attempt to 
relieve this through individuals choosing a lifestyle that avoids risk (Rose, 2000; 
Garland, 2001).  
Secondly, my participant’s did not analyse their personal problems in terms of 
neoliberal restructuring and the misrecognition of structural constraints. Instead, they 
appreciated the respectful treatment they received from the SBI. Even though there 
was relatively little they could do to change their behaviour because they were 
subjected to a range of deleterious effects associated with street life, they often felt 
that they had ‘done something worthwhile and meaningful’, in the words of one 
participant, by attending  the course. In this sense, the SBI engendered a false sense of 
confidence in participants. Three months later however, when participants were still 
unemployed and falling back into old habits, many participants found unemployment, 
drug use, and violent careers associated with gang membership to be a normalised 
activity within their neighbourhoods. Hence, in composing a significant part of the 
‘neoliberal policy repertoire’ (Spaaij, 2009), the examples of Mark and Tristan 
demonstrate the unintended consequences of this shift and how they can backfire. 
Well-meaning staff taught participants to take individual responsibility for their 
unemployment. This interaction, however, reaffirmed a ‘road culture’ subjectivity 
amongst some young men in Neighbourhood’s A and B, where being directly 
disobedient and oppositional to advice felt like an empowering alternative to 
conceiving of oneself as a failure who lacks self-control.  
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For example, Steveo, had failed to get ‘the help I need’ from the programme, and 
constantly being told that he needed to take control of his life reaffirmed his ‘do-it-
myself-road-culture’ subjectivity, leading to a continuation of self-destructive drug 
taking and reckless behaviour: 
‘How is going on this course thing going to help?  FUCK [SBI]. I ain’t 
got no qualifications or nothing, no CV, no chance of a job ‘cause I’ve 
got no experience. I’m fucked…might as well just go out, get fucked 
up, get some good weed, chill with fam…maybe start dealing again or 
something. Ain’t no point in trying to get a job? I’m not cut out for that 
shit. I can be making money like what a person makes in a week, what 
they earn, I could make in a day!’ 
    Steveo, Neighbourhood B, March 2012 
 
SBI officials meticulously educated their participants about individual success and 
achievement, self-regulation and employability skills, yet participants could do little 
with that knowledge growing up in environments derailed by poverty, drugs and 
unemployment. No resources were provided to alleviate substance abuse, educational 
difficulties, or mental disabilities. Instead they received information on body language 
and confidence without material support, which have little impact on young men 
growing up in socially destabilised locales. Participants prepared CVs where the 
education and unemployment sections were often empty. It was no surprise then, that 
after handing them out to local businesses and shops on completion of the course, my 
participants were still unemployed two months later. SBIs can therefore inadvertently 
create a process of self-blame amongst participants, which has contributed to a 
misrecognition of the relationship between structural inequality and individual self-
control amongst participants. Within the neoliberal policy repertoire (Garland, 2001; 
Spaaij, 2009), this reflects the neoliberal agenda that has permeated criminal justice 
and youth policies (Wacquant, 2009) as well as SBIs (Spaaij, 2009). Hence, rather 
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than investing in interventions to tackle structural exclusion, poverty and 
unemployment, SBIs expect that it is a participants moral responsibility to ‘choose’ a 
lifestyle in line with the key components of neoliberalism, as put forward by a SBI 
member of staff in London. 
‘We want our participants to be integrated into the mainstream, to follow 
traditional paths into employment, education, or training. Whether that be 
University, college, or some form of employment, it’s important that these 
participants take responsibility for themselves and attempt, at least, to get 
some form of work or training that can move them forward in life’ 
    Isabel, SBI staff, London, March 2012 
In progressing this chapter further, I will now explore a further component of the SBI’s 
operations. I will go on to suggest that the funding streams linked to the SBI researched 
in this thesis ‘structure’ many of the operational decisions I have identified above. I 
will also suggest that these funding methods are tied to the ‘type’ of participant 
‘targeted’ by the SBI.   
Funding, Audit Culture and Success Rates 
As has been alluded to in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the PbR system reflects an 
established tradition within neoliberal, advanced industrial nations; related to the new 
forms of neoliberal governance of social, political and economic affairs which have 
emerged (Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009). With regard to worklessness 
and criminal justice, recent years have witnessed an erosion of penal-welfare policies 
for the ‘correction’ of social problems, to one in which a new ‘culture’ of strategies 
have appeared underpinned by risk assessments, behavioural management practices, 
and monitoring and evaluation techniques (Garland, 2001; Muncie and Goldson, 2006; 
Gray, 2009).  
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In forming a key component of the new neoliberal policy ‘repertoire’ (Spaaij, 
2009:252), SBIs must also now market and strategically ‘brand’ themselves to gain a 
strategic foothold within a competitive market of provision (Mythen et al., 2011:5). 
Although on paper this proposal sounds appealing, the competitive market instilled by 
such an approach can lead to increased ‘operational insecurity’ amongst service 
providers (Kelly, 2012).  
Indeed, the brief period of intervention for some participants in the North East was cut 
short by the economic downturn that occurred prior to and during the fieldwork for 
this research, culminating in a drastic effect on the functioning of the SBI, its staff, 
and ultimately, its participants. The Coalition Government’s austerity programme and 
sustained reductions in public spending intended to reduce the budget deficit incurred 
in preceding years. In response, private companies and voluntary organisations were 
given an increased role and responsibility in delivering public services, representing   
‘greater efficacy’ and ‘value for money’; ‘an economic and moral imperative’ 
(Wiggan, 2012:3) for the mending of ‘broken Britain’ (Conservative Party, 2010:13).  
 
In the second year of fieldwork, however, the UK voluntary sector was subject to cuts 
totalling more than £110m (BBC, 2010), whilst in the third year of fieldwork this 
figure was elevated to ‘between £1billion to £5.5billion’ (BBC, 2012). These measures 
‘hit deprived areas hardest’ (Hastings et al., 2013); the north east was subjected to 
some of the harshest funding cuts, with two thirds of all charities in the area having 
central government funding slashed in the wake of the coalition’s on-going austerity 
measures (BBC, 2014). The sector was thus subject to the double challenge of 




In the wake of these measures, the competition for funding from the public sector 
intensified, and voluntary organisations were now competing with one another for 
increasingly diminutive funding streams. The shift from grant funding to contract, 
outcome based funding that occurred in the second year of fieldwork meant that the 
SBI was now dependent on the success of finding bids to colleges, corporate 
companies and local authorities. However, the competition for funding in the North 
East meant that contract bids were not always successful:  
‘Some of the funding bids, we could have done a lot, lot better. They 
were poor. We had a desperate, dry run with funding. Everything dried 
up Most of our funding came from the colleges, and if we had a dry run 
with participants it meant we didn’t get the funding. It was desperate’ 
  
     SBI Official, North East, October 2012 
Hence, unfortunately, in the wake of unsuccessful funding bits and a lack of 
participants who fitted the new 16-25 year age criteria, a number of SBI sessions in 
the North East were closed down. The PbR funding system that required moving 
participants into employment, education or training meant that sessions composed of 
participants who were not ‘progressing’ were shut. Indeed, a successful open football 
sessions that attracted between 20-30 regular participants each week, located close to 
Neighbourhood A was subsequently closed for failing to attract the ‘right’ participant: 
‘The thing with it, we were getting so many participants on it, but no 
one was progressing. They were all either old participants, too old, or 
just weren’t willing to go on it [8 week academy]. A lot were over 25 
who we had to kick them off. It makes sense to target those who want 
to go on the academy’. 
        SBI Official, North East, March 2012 
A number of participants who had attended these sessions on a weekly basis were not 
informed of the closure of this particular sessions, and continued to turn up each week 
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in the hope that the session had restarted. Joe, an academy graduate and volunteer 
coach at the session was not informed of the closure, and was subsequently left without 
any post-intervention support: ‘I remember we turned up for a session on Wednesday 
and no one was here. All I got was a text from Andy saying it’s stopped because of 
funding’.  
Sessions located in and around Neighbourhood B, however, were largely unaffected 
by funding cuts, and continued unchanged. This is because funding cuts to the 
voluntary sector hit Sunderland City Council by £10,000,000, Northumberland 
Council by £1,145,181.45, Cleveland and Redcar by £1,145,057.77, and Durham by 
£821,160 (The Guardian, 2011). Hence, although public sector funding for the 
voluntary sector across the capital peeked at a reduction of £19,041,521.56 (The 
Guardian, 2011), the availability of funding streams in the capital and the higher 
density of corporate sponsors providing unregulated income meant that the SBI in 
Neighbourhood B was not subject to the same financial burden experienced in 
Neighbourhood A. Indeed, the majority of funding in London came primarily from 
large foundations located in the capital and a number of educational organisations 
providing commission based funding. The accessibility of key corporate partners 
meant that a number of high profile events in the capital, including visits to Downing 
Street and Wembley Stadium, also increased the profile of the programme in London 
and facilitated links with corporate backers and educational organisations offering 
support. In 2012, the London SBI programme accumulated £283,518 in unrestricted 
funds and £546,757 in restricted funds from commissioned contracts to spend on 
programmes. In the North East, however, the desertification of larger corporations and 
educational institutions, and implications of broader austerity measures meant that in 
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the financial year ending 2012 only £52, 609 was accumulated in unrestricted funds, 
and £83, 823 in restricted funds from commissioned income (Annual Report, 2012). 
 In an area with some of the highest youth unemployment statistics in the UK, the 
dereliction of other public services has serious implications for those growing up in 
post-industrial Neighbourhood A. These cutbacks resulted in a number of employees 
being laid off in the North East, and the closure of several open football sessions across 
the region in the years between 2010 and 2012. Due to the grievous shortages in 
regional budgets, staff, sessions, and the relative dereliction of other third sector 
interventions, structural variations can be used to explain the key differences in 
operational functioning, engagement, and implementation. Predictably, these factors 
also have serious implications for some of the youth growing up in Neighbourhood A, 
as chapter 8 of this thesis will explore.  
Within the context, it was found that the ‘operational insecurity’ exacerbated by 
competitive funding often lead to a purposeful overemphasis of the ‘riskiness’ of 
participants by SBI staff, exaggerating participants’ precariousness whilst highlighting 
‘success stories’ in attempts to appeal to funding bodies (Kelly, 2012). For example, 
well-meaning SBI officials were asked to provide case studies of successful 
participants at the end of each 8 week academy. Often these were filled with emotive 
language, highlighting (and often exaggerating) participant hardship and difficulty, 
and the subsequent ‘life changing impact’ of the SBI. As such, the punitive audit 
culture had the unintentional consequence of fuelling stigmatisation and the labelling 
of ‘risky’ inner city youth, whereby the SBI ‘defined’ the ‘type’ of participant they 
worked with: 
‘We need to fill out case studies at the end of the academy, to send off 
to newspapers and put on the website and stuff. To be honest I’m really 
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struggling from the last academy…I can’t really think of anyone that 
has, like, really achieved anything. But they want us to do at least two 
of them…often it’s just a case of picking someone who had a bit of a 
rough time before coming here, and the talking about the impact we 
have had. It’s a bit shit really as I often think we don’t really do much, 
but they like us to have like really emotional case studies of 
participants, how they had a difficult time before here and how we’ve 
helped them’ 
             Rob, SBI Official, London, August 2012 
 Although nothing should be taken away from the work of SBI staff, such an approach 
fails to consider the limited ‘impact’ the SBI had on participants: in 2011/2012, the 
‘success rate’63 for all engaged participants stood at 27%, whilst in 2010/2011 this 
figure was 13% (Annual Report, 2013). As chapter 8 will highlight, even when 
participants do ‘progress’ into forms of employment, education, or training, the 
sustainability of these outcomes was questionable. Hence, although such an approach 
is conducive to potential funders by highlighting the potential of SBIs to alleviate 
issues associated with gang membership, substance abuse and exclusion, it masks the 
reality – and sustainability - of participant outcomes. 
The transfer of funding streams has further implications for outcome driven, 
preventative programmes in which it is difficult to define outcomes. The PbR system 
means that SBI programmes are subject to a punitive audit culture whereby funding is 
justified by the aforementioned success rates. Not only can this exacerbate the said 
concern, but can also lead to an occurrence whereby participants are ‘cherry picked’ 
based on their ability to achieve a prospective outcome (Mythen et al., 2011, Kelly, 
2012). Meanwhile, ‘harder to reach’ participants are cast aside to face further 
stigmatization and exclusion. For example, screening procedures were put in place 
during the second year of fieldwork to regulate the number of participants on 
                                                          
63 Defined as moving a participant in education, employment, or training. 
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programmes. During this period, the number of ex-offenders and drug and alcohol 
abusers reduced from a respective 27% and 13% in 2010/11 to 19% and 1% in 2012/13 
(Annual Report, 2013).  Academy programmes were also restricted to 20 ‘recruits’ for 
each quarterly programme, and SBI officials were told to focus on those who were 
deemed ‘ready’ to progress into employment, education or training: 
In SBI office, London discussing upcoming academy 
TM: ‘What about Rashid’? 
Isabel: ‘Yeah he seems OK, don’t really know much about him. He’s got a 
record though so he could be quite difficult. We don’t want too many with 
records because it can be quite difficult to progress with and deal with them’ 
Rob: [Talking to me] ‘We are screening down referrals from YOTs and 
Probation as we find they are harder to work with and progress. Obviously 
we still refer them on to another organisations who are more specialised and 
better suited to deal with their needs’  
  Field notes, Neighbourhood B, September 2012 
 
This screening procedure provided competition for places, purposefully prioritising 
less ‘risky’ participants without excess social and crimogenic ‘baggage’ that could 
potentially disrupt a successful ‘outcome’, which funding was based upon. One 
common strategy was to ‘screen’ participants in the weeks prior to the academy, 
monitoring their attendance, work rate, and commitment at street football sessions.  
The funding logic behind this, however, is not explained to participants, and those 
with more complex issues such as substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal 
behaviour were ‘referred out’ of the programme if their attendance waned or behaviour 
deteriorated. Although they would often be told that they could return to open ended 
street football sessions, the majority of participants, often aggravated that they had 
been asked to leave, would not be seen again. Often more complex problems would 
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provide justification for the expulsion of more ‘risky’ participants, who could be 
‘referred on’ to other organisations: 
Rob: ‘Like once we had this guy on the academy and he’d always turn 
up late, or we’d not see him for a few days then he’d suddenly re-
appear. One time we’d gone out for a day trip and it wasn’t necessarily 
evident at the time but we found out he was an alcoholic. And he was 
pissed on this day and went into a local shop and nicked a load of stuff 
and got caught. So we were all there and he gets arrested right in front 
of the whole shop! 
TM: ‘What did you with him after that’? 
Rob: ‘We refer him on to another organisation who can deal with his 
needs. We’re not equipped to do that, so we find someone we can pass 
him on to’. 
 
The bureaucratic rules imposed by funding imperatives, including age restrictions 
(programmes could only focus on 16-25 year olds) and the need to find ‘work ready’ 
and willing participants to enrol on the course provided a further point of conflict 
between participants and operational staff. Because the logic behind excluding those 
who exceed age ranges or do not fit screening criteria is never fully explained to 
participants, ‘excluded’ participants would often exclaim their resentment for staff 
when turned them away from sessions or denied opportunities to partake in the 8 week 
academy. I often heard participants claim that the intervention was partial to ‘teacher’s 
pets’ – those ready to work and with the best attendance records. No one recognised 
that the problem was the precarious funding measures based upon a PbR system. 
For example, upon ‘failing’ to make a summer academy programme in 2011 for not 
matching specific criteria and regarded as operational staff as having ‘complex’ needs, 
Wes resorted to a cycle of self-blame and hatred towards the organisation. 
Subsequently, his mental illness and behaviour at sessions deteriorated, and, unable to 
find employment or suitable social interventions, left the area and rehoused himself in 
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a homeless shelter in a nearby northern city close to Sunderland, still unemployed, 
vulnerable, and using increasingly harder illegal substances. Upon bumping into Wes 
six months after he left the area, I found he had adopted the ‘do-it-myself-road-culture-
subjectivity’, criticising the intervention for his expulsion and, in his own words, now 
having a ‘fuck-it-all-attitude towards life in general’. Ben’s situation is an example of 
how the PbR method can backfire; for some, a wilfully and self-destructive attitude 
felt like an empowering substitute to considering oneself as a failure who lacks the 
control and skills to be selected for an SBI programme.  
I will now provide an account of the type of work SBI staff ‘progressed’ participants 
into.  
Any Old Job 
After spending the previous 6 weeks failing to find any form of stable 
employment in the local area, Ben spent the previous evening job 
hunting for participants, and found 12 jobs in 40 minutes in North Bay, 
a tourist area close to Neighbourhood A. One of them is in a fish and 
chip shop. Steve explains this to the group, and is met with a mixed 
reply. ‘Work in a chip shop?!’ Exclaims Rick, ‘I ain’t doing that, no 
way. I’ll stink of grease and never get a bird!’ The majority of the group 
reject Ben’s offers of low paid retail work in shops, cafes and 
restaurants in the area. Later, I ask Ben why he thinks this is. ‘Some of 
them don’t have the fear of not having a job. A few years back I got 
that and ended up working on a building site. Hated it. Then I came 
here, after working in a café as well. I used to have to start at 6am and 
then finish and come straight here. It was hard. I used to stink when I 
turned up to coach. You were there’.  
        Field notes, March 2012, Neighbourhood A 
This situation demonstrates the tendency of SBI programmes to encourage participants 
to ‘take any old job’ that came their way. Despite participants facing multiple needs 
and unique barriers to employment, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ (Crabbe, 2008) approach to 
SBI work reflects a broader shift in political-economic trends and socio-cultural 
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factors in recent years. As has been discussed in chapter 3, the neoliberal welfare 
reforms and the de-industrialisation of once proud industrial areas across the UK in 
the 1970s and 1980s means that those ‘left behind’ by the fast moving pace of the post-
Fordist, capitalist economy are now caught in a virtuous circle of poor work, low pay, 
and insecure, flexible forms of unemployment (Byrne, 1999; Shildrick et al., 2012). 
Within the post-Fordist, flexible labour market era then, the combination of low 
wages, insecure employment, and locales of structural unemployment has led to the 
creation of a workforce catering specifically to the lower rungs of the employment 
ladder (Shildrick et al., 2012:200). The formation of a number of ‘welfare to work’ 
schemes under New Labour to create self-regulated, post-Fordist workers capable of 
navigating the post-industrial economic landscape is thus evidence of Byrne’s idea 
that ‘The logic of the employment form of much of post-industrial capitalism is that 
the work will not be good work. However, people have to do it…Welfare to Work is 
a constitutive process for this’ (Byrne, 1999:99). 
The SBI often drove clients into low paid work, quite literally64. The SBI also had a 
number of links with organisations and companies who would take on ‘apprentices’ 
on completion of the 8 week SBI course. Yet these links only provided short term, low 
paid employment, and more often than not the PbR funding method meant that 
organisational staff taught participants to churn out CVs and take any jobs they could. 
However, in the North East, the ‘feminine’, low paid service sector jobs were in direct 
contrast to the masculine, industrial habitus formed in the dockside area of 
Neighbourhood A (See Winlow, 2001), which, like the job in the fish and chip shop, 
did not appeal to participants: 
                                                          
64 On one occasion in March 2012, I spent two consecutive days accompanying participants around Sunderland and Newcastle 




‘Um…well obviously I signed off, I’d only been signing on I think 2 
months, I got a job at McDonald’s uh…I ended up like leaving 
um…because…I thought…I had an interview for this placed called 
Savers so I left McDonald’s for that and I left, I left there the first week 
of Savers because…not that it bothered us but I was the only man like 
working there.  It was a proper shit like. 
I would say…I mean…fast food jobs I would say are the most…they’re 
always going to be in business because everyone needs food and 
everyone is going to be eating.  So I think the likes of Burger King, 
McDonald’s, KFC I reckon…if you go on the online application form 
for these places there is always positions open in the northeast.  
And…so… …but no one wants to do it you know what I mean? 
                Keith, Academy Participant, Neighbourhood A 
Although many young men struggle to find stable employment in most circumstances, 
finding employment during an economic recession in two de-industrialised locales 
makes such efforts even harder (Shildrick et al., 2012). The failure of participants to 
find stable, long term employment should therefore have reflected the deleterious 
economic conditions they are exposed to, most notably in the form of short term 
contract, low paid work. Yet because the SBI did not take into account structural 
barriers to employment, the failure of participants to find long term jobs merely 
reinforced popular stereotypes of young men being immoral and lazy, as is found in 
Tristan’s discussion at the onset of this chapter.  
 
In this sense, by offering no means of acclimatisation into post-industrial labour 
markets that exist in and around Neighbourhoods A and B, or the resources to provide 
further educational qualifications beyond an entry level college course, the SBI 
attempted to move participants into relatively low paid, transient service sector 
employment (Shildrick et al., 2012). Such an approach, which critical scholars have 
argued effectively ends welfare dependency rather than underlying, structural poverty 
(Wacquant, 2009), exaggerates young men’s experiences of ‘churning’ (MacDonald, 
2011, Shildrick et al., 2013) as found in Keith’s case stated above, whereby young 
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men fluctuate between low paid, service sector jobs, that they have no desire to work 
in now, or for the rest of their lives. By moving participants into low paid positions, 
the funding conditions of SBI inadvertently reproduce unstable, flexible low paid 
labour markets that rely on the creation of a work workforce ‘required for and required 
to do the poor work that flexible labour markets create’ (Shildrick et al., 2012:200), 
thereby maintaining the effective functioning of post-Fordist, capitalist nations in a 
competitive, globalised, neoliberal world (Byrne, 1999:9).  
Chapter Summary  
This chapter has described the operational processes of the SBI ‘researched’ as part of 
this thesis. I situated each SBI logocentrically within their own specific social and 
cultural ecologies, to provide a microscopic analysis of commonalities and differences 
existing between the SBI located in Neighbourhood A and in Neighbourhood B. Here, 
I have highlight how the distinct social, cultural and economic features of the two 
contrasting areas essentially ‘structure’ how each SBI functions.  
The social ecology of the surrounding area was found to be instructive in informing 
the operations of the SBI. Targeting specific areas is often dependent on local needs, 
or more often than not, responding to public and populist concerns surrounding youth 
crime, unemployment, and ‘gangs’. The ‘territorial stigmatization’ of areas was found 
to be one factor behind the ‘setting up’ of sessions in particular neighbourhoods. 
Indeed, it was found that once a place was publically labelled as a dangerous area by 
the SBI, the process of setting up projects in these areas was simplified and could be 
easily legitimized to potential funders. Such a process – although far from the intention 
of SBI – can lead to further marginalization and stigmatization, a vicious cycle that 
submits participants from the area to dictates of ‘risk management’ that succumbs 
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them to the low pay labour market, renders them as public threats, and results in further 
stigmatization should they not comply with project aims. 
I have also sensitised readers to the organisation’s views of its participants. It was 
found that neoliberal rhetoric was a common theme within SBI projects and amongst 
SBI staff, and videos, presentations and motivational speakers espousing individual 
responsibility, self-actualization and success at all costs made up significant parts of 
the SBI’s educational framework. Neoliberal underpinnings of programmes can thus 
individualize the issue of unemployment, whilst concealing and de-emphasising 
broader structural inequalities that have placed a young person in a position of 
unemployment, poverty or crime in the first instance (Kelly, 2011). Not only does this 
process fail to consider the lived social experiences of young men and the structural 
deficits engendered by neoliberalism they face on a daily basis, most notably 
exclusion, poverty, de-industrialisation, and stigmatisation, but also, from the 
perspective of the participant, may also result in them failing to recognise these 
structural inequalities themselves.  
I have also alluded to the PbR system which requires that SBI programmes are subject 
to a punitive audit culture whereby they must justify their funding by success rates. 
Not only can this exacerbate the aforementioned concern, but can also lead to an 
occurrence whereby participants are ‘cherry picked’ based on their ability to achieve 
a prospective outcome (Mythen et al., 2011, Kelly, 2012) whilst those ‘harder to reach’ 
are cast aside to face further stigmatization and exclusion. 
 
Finally, I have explored the regional variations in economic structures, which I argue 
have facilitated the overall functioning of the SBI. In the North East, severe budget 
cuts have resulted in the closure and downsizing of the SBI, which, combined with the 
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desertification of broader educational, corporate and social interventions, has led to a 
situation of marginality for the young men of Neighbourhood A attempting to transist 
into the surrounding post-industrial labour market. In contrast, the high density of 
corporate organisations and educational institutions in and around Neighbourhood B 
have increased the accessibility of the organisation to access diverse funding streams. 
This is reflected in the income of funding for the respective regional centres (Annual 
Report, 2013). Ultimately, these structural differences have had a severe impact on the 
functioning of the SBI and has had a predictable impact on participants in both areas. 





Chapter 7: SBI Interaction with Post-industrial Identities 
The two preceding empirical chapters have documented the social and ecological context from which 
two respective youth cultures have emerged out of, and outlined the operational activities of the SBI 
centres that function in these two urban locales. I have continued the overriding sociological theme of 
this thesis by situating each SBI centre within its specific social milieu, and their respective identifiable 
social, economic and cultural backdrops. 
In expansion, Chapter 7 looks at how neoliberal self-help discourse interacts with the cultural ecologies 
and distinct social habitus’ that operate within Neighbourhood A and B. Here, I identify four typologies 
of post-industrial youth who ‘make use’ of the SBI under investigation in different ways, and absorb 
the rhetoric of neoliberal thought that structures SBI work. I will thus provide readers with an account 
of how ‘learnt’ discourse and rhetoric, despite its good intentions, is often irrelevant for many young 
men whose choices are constrained by broader structural, political-economic forces that contradict the 
logic and discourse of such language.  
Introduction 
All my participants, in both neighbourhoods, were not in employment, education or 
training. Yet rather than perceiving these young men as one static, homogenous 
unemployed group, this chapter explores the distinct youth groupings that exist in 
these two locales and ‘make use’ of the SBI. Here, I have identified four typologies of 
SBI participant; their outlooks, attitudes, and stances toward employment, criminal 
behaviour and consumption diverge and contrast, and they exist in locales that 
embrace dissimilar existential ideals and habitus’. Their convergence within their 
neighbourhoods and at the SBI is the only similarity that they share. These are, located 
within Neighbourhood A, the Outcasts and Conformists, and in Neighbourhood B, the 
Aspirationists and Road Boys. 
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Chapter 7 progresses this thesis’s findings to discuss the distinct ways in which these 
typologies experience, interact, and internalise the neoliberal underpinnings and 
rhetoric of SBI work. I introduce readers to the everyday reality of SBI life for these 
participants, and how they make use of the intervention in different ways depending 
on the socio-economic landscape of the surrounding area, the cultural habitus’ of 
neighbourhoods A and B, and their internalisation of neoliberal rhetoric. This point by 
point comparison will allow us, in chapter 8, to investigate the post-SBI transitions of 
these four typologies of SBI participant.  
The section begins by introducing readers to one ‘type’ of Neighbourhood A 
participant: the Outcasts, and their use of the SBI. 
The Outcasts’ use of the SBI 
In Neighbourhood A, 7 of my participants could be categorised as belonging to an 
Outcast cultural grouping.  I have termed them Outcasts for their outright rejection of 
post-industrial work65, their intention of remaining on state provided benefits, and their 
apparent unwillingness to find legal employment66. All of these participants joined the 
SBI having been unemployed for the majority of their young lives, and post-SBI, 
continued along this pathway.   
                                                          
65 A number of Outcasts did however, for a short period of time, engage in informal, cash-in-hand work, ‘on the fiddle’. Usually 
this involved working in manual work, including furniture removal and construction, on tip offs from close friends or relatives. 
Two Outcasts also worked ‘with gypsies’ doing small manual tasks such as paving driveways and painting and decorating. Philip 
had recently returned from Norway:  ‘I’ve been unemployed for a couple of years…I’ve been doing odd, fiddly jobs…and 
painting, decorating, paving, like I went up to Norway to do that. With gypsies.  I’ve got the experience, what they teach you, 
but I won’t bother again. They just treat you like, frankly they just don’t treat you fairly, you know? I was out there for about 
three, four months… we were meant to go to Sweden, but like, that was because my dad, he’s over there, and also I wanted to 
see him.  I missed him, so I thought it was the only opportunity I was going to get to go and see him, but in the end, I stayed in 
Norway instead of going to Sweden’ 
66 It is worth stating here that I am not reducing the problem of unemployment to one of immoral fecklessness or irresponsibility, 
or categorising these participants as a form of lumpen, dismissed by Marx and Engles as ‘this scum of depraved elements from 
all classes’ (Marx [1870] 2002:xii); rather, these ‘outcomes’ are merely a response to the organisational structure of the SBI, and 
the deleterious effects of structural change occurring in and around Neighbourhood A over the last 30 years. 
243 
 
Since its inception in 2006, the SBI has provided ‘open’ football sessions to 
participants experiencing a range of social problems related to homelessness, 
unemployment, and criminality. These sessions functioned as a ‘filter’ into the eight 
week academy programme, where participants can be assessed for their ‘readiness’ 
and willingness to take part. Although these sessions are intended as a ‘hook’ to attract 
prospective participants, ethnographically I discovered that an unintended 
consequence of these sessions is that they are often used by the Outcasts as a form of 
leisure, composed of participants with no desire to take part in the 8 week academy 
programme, or progress into employment. This proved to be a point of contention for 
SBI staff, who were keen to evict participants unwilling to advance beyond these 
sessions. For the Outcasts, however, the open football session provided a leisure 
activity which they could look forward to on a weekly basis: 
‘I’m not going on it [the course]. It’s just another hassle. I’ve already got 
too many things on my mind. They [the SBI] only want me on it so they get 
their figures. I’m not really interested in the other stuff, I just want to play 
football and get fit. They provide you with all sorts of stuff, kit and t-shirts, 
and try to get you involved. It’s blackmail! I’m just interested in the football, 
really; they’ll kick you off the programme after 6 months anyway so I have 
to leave soon… [Thinking hard] it’s not really for me, I just want to play 
football. At least I’m being honest!’ 
   James, Neighbourhood A, March 2011 
James, like many other Outcasts who experienced weekly pleasure, excitement, and 
enjoyment from these sessions in an otherwise mundane, routine unemployed life 
(Ferrell et al., 2008) was subsequently evicted from the session in the summer of 2011 
after a crackdown on ‘non-progressing’ participants. The implications of this, 
however, was further social marginalisation and stigmatisation; Outcasts were often 
labelled as ‘lazy’ or ‘workshy’ by SBI staff for refusing to participate in the academy 
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programme, and, as chapter 8 will go on to demonstrate, left in an amplified state of 
exclusion upon their SBI expulsion.  
Many of the Outcasts also exploited the neoliberal culture that pervades modes of 
governance away from welfare social service provision toward the punitive treatment 
of young men deemed ‘at risk’ (Garland, 2001). In the neoliberal era, the welfare state 
is seen as ‘not the solution, but the problem’ (Young, 2007:69) and benefit claimants 
must now actively seek work to meet the eligibility criteria for claiming state 
sponsored benefits. This includes attending particular courses or registering with 
specific employment agencies, of which the SBI was one. Mark was particularly adroit 
at manipulating this system for his own profit. For a six month period he attended SBI 
‘open’ sessions, each week playing football for two hours and having his job centre 
form signed by an SBI official as proof of his attendance at an ‘employability course’. 
Mark would then return to the job centre, show his form and state he was currently on 
a course looking for employment. One afternoon after receiving his weekly £56.80, 
Mark proudly displayed his signed form and told me outside the job centre:  
‘I’m only going for me benefits! Get them signed off each week. Looks 
like I’m looking for a job but really just having a kick about each week! 
Cheeky I know innit, but it’s their fault! Shouldn’t be so stupid to think 
that people would actually look! [For jobs].’ 
 
Through this exploitation of the unintended consequences of a punitive stance toward 
social services, Mark and other Outcasts continued to use the session as a means 
through which to obtain state benefits. During this period Micky, a fellow 
Neighbourhood A resident, also used the session to continue to claim state benefits. 
SBI staff were aware of this behaviour, and often realised that there was nothing they 
could do to counter it other than to ‘refer out’ Outcasts:  
245 
 
‘Micky was about for a while as well. I really, really, liked Micky. 
Remember he wanted to join the army? He didn’t go, do you know the 
reasons why? Because his mum still wanted to claim for him and get 
benefits from him. He still came about for a while, and I could see he 
wasn’t really doing much, not looking for work. So I sat down with 
him once and just said look, what going on? And he was just honest 
with me. Told me he didn’t really want a job, hadn’t been looking. And 
I was pleased that he told me because I knew that something was going 
on. He was involved in some illegal activity. He wouldn’t tell me what, 
but I can think what, I had an idea. And it sounds like he was making a 
fair bit of money from it and was happy. So I just said, look, that’s fine, 
but let’s cut all our ties, let’s go our separate way. There was nothing I 
could do for him….he just used the sessions so that he could claim’ 
           Ben, SBI Coach, Neighbourhood A 
The Outcasts’ commitment to ‘scamming the system’ meant employed 
Neighbourhood A residents were irritated by the Outcasts’ commitment to obtaining 
welfare and their rejection of employment. They are a cultural group that is available 
and ‘ready’ to work, although they have no intention of doing so. They are 
representative of the underserving ‘underclass’, vilified within the community, and 
embody the dole dependent ‘other’, widely ridiculed and stigmatised by society; as 
Jock Young reminds us:  
‘The underclass, although in reality a group heterogeneous in 
composition and ill-defined in their nature, is a ready target for 
resentment. Re-constituted, rendered clear cut and homogenous by the 
mass media, they become a prime focus of public attention in the form 
of stereotypes: ‘the underserving poor’, the ‘single mother’, ‘the 
welfare scrounger’ etc., and an easy focus of hostility. Such stereotypes 
derive their constitution from the process of essentialising, so 
widespread because of the prevalent crisis of identity…the very 
opposite of the ‘virtues’ of the included’. (Young 2007:37) 
 
Yet one must understand that the Outcasts are, in a sense, one of the wisest of cultural 
groupings explored in this thesis. Their refusal to join the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle of 
‘precarious work’ (Shildrick et al., 2012) is a particularly shrewd manoeuvre, and they 
have the sociological nous to realise that welfare to work programmes, like the SBI, 
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will merely result in ‘poor work’ (Byrne, 1999:69). Excluded and left behind by the 
post-industrial labour market, James knew the SBI was going to do nothing to reduce 
the structurally imposed suffering he experienced, and used it simply as a chance to 
experience excitement, fun, and enjoyment in an otherwise unexciting urban 
environment (Ferrell et al., 2008). For the Outcasts, unemployment represents a 
voluntary choice; the best option in the low paid, unstable labour market of 
Neighbourhood A. The Outcasts actively dismiss the help of the SBI and any 
employment opportunities that are offered to them, aware that the system is geared 
toward pathways into low pay, low-skilled and precarious employment, which often 
‘keeps people in poverty, undermines the purpose of welfare as temporary respite, and 
denies prosperity’ (Shildrick et al., 2012:38). For them, being unemployed is a rational 
decision when considering the opportunities available to them in the surrounding post-
industrial labour market: 
‘Scam is probably a bit of an extreme word but it [the SBI] is a bit ‘scamy’ 
in that it leads everyone to think that they might get a chance of work…I 
think that people telling you that being unemployed makes you feel bad, 
and I think if you say ‘no, piss off actually, I’ve got more spare time…I’ve 
got lots of things I like doing’…I think it’s getting a healthy balance…I was 
living off savings, just bare essentials, just my food, and I found that I didn’t 
need to work.  
To tell you the truth if I’m with a group of guys… say there are 10 of us, 2 
blokes have got a lot of money and the rest of us haven’t got much, 
something is going to rankle with me, some spirit or energy is going to say 
fuck ‘em, I don’t like ‘em, I don’t want ‘em round me!  I would rather they 
went somewhere else…I would rather they had nothing and be poor and 
everyone around me was in the same boat than have even a little bit extra, 
and they’re the typical people who’ve got a lot more so I think the country 
would be better off without…I don’t think we should be looking to attract 
all these mega billionaires and all that.  We would be better off without 
‘em… You’ve got this huge division in this country between people at the 
top and people at the bottom and it’s the people at the bottom who are 
striving to get to the top…we don’t need that.  
Embrace poverty you know?  It means you’re going to get healthier if 
there’s no money…and you have to cut back, it will be better for you.  
We’ve got an overweight society, unfit society, it’s an opportunity, but stop 
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thinking of finding a job, finding a job, more thinking what…what will 
help…If everyone was poor…like a mate of mine went to Cuba, my 
manager, the guy I was telling you about that used to run the shop. He said 
oh Sonny, you wouldn’t believe it he said, their poverty mate; he said 
they’ve got nothing – flippin’ nothing!  It’s terrible!  I said so they’re really 
unhappy?  He said oh no mate you’ve never seen such a happy bunch of 
people!  Everyone is smiling, I said so…there is something not tallying up 
here’. 
 Sonny, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
The Outcasts are therefore exploiting a welfare to work system, such as the SBI, for 
its ineptitude to find suitable, sufficiently paid, stable employment for a group of 
young men who recognise the structural deficiencies they face. They therefore do not 
constitute, in Marxist terminology, a ‘reserve army of labour’ that the owners of capital 
can draw upon to continue to undermine low wages; for they are too marginal to even 
make up this form of lumpen proletariat. The Outcasts have no productive or economic 
raison d’etre, and exhibit a general unwilling to engage in waged labour. The issue 
here is that this is not due to downright, laziness, fecklessness, or lethargy; the Outcasts 
are aware of what the low-pay, unstable employment the post-industrial world can 
offer them, and want no part of it whatsoever. I am therefore not dismissing the 
Outcasts as a dismissive, lumpen class, but rather, a class of young men with the 
sociological awareness to recognise the enforced structures of inequality upon them.  
The Neoliberal Conformists  
Occupying a divergent post-SBI trajectory are the neoliberal Conformists. They 
represent a cultural grouping ‘attuned’ to the neoliberal logic of individual success, 
responsibility, and hard work. Despite their unemployment, they are committed, 
dedicated, and eager to position themselves within the labour market in and around 
Neighbourhood A. As such, their modus operandi is to use the SBI as a facilitative 
pathway into the post-industrial labour market, acquiring the relevant skills, 
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knowledge and information which they perceive as a requisite for transiting into the 
local ‘knowledge economy’. They are the perfect neoliberal subjects: ‘docile bodies’, 
subjected to, in Foucauldian terms, the capillary manifestations of power, exercised as 
‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the 
control of populations’ (Foucault, 1998:140). Although the Conformists have adopted 
the neoliberal rhetoric of self-improvement regulation, as I will argue within the 
context of chapter 8, there are numerous ‘unintended consequences’ of the ways in 
which this process miscarries, and is at times wholly unproductive. 
Like the Outcasts, the Conformist’s utilisation of the SBI is marked by a distinct 
pattern. They are eager, attentive, and ready to learn. In a sense, they are modern day 
‘ear’oles’:  described in Willis’ classic Learning to Labour (1977). The majority of 
Conformists heard about the SBI through the Job Centre, and their ‘use’ displays a 
strong instrumental dimension: its main purpose is to generate not so much ‘leisure’, 
but rather to relieve joblessness and equip them with the necessary skills to transcend 
the post-industrial economy. Even though the Conformists are reliant on welfare, their 
main objective is to find stable, established employment, and they have a perception 
of welfare as being a characteristic of the ‘lazy’, ‘work-shy’ Outcasts. As such, they 
feel shame, embarrassment, and a distinct awkwardness for their joblessness and 
continued reliance on state support: 
I was walking down the street there, and there were two young lads and a 
young lass. They were sitting on the floor, rolling fags out of Drum baccy. 
Just rolling fags. I was thinking to myself, ‘The rest of the world can’t be 
like that, it can’t just be something like that.’ It’s terrible, it really is. 
I don’t like to think people are shivering in their houses, living off benefits, 
with [nothing today]. I can’t stand it really, to be honest with you. I hate 
living on benefits. I’ve been looking for a job for ages now… It’s terrible. 
               Ollie, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
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The Conformists made a sharp differentiation between themselves and the Outcasts 
who they vilified and ‘othered’, and whose ‘ilk’ they wished to be no part of.  The 
Conformists levelled angry, often heated, tirades at the Outcasts, distinguishing 
themselves from them through adopting stigmatising, popular representations of non-
contributors: 
‘… I won’t mention any names or anything, but I know there is a bloke 
who’s married a woman. He’s married his wife, she had about seven or 
eight bairns before he married her and he’s had twins with her. So, nine 
children, living in the house with them. Him and his wife had nine. I 
think one of them has moved out now actually. Anyway, still he hasn’t 
worked a day in his life. She doesn’t either!  
I’m trying to work out how much they’d have. I can’t remember how 
much it is now with child benefit but he would be getting at least £500 
a week I think, off all the bairns he’s got. I think he’d be getting that. 
On top of his other little earner he’s got going, like he’d be selling a bit 
of dope and stuff like that, as they do. He’d be getting quite a bit of 
money a week in, when I’m thinking back. I think he’s been doing that 
for as long as I’ve known him and he’s about 35 or 36 years old…I 
don’t think he’s ever worked, to be honest with you. If you knew him, 
to look at him you’d know what he was before he even… I don’t like 
to stereotype but to look at him you’d know what he was. He’s horrible, 
he stinks, he’s scruffy. He really is. You couldn’t misplace him. He 
looks homeless, it’s that bad. 
…I just think people fall into it. It’s a safety net. Some people genuinely 
do want to work and maybe business is a little bit slow and they can’t 
get any work. They fall back into that and just get stuck in it. They get 
used to having it. They’ll say, ‘I want to work’ but when it comes to 
the crunch they don’t really want to go to work, they’re happy where 
they are, sitting watching Jeremy Kyle and Loose Women all day’  
        Ollie, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
In their attempts to differentiate themselves from the Outcasts, the Conformists are 
attentive, eager, and focussed during SBI classroom sessions. They complete the work 
asked of them, and actively seek employment. They take on board the advice given to 
them, and see their SBI experience as something that will be beneficial, in the long 
run, for their assimilation into the post-industrial labour market. When speaking to, 
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and interviewing the Conformists, I was struck by how many of their quotes were 
peppered with neoliberal rhetoric of how the SBI had ‘changed my life’, or ‘saved 
them’. Often it felt as if the Conformists were merely regurgitating the language of the 
SBI, believing that by simply attending the SBI they had done something reasonable 
and practical that could help them navigate the post-industrial world: 
TM: So how, you know, since you’ve been on the course here how has 
your behaviour changed? 
Mike: ‘Totally changed, changed everything about me.  Changed my 
whole thought process whatsoever, you know what I mean.  I think 
about me and what I want, you know what I mean, instead of worrying 
about their problems, you know, when I’ve got my own problems.  I 
still have problems, I mean, like I need a new flat...but I’ve changed 
from how I used to be… 
…during the week, you know, it’s mainly, I may just have four cans in 
the house and be in bed for ten o’clock because I know I’ve got to be 
up in the morning for my class.  That’s what I mean, it’s changed me, 
it’s give me a structure in my life. 
I can’t really say there’s been any negatives in there.  The only one 
thing that I would say is it’s too short! I’ve loved it, every minute of 
it….’ 
     Mike, Neighbourhood A, October 2011 
 
The Conformists of Neighbourhood A are thus adhering to the SBI’s neoliberal model 
of self-improvement, believing that, in opposition to the Outcasts outlook of life, that 
they can, in one participants words, ‘achieve anything I want if I put my mind to it!’. 
Hence, the Conformists suppose  that ‘human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade’ (Harvey, 2005:2). As such, the Conformists see it as an individual’s moral 
responsibility to ‘choose’ and follow self-help rhetoric along an authorised path (Rose, 
2000; Darnell, 2010).  
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In aligning with the goals, objectivities and philosophies of the SBI then, one can 
observe three distinct ways in which the Conformists’ lifestyles diverge from the 
Outcasts. Firstly, by definition of their adherence and commitment to attaining a 
foothold in the post-industrial labour market, they are well behaved, well mannered, 
and keen to learn at SBI sessions. As such, they constitute a cultural grouping 
‘favoured’ by the SBI; ‘cherry picked’ (Kelly, 2012) due to the perceived ‘readiness’ 
and ‘willingness’ to work and be ‘fashioned’ into neoliberal subjects capable of 
transcending the post-industrial economy. The majority of Conformists are educated 
to GCSE level - and often beyond - and their criminal records, unlike the Outcasts, are 
clean67. They arrive early, complete work on time, and unlike the Outcasts, have 
consumed the rhetoric of the SBI to take individual responsibility for their 
unemployment. They are ashamed of their joblessness, reliance on welfare, and 
current social position.  
Secondly, unlike the Outcasts, the Conformists have acclimatised to the post-industrial 
environment, and post-SBI, seek to find employment in the array of post-industrial 
employment opportunities found in and around Neighbourhood B. Ethnographically, 
it was clear that the Conformists had been conditioned by hegemonic notions of 
respectable employment and lifestyles; they adhere to popular fashions, musical tastes, 
and consumption practices. Accordingly, despite their working-class backgrounds, 
and having been ‘born-and-bred’ Neighbourhood ‘A’ers’, they are adapting to a form 
of identity that rejects the ‘traditional’ notions of working-class masculinity and 
identity found in Neighbourhood A. In doing so, the Conformists were fully 
                                                          
67 Ethnographically is was uncovered that, cannabis use, although intermittent, existed amongst the Conformists. The 
Conformists, however, are quick to make a distinction between low grade cannabis resin, which they perceive to be ‘cheap’ and 
used ‘by charver scum’, and ‘weed’, a potent, less adultered alternative containing higher concentrations of 
Tetrahydrocannabinol, the psychoactive constituent of the cannabis plant. Drug use however is largely intermittent, and pales in 
intensity and usage compared to the Outcasts 
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assimilated into the surrounding post-industrial environment and social order. They 
‘conformed’ with popular notions of fashion – as evidenced by their ‘trendy’ clothing 
from popular high street fashion retailers such as Topman and H & M; their haircuts – 
neatly cut, frequently groomed, and styled with male grooming products - were not 
unlike many of the professional footballers they idealised. They also aspired to an 
‘acceptance’ in the night time economy of the North East; they wished to be seen in 
the popular nightclubs, and their fashion, lifestyles, and attitudes facilitated their 
assimilation into this environment. Stylistically, personally, and attitudinally, they can 
thus be seen as a changing, metamorphosing cultural grouping within Neighbourhood 
A. 
Finally, to follow on from the above, the Conformists desire forms of post-industrial 
employment that deviate from the traditional forms of labour found in Neighbourhood 
A. They seek and ‘want’ employment that reflects their post-industrial 
metamorphosis; they reject traditional ‘hard’ labour that has characterised the 
surrounding area for preceding years, and wish to find employment in one of the 
numerous office, knowledge based jobs located in and around the outskirts of the city 
of Sunderland. In this sense, they wish to ‘surrender’ their industrial employment 
image, and adapt to the new post-industrial economy, where, in terms of labour,  the 
growth of the knowledge based economy prioritises ‘feminised’ attributes such as 
keyboard skills and communication proficiency over the robust ‘masculine’ qualities 
associated with the culture of manual work (Nayak, 2003:9): 
‘I’d like to find a job in an office or something like that. You know, one of 
those smart places where you have to wear a suit and that. I think I’ll like 
that, like, having a decent job, looking good…I’d prefer that to say working 
down the mines everyday like me old man used to!’ 
     Ollie, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
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In deploying a Gramscian framework here, one could understand the Conformists as 
active in (re)producing the neoliberal philosophy that underlies SBI programmes. 
Post-industrial assimilation is, for the Conformists, commonsensical. Because 
behaviour is viewed as being reinscribed through social experiences and relations, the 
prevailing ideas and logics behind SBI programmes can be viewed as renewing 
dominant, hegemonic notions of individual upward mobility achieved via individual 
responsibility and self-regulation (Rose, 2000). Through the diffusion of hegemonic 
ideals, the Conformists have experienced an ideological subordination of their 
subjectivities; they are the recipients of hegemonic thinking, and have been 
manipulated and aligned with society’s dominant social order to ‘frame all competing 
definitions of the world within its range’ (Clarke et al., 1976:39).  
Neighbourhood B 
In post-industrial Neighbourhood B, two identifiable groups can be found. 
Reproduced by this distinct social and economic backdrop, they have ‘made use’ of 
the SBI, and are now making attempts to navigate the complex, ever changing terrain 
of Neighbourhood B. Within my sample, the Aspirationists are attempting to 
assimilate into this ever-changing locale, to find employment in the various business, 
media, and knowledge-based employment opportunities now located here. They face 
a struggle, however, in that they now compete space with an educated, white, middle-
class, who, by definition of Neighbourhood B’s locality and ‘edgy’ urban reputation, 
have now made the area ‘their own’. This means it is increasingly difficult for the 
Aspirationists to find employment. They therefore, quite often, find themselves 
casually employed, working sporadically, and filling the manual, working-class jobs 
that the traditional, white working-class population filled during the industrial era 
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(Wilmott and Young, 1957).  In contrast, a group affiliated to a local youth gang have 
taken advantage of the clear cultural impacts of the changes in social and economic 
conditions of Neighbourhood B, and with great entrepreneurial nous, feed off the 
ample consumer based criminal opportunities that now exist here. I refer to this group 
as the Road Boys; a collective of young males who are affiliated with a well-
established and respected youth street gang in Neighbourhood B. They are 
unemployed by choice, and have decided to ‘survive’ from the entrepreneurial 
criminal activities that have been thrown up in this ever mutating urban locale. 
I will now detail these two youth groups and their use of the SBI, beginning with the 
Aspirationists.  
The Aspirationists 
The Aspirationists are comparable to the Conformists of Neighbourhood A. They are 
hardworking, meticulous, and use the SBI to improve their employability skills. In this 
sense, they are - like the Conformists - an ‘ideal type’ of SBI participant; ‘cherry 
picked’ (Kelly, 2012) and fast tracked onto the education programme due to their 
‘readiness’ and ‘commitment’ to work. Their aspirational outlook, in part, stems from 
the surrounding area. Neighbourhood B is an area of rich diversity, history, and 
potential. They have grown up under the lights of Canary Wharf, the financial centre 
of the UK, and a couple of miles eastwards, one can view the Olympic Park, a 
symbolic figure of the large scale regeneration of East London. 
8 of my participants could be categorised as belonging to an aspirational cultural 
grouping. They are all of black or ethnic minority origin, reflecting the cultural 
diversity of the area. All of these participants joined the SBI having been referred from 
the job centre, and were unemployed for periods of between six and twelve months. 
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During their engagement with the SBI, all Aspirationists stated their intention of 
finding employment on completion of the SBI. Thus, I have termed them the 
Aspirationists, for their commitment and dedication to learning and education, and 
finding well-paid, respected employment in and around Neighbourhood B. 
Accordingly, the Aspirationists were committed, and completed classroom based 
work on time at the SBI. The majority of them were educated to at least GCSE level, 
and were active in job searching and seeking in and around Neighbourhood B68.  
Like the Conformists of Neighbourhood A, the Aspirationists were not proud of their 
unemployment, or reliance on support: 
‘It’s annoying. It’s annoying signing on and all that. I hate signing on. It’s 
the most humiliating thing I’ve ever done. I hate signing on. The way they 
sit there and they look at you as if you’re just another face, and really you’re 
just someone who wants a job’   
Dylan, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
The ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ of Londoners has been noted elsewhere (see Hobbs, 1988), 
and ‘getting by’  via means of a variety of money making activities, both formally and 
informally, has a well-established heritage in this part of East London. As Gunter and 
                                                          
68 However, due to their aspirational outlook, they often rejected employment which they saw as unsuitable and unmatched to 
their skilled and educated self. The conditions of obtaining JSA state that recipients must accept employment that is offered to 
them and thus, many of the Aspirationists had benefit claims suspended. This often resulted in tension and pressure with job 
search agencies: 
 Dylan: I hate the Job Centre. 
TM: Everyone says that they hate the Job Centre. 
Dylan: They depress me. They depress everyone. 
TM: What goes on there, why are they...? 
 Dylan: [interrupting] Right, this is what happened. They wanted me to go to this interview to apply for this job in Tesco. Which 
was through them, so I could have got interviewed straight away. They wanted me to put my availability as Monday to Sunday, 
7 in the morning to 11 at night, but I can't do that because I'm doing this course.  So I said to them I can't do that because I'm 
doing this course, and they were saying to me, well you have to do it. I'm saying to them, ‘Hold on a minute, you've put me on 
this course and now you are telling me that if I get the job I need to stop doing the course to work in Tesco. Why would I work 
in Tesco?’ I've been an assistant manager in a betting shop and you want me to degrade myself and basically find something 
lower. I'm not trying to say that the job isn’t a good job that I wouldn’t do, I wouldn’t mind working in Tesco part-time, but I'm 
not going to cancel my plans for your needs basically. This is my life, you can't tell me where to work.’ ‘Well, your jobseekers 
agreement says that because your availability is 24 hours then...’ ‘That was then, you've put me on the course so why would you 
then want to take me off the course. That then renders the course pointless. They were just like, ‘Well, if you're not going to do 
it, we are going to have to suspend your claim.’ I was like, ‘Suspend it then. They just want to put people in work and get their 
tallies up for their areas, because I think they get all these...They have competitions and stuff, like what borough or area gets the 
most people into work, 16 to 24, and stuff like that. I think they just care about that, they don’t really care about... and that's not 
fair because this is my life. You can't tell me where to work. 
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Watt (2009) have correctly noted, in the present context this practice remains 
applicable to the contemporary, working-class youth of the area. To add to this, an 
aspirational culture has always existed in and around Neighbourhood B, reinforced by 
the success of black and ethnic groups in sporting, media, and musical endeavours. 
Yet the distinct locally specific social conditions characteristic of the ecology they 
exist within was also seen as being a hindrance in many young men achieving: 
‘There's so much talent in Hackney in terms of singers, dancers, actors, 
footballers, stuff like that. In my school…that's in the heart of Hackney. I 
think Neighbourhood B is proper Hackney, some people don’t classify it as, 
but it is.  
Labrinth went to my school, you know Labrinth? He went to my school. I 
know loads of backup singers that are back-up for Wretch 32 and Jessie J 
and stuff like that. They go to my school. Someone else went to my school 
as well... A lot of famous people come from there. Yeah, but it's hard.   
There was one boy, he was so sick at football. His name was William. He 
played a game against Arsenal - he was with one team and he played against 
Arsenal, they lost 10-1. I think he scored the only goal, but I think he must 
have performed good, and he had a trial with them, but I think the day before 
his trial he went to jail. 
So he couldn’t have his trial no more. So, you can't mix the two. So because 
he grew up in Hackney you get caught up in things, peer pressure, and stuff 
like that. So imagine if you didn’t do that stuff...’ 
Shawn, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
The entrepreneurial ethic and established aspirational culture that exists in this 
particular part of East London meant that post-SBI, many of the Aspirationists wished 
to follow paths into ‘respectable’, ‘highly paid’ jobs. They were quick to make a 
distinction between, what Gunter and Watt (2009) have previously identified as ‘dirty 
work’ and ‘clean work’; that is, ‘traditional, manual male jobs’ (Gunter and Watt:521) 
which were perceived by my participants as ‘low paid, poor man’s work’; and 
employment in the post-industrial economy, which required qualifications, led to 
‘better pay’ and required one to wear ‘a shirt and tie and look smart’. Accordingly, the 
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Aspirationists sought employment in the various well paid, post-industrial 
employment opportunities located in and around Neighbourhood B, and adapted their 
customs to ‘fit’ in this new environment: 
 
‘Right now, I'm looking for an assistant manager job or car sales executive 
jobs. Like big jobs, you know what I'm saying? ‘ 
I want to change my vocabulary as well. I want to stop saying, ‘Do you 
know what I'm saying?’ ‘You get me?’ and I want to... I don’t mind 
speaking like this, but when I'm speaking to someone from work or 
something, I want to be able to express my point properly without using 
slang. From the last year or two, I've been reading the dictionary, trying to 
raise my vocabulary. I looked at it this morning actually. 'Decorum', came 
into my head, what does it actually mean? So I just looked it up. The best 
thing I ever done was buy a dictionary because there are loads of words I 
think of. In school, I hated English, but now I wish I'd paid more attention 
because now I love words.  So I started reading it, reading it, reading it and 
I got wiser, I got wiser, I got wiser’  
     Dylan, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
Similarly, two respondents were actively seeking employment in the music industry, 
reflecting the aforementioned rich ability in creative industries in and around 
Neighbourhood B69, and the ability of the Aspirationists to draw upon the various post-
industrial artistic and musical scenes and various studio spaces opening up and 
operating in the area: 
‘What I like doing is, first of all, singing with my brothers. That goes on the 
top of the list because ever since we were little, my mum forced us to sing 
in front of our, I would say, our congregation at Church. But we liked it 
because we wanted to be - I don't know - the next Jackson 5!…I'm hoping 
to have me and my brothers make it; make it in singing. We wouldn't go on 
X Factor or any other - we wouldn't go on those shows. We would try to 
make it, literally, by grouping people. So we might have this guy who 
knows musicians. We might have this guy who does the studio work. 
 
…Reaching stardom? The only prevention, I would say, is not knowing how 
to make it’  
 
                                                          
69 East London has long been well respected epicentre of the UK urban music scene. The ‘grime’ subgenre, incorporating elements 
of UK garage, drum n’ bass, hip hop, and dancehall emerged from nearby Bow in Tower Hamlets. The movement was led and 
pioneered by young, black and ethnic minority East Londoners, including Bow residents Wiley, Scratchy, Flow Dan and other 
members of the Roll Deep collective.  
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Jamie, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
 
The reason the Aspirationists are quick to make a distinction between hard, manual 
work and the ‘clean’, post-industrial work is in part due to the historically established 
ethnic profiles of those associated with ‘manual’ work in East London. 
Neighbourhood B is an area marked by significant immigration, and the majority of 
my participants in Neighbourhood B were the children of first and second generation 
migrants from the Caribbean, West Africa, and South Asia.  As such, the grandparents 
and parents of my participants missed the period of stable, manual employment found 
over East London dominated by a white working-class, and instead penetrated the 
local area with their own trades and service industries (see Cohen, 1972:15). 
Consequently, the constantly churning, multi-ethnic population in Neighbourhood B 
is disconnected from any cross generational neighbourhood patriotism and 
employment; and ‘particularly in East London, black youths were largely excluded 
both from subcultures and from the world of work into which members of subcultures 
segued’ (Hobbs, 2013:127). The fragmentation of post-industrial life and the 
successive waves of immigration that have found their place within the multi-ethnic 
scene of Neighbourhood B then, means that any connection between contemporary 
youth and their parent culture no longer exists (Hobbs, 2013), and in this post-
industrial vacuum, youth are now required to forge new and original identities, and 
consider post-industrial employment trajectories. Indeed, as Gunter and Watt 
(2009:526) have noted, white dominated ‘grafting employment networks’ have long 
been seen by black youth and ethnic as ‘poorly paid ‘dirty work’’ (Gunter and Watt, 
2009:523). Consequently, any young black male who chooses a manual, ‘hard’ form 
of labour as a career deviates from the ‘stereotypical perception of what a young black 
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male should be like’ (Gunter and Watt, 2009:522). These findings extend to 
ethnographic evidence observed in this thesis.  
Like the Conformists of Neighbourhood A, the Aspirationists have absorbed the 
neoliberal rhetoric of the SBI, and see employment as a voluntary choice; a moral 
responsibility to choose a lifestyle which avoids risk, and conforms to the hegemonic 
discourse of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). As such, the Aspirationists consider 
unemployment to be caused by personal character ‘deficiencies’ or immoral 
behaviour. However, by accepting the neoliberal logic of SBI thought, the 
Aspirationists misrecognize relations of power that legitimise social inequality, and 
believe that they can achieve anything ‘by putting their mind to it’. An unintended 
consequence of SBI programmes underpinned by neoliberal logic however, is that they 
can perpetuate a dynamic cycle of self-blame among the Aspirationists if they fail to 
find employment: 
Jamie: ‘Just now, I'm in a predicament where [SBI] has given me a 
foundation.  I'm learning about myself. I'm learning that I would have 
to look back on myself and say, ‘If I don't achieve this certain thing, 
then it's my fault’ 
 Also, [SBI] has put me on a stepping stone to, I would say, making it; 
being a star’ 
TM: Is there anything that might prevent you from achieving those 
goals? 
Jamie: The prevention is, as I say, the advice that I was told in [SBI]; 
it will be my fault. That's the only reason; that's the only way that we 
would not make it’ 
 
Absorbing the neoliberal rhetoric of the SBI has significant consequences for the 
Aspirationists’ post-SBI transitions, which will be explored in chapter 8. 
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The Road Boys 
‘….When you get into a gang, you see a lot of money and drugs and 
stuff like that, you might see that there’s not much point in getting a 
job. On top of that, if you’re getting minimum wage – compared to I 
don’t know how much money from whatever you’re doing – It makes 
sense. Yeah, there’s just some people that don’t really care anymore, 
just want to be on the streets’.  
              Leon, Neighbourhood B, August 2013 
The Road Boys represent a collective of young males who are participants of the SBI, 
or who are peers of these participants and thus situated on the periphery of my 
fieldwork network in Neighbourhood B. They actively reject post-industrial 
employment in favour of entrepreneurial based criminal activity, spawned out of the 
clear cultural impacts of gentrification, post-industrial labour restructuring, and the 
influx of middle-class residents in Neighbourhood B. Within my fieldwork networks, 
9 of my participants self-identified as those conforming to a ‘road’ lifestyle (i.e. 
affiliated with a local youth street gangs, and eking profit from a range of criminal 
activities including drug dealing to armed robbery). The majority of these participants 
were drawn from one particular street gang, known to police and well established 
within the criminal fraternity of Neighbourhood B70.  
In this section I intend to specify how the Road Boys ‘make use’ of the SBI, detailing 
how their road culture subjectivities are in direct opposition to the neoliberal rhetoric 
underpinning SBI programmes. Here, I intend to describe the strategies, tactics and 
approaches utilised by the Road Boys to subvert the work of the SBI, and render it 
unproductive in the lives of young men residing in post-industrial areas characterised 
by enduring and established criminal entrepreneurial networks which, via a cultural 
                                                          
70 The structure, membership, and hierarchy, along with their associated legal and illegal activities, have been described in Chapter 




inheritance of ‘physical toughness and sharp business acumen’, have ‘laid the 
foundations for the teenage drug dealers who represent a sphere of continuity in the 
life of the area’ (Hobbs, 2013:124) 
Unlike the Aspirationists, the Road Boys have rejected the logic of neoliberal rhetoric 
found in the SBI programme. However, to dismiss this as a formal dismissal of 
neoliberal subjectivities is perhaps somewhat premature, and I propose that unlike the 
Outcasts of Neighbourhood A - an akin cultural grouping who, shaped by the distinct 
ecological culture of Neighbourhood A, actively reject employment and conforming 
to neoliberal modes of ‘being’ - the Road Boys have inverted this neoliberal logic to 
reaffirm their own ‘road’ subjectivities. For many young men growing up in the 
mundane reality of the post-industrial inner -city (Young, 2007; Hobbs, 2013) being 
intentionally oppositional and disobedient to hegemonic ideals of ‘being’ is an 
empowering alternative at micro level to following the rhetoric of self-help along 
authorised paths. In this sense, the Road Boys have responded to the continuing 
cultural inheritance of generations of illegal networks and territorial based criminal 
groups in this area (Hobbs, 2013), and have subverted the logic of neoliberalism, and, 
with impressive business acumen, commodified their criminal activities and aligned 
them with the local political and social economy: a post-industrial urban milieux 
which provides a fertile and lush ecological environment in which various consumer 
based criminal opportunities and enterprise thrive.  Hence, I concur with Hobbs that: 
‘What is clear is that in post-industrial society, youth collaborations are 
increasingly market orientated… [And] the drugs trade offers an 
accessible alternative sphere of enterprise to declining opportunities in 
traditional male employment’  




By aligning themselves with market orientated forms of criminal enterprise, the Road 
Boys represent a cultural grouping who, fragmented and disconnected from the 
financial, corporate and service sectors that now populate Neighbourhood B, represent 
an increasingly fractious working-class group exploring the ‘downward’ option of 
post-SBI trajectory. The irony here of course, is that via criminal based enterprise 
cultures, road culture represents a pathway that is financially more attractive and offers 
a quicker route and acceptance into the consumer market place than the post-industrial 
labour market that the Aspirationists desire. As such, criminal enterprise culture is a 
seductive, well paid route for the entrepreneurially informed youth of Neighbourhood 
B than the low paid, insecure work that is offered by the SBI. I discussed the profits 
made from cannabis dealing with Leon: 
TM: ‘How much money were you making per day’?  
Leon: ‘Per day? I reckon I could make probably what a decent person 
earns at a job in that day, as in what a person earns in a week, I could 
make in a day, of a decent job’. 
 
By definition of their rejection (and subversion) of traditional, hegemonic notions of 
neoliberal self-actualization and personal responsibility, the Road Boys are wilfully 
oppositional to the help members of SBI staff dispense during education sessions. This 
is not to say they are a wholly uneducated, disruptive, and resistant cultural grouping 
akin to ‘the lads’ found in Learning to Labour (Willis, 1979); rather, the majority of 
them are educated to at least GCSE level, engaged and somewhat vocal in class and 
on the football pitch, and have shown a degree of entrepreneurial intellect to re-
appropriate the logic of neoliberal entrepreneurship and self-actualisation ‘on road’. 
Yet, their affiliation with a local street gang and, (often public) displays of association 
mark them out as self-identified offenders with criminal, often violent, pasts, marked 
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by personal tragedy and violence. Leon’s story is symbolic of the backgrounds of 
many participants affiliated with the Road Boys, and I will quote it at length to provide 
readers with a sense of the Road Boys’ lifestyle: 
Leon: Yeah, my road is called [Neighbourhood B] Road. Yeah, it was 
very quiet, very calm and easy going area, like everyone was friendly 
and stuff. Yeah, that was it.  
TM: So you’re saying it was a nice area?  
Leon: Well, yeah I just think the bad side of things was like, because 
there’s such a big Somalian community, which is my nationality, 
getting into trouble was quite easy because all my friends were 
Somalians and in the area Somalians were sort of causing the police 
problems– then we would chill together and we segregated ourselves 
from other people.  
TM: What sort of stuff have you been in trouble for?  
Leon: I’ve done a couple of street robberies, obviously I didn’t do them 
[smiling], but I’ve been arrested for them, selling drugs, that’s probably 
about it.  
TM: What were you dealing?  
Leon: Just cannabis, but it’s because it was in a drugs hotspot. You 
know the actual area in [Neighbourhood B], where the station is and 
that, it’s a drugs hotspot and everyone knows.  
…It didn’t start off that way [the Road Boys], it started off as just 
friends, but then we just went around beating people up for fun. We’d 
go to the – do you know the park [local park]? Yeah we used to go there 
on a Friday night and we’d just kick the shit out of people and rob them. 
Am I allowed to say this?! This is basically like a confession, so if the 
police…! 
But yeah, it was and it wasn’t [a gang]. It didn’t start off that way, it 
was just a group of friends, but most of the acquisitions that came to 
the gang was like people’s older brothers, who they had their own gang, 
it was their younger brothers and stuff. But they didn’t chill with us, 
they just did their own thing but then we’d bring them in, do you know 
what I mean? We’d say, ‘Yeah, come chill with us,’ then they’d end up 
chilling with us and then we ended up having quite a lot of people. But 
it was really a school thing; it started off in our school. A group of 
mates from school to a group of mates from all over the borough. Even 
then, we started expanding and people from other boroughs were 
getting involved to chill. It was mostly Somalians then it was like 
maybe a couple of Eritreans, Ethiopians and then there was like one 
Turkish boy, one black boy.  
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…Yeah mostly it starts from areas, I think, it’s more of an areas thing. 
It starts from areas and schools and then it just builds up. Once the gang 
gets a bit more, what’s the word? Respect, then people start to fear them 
and then people think, ‘I want to join this gang,’ or, ‘I want to fight this 
gang,’ do you get it? So it’s either one of two, ‘I want to join you,’ or, 
‘I want to fight you because you lot are getting a bit of a reputation 
now.’ That’s how it got with us. We actually made – the people we had 
a real tension with, which was the group that lived basically round the 
corner from – we all lived in the same area, we had the most tension 
with them. The worst thing is, we started it with them. They didn’t want 
to fight us, but we knew about them and started on them. Yeah, from 
the area, it was because they had a name for themselves, but it was 
more like a music thing. But they all chilled with each other and there 
was loads of them and they all did music, but for some reason we 
started on them and then they were like, ‘It’s not us, we don’t fight, we 
do music, but if you want to make it into a fighting thing between us 
then we’ll do this,’ then eventually it became that.  
That’s how a lot of people do it, that’s how I did it. I went out, robbed 
a couple of people, just came up to them, Boom. But the thing is I was 
one of those people, I didn’t ever rob other kids for some reason. I 
robbed men and stuff, because I felt like they could easily – like I 
robbed their laptop, they’d go and buy one tomorrow, whereas kids it 
was like I felt a bit harsh, because robbing people that are my age and 
stuff like that, I felt a bit sorry for them. But then there were some guys 
that were young and they’d have a flashy phone because their mum’s 
bought it for them and you’d want to rob that but then I felt bad 
sometimes robbing kids. So that’s why I only used to rob men and stuff. 
A lot of the men were paranoid because of the fact that they’re thinking, 
‘I don’t know what this kid’s got,’ you know what I mean? I always 
used to act like I was holding something. Most of the time I wasn’t, 
until I got to about 15, 16, then I started holding a blade, but before that 
when I was like 14, starting off, I didn’t use to hold a blade, I just used 
to act like I did and they’d be scared because they’d think I’m going to 
pull something out, but I’m not. It’s all an act, but they don’t know’.  
 
The Road Boys affiliation with a youthful street gang in and around Neighbourhood 
B meant that their engagement with the SBI was limited by the territorial based 
rivalries that penetrate this particular area of London. Indeed, East London has a long 
established and deeply engrained history of territorial based conflict (Hobbs, 2013), 
and the situation of SBI sites across the borough meant that participants risked 
trespassing on rival terrain where their identities, reputations and affiliations are 
known and their intrusion on an adjacent postcode will not go unopposed. Kieron and 
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Andre state the intricacy, density and concentration of youth groups in this particular 
area, and the complexity this bring for many Road Boys when engaging with and 
choosing an SBI project site: 
Kieron: ‘listen, you go to Hackney, Hackney’s the worst I reckon. I 
reckon Hackney is worse than South London. South London there’s 
just as many gangs, but I think Hackney is just a whole lot worse 
because all the gangs are so close, it’s like road here, and ‘We hate the 
road there.’ It’s like you go in the corner shop and you’re bound to see 
one of them. It’s mad, man.’ 
TM: ‘How come you decided to come to this SBI rather than one nearer 
your local area?’ 
Andre: ‘Because, obviously, in [Neighbourhood Y] - when I was 
younger, I used to be a little arsehole. I thought I was the big I am and 
everything like that. Neighbourhood Y was one of the places we used 
to try and run when I was young. So a lot of them would recognise me 
because I haven't really changed…’ 
 
Consequently, many Road Boys either chose to attend SBI sessions in adjacent 
boroughs where their identities and reputations as Neighbourhood B gang members 
were not known, and their intrusion would go unchallenged. By definition of their 
membership, a number of gang members situated on the periphery of my fieldwork 
network and not part of the SBI suggested that they would not attend any London 
sessions due to the potential for violence and conflict with unknown gang members 
who display a similar penchant for territorial based violence. Indeed, as previously 
alluded to, a recent incursion by one SBI group from South East London to North West 
London – two areas separated by a major river and significant geographical distance, 
and with no long standing territorial rivalries - for an SBI football match, resulted in 
the shooting of a participant in the back with a shotgun whilst he passed through 
defined ‘gang’ territory on the way back to the tube station71. As such, engaging gang 
                                                          
71 See Kilburn Times (2012). ‘Footballer blasted in the back for straying on to the Stonebridge Estate’.  
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affiliated members in Neighbourhood B was an issue, a significant barrier being the 
pan-London location of various sessions which requires members of the Road Boys to 
transcend boundaries into hostile territory.  
Those ‘Road Boys’ that do ‘make use’ of the SBI are disobediently oppositional to 
advice and guidance afforded by SBI staff. Instead, their primary motivations are to 
use the SBI as a chance to play football on a regular basis, honing their skills and 
engaging in an activity that has been a regular and established pastime for many youth 
growing up in and around Neighbourhood B. Indeed, the area is characterised by a 
distinct and well established street football scene renowned for its talent, creativity, 
and harbouring of potential talent, and many of the Road Boys were keen to state their 
previous experiences with the youth teams of well-known London teams. The Road 
Boys were respected by the Aspirationists for their football skills, but at an 
observational level it clear that their interest was due to the football aspect of the 
programme – particularly as they had no intention of seeking employment due to their 
engagement in market based criminal activity: 
TM: ‘Okay and what was it that made you get involved with SBI?’  
Leon: ‘Because my friend did it and he said he just played football every 
day. Football is something that I enjoy… 
…Most people who come here, especially me, my friend who did it before, 
the thrill of it was the football, coming here and playing football every day. 
It’s like he’d say to me – I was like, ‘What, no paperwork when you’re 
doing this course?’ He was like, ‘Yeah, piss easy mate!’ 
     Leon, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
The Road Boys rejection of SBI help and advice, and frequent disappearance and 
sporadic attendance at sessions, was instilled by a belief that they knew the SBI would 
have no impact at all on their lives. They were aware of the social inequalities and 
structural deficits they faced when growing up in Neighbourhood B, and in attempts 
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to ‘sidestep the exclusionary logic of capitalism’ (Hobbs, 2013:125) inverted the logic 
of neoliberal self-actualization to exploit the number of criminal opportunities thrown 
up by the fluctuating socio-economic transformations occurring in Neighbourhood B. 
In this sense, they can be considered street-savvy criminal entrepreneurs, establishing 
successful criminal enterprises and exploiting and seeking out markets through a range 
of commodified illegal activities (Hobbs, 2013). The sheer range and diversity of 
criminal opportunities brought about by gentrification, post-industrialism, and an 
influx of middle-class, resource-rich residents provide an alternative post-SBI 
trajectory that is a somewhat more tantalising prospect than the low-paid, insecure 
work SBIs channel participants into. Hence, prior to starting the SBI course, the Road 
Boys were already aware that the SBI could not transform their lifestyles; that to 
remain unemployed and engaged in criminal activity was their choice, and not 
something the SBI could influence: 
Kieron: ‘I think the person you’re trying to get to has got to want to change. 
I don’t think you can just come to gangs and be like, ‘We’ve got this new 
course going on,’ because I reckon most of them will just come to play 
football. That’s about it; they wouldn’t take nothing else seriously. Most of 
them probably wouldn’t even come because they’re thinking, ‘Out of the 
time I’m being here, I could be going making two or three hundred pounds 
while I’m here. What’s the point of being here and not making anything 
when I could make a lot of money elsewhere?’  
Yea, it’s got to be a person that wants to change their lives, because if you 
don’t want to change your life and you want to be in a gang and make all 
this unlegit money and you’re enjoying making this unlegit money, and 
especially if you’ve never been caught doing it previously, you’d always 
want to carry on until the day you do get caught and then you think, ‘That’s 
my first strike.’ Most people won’t go to jail on their first strike. It depends 
how serious their case can be, but most people don’t go to jail on their first 
strike, so that first thing is for them to say, ‘You know what, I’ve had a 
chance now, now do I really want to carry on, or do I want to try and change, 
because now that I’ve been caught, now they’re going to be onto me. 
They’re going to try and get me again so they can put me away. 
So you’ve got to think smartly about things, but then I think a lot of people 
if they haven’t been convicted of nothing, they’ll keep going until they do 
get convicted and have to spend some time in jail.  
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They might use SBI. But it all depends if they think it's worthwhile to them. 
Because most of the gangs, they do love football and everything like that. 
But they love their money more. That's their main thing, is the money’ 
     Kieron, Neighbourhood B, April 2012 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has captured four typologies of working-class youth who make use of the 
SBI. In Neighbourhood A, these include the Outcasts and the Conformists, two 
typologies who contrast and diverge in terms of their post-industrial identities, 
ambitions, and subsequent post-SBI trajectories. In expanding this chapter, I have also 
uncovered two typologies located within Neighbourhood B who similarly make use 
of the SBI; these are the Aspirationists, who seek to assimilate into London’s 
burgeoning post-industrial economy, and the Road Boys, who actively reject the work 
of the SBI and wish to continue eking profit from a number of illicit activities, rather 
than ‘degrade’ themselves in low paid, post-industrial service work.  
This chapter has shown how post-industrial youth identities are varied, diverse, and 
heterogeneous across populations, shaped and fashioned by the distinct and embedded 
habitus’ that operate in Neighbourhood A and Neighbourhood B. Youthful 
experiences of unemployment are not homogenous across the UK; and nor is there a 
standard youthful subjectivity within these post-industrial neighbourhoods and 
communities. 
The following chapter will expand on the debates put forth in chapter 7, by considering 
how these four contrasting typologies experience post-industrial life, post-SBI.  
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Chapter 8: Post-SBI Transitions: A Comparative Sociological Analysis 
Chapter 8 advances this thesis’ empirical chapters by considering how my participants experience ‘post-
SBI’ life; that is, how they internalise the rhetoric of neoliberal self-help espoused by the SBI along 
authorised paths; and how this neoliberal rhetoric interacts, shapes, and impacts upon everyday social 
phenomena and individual action at micro level. Hence, in this chapter, I illuminate how neoliberal self-
help discourse and intervention structures, in praxis, various patterns of post-SBI trajectory.  
Structurally, this chapter is separated into three main parts. First, I briefly repeat the setting and 
political-economic backdrops of neighbourhoods A and B. Thus, I reacquaint readers with the post-
industrial labour markets which my participants are ‘expected’ to assimilate into, upon ‘graduating’ 
from the SBI. Second, I identify, at microscopic level, the distinct pathways followed by two, 
identifiable social groups within the social-cultural context of Neighbourhood A. Similarly, I expand 
this analysis to include the two diverging pathways of two distinct youth groups in Neighbourhood B. 
In doing so, I illustrate how the participants within SBIs are composed of heterogeneous cultural 
groupings, exploring distinct SBI trajectories. I will thus provide readers with an account of how ‘learnt’ 
discourse and rhetoric, despite its good intentions, is often irrelevant for many young men whose 
choices are constrained by broader structural, political-economic forces that contradict the logic and 
discourse of such language.  Thirdly, I consider how these responses apply to the functioning of the 
SBI, particularly as its main function is to provide a route for young men into employment, education 
or training, and the implications of these findings. The findings can thus be extended to the work 
evaluating the impact of SBIs within ‘the neoliberal repertoire’ (Spaaij, 2009).  
Post-SBI Trajectories  
Perhaps one of the most striking findings of this research is the documentation of post-
SBI trajectories of participants. These pathways were shaped as much by historically 
embedded cultural values (i.e. in that my participants are ‘cultural products’ of their 
environs; ‘industrial masculinities’ in Neighbourhood A vs. ‘road culture’ in 
Neighbourhood B) as they were by the neighbourhood specific economic forces in 
place in these two distinct urban locales. Hence, this section will expand upon the 
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findings thus far to explore the diverging courses of participants upon ‘graduating’ 
from the SBI logocentrically, that is, within the social, cultural and economic 
frameworks of Neighbourhoods A and B.  
To begin, I will briefly reiterate the distinct, converging labour markets that exist in 
these two contrasting neighbourhoods. I begin with Neighbourhood A, to illuminate 
the economic context in which the Outcasts and Conformists are expected to assimilate 
into. 
The Labour Market Situations of Neighbourhood A 
Neighbourhood A was once defined by its industrial, ship building heritage. At its 
peak in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, work in the thriving shipbuilding 
industry was the staple of male labour, and the docks close to Neighbourhood A 
employed over 12,000 men, approximately one third of the cities adult population. 
The large number of local workers employed in the trade was required to deal with the 
large production outputs taking place during this the Second World War: between 
1939 and 1945 shipyards on the Wear launched some 245 merchant ships (Sunderland 
City Council, 2013). 
 
We have already seen how the industries that had formerly employed the grandfathers 
and fathers of the young men that now populate Neighbourhood A disappeared before 
many of them were born. Yet this structural transformation and subsequent 
experiences of ‘recurrent poverty’ (Shildrick et al., 2012) essentially transformed 
Neighbourhood A into a de-industrialised zone, ripe for producing lumpenised social 
populations (Byrne, 2001; Winlow, 2001). The parents and grandparents of 
Neighbourhood A youth, who had previously worked in the shipyards, glass cutting 
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factories, and heavy industry warehouses, effectively became a generation of obsolete, 
low-paid labourers. For example, Steve’s grandfather, father, and extended family 
found employment in the shipyards and mines in the 1970s and 80s before de-
industrialisation took hold, forcing his father to work as a low-paid plasterer for the 
rest of his life: 
‘Originally, my granddad on my dad’s side was a miner. He has worked in 
mines all over the place. He’s been to the shipyards, he’s been in loads. My 
dad on my mum’s side worked in the shipyards, and thinking back actually 
my granddad’s brother on my dad’s side worked there as well. My 
granddad’s brothers worked on the shipyards.  
That was the job for somebody. If you were from Sunderland, you worked 
in the shipyards, you worked in the mines. The same as if you were in 
Wales, you worked in the mines. You’re not going to work in the mines if 
you live in Hampstead Heath, because you haven’t got any! It’s just the way 
it is. Now with the mines closed down, my dad’s a plasterer, earning…next 
to nothing’           
                              Steve, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
 
Although Neighbourhood A youth were too young to have access to the past industrial 
labour market, they have had to adapt to the economic metamorphosis of the 1980s. 
Here, it is important to consider the inherited identities (Winlow, 2001) of my 
participants, and the impact this has had on their post-SBI transitions. Many of my 
participants talked about how they had ‘learnt’ their work ethic from their family 
members and social networks, and sought to continue this in the post-industrial 
context. Neighbourhood A is a working-class locale moulded and fashioned by its 
‘hard’, manual, workforce; a place where its men were socialized into physically 
exerting forms of employment, in accordance with their peers and family (Winlow, 
2001:36). As such, assimilating into the new post-industrial labour market is not a 
straightforward process. I often heard participants denounce available employment in 
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call centres, retail or hospitality as ‘jobs for birds’, ‘sissy stuff’, and claim that post-
industrial jobs were partial to ‘benders’: 
‘A call centre? No I haven’t. For birds and benders innit! I don’t think I’ve 
got the voice for it! I heard before actually that they prefer the north east 
accent but it’s a diluted version. It’s like what Cheryl Cole does! She speaks 
very plainly but you can hear the accent and that sort of thing. That’s why 
there are a lot of call centres up here. I think if I had vocal coaching or 
something then I think I could do it: but I don’t think I could do it, to be 
honest!’  
  Steve, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
The North East of England sports one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the 
UK. It is no surprise then, that the majority of jobs in the city of Sunderland are in 
‘feminised’, ‘sissy’ ‘service’ work: 77.8% of the total jobs in the Local Authority in 
which Neighbourhood A is located are now in retail, IT, call centres, and in the public 
sector. Manufacturing represents 15.3% of all jobs, whilst construction and manual 
work, once the domain of the ‘hard’, ‘industrial’ masculinities found here (Winlow, 
2001) is only 4.9%.   
Gone are the previous industrial forms of manufacturing once associated with the 
North East: the shipyards, steel plants and coal fields, and in their place are post-
industrial forms of low-pay service, financial and corporate sector employment  
associated with the North East’s emerging post-industrial economy; the call centres, 
the retail shops, and the ‘white collar’ IT based office jobs. Consequently: 
 Neighbourhood A and the surrounding area has a ‘high’ unemployment rate: 
9.3% of the Local Authority in which Neighbourhood A is located are 
unemployed, compared to 7.8% nationally.  
 Neighbourhood A has a high proportion of JSA claimants: 6.3% compared to 
1.9% nationally (NOMIS, 2011) 
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The intended function of the SBI is assimilate participants into forms of EET within 
the post- industrial economic landscape identified above. Indeed, in making up a 
significant component of the ‘neoliberal repertoire’ (Spaaij, 2009), contemporary SBIs 
now ‘serve as a form of social control and regulation’ that act as ‘gate-keeping 
mechanisms that regulate access to desirable positions’ (Spaaij, 2009:15). 
Having briefly reiterated the context in which the SBI of Neighbourhood A is situated, 
I will now expand this chapter to illuminate how, after interacting with the SBI, the 
two typologies of youth found in Neighbourhood A experience post-SBI transitions. I 
begin with the Outcasts. 
Post SBI Trajectories: North East  
Mark is waiting for me outside the metro station, where he has just scored 
an eighth of low grade cannabis resin from a local dealer known as Frimmy 
who operates from the block of flats that overlooks the main bus terminal 
adjacent to the station. He shakes my hand enthusiastically, it’s been six 
months since I last saw him, and he declares loudly how Frimmy had been 
generous in his ‘measure’ this week. Mark bounces onto the bus that will 
take us down to ‘the cages’, a renowned local footballing establishment that 
previously housed an ‘open’ SBI session a year earlier.  
After finding a seat at the back of the bus, Mark immediately produces a 
pack of King Size Rizzla, a lighter and the foil wrapped ‘eighth’ he has just 
picked up, and begins burning the dark brown clump of resin to produce it 
into a more softer form. Ignoring my protests to stop, Mark asks me to lean 
over him to open the window; the distinctive sweet, cloying smell of cheap, 
low grade resin is quickly filling the back of the bus. I ask why he continues 
to smoke resin, given its reputation as a low-quality product adulterated 
with binding and bulking agents: ‘it’s cheap’ replies Mark…’No money for 
anything else…I don’t mind it to be honest’. The rock is now in a more 
malleable form, and Mark picks at it, crumbling small specs of resin into 
the paper that lies in his lap.  
The bus comes to an abrupt stop, and some of the small specs, along with 
tobacco sourced from a cigarette, fall from the paper onto the floor. ‘Shit!’ 
exclaims Mark, ‘help me pick them up’. Mark scrambles under the seat in 
front, scouring the floor with his bare hands to find any remaining bits. The 
floor is filthy, wet, and well-trodden by muddied shoes from the wet 
landscape of Neighbourhood A. Mark’s hands are filthy with dust and mud, 
and he is angry. ‘Fucking bus driver, should learn to fucking drive’. He gets 
up, hands and knees dirtied, and continues to roll his joint. Once completed, 
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he seals the end and holds it up to be admired. ‘I’ll save that for later, once 
I’ve put a few past you in goal today pal!’ 
We pull up outside the cages, and alight the bus. Mark races across the busy 
main road, whilst I hesitantly judge the oncoming cars, before darting over 
to reach the other side. I can already see 7 or 8 young men, hoods up against 
the light drizzle, milling around outside the cage. Smoke lingers in the air, 
and the ground is littered with empty water bottles and discarded sports 
drink cans as we take the path over an overgrown green space that leads up 
to the cage. Moving closer, I recognise some of the faces buried beneath 
their hoods, pulled tight over their faces. It’s Max, Kevin, Tommy and 
Flack; all ex-SBI participants who all took part in an academy programme 
a year earlier. They are as surprised to see me as much as I am them; I have 
been away in London for the last six months, and contact has been minimal. 
‘Tom, you back mate!’ shouts Kevin enthusiastically, flicking his cigarette 
against the metal cage that lines the perimeter of the football pitch. Max 
stops smashing the football hard against the wall of the changing room, and 
charges over. We shake hands and playfully shove each other, jovially 
ridiculing one another regarding appearance, football results, and my 
whereabouts for the last six months.  
The session attracts up to 30 participants. This is not a formal SBI ‘open’ 
session, however; neither has it anything to do with the SBI. Instead, for the 
past six months, previously excluded participants - ex-participants unable 
to find jobs, or those left behind after the SBI closed several months early - 
are here. It has been organised by themselves; the Outcasts’ own football 
session. It provides them with the fun, excitement, and weekly exhilaration 
they desire, without the neoliberal rhetoric, motivational speak, or pressure 
to pursue employment. It is unashamedly macho and misogynistic; a bastion 
of testosterone fuelled, unregulated bravado and swagger. It is no surprise 
that there are no women here, and it is purely populated by ex SBI residents 
who once made up this session; the unemployed, drug addicts from a nearby 
dry house, older participants shunned by the SBI (one participant is at least 
60), and those that generally declined the ideals associated with the SBI.  It 
is pure, unadulterated, football; an organic, grassroots movement 
constructed by ‘failed’ participants who have rejected post-industrial work: 
the ‘Outcasts’. They are all here.  
Sonny, an ex-participant, enters the fray, shaking my hand and walks with 
me into the cage.  When I ask if he felt disappointment when the previous 
SBI sessions stopped, he laughs: 
‘No.  It was two opposite things, like you’ve always got to look for the silver 
lining you know, whatever is happening, and so my first thought was is 
there anything positive that can come out of this?  And I thought straight 
away, I’ll do it my flippin’ self!  And I just thought yeah! Then it can be 
even better, so the actual sessions feel better to tell you the truth. It’s just 
burgeoning, we’ve got 40 now, 40 people turning up, we’re talking about 
having all the pitches going at one stage because it’s just ballooning. We 
have a tournament every week now, we have 2 pitches going, we’re looking 
at having 3 to 4 pitches now and everyone…and there’s no break you just 
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switch around.  The losers move around to play the losers and the winners 
play the winners – a round robin. 
It’s brilliant, the players love it more than they liked SBI. There is more 
freedom now and it’s more fun, there’s more participation, the players come 
and they feel like they’re contributing to the running of it.  There’s less 
hierarchy, that focus isn’t there, and, I’d like to reintroduce that maybe in a 
less controlled fashion though you know?  I think people indoctrination and 
more…more…accessibility to information’ 
Arriving early gives me a chance to catch up briefly with some of the old 
participants. Upon graduating from the academy programme last summer, 
Nick, a lively, jovial character, went on to complete a level 1 BTEC diploma 
at college. However, since completing this a few months earlier, he has 
failed to find, or even attempt to look for, any employment, education or 
training activities: He is wearing old ragged clothes; his boots have holes in 
and the knees on his tracksuit bottoms are ripped, and he is mocked openly 
by other participants regarding the odour coming off him. Sam, a small, 
timid ex participant, hasn’t been working since volunteering for the SBI 
prior to its shut down.  Since then, however, he has been ‘doing nothing; 
back on the dole’.  Wes, who dropped out of the same academy programme 
last year due to a  ‘psychotic episode’ has spent the previous year ‘caring 
for wor lass, she needs help’ as well as receiving treatment for his ‘anger 
management issues and me psychotic episodes’.  
A series of small 5 a side games are played enthusiastically for two hours, 
with the teams alternating on and off the pitch depending on the score line. 
Without an ‘official’ coach or regulator, the games are brutal and full on, 
with no one holding back. The open nature of the session means anyone can 
drop in, and two serious, quiet, hardened young men arrive. No one knows 
who they are, but they mean business. In the last minute of the final game 
Mark catches one of them, a man of approximately 22, 6’2 and with a tattoo 
on his neck, with a late, mistimed tackle. The man immediately springs up, 
grabbing Mark by the throat and shoving him into the side of the cage. The 
crowd stand outside the cage, watching the spectacle. His friend, an even 
bigger man, heavy set with a shaved head, charges over, and lands a couple 
of punches on Mark, who, to his credit, struggles back against the two, and 
lands a few punches of his own. The fight escalates and Sonny, along with 
a fellow older, more mature participant, attempt to break them off. Mark 
struggles away, and walks toward the gate to exit the cage. He walks along 
the side of the cage to reach it, and we can see his nose is bloodied, and 
mouth cut. Rather than making his way to the safety of the changing rooms, 
however, Mark picks up his bag and retrieves a phone. He makes a call, and 
approximately two minutes later, amid attempts to calm him and the other 
two men down, who are now eying each other through the meshing of the 
cage, a man arrives on a moped, 6’5, shaven headed, and at least 16 stone. 
The two unknown men have now made their way out of the cage, and face 
Mark and his sidekick. The large man swings his moped helmet, missing 
the smaller of the two men, whilst Mark and the other man jostle each other, 
fists raised, like two boxers in the ring. They circle, during a time when, 
perhaps due to the size of the men, no one seeks to intervene. There are up 
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to 20 people watching, surrounding the men in a make-shift gladiatorial 
style arena. Following many missed punches, minor scuffles, and the 
swinging of a metal bike lock that Mark was lucky to escape, a police car 
screeches into the car park, and the four men inside the cage scramble away; 
one group towards the main road and bus stop, the other group in the 
opposite direction, through thick bush and trees and onto a school field. We 
remain, and the police ask questions. No one diverges any information, nor 
admits to knowing the men. After a couple of minutes of deafening silence, 
the police call for back up and begin searching along the bush for Mark and 
his accomplice, who’s moped still sits next to us. No one has said it’s his 
though. 
     Fieldnotes, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
The above moment represents several ethnographic ‘snapshots’ during a four hour 
period travelling to, participating in, and travelling back from one football session run 
by a number of ‘excluded’ Outcasts. All of the above occurred in a period 
approximately 16 months after participants had ‘graduated’ from an SBI academy 
programme. As such, this period, made up of several attendances at this informal, 
organic gathering, represent an opportunity through which to explore the post-SBI 
transitions of a number of Outcasts72.  
From October 2012 – December 2012 I attended these sessions weekly. These sessions 
grew out of the closure of an open SBI session73 that a number of my participants had 
attended a year earlier. The closure occurred primarily for the session’s inability to 
progress participants into stable employment, education, or training. The previous 
session was composed of self-identified ‘Outcasts’ and was therefore seen by SBI staff 
as stagnating, attracting only those that wanted to use the session for leisure, or as a 
means through which to meet JSA criteria. It was formed by a group of Outcasts, who, 
rejecting the neoliberal rhetoric of success, employment, and the maximisation of 
                                                          
72 Regular contact was also maintained between the period of graduation and my first attendance at the informal session, either 
in person, phone or social media.   
73 See chapter 6 
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individual assets, set up the session aimed at those who didn’t ‘fit’ with the SBI 
neoliberal model. The session attracted a ‘hardened’ client base, and was composed 
of ex participants who would have previously been ‘referred out’ of the SBI session 
due to their perceived ‘dangerousness’. The session represents the key tenets of the 
Outcasts’ outlook toward work, and their outright rejection of assimilating into a post-
industrial economy: 
‘This is what it used to be, before all the money came in and they tried to 
tell everyone what they should be doing… all the guys are still coming to 
this one you know. And they’ve moved for me into a better space where 
they’re not looking [for employment]…what I’m looking to avoid is the job 
mentality…it’s away from the indoctrination, school isn’t education its 
indoctrination, and the indoctrination process is constantly keeping 
plugging into your brain that you need a job.  And my kids…I didn’t want 
them to go to school at all because what I didn’t want to happen has 
happened.  They come and they say this is the job I’m going to have, and I 
say it’s a job, don’t get a job, work for yourself!’  
                      Sonny, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
The participants who attended this session were aware of their position in the social 
structure, and having rejected the help of the SBI and the chance to assimilate into the 
post-industrial economy, explored a diverging post-SBI trajectory downwards; they 
remained unemployed, claiming state benefits, and increasingly marginalised and 
stigmatised by society. For example, on one occasion I arrived early at ‘the cages’, 
and went inside the small reception area to wait for participants to arrive. Upon striking 
up a conversation with the receptionist, I tried to outline, diplomatically, that I was a 
PhD student ‘researching’ the post-SBI careers of participants, and explain the social 
goals of my research. Her reply was somewhat frank, and to the point: 
‘I don’t get why we should help, they’re the people who are mugging, 
using drugs and the like…you should see the state of the place once 
they finish here…it’s not our problem, they are the ones that chose to 
be like that, I can’t see them changing, despite what you do, like, the 
work you are doing to try and help them, and the help they 
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get…benefits and that. I think it’s a disgrace. We’re too soft in this 
country’ 
   Facility Staff, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
Despite the collective stigmatisation and vilification, however, the Outcasts were 
happy to continue unemployed, and recognised the structural impediments and 
inequality that exists in and around Neighbourhood A. They were aware that the SBI’s 
primary function was to move a participant into employment; however, the quality of 
this employment was dubious, and the quantity of jobs available was restricted by the 
de-industrialisation of the surrounding area. As such, they showed a great deal of 
sociological nous to realise that a completion of the SBI course would not be enough 
to alleviate their marginalised social status. Sonny was aware of the structural forces 
that limited his access to stable, well paid employment, and used a broken leg as a 
metaphor for how SBIs work at individual level, but fail to address underlying 
structural deficits in the north east.  
‘What was I looking at?  I don’t watch television much but um…I 
caught a programme Sunday, a political programme… [Thinking hard] 
Andrew Marr! And they were talking about cuts, and it was the 
northeast, Newcastle and Sunderland that had been cut.  And the guy 
said…he said ‘I know you’re going to say it’s not that but it is always 
the northeast that gets picked first!’ … it’s always the northeast the gets 
dumped first!  
These schemes [the SBI], it’s like…if you’ve got a patient who has got 
cuts and they’ve got a big broken leg …you [the SBI] attend the cuts 
while you’re waiting for the broken leg to get fixed.  That [the broken 
leg. Read: the economy] is the major one but you can’t do anything 
about that at the moment.  So as the structure is as it is, then you need 
more of these schemes, but ideally you’d look to be addressing the 
broken leg first: the whole approach’ 
    Sonny, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
The Outcasts’ apparent happiness, and contentment with remaining unemployed, 
despite collective vilification and stigmatisation from society as a whole, does come 
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at price. Aesthetically, they conform to a ‘chav’ stereotype of tracksuit bottoms, 
baseball caps, and hooded tops. They are labelled as such by other, employment-
seeking members of the SBI, branded as ‘charver scum’, whose unemployment was a 
matter of choice, and a result of personality ‘deficits’. Will, an SBI participant seeking 
employment and identified here as a Conformist, described the Outcasts as such: 
‘I think a chav, or as we would say a charver…if you’re talking about dress 
wise you would say the caps and the trackies and the socks, that sort of 
thing, the Nike Airmax’s. If you’re talking about personality wise you’re 
saying knocking about on street corners, drinking cider.  
I think a chavs more than just a social tag, you can’t just say, ‘Years 16 to 
25, you’re a charver. If you’re older than that, you’re something else.’ It’s 
not as easy as that. It’s like a way of life. You don’t choose to be a chav 
maybe, you just are one. 
Most people that have been through SBI and you’re trying to find them jobs, 
a lot of them don’t want to be helped. Even the ones who do want to be 
helped, can’t be helped because they just haven’t got the personality for it!  
Some people [charvers], you talk to them and you think to yourself, ‘You 
haven’t got much of a chance in a job or in life or whatever.’ Just because 
of the type of people they are. It might not always be their fault, they’ve 
been brought up that way but some people can help themselves’ 
       Will, Neighbourhood A, March 2012 
In conforming to the subcultural style of the chav: i.e. ‘clothing (branded or designer 
‘casual wear’ and ‘sportswear’), jewellery (‘chunky’ gold rings and chains), cosmetics 
(‘excessive’ make-up, sunbed tans), accessories (mobile phones), drinks (‘binge’ 
drinking, especially ‘premium lagers’ such as Stella Artois), and music (R&B, hip-
hop)’ (Hayward and Yar, 2006:14), the Outcasts provide an easily identifiable, 
readymade target for collective social vilification and ‘othering’ (Nayak, 2006; 
Martin, 2009). I discovered Neck tattoos were de rigour for any self-identifiable 
outcast. Often the Outcasts clothing was dirtied, unwashed, and foul smelling: Nick 
was once provided with free clothing from the SBI due to his habit of turning up in 
malodourous attire, but this habit appeared to continue. Subsequently, the employment 
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seeking participants of the SBI made a point of differentiating themselves from the 
slovenliness of the Outcasts, often shouting and ridiculing Nick if he came too close 
or became too tactile: 
 
‘Nick, he stinks of piss…fuckin’ hell! I hate it when he comes over and 
puts his hand round me…fuckin’ dirty charver! Have you got any spare 
[SBI] t-shirts for him? Oi Nick! [Nick looking over] get some new 
clothes you fucking pikey, you stink of piss!!’ 
            Nathan, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
The Outcasts’ aesthetic, habits, and lifestyles are a constant source of vilification, even 
if - for them - they are commonsensical customs attuned to their outcast lifestyle. 
These habits however, result in further marginalisation, post-SBI. Their anti-work 
ethos, obviously, excludes them from the post-industrial labour market (see also 
Nayak, 2006). Subsequently, they are also excluded from forms of post-industrial, 
leisure life (Nayak, 2006); their lack of cultural and financial capital prohibits them 
from engaging in post-industrial consumer culture; the ‘hub around which the life-
world rotates’ (Bauman, 1992:49), compounding their distinct ‘otherness’, and 
ensuring that they are ‘left behind, disinherited or degraded, shut off or excluded from 
the social feast to which others have gained entry’ (Bauman, 2002:38). This exclusion 
confirms their ‘outcast’ lifestyle and ensures that they constitute a contemporary social 
underclass in Neighbourhood A ‘discarded and left to rot on marginalized housing 
estates, [through being] unable legitimately to acquire the lifestyle symbolism 
validated by consumer culture’ (Treadwell et al., 2013:8). Similar to Nayak 
(2006:820) I found that the Outcasts were ‘priced out of many of the new drinking 
venues where bright lights, glitz and silver chrome predominated’ and that their 
‘particular style of clothing, which included tracksuits, trainers and baseball caps were 
banned from these establishments’. Their use of illegal substances was also guided by 
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their self-exclusion from the labour market, and their lack of monetary capital meant 
that, for some like Mark, they were restricted to purchasing and smoking low-grade, 
cheap, cannabis resin, often adulterated and bulked with agents to bind and colour the 
product during production. In contrast, other, employment-seeking participants made 
a sharp differentiation between ‘hash’, which they saw as symbolic of a ‘chav’ or 
‘outcast’ lifestyle due to its cheap, poor quality,  and higher-quality ‘skunk’ or weed, 
considered a more ‘upmarket’, recreational intoxicant which had connotations with 
the ‘glamour’ and ‘bling’ of hip-hop lifestyles (Winlow, 2001). Hash smoking, then, 
was a marginal leisure activity, which attracted those associated with the outcast 
lifestyle who are excluded from the post-industrial labour market and leisure sections; 
its main function is to generate a ‘high’ for as little money as possible74.  
Through their self-exclusion from the post-industrial labour market, and collective 
social exclusion from the night-time economy, the Outcasts have attained a lifestyle 
that attempts to transcend the monotony and tedium of unemployed life in 
Neighbourhood A. Mundane activities, such as smoking hash, hanging around on 
street corners, and, at best, attending the ‘outcast’ football session (Nayak, 2006; 
Shildrick and MacDonald, 2006) offer more affordable, accessible leisure pursuits. 
Attempts at ‘seizing control’ (Hayward, 2004) in an excluded post-industrial locale 
however, often results in the creation of more exciting, transgressive acts, and, as we 
have seen in Chapter 5, petty theft, vandalism, violence and using increasingly harder, 
cheaper substances are some of the most common forms of visible delinquency 
amongst the Outcasts in Neighbourhood A. Much of this delinquency is opportunistic, 
exhibiting a strong sense of spontaneity and having an expressive dimension. Its main 
                                                          
74 The same could be said for cheap, strong lager, such as Oranjeboom, a strong percentage, Dutch brew that is synonymous with 
the unemployed, substance abusers, and marginal members of society.  
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purpose, then, is not so much planned, or to generate monetary capital; but rather 
‘action’: ‘attempts to achieve a semblance of control within ontologically insecure life 
worlds’ (Hayward, 2004:165): 
This exclusion is manifested in the open spaces of Neighbourhood A. Many of the 
Outcasts would congregate outside a Metro station, hanging around in the forecourt 
under the cover of a roof, and occasionally kicking a football against the wall of an 
adjacent newsagents. A nearby bookmakers provided a warm, welcoming 
environment for some participants, an accommodating environment where they could 
spend their JSA without being collectively ridiculed, pillared or excluded for their 
lifestyles. I once spent two hours in a bookmakers with Mark whilst he squandered 
£90 – a relatively large amount for an unemployed young person to be wasted in the 
matter of hours – on a roulette machine, continually gambling his winnings before 
they were exhausted and he built up a deficit. Nevertheless, the environment provided 
an inclusive arena in which the transgressive excitement of the bookmakers functions 
as a means of pushing one to the ‘edge’ (Lyng, 2005), a ‘performance zone…in which 
displays of risk, excitement, and masculinity abound…that offer both rich excitement 
and an illicit means of traversing, even momentarily escaping, the socially degraded 
neighbourhood’ (Ferrell et al., 2008:74) 
‘I love it down here me…spend hours, get me cup of tea, get me 
sausage roll from Greggs. Spot on. I’ll spend hours on the roulette, 
sometimes just sitting, watching which one is paying out…it’s a skill. 
Do the ACCA at the weekends for the football; I get a proper buzz just 
waiting for the results to come in! It’s just somewhere nice to go you 
know, can’t be bothered with no fancy bars or nothing. Just happy to 
come down here’. 
    Mark, Neighbourhood A, January 2012 
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Similarly, violence provided a pathway through which the Outcasts explored, and the 
small fieldwork exert provided at the onset of this chapter was one example of the 
instrumentality of violence to transcend boredom and gain status, respect, and esteem 
amongst a collective group devoid of, and excluded from, the traditional consumption 
and consumerism practices that are ‘key contexts for the constructions of youth 
identities in de-industrialized Britain’ (Winlow and Hall, 2009:91). Tristan, for 
example, had ‘three other sentences and that’s all been for fighting’ and regularly 
turned up on Monday mornings with swollen knuckles and blackened eyes. For him, 
fighting and violence was a normalised activity, a means of asserting his masculinity 
and augmenting the status of himself, his peer-group, and fellow family members in 
de-industrialised Neighbourhood A: 
‘Most of my life I’ve been like creating trouble kind of thing.  Well, not 
creating trouble but in and out of trouble, fighting most of all, you know 
what I mean? A lot of my mates have all gone to prison, that’s how we were 
brought up; we were brought up…  My old feller, if I went out and I got 
beat, get back out there and fight again and don’t come back until you do 
beat him.  I might have to fight him ten times. A lot of the lads are hard lads, 
that’s the way we were brought up, you know what I mean.  We weren’t 
brought, we were dragged up, and you know what I mean.  Just couldn’t go 
home unless you won a fight’ 
           Tristan, Neighbourhood A, December 2011 
Well-meaning staff attempted to instil the neoliberal rhetoric of self-treatment and 
personal responsibility, relying on the individual willpower and self-motivation of 
participants. SBI staff educated and implanted the Neighbourhood A Outcasts with 
help and information, yet the Outcasts had the judgement to realise that they could do 
little with that knowledge and information. Most of the participants I came into contact 
with in Neighbourhood A were Outcasts, and most had completed the course merely 
to, in the words of one participant ‘get me out of bed in the morning, and come along 
and play footie for two hours a day’.  
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Following a brief period of positivity in the immediate aftermath of graduation, many 
of the Outcasts returned to their previous lifestyles, as has been described here. The 
absence of post-SBI services and the neoliberal underpinnings of the SBI meant that, 
with their new found acquired skills, participants were expected to go out and find 
employment. Fortunately, for the Outcasts, their ability to spot the inequality they 
faced meant that they were content in prolonging their outsider subjectivities. Once 
again idle, with little structure to the day, JSA pay checks burned a hole in Nick’s 
pocket, and he went on a three day drink and hash binge and was soon back to being 
a full time outsider. Six months after graduation I ran into Dan on a bus in the town 
centre, and his prognosis was not much better: he had spent the previous months 
helping his Dad out ‘on the fiddle’, but was back ‘doing nothin’, just keepin’ me head 
down, on the drink, on the dole’.  
Two months after he had graduated I visited Mark’s rented hostel accommodation. He 
resided in a bedroom with a sink in a high rise hostel close to the river. Mark had no 
family or social contacts in the immediate vicinity of Neighbourhood A. His Mum 
‘died when he was young’, and he ‘doesn’t know where his dad is – I don’t really have 
any family, no brothers or sisters’. Alone in the North East of England, isolated and 
lacking any firm or ‘real’ social contacts, the only other young men he comes in to 
contact with are those who live in his hostel: ‘junkies, meth heads, not nice people’ – 
Mark became aware of his position in the social structure, and believed he couldn’t be 
helped. Yet he showed apparent contentment in continuing along this post-SBI path, 
and came to accept this as his established being, post-SBI. This is the reality of the 




Now that have detailed the Outcasts’ post-SBI trajectory, I will consider the second 
cultural grouping – the Conformists – and their respective SBI pathway.  
The Neoliberal Conformists 
Graduation day finally arrives after 8 weeks of classroom activities, CV 
writing, job applying, and of course, football. The venue is an old sports 
hall, with chairs placed either side of an aisle for up to 30 visitors to sit. I 
take a seat amongst the participants; 16 of them who have completed the 
course, out of a starting total of 20. The participants are required to deliver 
a short presentation detailing their experiences of the project and their ‘next 
steps’. Most are extremely nervous, and we have spent the last week 
practicing and perfecting the content, timing, and delivery of the speech. 
Ryan, an SBI participant who I sit beside, appears to be the most nervous. 
He turns to me and tells me he can’t read his own writing; it is an ineligible 
scrawl, and I quickly respond to his request to re-write it for him, in a 
slightly more eligible form.   
The hall quickly fills up with spectators; parents, siblings, girlfriends, key 
workers from various social interventions, and other members of SBI staff. 
They are welcomed by Brian, the SBI coach, who has put together a video 
which is screened to the room, containing images and clips of participants, 
amusing moments, and short interview clips with participants explaining 
what they enjoyed about the course. After this, it is time for the participants, 
and they are called up, one by one, to deliver their speech. Wearing suits 
and ties, many of the graduates appeared nervous at first, but eased into the 
presentation after the first thirty seconds, reliving humorous moments, 
anecdotes, and their next steps, ‘post-SBI’. Ryan thanked the SBI staff for 
helping him, and to the audiences delight, delivered a well presented, 
coherent speech. At the end of his speech, he gleamed, smiling; ‘I did it!’  
The group are aspirational in their next steps. Mitchell is interested in going 
to uni, ‘to become a therapist’, similarly Catherine hopes to ‘to go to uni 
and become a midwife’. 5 out of the 10 graduates are going to a local Higher 
Education College to complete BTEC and HND programmes. No doubt the 
course has improved their confidence, and all participants talk about how it 
has improved their employability, personal skills and confidence. At the end 
of the talks, Brain talks about ‘how far the participants have come’, and how 
they are going on to ‘college, volunteering and work’. Most of the 
Conformists believed that the SBI could change their lives, and they left the 
room filled with hope about their education and employment prospects. 
                    Fieldnotes, Neighbourhood A, July 2011 
Almost all Conformists had found employment, education or training programmes in 
the immediate weeks following their completion of the course. Ryan benefited from 
286 
 
the timing of the course, which coincided with the start of the new academic year, and 
enrolled himself on a BTEC Sports Science course at a local Higher Education 
college75. He had visions of becoming ‘a top sports coach, like, for one of the big footie 
teams’, and looked forward to full time education. 
Practically, the appeal of higher education courses offering Higher National Diplomas 
(HNDs) and BTECs in ‘post-industrial’, knowledge based disciplines such as Sport 
Science, Business, and Health and Beauty, was their capability of offering relevant 
technical and communication skills required to assimilate into the post-industrial 
labour market. In this sense, colleges are a natural extension for the SBI, assisting in 
the evolution of participants into neoliberal subjects with ‘the entrepreneurial skills to 
actualize himself in a competitive society’ (Rose, 2000:322). Hence, post-SBI higher 
education was seen by many young Conformists as a necessity for post-industrial 
living.     
Other than education, many Conformists sought employment in the surrounding post-
industrial environment. The Conformists believed such employment, in contrast to the 
masculine, ‘hard’ labour the area has long been associated with, afforded a sense of 
prestige and status in an adapting post-industrial labour market defined by knowledge 
based and service sector employment. For the Conformists, post-industrial 
employment provided them with a disposable income to sustain post-industrial 
identities increasingly defined by consumption practices (Bennett, 1999). Their work 
and identities are thus intrinsically linked; and post-industrial employment is seen as 
reinforcing their post-industrial lifestyles and identities, and they align their post-
                                                          
75 Local colleges were provided with a steady flow of post-SBI participants. Due to the age of range of participants, college was 
seen as a natural progression for many hoping to find eventual, stable employment. Hence, many of the Conformists ‘ended up’ 




industrial ‘self’ with the hegemonic, post-industrial environment via their shirts and 
ties and ‘trendy’ clothing, styled hair, and smart, polished shoes. Inevitably, the 
aesthetic features and the employment choices of the Conformists conflict with the 
‘masculine’, ‘industrial’ hegemonic cultural standards and values within 
Neighbourhood A. Nevertheless, the Conformists see post-industrial employment as 
an inevitable changing feature within Neighbourhood A, and want to be part of it.  
The Conformists described here are the ideal candidates for SBI intervention. In my 
ethnography I caught a practical glimpse of how they believed that they had ‘done 
something productive’ by simply participating in the SBI. I was struck by how many 
of the participants graduation speeches were peppered with the neoliberal rhetoric of 
individualisation and self-responsibilisation, how their employment ‘was down to 
them’. They absorbed the moralising techniques of ethical reconstruction, instilled to 
‘govern the existence and experience of contemporary human beings, and to act upon 
human conduct to direct it to certain ends’ (Rose, 2000:322).   
However, the long term outcomes of the SBI demonstrate how the neoliberal rhetoric 
of SBIs can often backfire. The Conformists took responsibility for their 
unemployment, and as such, misrecognised the common structural indicators for 
unemployment, exclusion, and poverty. SBIs rely on individual willpower, and by 
instilling the neoliberal rhetoric of the individual’s moral responsibility to find 
employment and avoid risk - that they can ‘achieve anything they want to’ – risk 
imparting a false sense of security amongst participants. Many Conformists had 
dreams of going on to University, or of becoming successful business entrepreneurs. 
Will hoped to become ‘a basketball coach in the NBA’, and took on board the helpful 
support and guidance of well-intentioned SBI staff.  
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Yet what the SBI and its participants did not realise is that within Neighbourhood A, 
this guidance and support means little; SBI programmes provided the Conformists 
with enough information – in line with neoliberal self-help rhetoric – to realise that 
employment was a moral choice and that self-entrepreneurship should be encouraged, 
but there was relatively they could do to realise these dreams because quite bluntly, 
they lived in an area with some of the highest youth unemployment rates in the 
country, and had relatively little qualifications or experience. The Conformists felt like 
they had done something productive merely by attending the course. SBI programmes, 
consequently, can engender a false sense of confidence amongst participants.  
For example, I do not know of one Conformist who, over the three years of my 
fieldwork in the North East, went on to complete - let alone register - for a University 
course post-SBI. The majority of them went on to complete level one BTEC 
qualifications at local colleges, only to drop out later. Neither did any of the 
Conformists obtain any stable, full time employment, despite their commitment to 
finding employment throughout the course.  
Sonny: ‘What’s his name?  I can’t remember the guy’s name - Baz’s 
mate um…tall slim fellow Dean…not Dean…there is 3 of them, Baz, 
Dean, and the other…I can’t remember his name’. 
Me: ‘Stuey’? 
Sonny: ‘Stuey! Yeah.  Now Stuey he’s a lazy git he just is, he’s got 
great skills but he’s….he needs pushing and he got pushed into going 
to college: and he just dropped out’! 
 
Further Conformists ‘let down’ staff post-SBI, despite the apparent commitment to 
finding employment. At times staff were exasperated by the long term outcomes of 
the Conformists, and saw their failure to hold down long term employment a result of 
laziness and a lack of personal regulation: 
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‘Out of the 9 that graduated how many do you think actually progressed 
into EET? 2! Guess who, you won’t believe it. Ryan, remember Ryan, black 
hat, quite big, tattoo on his neck. He went on a horticulture course! Stav 
went into packing SIM cards in a factory. Catherine got pregnant within a 
day of graduating. Will, he went into working in a call centre, although he’s 
left now. And the rest, they’ve been doing nothing. I’ve tried speaking with 
them but it’s just gone on too long now. Remember Kris? Massive let down. 
Terry rang me saying they had jobs in Costco. So I went and met the boss 
there and said I’ve got three guys who will be real quality, won’t let down. 
Kris got given the job. On the Monday he turned up. Tuesday he was late. 
Wednesday he was late. Thursday he didn’t show up. And on Friday he was 
gone. I gave him a ring and just set look, I’ve given you this opportunity, 
and you’ve really let me down. Really let me down. I was so pissed off that 
I got him this opportunity and he’s gone and made me look stupid’. 
‘The other guys, Tommy was a let-down, he’s not doing anything. Kevin. I 
really liked Kevin, I had a lot of contact with him, spoke to him a lot. But 
then he was just honest with me once, told me he wasn’t looking for any 
jobs. Then all of a sudden he was just gone, wasn’t answering any calls or 
anything. I spoke to one of his mates and he said that he just wasn’t into it 
anymore. It’s like the more I tried to get in touch with them, the more I 
pushed them away.’ 
     Brian, SBI Coach, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
Employment, education, and training represented a more complicated challenge then 
the Conformists anticipated. The one-size-fits all approach to SBIs fails to recognise 
the complex structural factors that impinge on young men attempting to assimilate into 
the surrounding post-industrial labour force. The Conformists, despite their 
willingness and commitment to work, did not recognise the social inequalities that 
engulfed them, and faced the double bind of living in an area with some of the highest 
unemployment rates and lowest jobs to person ration in the country, and could not 
compete with the younger, and more educated workforce for the dwindling number of 
post-industrial jobs available to young men in their neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the 
Conformists were ashamed of their unemployment and ‘welfare’ identity, and after 
failing to find the employment they aspired to, scurried for college places and low-pay 
employment, encouraged by well-intentioned SBI staff who advocated that 
employment was the way to ‘actualize himself in a competitive society’ (Rose, 
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2000:322). The Conformists expressed appreciation for any form of post-industrial 
employment, as long as it was not personally humiliating or exploitive.  
It is impossible to know with any real certainty the extent to which the SBI has 
‘changed’ the conformer’s lives. Ethnographically, there is no doubt that ‘soft’ skills 
such as confidence, motivation, and subsequent employability skills were improved. 
Yet ‘hard’ outcomes, and the drive to achieve them, can have unintended negative 
consequences, as the last year of my fieldwork revealed.  
Kris’s success in finding employment ultimately proved ineffective. After spending 
the previous eight weeks looking for employment, which included handing out CVs 
in shops and cafes in Newcastle and Sunderland city centres for two consecutive days, 
he finally found employment in a Costco, a  membership only wholesale retailer. After 
three days of turning up late, he finally quit at the end of his first week.  
Joe, who still lived permanently at home with his mum and brother, began an 
apprenticeship with the SBI. He assisted with the running of SBI open football 
sessions, and completed a number of FA accredited coaching courses. Despite 
showing good promise as a coach and helpfully aiding the running of sessions, the 
closure of the session on the back of the drastic economic situation meant he was 
unable to continue his role as volunteer coach: 
‘I remember we turned up for a session on a Wednesday and no one 
was here. All I got was a text from Andy saying it’s stopped because if 
funding. Since then I’m back on JSA, just been seeing my lass up in 
Dundee’. 
         Joe, Neighbourhood A, October 2011 
Tommy, like Joe, graduated from the programme and found an apprenticeship with 
the SBI, assisting with the academy course and open football sessions. However, his 
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attendance slowly dwindled, and I last bumped into him in Durham City Centre, a year 
after leaving, selling plastic wristbands for a popular British Army campaign and 
working ‘now and then on the doors in Yates’’. 
Flack, Ryan, Kevin and Catherine enrolled on BTEC and HND courses at a nearby 
higher education college. Ryan dropped out after three weeks, because he ‘realised I 
didn’t actually want to learn anymore’, and Catherine fell pregnant weeks after 
graduating, preventing her from enrolling on the course. Flack and Kevin, however, 
successfully completed a level one course, and had the potential to continue for a 
further year to achieve a full BTEC Qualification. However, a year later, I arranged to 
meet with them in Neighbourhood A to check on their progress. Their outcomes were 
not much better. Flack had dropped out of the course after only a couple of weeks, and 
Kevin, after completing the course, was back to being unemployed again: 
‘I wanted to do the level 2 but no one got back to me. So I’m back on the 
dole. Been looking for jobs, mainly retail, like, but canny find any, so I 
stopped looking. Hate doing it, can’t be bothered’.  
             Kevin, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
 
SBI staff spent hours looking for employment opportunities, telephoning agencies and 
often asking in local retail shops for any prospective openings. The drive to achieve 
‘outputs’ however, means that once a participant is enrolled on a college course, or 
has found a form of employment, they are seen as having ‘achieved’ a positive 
outcome, and left to navigate the post-industrial labour market by themselves. SBIs 
rely on individual willpower and individuals being ‘self- responsibilised’ to achieve 
long term, sustainable outcomes. Somewhat predictably however, many young men 
residing in post-industrial locales frequently ‘churn’ between low-paid employment, 
welfare, and unemployment before finally finding stable employment (MacDonald, 
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2011; Shildrick et al., 2013). Without any prolonged, continued support it is difficult 
for young men to re-find employment once the inevitable churn begins. Hence, as is 
the case with a number of my participants, they often fall back into their familiar ways 
of unemployment, seeking out old friends and acquaintances, and engaging in 
previous forms of behaviour in Neighbourhood A, a hotbed of drugs, alcohol, and 
crime.   
Within this environment, the SBI instils the rhetoric of neoliberal self-help in 
participants, holding them accountable for their unemployment and implanting a 
neoliberal logic that ‘you can achieve anything you want’. This sets Conformists up 
for a predictable failure, as the examples above demonstrate. Many Conformists had 
dreams of entrepreneurship, professional sports coaching, and moving on to 
University. During my three years of fieldwork, I did not meet one participant who 
enrolled on a university course, let alone progress into professional sports coaching, 
or become entrepreneurs. In this sense, SBIs can instil a false sense of capability 
amongst the Conformists, and obscure deep rooted structural and economic 
inequalities that exist in and around Neighbourhood A by unwittingly reassigning 
blame to participants for their individual ‘failures’. Despite their good intentions, SBIs 
can mystify power vectors that assign inequality amongst participants: it is only once 
they enter the post-industrial labour market that they truly encounter and come to 
realise them, and as a consequence of taking on board neoliberal rhetoric, blame 
themselves for their reversion back to unemployment and welfare support. Max took 
full responsibility for his failure to find a successful job post-SBI: 
‘I guess I just don’t have the qualifications for it, or the skills, 
knowledge, all that. It’s my fault for being a bum when I first finished 
school.  I don’t know what I’m going to do. It’s depressing Tom, it 
really is’  
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            Max, Neighbourhood A, June 2012 
 
Follow up and aftercare support that addresses structural problems are the biggest 
drawback of SBI services. Because of the inevitability of churning, most participants 
are left to return to finding a job or supportive network, on their own, and having been 
instilled with the logic of neoliberal self-help, unwittingly reassign blame on 
themselves for their individual ‘failure’.  
Summary 
The two typologies of SBI youth introduced in chapter 7 have been revisited here, in 
an effort to investigate their unique post-SBI trajectories. There are the Outcasts, a 
typology that has an outright rejection of work and neoliberal rhetoric espoused by the 
SBI. Post-SBI, they remained vilified and stigmatised within Neighbourhood A, yet 
were happy to remain in an unemployed state despite their own exclusion. In contrast, 
the Conformists wished to assimilate into the post-industrial economy of 
Neighbourhood A. However, misrecognising the structural impediments they faced 
meant that the neoliberal rhetoric they took on in the context of the SBI had little 
impact in post-industrial Neighbourhood A: Well intentioned SBI staff ‘trained’ their 
participants in employability skills in line with post-industrial ideals of employment. 
Yet in an area of structural unemployment, there was nothing that the Conformists 
could do with this knowledge. Indeed, by consuming the logic of neoliberalism, the 
Conformists, unlike the Outcasts, misrecognised the social inequalities they are 
contained within, believing ‘they could achieve anything they wanted to’. 
Unsuspectingly, in reassigning blame on individuals for their joblessness, the 
Conformists were placed in a precarious position if their post-SBI plans failed to 
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materialise, setting them up for an unproductive process of individual culpability for 
their unemployment. 
Having detailed the post-SBI trajectories of Neighbourhood A youth, I will expand 
this section by following a similar line of inquiry for the two youthful typologies found 
in Neighbourhood B. 
Neighbourhood B 
We know that in Neighbourhood B, the social, economic, and industrial trajectory is 
somewhat different to the one experienced by participants in Neighbourhood A. Its 
diffused industrial base, composed of a patchwork of manual labour industries, 
provided the indigenous white working-class with stable employment opportunities 
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Many of the same family were recruited 
into existing family trades or industries, and even if youth did not follow their parents 
into similar forms of employment (and this was often the case, according to Young 
and Wilmott’s (1957:92) analysis), the economic variety of East London meant they 
could be absorbed into one of the many other craft or manual trades in the area. 
In the 1950s, the social and economic structure of this proud proletariat heartland 
formed around ‘single-class manual communality’ (Hobbs, 2013:116) began to 
dismantle. The first stages of the restructuring of the social and economic backdrops 
of the East End began eroding as the post-War British economy attempted to revitalize 
itself with increased production outputs, using technologically advanced 
manufacturing techniques. The small scale craft and furniture industries, located in 
and around Neighbourhood B, were hit hardest as automated, specialised production 
systems replaced the traditional division of labour (see Cohen, 1972:18). Key 
295 
 
industries in the furniture and tailoring industries were brought out and replaced by 
large scale operations (Hobbs, 1988).  
Occurring alongside this de-industrialisation was a basic process of change occurring 
amongst the demographic structure and pattern of social integration in the east end, 
which has not affected Neighbourhood A to the same extent. The 1950s witnessed a 
development of new towns and estates located close to the boundaries of the M25 – 
Dagenham, Romford in the east, Welwyn Garden City and Stevenage to the north - 
and East London, including Neighbourhood B, underwent a rapid depopulation as 
families were rehoused or gravitated outwards and ‘upwards’ to these utopian-esque 
townships. As this change occurred, the void created by the out-migrating populace 
was quickly re-populated by a large influx of West-Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
migrants (Dench et al., 2007). The great-grandparents, grandparents, and parents of 
many of my participants settled in and around Neighbourhood B during the first wave 
of immigration during the 1950s and 60s, inhabiting the area and penetrating the 
economy with unique trades and industries (Cohen, 1972). 
The churning, mutating population of Neighbourhood B, and the erosion of its once 
stable industrial base has left behind a hybrid mix of multi-ethnic, working-class 
residents who have made the area their own over the last twenty years. This 
population, however, have been de-stabilised by an educated white middle class; 
‘bourgeois colonialists’ (Hobbs, 2006:138) who have colonised the area in recent 
years, drawn by the edgy urban character of Neighbourhood B. Neighbourhood B, 
despite its gritty urban past, is now an urban zone of stratospheric house prices, where 
gleaming new-builds sit side-by-side with grimy 1960s social housing estates. The 
economic base is diffuse, and does not resemble the inward looking east end of the 
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immediate post-War period. Instead, it has converged with the capital as a whole 
toward post-industrial service and financial sector work, reliant on a commuting 
workforce (Dench et al., 2007).  
A significant feature of this changing is economy is that it is less entrenched within 
local community, and has a different relationship with the family. Young and Wilmott 
(1957) noted close ties between kinship networks and economic activity; family based 
units looked after their own. The first wave of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s of 
course, had no ties through which to connect to the economic base, and the first, 
second and third generation family members (which, includes my participants), have 
grown up in an environment with no familial connections to the economic life of the 
area, and have had to adapt to a transformative post-industrial economy, often in direct 
competition and conflict with indigenous white workers (Dench et al., 2007). 
Undoubtedly, for the new generation of young men in Neighbourhood B , there are a 
number of new economic possibilities; many of the young men I came into contact 
with were ambitious and aspirational, seeking employment in the high tech, 
knowledge based industries now located in Neighbourhood B, or the financial, 
business orientated businesses found in the global city.  
However, as Dench et al., (2007:134) suggest, the ability of resource poor, socially 
marginalised second, third and fourth generation ethnic minority youth to progress 
into post-industrial city occupations ‘looks increasingly like a one-off event, caused 
by a structural expansion of knowledge-based occupations rather than any long term 
increase in social mobility’. Indeed, the marked inequality the exists in and around 
Neighbourhood B, means that many of the young, multi-ethnic working-class 
population now compete with an educated, white middle class rich in social and 
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monetary capital, rivalling them for the same graduate level post-industrial jobs 
despite the skewed structural disadvantage, exclusion, and marginalisation they have 
faced for most of their lives. The tragedy is, that in the post-industrial economic 
climate, the distinct inequality that exists in Neighbourhood B means that a large 
majority of young men will live approximately a mile away from the richest part of 
the country, yet have the potential to be unemployed or drawn into the lucrative, 
consumer based criminal cultures that exist here. As such, in line with the previous 
subcultural work of Cohen (1972), my empirical findings found that for many of the 
young men in and around Neighbourhood B there are two diverging career trajectories 
that could be taken: ‘upwards’ into the post-industrial workforce of London, or 
‘downwards’ toward unemployment and the exploitation of ample criminal 
opportunities produced by the distinct cultural changes occurring in Neighbourhood 
B. 
Within this context, two identifiable groups can be found. Reproduced by this distinct 
social and economic backdrop, they have ‘made use’ of the SBI, and are now making 
attempts to navigate the complex, ever changing terrain of Neighbourhood B. Within 
my sample, the Aspirationists are attempting to assimilate into this ever-changing 
post-industrial locale, to find employment in the various business, media, and 
knowledge based employment opportunities now located here. In contrast, a group 
affiliated to a local youth gang have taken advantage of the clear cultural impacts of 
the changes in social and economic conditions of Neighbourhood B, and with great 
entrepreneurial nous, feed off the ample consumer based criminal opportunities that 
now exist here. I refer to this group as the Road Boys; a collective of young males 
who are affiliated with a well-established and respected youth street gang in 
Neighbourhood B. They are unemployed by choice, and have decided to survive from 
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the entrepreneurial criminal activities that have been thrown up in this ever mutating 
urban locale. 
I will now detail these two youth groups and their post-SBI trajectories, beginning 
with the Aspirationists.  
The Aspirationists 
Given the well-defined ethnic markers of employment, and the well-established 
entrepreneurial and aspirational culture that pervades this area of East London, the 
Aspirationists wish to gain a foothold in the various financial, IT, and creative 
industries that now populate the streets in and around Neighbourhood B. However, the 
transformation of East London into a creative hub of technological industries has also 
attracted an influx of well-educated, middle class residents who, attracted by the once 
cheap housing prices, the areas proximity to the city and key technological industries, 
and the perception of the area as an ‘up and coming’, edgy inner city proletariat 
heartland, have now made the area their own. The young men of Neighbourhood B 
then, are competing for post-industrial employment with a well-educated and 
experienced workforce.  
In this sense, post-SBI the Aspirationists are set up for failure. They fail to consider 
that they now compete with a workforce of University educated, middle-class, white 
employees, with significant experience and skilled in the creative and high-tech 
industries that now populate Neighbourhood B. The Aspirationists were caught in a 
position where they were too young to have access to the industrial work that ceased 
in the area during their childhood years, and as East London’s financial and web based 
industries reached full swing in the late 2000’s, many of the Aspirationists were 
already in their late teens/early twenties; an age where they were too late to adapt to 
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this economic metamorphosis upon the completion of formal education. Now, 
unemployed, most of the Aspirationists had minimal qualifications, and a lack of 
experience in technological, financial, or creative industries. Consequently, as 
Aspirationists pursued employment in these industries, they were already marginalised 
from obtaining the high paid, respected employment opportunities they sought. 
Matthew was one aspirationist, who despite being the only participant I came across 
during three years of fieldwork who had a degree, struggled to find employment in the 
local creative media sector: 
Matthew: ‘I went to Brunel University and I graduated last July. I have a 
degree in Multimedia Design and Technology. I was working in February, 
probably till June… I was working for a communications company… 
multimedia and web design.  
I kind of got made redundant. Basically there wasn’t enough work and the 
actual job spec that they brought me in for, like the job was for a system for 
clients, but it didn’t really take off. So they just thought there’s no point in 
keeping me, it’s just not taking off’ 
TM: ‘How are you finding being unemployed again?’ 
‘Matthew: ‘Quite hard. I’ve had a few interviews and I just think because 
I’m an actual graduate – I’ve applied for actual quite junior to senior roles, 
so I just think maybe it’s because other applicants have had more 
experience, more years’ experience, and maybe generally their portfolios. 
So I have just been trying to gradually build up by portfolio and trying to 
do extra work, like volunteer work as well, to build it up. I want a proper 
job that I enjoy…I’ve always felt that way, to get a proper job in what I’ve 
done, what I enjoy, which is graphic design, I’ve always felt like that’ 
 
Many of the Aspirationists graduated from the SBI course with hope of finding 
employment in the array of high tech knowledge based employment opportunities 
located nearby. Throughout their SBI experience, they were prepared with mock 
interviews, new CVs, and voluntary apprenticeships at large banking and retail firms 
located close by to Neighbourhood B. Although these practices can instil and develop 
‘soft’ skills such as confidence, interview experience and post-industrial labour 
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familiarity, they can also inadvertently impart a feeling that participants had done 
something productive by merely attending, even though they could do little with the 
detailed information about finding employment in the post-industrial, high-tech 
employment.  
Most of the Aspirationists were ashamed of their unemployment, and were quick to 
blame themselves for failing to secure stable employment in the local economy. This 
is one example of how SBI programmes can unwittingly reassign blame on individuals 
for their failure to find employment in local labour markets. Six months after his 
graduation, I met with Matthew to discuss his current situation. He had been searching 
for jobs in the financial sector after receiving advice and guidance from the SBI and 
an external organisation to pursue this line of employment: 
‘I’d say it’s been difficult to find what I wanted to do… Maybe at first it 
seemed different because I worked full time as well for a bit. But after you 
just don’t want to sit down and sit around. It was quite miserable and quite 
depressing because I went for a couple of interviews and it was rejection 
every time. Then you think in your head that I’m not going to get anything, 
there’s nothing for me. It demotivates you further down. When there’s a job 
that you actually like and then you go for it, you prepare for it really well 
and then you get rejected. That’s happened to me’. 
                 Matthew, Neighbourhood B, August, 2012 
By any measure, the Aspirationists could not compete with the more qualified, skilled, 
and educated work force who had adapted quicker to this economic metamorphosis. 
Nevertheless, they were ashamed of their unemployment and subordinate worker 
identity, and in the immediate months following their ‘graduation’, they therefore 
scrambled for either low public service work, or apprenticeship schemes and low paid 
assistant roles in the few manual labour jobs available to the young men of 
Neighbourhood B. Mathew had aspirations of becoming a graphic designer, but found 
himself working in low pay catering for a hospitality company. Similarly, Dylan’s 
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ambition of finding ‘an assistant manager job or car sales executive jobs’ was but a 
brief, transitory ambition, and his subsequent realisation that he lacked the skills and 
qualifications led him to informal employment working as an apprentice at an 
industrial plumbing company. Other Aspirationists were also forced to take 
apprenticeships in skilled, manual work upon finding they lacked the specialised skills 
in the creative, knowledge based economy:  After Niall was unsuccessful in his 
application for an apprenticeship for a large, international bank, he signed up to start 
an apprenticeship in carpentry and construction with a furniture and building 
company.  
In this sense, a reversal of ethnic employment roles are taking place in Neighbourhood 
B: despite their initial reluctance to engage in low-paid service sector, or in the white 
dominated ‘dirty’ manual labour (Gunter and Watt, 2009), the multi-ethnic 
Aspirationists were forced to fight amongst themselves for the low pay retail, catering 
and manual employment opportunities that exist alongside the higher paid knowledge 
economy. Ethnographically I observed a shift and reversal of employment 
demographics; whereas the employment base in the immediate post-war period in 
Neighbourhood B was marked by small, family based production units utilising skilled 
and manual techniques and employing the families of  established white, working-
class residents (Gunter and Watt, 2009; Hobbs, 2013), the gradual decline in the timber 
and furniture industries in the area, amounting to a loss of 26,000 jobs (Hall, 1962:72 
cited in Hobbs, 2013), resulted in the emptying out of large sections of East London 
as the traditional white working-class responded to the decline in manual labour and 
gravitated to towns and areas situated around the M25 boundary. The subsequent re-
population of many of these depopulated East End areas with West Indian, Turkish 
and South Asian migrants brought with them their own trades and services. Manual, 
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skilled labour was seen as the preserve of the once indigenous white working-class, 
and hence its rejection by black and ethnic minority youth populations (Gunter and 
Watt, 2009). However, in contemporary post-industrial Neighbourhood B, there is a 
polarization and reversal of roles; the area is now becoming repopulated by a socially 
mobile, educated, white middle class who have adapted to the economic changes 
occurring here, whilst the working-class ethnic minority population, who, beset by 
economic and social marginalisation, have failed to keep up with the drastic post-
industrial changes recently occurring on the doorstep, are being forced to take on the 
low-pay, working-class jobs that, in Cohen’s era, were filled by the white, working-
class population: i.e. ‘the routine, dead end, low paid and unskilled jobs associated 
with the labour intensive sectors, especially the service industries’  (Cohen, 1972:18). 
A quote from Cohen’s influential article from 1972 can be reapplied today, to the case 
of ethnic minority youth living in socially marginalized zones of exclusion, who 
competing for employment with a competitive, educated white middle class are now 
forced ‘downwards’ into low pay employment: 
‘As might be expected, it was the young people, just out of school, who got 
the worst of the deal…lacking the qualifications for the new industries, they 
were relegated to jobs as van boys, office boys, packers, warehousemen, 
etc., and long spells out of employment’ (Cohen, 1972:18)  
 
Because many of the young black ethnic minority men in my sample still perceive 
manual labour to be low paid ‘dirty work’ (Gunter and Watt, 2009:523) and tied to 
historically embedded notions of white, working-class ‘grafting’, employment in these 
industries was short lived. Niall, for example, quit his apprenticeship in carpentry and 
construction because, according to one SBI official ‘it wasn’t what he thought it was, 
so he left’. Similarly, Dylan left his role at an industrial plumbing industry, because 
‘he didn’t get on with guy [who was training him]’. After speaking with Dylan two 
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weeks later, his aspirational outlook was behind his decision to quit: ‘I've never 
worked in a low class job. I've always had quite a decent job so I don’t think that holds 
me back… I know I can get a job easy, but I want to get the right job’ 
The neoliberal logic behind SBI programmes can unwittingly lead to the perception 
that, with hard work and effort, one can find successful, stable employment. 
Ultimately, as this section has proved, this often sets participants up for failure, as they 
misrecognise the relationship between power, self-regulation and unemployment. The 
Aspirationists lag behind an educated, socially mobile and skilled middle class who 
have adapted to these economic transformations. The Aspirationists were 
consequently forced to find employment in the ‘dead end jobs’ (Cohen, 1972), which, 
due to the aspirational outlook and entrenched ethnic stereotypes pertaining to 
employment, were seen as incompatible with their visions of employment. Often, after 
being provided with opportunities by the SBI, Aspirationists declined low pay work 
or frequently quit, as the two examples above attest. The misrecognition of power, 
masked by the neoliberal rhetoric of entrepreneurship and self-actualisation, therefore 
leads to a perpetual cycle of self-blame amongst the Aspirationists, who, by no fault 
of their own, struggle to adapt to the economic metamorphosis occurring on their 
doorstep.   
The Road Boys: An Alternative Post-SBI Trajectory 
In Chapter 7 I have illustrated the Road Boys’ use of the SBI, and I will expand upon 
this discussion here by detailing their post-SBI trajectories. For the ‘Road Boys’, I will 
therefore explain why ‘the gang’ represents an alternative SBI pathway for many 
young men to the low paid, post-industrial labour that the SBI attempts to channel 
participants in to, and why the operations of the SBI represent fruitless endeavours in 
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attempting to ‘transform’ the lifestyles of young men, who by showing significant 
entrepreneurial nous, profit from the clear cultural impacts of gentrification and labour 
market restructuring, and the consumer based criminal opportunities that these 
transformations convey.  
Almost all of the recent studies of ‘gangs’ suggest that gang affiliation offers an outlet 
for young men to experience excitement, status, and respect in urban neighbourhoods 
beset by economic decline, unemployment, and poverty (Gunter, 2010; Densley, 2013; 
Hobbs, 2013; Medina et al., 2013), and upon completing the SBI, the lure of the ‘road’ 
was an enticing draw for many young men seeking ‘control in neighbourhoods where, 
more often than not, traditional avenues for youthful stimulation and endeavour have 
long since evaporated’ (Hayward, 2004:149-150). Thus, I discussed the incentive of 
gang membership with Leon: 
 
TM: Did you get a buzz from doing that? Was there a sort of thrill?  
Leon: The buzz was when you’ve taken what they’ve got and you’re 
off, you’re running and you’re thinking, every turn you take you’ve got 
to be careful to take that turn because the police could be on that road. 
That was the fun bit maybe, that was the fun bit for me 
TM: And why do you think people join gangs? 
Leon: I don’t know, I think they just join it to have a bit of a reputation 
so people fear your name or hear your name and are like, ‘Oh yes, you 
don’t want to fuck with him.’ Most people think being in a gang is cool. 
They think it’s another way to get women as well, you know what I 
mean, which at one stage it was. ..I remember there were loads of girls 
that were opening their legs for about 10 or 15 guys. It’s like, ‘What 
are you doing? Where’s the shame for yourself?’ It’s all because you 
were in a gang, you were flashing money. It’s mental’ 
 
Similarly, gang affiliation provided a sense of protection and solidity amongst young 
men residing in an area populated by established criminal factions and marked by 
defined territorial boundaries. Indeed, Neighbourhood B is an area where strictly 
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defined boundaries are common features of the urban cartography. Roads, parks, and 
train lines represent common borders which some of the young men from 
Neighbourhood B’s SBI are caught between, resulting in a choice of either joining a 
local faction or risking physical harm. I discussed this issue with Andre and Peter: 
Andre: ‘A lot of people do get into them because of that reason, they’re 
thinking, ‘I’m not part of this gang, but then I’m not part of that gang, but 
then two gangs hate each other, I live in the middle of both of them. I’ve 
got to pick a side because if I don’t pick a side, I’m one day going to get 
mistaken for being part of that side or that side.’ That’s what happens to a 
lot of people. A lot of people get beat up for not being part of none of them 
and then just get beat up and stuff for not being part of nothing, but yet 
they’re thinking you’re part of that side because you’re not part of their side’ 
 ‘The positives are like as long as you’re always with at least one of you, 
you know that you’re ready to fight, even if there’s like five or six of the 
other people. There was a lot of times where you’d be on your own and 
there’d be five or six of them and it’s like, ‘What am I going to do?’  
Peter: ‘It's fun in a way because you learn things. It kind of teaches you how 
to be a man. I'm not saying robbing people can teach you how to be a man, 
but you go through things’  
Like, I'm walking through Wood Green, and ten boys might come up to me 
and I'm by myself, so how am I going to get myself out of this predicament? 
Do you know what I'm saying? Without fighting, or if I do fight, what am I 
going to do, kind of thing’  
                  Andre and Peter, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
Because of these tightly defined boundaries and the physical risks of a un-association 
with local groups, SBIs fail to consider that their work is attempting to reverse the 
behaviour of young men residing in neighbourhoods where gang membership 
represents an attempt to transcend the tangible threat of everyday violence. Thus, by 
attempting to ‘change’ the behaviour of participants, by definition of their affiliation 
with a local street collective, SBIs risk perpetuating a cycle of violence which places 
a number of Road Boys at risk. Indeed, should the SBI successfully steer a Road Boy 
away from their respective youth group, the lack of post-SBI provision, tuition or 
follow up services means that they will be released back into Neighbourhood B 
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without any further support or protection. I met with Mikel several weeks after he had 
graduated from the SBI and made a subsequent decision to leave the Road Boys 
behind:  
‘Well, when I left, they just gave me a choice, either let us beat you up or 
go and do a street robbery or burglary and stuff like that. So I choose for 
them to beat me up because I wasn't getting in trouble again.  
So I got beaten up, put in hospital and when I came out that was all good. 
Because I'd had enough of having knives and guns put up to me and 
everything like that. My little brother had just come along so I didn't want 
anything happening to my family. 
I think there’s more pressure on the front of – you can leave the gang 
because it’s your choice, but there’s some gangs where you’d leave them 
and they don’t want nothing to do with you, so if they see you, you can 
become the enemy now because you’re not their friend no more. You know 
what I mean? They haven’t chilled with you in ages; you can become the 
enemy in most cases’. 
                 Mikel, Neighbourhood B, September 2012 
 
The difficulty of progressing out of established gang structures renders any attempt by 
the SBI of ‘modifying’ the behaviour of Road Boys in line with hegemonic notions of 
‘respectability’ unproductive: the established structures, hierarchies and practices of 
the gangs of Neighbourhood B are too deeply entrenched in the lives of many young 
men to reverse over the course of eight weeks. As has been previously alluded to, SBIs 
rely on individual willpower and the internal reconfiguration of personal goals and 
characteristics. Predictably, gang affiliated youth require more than an SBI to change 
their behaviour, and many of my participants continued to engage in gang activity 
before finally ceasing to participate due to significant ‘turning points’ 76. For example, 
                                                          
76 In the field of desistance studies, Sampson and Laub (1993) found that ‘important differences in adult criminal career 
trajectories that cannot be predicted from childhood’ and that key ‘turning points’ in adulthood were responsible for accounting 
for differences in criminal career trajectories: ‘although there are multiple pathways to desistance, our [qualitative] data suggest 
that desistance is facilitated  by self-described ‘turning points’ – changes in situational and structural life circumstances like a 
good marriage or a stable job – in combination with individual actions (that is, personal agency’ (Laub and Sampson, 2003:278). 
Hence, the argument Sampson and Laub (1993) present is based on individual responses to a certain external ‘turning point’. 
What is critical is how individuals respond to these turning points; even if the offender does not necessarily see this ‘turning 
point’ as a significant moment in their criminal careers, it may subsequently have a considerable impact on their offending, the 
response to which will vary considerably depending on the willingness of individuals to change or interpretation or events (Le 
Bel et al, 2008).  
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the death of a friend 77 and the consequences of spending time in jail on his family was 
seen as a significant ‘turning point’ in Mikel’s decision to leave his gang  after he had 
graduated from the SBI: 
Mikel: ‘Yes, I just realised, 1. I don’t want to go to jail and 2. If I did 
go to jail, my mum and them lot would be – there’s no one helping 
them out. But in my case it was just like, ‘I don’t want to do it no 
more.’…Plus, my friend got – another reason I wanted to get out of it 
was my friend died, so I didn’t want to. He died to gang violence 
basically. So it was like, do I really want to? ‘ 
See it was like that until I moved to the area we had the most trouble 
with, which is New Park, the area is called Kings Court. We had trouble 
with them and then I moved there and it all became cool because I told 
them, ‘I’m not involved,’ but then that beef really sort of died down 
because after my boy got killed, obviously a lot of people wanted to 
retaliate but then for some reason it just fizzled out because the gang 
didn’t actually kill him. It was one of the members of the gang got beat 
up and then he felt like, ‘I’ve been violated.’ This is apparently the 
story, he went back to his friend and was like, ‘I’ve been beaten up, 
come help me, let’s go get them.’ They were all like, ‘No we can’t be 
bothered.’ So he was like, ‘Alright, if no one wants to help me I’m 
going to bring in someone else that’s not part of the whole scenario.’  
So apparently he rung someone else and that person came and let off 
the gun, but then they weren’t really involved so after that the beef sort 
of fizzled out. It’s like one of them things that just – there’s a lot of 
tension between the two groups, do you get it? But like a lot of people 
from both sides are cool with each other 
TM: Would you ever go back to that lifestyle?  
Mikel: No.  
TM: You wouldn’t go back?  
Mikel: A lot of people have said to me, ‘What are you doing? Why 
don’t you come back and do what you were doing?’ But I said like, 
‘It’s my mum isn’t it?’ I always say to these people that go to jail, these 
                                                          
77 A death of a friend was considered a turning point for one other Road Boy: Alex: ‘I’ve had friends who’ve been stabbed and 
shot and killed. Like, there was a guy I knew, his name was Mo. I went away with him once on a holiday with social services 
and he was the smartest guy you’ll ever meet. The man could answer any question, bang he’d answer, but his temper – he had a 
temper. But one day a group of boys chased him and his brother in a tower block and they threw him off of the tower block. He 
tried to – basically, when they chased him, his brother ran down the stairs and the brother went the opposite way. So to get away 
from these guys he started climbing down the poles of the balcony. It was the people that lived in the estates called ‘Upton’. The 
people that – it was a bunch of Rastafarians and they all lived in Upton Estate. They chased the guy. They chased Mo and Mo 
was climbing down the poles that separate the balcony. He was sixty feet high and they were kicking his hands to drop him and 
when they dropped him he died on impact. So, you know, I mean, after that I just thought, ‘There are no morals.’ That’s the only 
thing in the area. There are no morals. If you were standing on crutches, they’d take your fucking crutches. I was gutted. I was 




so called gangsters, I think to myself, ‘You’ve got no love for your 
mum,’ that’s how I see it, and I’ve got so much love for my mum. To 
go to jail, they think, ‘Oh yes, it’s nothing, I’m going to jail, I can 
handle it.’ You may be able to handle it, but are you seeing the other 
people and the effect it has on them? No, you’re not caring about them, 
you’re caring about yourself, going, ‘I can handle it, I can,’ but can 
your mum handle it? Can your sister, can your brother handle it? Can 
your dad handle it? There’s a lot of other people that you’re connected 
to that it would hurt. That’s what a lot of people don’t realise.’ 
 
Hence, gang desistance is often caused by significant ‘turning points’ rather than via 
the external, coercive assistance of SBI or social interventions. Members often find 
their way out of gangs at times convenient to them, and attempting to change 
behaviour coercively and involuntary is unproductive due to the difficulties of 
absconding. Most of the spontaneous, windows of change for gang affiliated youth are 
missed because the PbR funding measures forces SBIs to exclude risky patients if they 
do not ‘succeed’ the first time of attending the session. Programmes inevitably set 
gang affiliated youth up for a predictable end. By failing to coordinate interventions 
with opportunistic ‘turning points’ (Sampson and Laub, 1993) and without any 
substantial post-SBI support other than the occasional phone call, it is difficult for the 
Road Boys to draw themselves away from the lure of the road. They have to construct 
new meanings of identity based on their voluntary willingness to change. Released 
back into their original neighbourhoods, they fall back into the familiar and persuasive 
ways of the inner city gang member, and they seek out old friends, acquaintances, and 
habits.  
For example, six months after graduating from the programme, Justin volunteered 
with the SBI for a number of months. He was in good spirits as he was involved 
regularly with the programme and assisting with youth work in his area. However, 
residing in his parents’ house in an area situated on the border of two postcodes, he 
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continued frequenting the violent young scene in which five years earlier he had been 
the victim of a serious stabbing78. By definition of his proximity to rival territory, an 
incursion onto unfamiliar terrain meant he ran afoul of the young men based there, and 
a  rival shot him in the leg at close range with a modified handgun to enforce the tight 
territorial boundaries that exist here, resulting in a long-stay in hospital. Justin 
dismissed the event as a consequence of ‘wrong postcode’.   
Rashid, a participant from a neighbouring SBI session, once again finding himself out 
on the street with no stable form of employment after graduating from the SBI, and 
soon fell back into the persuasive and violent ways of road life. Several months later, 
after maintaining a level of consistent contact with the SBI throughout this period, he 
was found on a street in South London in possession of a shotgun and arrested by 
police. Contact was subsequently lost following this event. 
Peter’s outcome was not much better. After gaining access to an SBI session and 
successfully completing the course, Peter was arrested after a number of anti-social 
incidents, including foul mouth rants and threats at shop keepers and residents in 
Neighbourhood B. He was slapped with a civil injunction, a so called ‘gangbo’ that 
prevented him from entering a postcode for two years and from being in a group of 
more than five people in a public place anywhere within his specific borough.  
Andre was arrested and sentenced during his time with the SBI. It should be noted 
however, that the criminal act occurred prior to his engagement with the SBI. Andre 
                                                          
78 ‘When I was fifteen I got stabbed twice just by being basically in the wrong place at the wrong time, sort of thing. Coming 
from school it was like a half day. It was, like Comic Relief. Comic Relief? I think, yeah. We had like a half day, non-uniform 
day at school and then, yeah, just we were going out looking for girls and stuff and then, yeah, wrong place wrong time. There 
were, like, four times as many guys as we were. I was with about ten or fifteen and it was about yeah, three or four times as much’ 
‘They knew who some of them were and, like, I don’t know. I didn’t see - I don’t even remember how it really kicked off, but 
yeah that is one thing that affected me because I just remember there was a big row, a scuffle, and then yeah, like as it all died 




was part of a gang who planned to carry out a looting spree in the wake of the London 
riots in 2011, who were jailed for a total of 37-and-a-half years for conspiracy to rob. 
After pleading not guilty in the first trial, Andre was subsequently sentenced to one 
year and five months for the act, which included the knifepoint carjacking of a van to 
be used in subsequent looting79.  
For these participants, their experiences of prison were ones that only exacerbated the 
problems of violence that is often classified as ‘gang related’, and perpetuates the cycle 
that SBI programmes are attempting to break. I discussed this with Alex: 
‘I’m saying this now: Prison does not teach people anything. People 
teach themselves things in prison. People teach themselves to be calm 
in tense situations, to not have a fight, to not go and do drugs. The 
prison system is just there to put a roof over your head and food in your 
belly. They don’t help you. They need to really shape up the prison 
system, because when I was in there and the amount of fights in there 
– pah! You’d think that was a boxing club.  
Then what they’ll do in prison, they’ll take your privileges away, which 
will make people even more angry and because of the gang problem, 
you’ve gone and started a gang war. So it’s just going in one massive 
circle, until eventually unfortunately what happened to me in jail, I see 
someone get, like, slashed across the face, you know those saveloys at 
the chip shop when they open them?, that’s what he looked like. His 
face was open like that and that was by a simple razor blade with a 
toothbrush.’  
                       Alex, Neighbourhood B, July 2012 
 
Several of the core members of my ‘Road Boy’ fieldwork network disappeared from 
Neighbourhood B altogether. Many simply wanted nothing to do with the SBI once it 
was completed and there was no football left. Ricky expressed no interest in the help 
                                                          
79Other participants noted how they had been sentenced for their role in the 2011 riots. For example, Alex once old me of his 
conviction for robbery ‘Yeah, I was involved in the Mare Street riots. I mean, it was a stupid thing. I’ve never denied that it was 
a stupid thing. I’ve never bragged about it. I’ve never gone, ‘Ah, yeah, I’m hard.’ I just saw an opportunity to get some free stuff 
and I took it and I paid the price for it. I got caught in December, just before Christmas. So I was saying to them, like, they asked 
me straight away and I pled guilty in the station. I pointed myself out in the pictures because they already had a red circle around 




of the SBI to help him attain a job, and confessed that he was happy to remain on and 
earning profits from his thriving cannabis business. Leon, despite being offered a 
placement with the SBI, was, in the words of an SBI official, ‘not very responsive to 
anything other than a football tournament’. Similarly, SBI staff noted how many Road 
Boys simply vanished from the SBI network due to their commitment to illegal 
activity: 
‘Ricky, he told me he doesn’t want to work because he’s still involved in 
illegal stuff. Drugs…He said he didn’t want to discuss it but basically said 
he didn’t want to work because he was still involved in stuff’ 
    SBI Official, Neighbourhood B, March 2012 
 
The inability of SBIs to tackle this behaviour post-SBI stems from the fact that such 
subjectivities are deeply entrenched within the post-industrial landscape of 
Neighbourhood B. The road offers a range of entrepreneurial activities that can enable 
a resource-poor, uneducated gang member to maintain a lifestyle on par with the 
middle-class, educated residents who many of these participants now compete with 
for employment in Neighbourhood B. From my ethnographic experience, I concur 
with Hobbs (2013:116) that such activities represent an ‘alternative sphere of 
enterprise to declining opportunities in traditional male employment’. Unlike the 
Aspirationists, the Road Boys have no intention of adapting to the low paid post-
industrial economy that now populates Neighbourhood B: 
‘Since I finished school, I mean, I was doing a couple – I was mostly doing 
courier jobs, cash-in-hand, just sort of, delivering parcels and all that. But 
no I mean, I work in a call centre for two weeks before I was fired for 
swearing at someone over the phone! So, no it’s just, like, when it comes to 
office jobs and all that I’m not good at it. But when it comes to jobs where 
you have to be physical, yes, I was bang on it. I love physical jobs, but office 
jobs I can’t do it. I can’t do it! (Laughing).  
       Leon, Neighbourhood B, August 2012 
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Hence, rather than adapt, or find their way into low-paid labour that has been forced 
upon them via the cultural impacts of gentrification, post-industrialism, and middle-
class migration, the Road Boys have been seduced by the chance to make ‘quick 
money’ from the range of consumer based criminal opportunities that now exist in and 
around Neighbourhood B. Indeed, in the neoliberal, post-industrial economy, youth 
groups have become increasingly market orientated, inverting the logic of neoliberal 
enterprise, and with a degree of economic rationality, apply it to one arena which 
offers  ample opportunities of capital: the street. Hence, in order to not appear ‘flawed 
consumers’ (Bauman, 2002), a term coined to describe those marginal to the consumer 
market in a post-industrial society, resource poor and marginal populations often 
source economic resources through any possible means to remain fully embedded in 
the social hierarchy of post-industrial, consumer culture. Crime functions as an 
instrumental and entrepreneurial resource for achieving positions of social merit; 
techniques of ‘social mobility’ for many young men in economic and socially 
marginalised communities (Hall et al., 2008; Treadwell et al., 2013), and luckily, the 
street provides an area in which successful criminal entrepreneurs can seek out 
thriving new markets spawned by the cultural changes associated with the 
gentrification of the area, and feed off consumer based criminality. I spoke with Ricky 
about his successful drug dealing business, how he started this, and the criminal 
opportunities available in the area: 
‘Because obviously young guys start off as obviously selling for the older 
people. That’s sometimes, but then other times the young people think, ‘I 
don’t need to start off selling for you, I’m going to be my own boss,’ but 
then that way they have to go and start doing little things to build their 
money up and then be able to buy a big bit of drugs and then go, ‘Now I’m 
ready. I’ve started up my business and I’m ready to roll.’  
There were times where you’d go and you’d go to a house party or 
something, like someone’s got a house party, some posh bloke, then the 
posh bloke knows another posh bloke who knows a gangster that he gets 
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drugs off and says, ‘Yeah, I’m going to this party,’ then the gangster laughs 
obviously…and you’d end up going to this house party and just robbing 
everyone there. Stuff like that. 
It just materialises from early –as soon as your mum starts giving you that 
bit of freedom, that’s where you start to think, ‘I’ve got that freedom now, 
I’m going to go and chill with them guys and these guys,’ and they start 
getting talked to in their ear by the older boys. Older boys start talking to 
them and start telling them, ‘You can make this much and that much and 
this and that,’ and the younger people start thinking, ‘Yeah, I can. This is 
what I want; I want that sort of money, that quick money.’ So that’s what it 
is, quick money, and it’s what a lot of people are interested in’ 
                     Ricky, Neighbourhood B, September 2012 
  
Hence, trying to break the established cycle of consumer criminality via progressing 
established Road Boys into low paid, post-industrial labour, is an exercise in futility. 
Ethnographically, my research gives credence to the notion that for working-class 
young men bearing the brunt of post-industrial transformations; ontological insecurity 
(Young, 2007) unemployment (MacDonald and Shildrick, 2005); and the search for a 
degree of self-identity in conditions of unregulated consumerism (which for many 
young people, is beyond their control), consumer based criminality provides one 
method in which young men, searching for a sense of identity in the post-industrial 
world, are responding. When considering the deleterious effects of consumerism and  
the increasing polarization between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, it is reasonable to 
consider why the Road Boys continue down this trajectory, and why SBIs are 
inadequate in curtailing this pathway. 
A Note on Race and Ethnicity and its Influence on Post-SBI Transitions 
It is important to recognise the significance of ethnicity in influencing the forms of 
youth cultural position identified in this thesis.  Participants in Neighbourhood A were 
of white backgrounds, whilst in Neighbourhood B - an area of significant ‘racial’ and 
cultural diversity – the majority of participants were of black African and Caribbean 
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descent. The influence of ethnicity on post-16 trajectories and adopted cultural 
identities should not be overlooked; previously, Gunter (2008; 2010) and Gunter and 
Watt (2009) alluded to the rejection of manual labour amongst black and ethnic 
minority youth populations. For them, manual labour was viewed as low paid ‘dirty 
work’ (Gunter and Watt, 2009:523), tied to historically embedded notions of white, 
working-class ‘grafting’. Similarly, scholars operating within the North East of 
England have cited the yearning amongst young, white working-class men for past 
forms of industrial labour (Giatzitzoglu, 2014). For those descending from families of 
manual and skilled labourers, new forms of post-industrial labour are at odds with 
those ‘from a stratum of the skilled English working class’ who seek employment in 
industries that provide an ‘appreciation of skilled physical labour over mental agility’ 
(Nayak, 2003; 309).  
 
The influence of ethnicity, then, has significance for the forms of youth cultural 
position identified here, as well as the forms of labour ‘transited’ into. What does it 
mean to be ‘white working-class’ in a society where the well-defined features of the 
industrial era have disintegrated? Moreover, what does it mean to be a young black 
male in an urban milieu which has never provided one form of stable, traditional labour 
for those other than the white working-class? 
 
In Neighbourhood A, the answer is relatively straight forward. The Outcasts continue 
to maintain their traditional white working-class cultural identity, and reject the notion 
of any post-industrial metamorphosis. They are the sons of a stratum of workers who 
were employed in skilled and semi-skilled, manual trades. Aside from Sonny, each of 
the Outcasts had fathers who were once employed as either shipbuilders, plumbers, 
plasterers, or bricklayers. They are comparable to Nayak’s (2003) ‘Real Geordies’; a 
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group who ‘promoted the values of a muscular puritan work ethic (honesty, loyalty, 
self-sufficiency, ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’) in a situation where unskilled 
manual unemployment was increasingly the norm’ (2003:309). As such, the cultural 
heritage of their immediate social and familial environment means they continue to 
enact a form of white working-class masculinity in forms of appearance, argot, and 
outlook; faced with a choice between post-industrial work or unemployment, the 
Outcasts chose the latter, and they continue to reproduce a white working-class strata 
where unemployment is increasingly the norm.  
Conversely, their North East counterparts, the neoliberal Conformers, who, similarly 
deriving from white working-class backgrounds, have negotiated global change in a 
different way. The globalisation of key industries alongside culture means that the 
Conformists have adopted a cultural identity in line with neoliberal ideals. Thus, Kevin 
had aspirations of employment in one of the post-industrial office jobs that now 
populate an industrial park close to Neighbourhood A:  
 
‘I wanna get a job where I can wear a suit, look smart, get the money, 
get the girls. HA! That’s like my dream, what, you know, I hope to be 
able to do one day’. 
Kevin, Neighbourhood A, January 2012 
 
The Conformists’ immersion into this new neoliberal culture has had a profound 
impact on the cultural identities of this cultural grouping; their dress, hairstyles, argot, 
and mannerisms are somewhat different from the embodied ‘hard’, ‘masculine’ 
identities of the Outcasts, who read themselves as ‘salt of the earth’ locals who 
continually reproduce a once dominant white working-class culture etched with the 
history of industrial labour. The Conformists, on the other hand, construe themselves 
as the now predominant form of masculinity in the North East, and a ‘cut above’ the 
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Outcasts on account of their advanced post-industrial credentials. As such, a 
resistance/adaption typology exists here, either, as was the case in Cohen’s (1977) 
analysis, ‘downward’ or ‘upward’ into respective unemployment or employment 
trajectories. As such, I am showing how these socio-economic and cultural groupings 
are ‘complicit in their own class reproduction’ (Dolby, Dimitriadis and Willis, 2004:4) 
and thus not cultural dupes merely responding to shifts and changes within social and 
economic structures.  
 
In Neighbourhood B, the case is not quite as clear cut. Indeed, when considering the 
trajectories of young black males, one must consider the structural and economic 
inequalities faced by young black men. A look at various indices of social exclusion 
and discrimination show that young black men top polls for living in poverty, school 
exclusion, educational under-achievement, and arrest rates. Add to this further root 
causes of social marginalisation - namely institutionalised racism, collective 
stigmatisation, caricatured representations of young black males, and belonging to a 
relatively ‘new’ parent culture which holds no embedded stake in the traditional labour 
market (Dench et al., 2007) - and it becomes evident that the situation facing young 
black and ethnic minority males in Neighbourhood B is somewhat different to the 
white working-class young men of Neighbourhood A. Yet rather than conforming to 
populist accounts of young black males, that, whatever the social, economic, or 
cultural cause, portray young black as one homogenous collective based on the actions 
of a small ‘problem’ minority (Gunter, 2008), this study not only considers the 
influence of ethnicity in shaping heterogeneous forms of cultural identity amongst 
young black men, but also examines the nuanced influence of place, leisure time, and 
post-school trajectories. In doing so, I attempt to evade any notion of  young black 
men as one homogenous group, and thus sidestep the caricatured depictions of the 
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dangerous urban black ‘other’ (see also Gunter, 2008; 2010; Gunter and Watt, 2009). 
My analysis also attempts to show how young males - from the same working-class, 
post-industrial neighbourhoods- experience different trajectories (see also 
MacDonald, 2001; Gunter and Watt, 2009). This thesis therefore does not gloss over 
issues associated with cultural practices and how these interact with different 
ethnicities – a weakness which MacDonald et al., (2001) has identified in other youth 
studies research.   
 
It is true, however, that a very small minority of the SBI population engage in what 
Gunter (2008) refers to as ‘road culture’. The Road Boys can best be understood as 
pursuing a lifestyle choice in which one ‘flirt[s] with certain aspects of badness’ 
(Gunter, 2008:349). Hence, ‘road life’ is interspersed with employment programmes 
(like the SBI), benefit claiming, and occasionally, as was the case with Leon, low-paid 
manual work. Yet the allure of the road continues to offer the vague promise of a 
lucrative and pleasurable alternative to the tedium of full time employment.  
 
For the Road Boys, their ‘blackness’ represented a hurdle to achieving ‘respectable’ 
forms of post-industrial employment 80, and the white dominated industries, both in 
manual labour and the office based economy in and around Neighbourhood B, are not 
viewed as career priorities for a number of reasons. Firstly, the white dominated 
‘grafting’ opportunities in manual labour are perceived as ‘dirty’ work, which, for the 
Road Boys, contradicts the clean, ‘bling’ aesthetic of road life, which is valorised as a 
                                                          
80 For those operating within ‘left realist’ traditions (e.g. Lea and Young, 1984), black youth face insurmountable barriers to 
social, economic and political institutions via institutional racism and deeply entrenched hegemonic norms. Those within more 
critical cultural traditions allude to the unfair labelling of black youth and the impact of institutionalised racism within the police 
and media (e.g. Hall et al, 1978). Others have alluded to notions of masculinity, whereby the response of young black males to 
both economic and social marginalisation is the ‘gang’ or the construction of deviant subcultures in response to their 
‘powerlessness’ (see Messerschmidt, 1993); the principle idea here being a form of economic and structural determinism within 
an institutionally racist global and political economy, which propels its subjects to adopting a form of deviant masculinity. Recent 
debates within criminology propose that the concept of the ‘gang’ is utilized with reference to the interplay of cultural, social, 
and structural factors. Hence, in overcoming a Mertonian (1938) view of relative deprivation and structural ‘strains’ that drive 
the individual into a criminal career, cultural criminologists have highlighted the ‘excitement’ and ‘seduction’ of criminal activity 
(Ferrell et al 2004), which offer alternatives to paid employment.  
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key component of this particular lifestyle (Bourgois, 2003; Gunter, 2010). Second, 
although there is a magnitude of low level manual labour jobs due to the relative 
buoyancy of construction in the capital, they are largely the preserve of the established, 
white working-class. Hence, although this career path is far from racially exclusive, 
the employment base is largely restricted to a niche network of key construction 
industries that rely heavily upon established social and familial employment networks 
(Gunter, 2010). Notably, these networks are dominated by established white, working-
class males, who rely upon the immediate social environment for future employees – 
and informal networks are of considerable importance in this industry given the large 
proportion of self-employed construction workers (Hobbs, 2001). Neighbourhood B 
is still perceived within the community as a ‘black’ estate, and thus this career route 
is relatively limited when compared to ‘white’ estates affording a greater deal of social 
capital located further north in the borough. Hence, for Watt (2003:1785) ‘those who 
[are] either outside or on the margins of the social networks connected to job 
information, because of ethnicity or social isolation, [are] in a far weaker labour 
market position’. Thirdly, many of the Road Boys reject employment in favour of road 
life, which offers a viable career path in which to earn ‘respect’ amongst marginalised 
ethnic groups (Anderson, 2001; Bourgois, 2003). Some of the Road Boys did find 
employment in the manual labour industry, but this was short lived; Leon quit his 
plumber’s assistant job after two weeks due to not getting on with his boss. Many 
Road Boys felt that working in subservient white-dominated industries undermined 
their emphasis on maintaining a ‘masculine’, ‘road’ identity. Leon stated that he 
worked in an environment where he was ‘bossed around’ and had to put up with every 
day, casual racism from colleagues. Hence for many of the Road Boys, road life 
afforded a direct contradiction to employment in and around Neighbourhood B; a 
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rejection of neoliberal trajectories into employment which enables men of black and 
ethnic minority to maintain respect and a living on their own terms (Anderson, 2001). 
Hence, many of the Road Boys deepened their involvement in criminal subcultures as 
a resistance to the social, economic, and political exclusion faced by young black men 
in urban environments today (Anderson, 2001; Bourgois, 2003; Gunter, 2010).  
 
In contrast to the Road Boys, the Aspirationists represented a group of young, black 
males aspiring to the ‘clean’ office-based jobs found in the post-industrial economy 
of Neighbourhood B. For them, like the Road Boys, they perceived manual labour to 
be ‘dirty’, white-dominated industry at odds with the ‘stereotypical perception of what 
a young black male should be like’ (Gunter, 2010:522). They therefore aspire to obtain 
‘clean’ work in the post-industrial economy in contrast to the ‘downward’ option 
followed by the Road Boys. For the Aspirationists, full-time office based employment 
represents an alternative ‘clean’’ option which both represents and embraces a middle 
class image which conforms to aspects of black road culture, notably through 
consumption (i.e. phones and electronic devices), smart, ‘clean’ style and aesthetics 
(e.g. suits, jewellery), and ‘respect’ amongst peers, and weighs against aspects of the 
‘dirty’ appearance associated with manual labour (Gunter, 2010). The ironic reality, 
however, is that very few of the young black men who made use of the SBI could 
realistically obtain service-sector jobs, given their limited educational qualifications; 
most instead found employment in low-paid, subservient and insecure employment 
instead.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 8 has captured the post-SBI transitions of four typologies of working-class 
youth who make use of the SBI. In Neighbourhood A, the Outcasts were found to be 
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content to remain in an unemployed state having actively dismissed the neoliberal 
rhetoric of the SBI, as documented in chapter 7.  The Conformists however, made a 
concerted effort to assimilate into the post-industrial economy. Having embraced the 
neoliberal logic of SBI work, they believed they had the potential to integrate in the 
surrounding post-industrial economy. However, in failing to recognise the structural 
impediments in which they are enveloped, the Conformists found it difficult to find 
employment post-SBI, leaving them in a depressed state and blaming themselves for 
their ‘failures’ to find employment.  
Similarly, in Neighbourhood B, an area which shares similar structural settings yet is 
composed of a demographically and socially distinct youthful population, the 
Aspirationists sought to integrate themselves in the local economy that has been 
populated by post-industrial and creative industries. Again, upon absorbing the 
language of neoliberal rhetoric found within SBIs, they also believed that their goals 
were realistic targets. Yet in an area identified as having some of the highest 
deprivation and unemployment rates in the country, their failure to find employment 
post-SBI meant they resorted to the low paid, ‘dead end’ jobs that they hoped to avoid 
prior to joining the SBI. 
Finally, the Road Boys, a collective of young males affiliated to a local street gang, 
outright rejected the help of the SBI programme in favour of eking profit from the 
lucrative consumer based criminal opportunities that exist in the area, fashioned out 
of the rapid post-industrial changes in the area over recent years. As such, upon 
graduating from the SBI, they resorted to life ‘on road’, in favour of the low paid, 




Chapter 9: Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, chapter 9 deepens this thesis’s analysis of SBIs and their associated work with 
contemporary, post-industrial youth. Chapter 9 is arranged into three main parts. First, I briefly reiterate 
the main findings and arguments presented in this thesis. Second, I detail the implications of my 
research for SBIs and policy makers, specifying how SBIs and related ‘workfare’ style programmes are 
fundamentally flawed in combating the issue of youth unemployment, as demonstrated by the findings 
of this thesis and the ongoing swell of unemployed young men across the UK today. Third, based on 
this thesis’s findings, I present a number of future recommendations for future SBI and public policy, 
which I hope will have utility in directing new modes of intervention towards eradicating worklessness, 
social marginality, and crime in the post-industrial inner city. 
A Brief Overview of the Thesis’s Main Discussions  
This thesis has traced the ways in which young men are experiencing the micro-level 
effects of de-industrialisation, globalisation, and urban gentrification in two 
socioculturally and economically distinct urban locales undergoing an ongoing 
evolution into post-industrial neighbourhoods. This thesis has also comparatively 
considered the ways in which SBIs approach the popular manifestations of local-
global transformations (i.e., unemployment, criminal behaviour, and social exclusion) 
and seek to alleviate them, and it has detailed how my participants experience SBIs 
and whether they offer a sufficient form of intervention to address the aforementioned 
symptoms of post-industrial change and neoliberal governance. Ultimately, this thesis 
has explained the ‘lived experiences’ of young men residing in the post-industrial 
inner city and their inevitable attempts at adapting to changes in the sociocultural 
economy via their use of the SBI. In doing so, it has illuminated the seminal way in 
which SBIs function in the lives of four distinct youth cultural groupings and filled a 
research lacuna in the fields of youth studies, sport studies, and criminology, by 
recounting empirically and ethnographically two contrasting post-industrial urban 
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locales; the young men enveloped within them who are subjected to the deleterious 
symptoms of ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008:260); and how these 
participants ‘make use’ of SBIs to respond and adapt to macro-sociological change.  
To provide a deeper, conceptual analysis of these issues, this work has drawn upon 
theories and ideas associated with macro-sociological change, including de-
industrialisation, post-industrialism, and globalisation, and connected them to the 
work of SBIs. Through this theoretical lens, this thesis has documented the evolution 
of two distinct neighbourhoods from industrial manual labour–based economies into 
post-industrial globalised markets. Chapter 1 and chapter 5 have shown that in the 
industrial era, both neighbourhoods were composed of homogeneous, static cultural 
groupings of skilled proletarian workers: Neighbourhood A was founded upon its 
shipbuilding industry and once provided stable employment for many of the 
grandfathers and fathers of my participants. Physically, economically, and socially, 
shipbuilding defined the city of Sunderland and Neighbourhood A and afforded an 
industry and habitus in which working-class masculinities could be defined, shaped, 
and constructed (Winlow, 2001:37). However, the demise of the industry resulted in 
the de-industrialisation of the city, and Neighbourhood A was particularly hard hit. It 
became exposed to the damaging effects of de-industrialisation, as endured in 
countless other single-industry de-industrialised cities (see Linkon and Russo, 2002) 
and began its evolution into its current post-industrial state.  
This thesis has proposed that the advancement of Neighbourhood A into a post-
industrial locale has rendered a number of sociological bearings for its youthful 
population, explored in chapter 5. In spite of the demolition of its traditional industrial 
base, Neighbourhood A’s contemporary cultural habitus remains defined by a static, 
stable population based upon the traditional working-class conceptions of family, hard 
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labour, and neighbourhood life (Hobbs, 1988). This is because unlike post-industrial 
Neighbourhood B, Neighbourhood A has not been subjected to significant social 
displacement exacerbated by intense gentrification, nor destabilised by an influx of 
educated middle-class post-industrial labourers, major immigration, or the 
development of large-scale post-war municipal social housing. As such, the traditional 
working-class communities and entrenched territorial boundaries of the industrial era 
remain relatively intact (Hobbs, 1988).  
Because of the stable homogeneous structure of working-class life in Neighbourhood 
A and the difficulties in dislodging the historically anchored ‘industrial masculinities’ 
of previous generations ( Winlow, 2001; Nayak, 2006), the ‘feminised’ forms of 
labour that now swamp the North East’s post-industrial labour market proffer little for 
the young men of Neighbourhood A today who continue the traditional ‘hard’ 
‘masculine’ identities of the industrial era. Hence, in post-industrial Neighbourhood 
A, the persistence of ‘industrial masculinities’ and the rejection of feminised labour 
(alongside the difficulties of single-industry towns reinvigorating themselves) have 
led to a situation where its young men must make a decision: to relinquish these 
identities and adapt to the new post-industrial economy or preserve their past and 
refute any form of post-industrial adaptation. Hence, in contemporary Neighbourhood 
A, young men are forging new identities and transitions (Nayak, 2006:813), and one 
can now identify ‘multiple masculinities … contextually contingent and always 
located in time and place’ (Nayak, 2010:148). As explored in chapter 7, there are the 
Outcasts, a cultural grouping who accept their subordinate position and are happy to 
remain unemployed, dependent on welfare, and engaged in criminal activity; and the 
Conformists, a group of young men who seek to free themselves from the shackles of 
culturally reproduced de-industrial living and adapt to the post-industrial service-
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based economy via a successful engagement with the SBI. The various embodied 
practices of these young men can be viewed as responses to shifts in socioeconomic 
trends in Neighbourhood A, and the outcome of and attempts at assimilating into 
multi-faceted, complex global changes.  
I have deepened and extended the discussions of this thesis via a comparative analysis 
of youth cultures within specific regional and local social milieu, and Neighbourhood 
B represents an urban area that has undergone parallel industrial decline and 
adaptation to transformations in the global economy. However, though similarly 
emptied of its traditional economic base, the two areas differ in terms of their 
morphological and ecological compositions and their experienced social realities of 
post-industrial transformation. Its industrial history is evidently different from 
Neighbourhood A. Neighbourhood B was not a ‘one-industry town’, but rather a local 
economy composed of multiple employment opportunities in various industries built 
around numerous forms of highly localised, familial, manual labour (Young and 
Willmott, 1957). In transforming to its post-industrial, post-modern state, 
Neighbourhood B has also experienced significant inward migration; a depopulation 
of its traditional, indigenous population; a large-scale urban gentrification and 
rebranding; and the influx of educated middle-class residents attracted by the 
burgeoning creative and technological post-industrial economy here.  
I have suggested that the evolution of Neighbourhood B into a global hub of 
technological, creative, and artistic industries has nurtured significant sociological 
transformations in the area, dividing—both culturally and socially—its young men 
from their counterparts in Neighbourhood A. First, the repopulation of the area with a 
churning multi-ethnic population in place of the once indigenous white population 
renders any connection its youth have with a proletariat past redundant, and its fluid 
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multi-ethnic population of young men are now constructing post-industrial place-
based identities in a social and cultural vacuum devoid of any historically embedded 
habitus. Second, the influx and diversity of technological, creative, and artistic 
industries has transformed the area into an entrepreneurial enterprise zone, attracting 
a middle-class educated population who now live cheek by jowl with the multi-ethnic 
working-class population in one of the most deprived areas in the country, with clear 
cultural impacts: the area now represents a polarised ‘dual city’81 (Mollenkopf and 
Castells, 1992; Sassen, 2000) composed of distinct split economies (both formal and 
informal) and an increasingly segregated social structure (indeed, one only has to walk 
down a street in Neighbourhood B to witness, firsthand, social housing estates sitting 
next to gated, new build communities). Third, the economic and social transformation 
of the area has engendered a number of entrepreneurial criminal-based activities, ripe 
for exploitation by an increasingly fractious marginalised youth population in a 
rational attempt to transcend the exclusion engendered by consumer capitalism 
(Hobbs, 2013).  
Emerging out of these post-industrial transformations are two cultural groupings who 
were found to coexist within the context of Neighbourhood B and its SBI: the Road 
Boys, a collective of young men affiliated to a local street gang, who, with a degree of 
entrepreneurial nous, exploit and eke out a profit from the array of consumer-based 
criminal opportunities found in the area; and the Aspirationists, an ambitious cultural 
grouping seeking to adapt to the transforming economic context. In dissecting the 
                                                          
81 The ‘dual city’ thesis rests on the idea that radical economic, social, and political restructuring occurring in the post-industrial 
metropolis has resulted in the polarisation of economic and wealth structures (Sassen, 2001), caused by the expansion of highly 
paid post-industrial labour and the concurrent influx of low-paid service work that serves the working class . Mollenkopf and 
Castells (1991) have charted the evolution of New York into a global ‘dual city’ reliant on a post-industrial service-based 
economy in line with global capitalism, documenting how these transformations have led to an increasingly polarised and 
segregated city. Similarly, the dual city thesis has been applied to London, which, since the economic restructuring of large 




identities and pathways of Neighbourhood B youth, I have uncovered their embodied 
practices and post-industrial subjectivities as a similar resistance/adaptation typology 
to local-global transformations, as has occurred in Neighbourhood A.   
The young men described in this thesis are considered cultural products of the changes 
occurring in the post-industrial metropolis, adapting and responding to macro-
sociological changes within these two neighbourhoods. In this sense, this thesis has 
considered the ways in which young men are exploring and constructing new identities 
as a reaction to the consequences of industrial decline and labour market restructuring 
in their respective neighbourhoods. Hobbs (2013) is correct in his assertion that 
‘economic explanations [of youth] isolated from the cultural contexts in which 
business is carried out are inadequate tools with which to explicate the complexity of 
motivations’ (Hobbs, 2013:127), and in following this, I have connected these local-
global transformations to the changing typologies of young men in Sunderland and 
East London today, with reference to those who ‘make use’ of an SBI. Indeed, in 
continuing the key sociological themes of this thesis, chapters 7 and 8 have shown 
how the social, cultural, and economic contexts in which young men reside also 
structured my participants’ use of the SBI and their subsequent post-SBI trajectories. 
A Brief Overview of the Main Findings 
This thesis has uncovered that contemporary post-industrial youth identities are 
varied, diverse, and heterogeneous across populations, shaped and fashioned by the 
distinct and embedded habitus that operate in Neighbourhoods A and B. Youthful 
experiences of unemployment are therefore not singular or homogeneous across the 
UK; and neither is there a standardised or consistent youthful subjectivity within these 
post-industrial neighbourhoods and communities.   
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In chapter 5, I have documented how, in the industrial era, the youth cultures of 
Neighbourhoods A and B were considered monolithic ‘types’ that ‘accepted their 
proletarian occupational futures and looked forward to traditional forms of leisure, 
where transgressive experimentation was largely restricted to liminal episodes 
dominated by the ecology of the working-class street and the hegemony of a single-
class social structure built upon the firm foundations unionized manual labour and the 
extended family’ (Hobbs, 2013:115). However, as this thesis has shown, in both post-
industrial Neighbourhoods A and B, young men are anything but standardised, and 
there is not one singular ‘dominant’ cultural group that exists in these neighbourhoods 
today. Rather, the divergent forms of youth explored in this thesis are representative 
of groupings characterised by ‘fluidity, occasional gatherings and dispersal’ 
(Maffesoli, 1996:76). This has sociological significance in that it gives validity to the 
notion that contemporary youth cultures are not static or homogeneous, but rather 
evolve in a constant state of flux, adaptive to the social milieu in which they are 
enveloped (Bennett, 1999). Significantly, I concur with Hobbs (2013:231) in that 
youth cultures today are ‘overwhelmingly shaped by market forces and … no longer 
mediated by the clearly defined inequalities and subsequent communality of industrial 
society’. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that micro-level behaviour has adapted and 
evolved in response to macro-level capitalist restructuring that has altered the social 
systems of distinct urban locales in the UK over the last twenty years.82  
 
I have argued that a dualistic model of working-class life therefore exists in two urban 
areas, each with their own distinct patterns of cultural aspirations, unemployment, and 
                                                          
82 This is not to say that there is now a ‘macro’ notion of youth culture irrespective of cultural conditions. The youth cultures of 
Neighbourhoods A and B are still fashioned and contingent on the historically embedded sociocultural conditions of these two 




consumption practices. These factors have also structured these young men’s ‘use’ of 
the SBI, which I will consider shortly. To elucidate these findings, however, I have 
presented a diagrammatic representation of the four youth cultural groupings 




























 Long term unemployment. 
 
 No Qualifications. 
 
 Anti-work ethos/some involvement in 
casual work ‘on the fiddle’. 
 
 Reliant on welfare. 
 
 Involvement in petty criminality. 
 
 Conform to ‘Chav’ stereotype. 
Cultural Characteristics 
 
 Aspiring: plans for higher education 
and post-industrial careers not 
associated with traditional working-
class employment.  
 
 Typically GCSEs/A Levels educated. 
 
 Reject ‘chav’ appearance/lifestyle. 
 
Use of SBI 
 Attend ‘Street Football’ drop in 
sessions primarily for social reasons 
and to conform to JSA requirements 
 
 Viewed as ‘problematic’ clients by 
staff due to behaviour. 
 
 High turnover, often excluded from 
sessions for poor behaviour. 
 
 Little interest in progressing through 
academy programme for multiple 
reasons, as became apparent in 
interviews: distrust of staff, issues 
related to substance abuse/domestic 
issues, pessimistic view of the help SBI 
can offer.  
 
Use of SBI 
 Typically Referred from job centre 
 
 Smooth progression from street football 
to academy programme. 
 
 Receptive to support and guidance 
offered by staff. 
 
 Client group is favoured and targeted in 
order to achieve annual organisational 
targets: an ‘easy progression’ into 
education, employment or training. 
 
Post-SBI Trajectories 
 Fail to progress through academy 
programme 
 
 Excluded due to poor behaviour or 
failure to progress.  
 
 Referred on to other agencies/OR 
revert back to previous lifestyle 
Post-SBI Trajectories 
 Progress into low paid, post-industrial 
employment, typically retail or call 
centre work. 
 Younger sub group re-engage with 
education at local colleges. 
 
 Employment/Education not sustained 






Table 2: Categories of SBI Client: Neighbourhood B 
Road Boys Aspirationists 
Cultural Characteristics 
 Long term unemployment. 
 Gang affiliated 
 Engaged in consumer based criminal 
activity 
 No Qualifications. 
 Conform to ‘Road’ stereotype 
Cultural Characteristics 
 Aspiring: plans for assimilation into 
financial, business, or creative 
industries now located in post-
industrial Neighbourhood B  
 Typically GCSEs/A Levels educated. 
 Reject ‘road’ subjectivities 
 Not affiliated with any local street 
gang 
 
Use of SBI 
 Source of leisure and fitness 
 Attend with friends 
 Often attend sessions away from their 
own neighbourhood in fear of potential 
for gang related violence 
 Attend sporadically 
 Oppositional to staff and education 
 Do not seek employment 
 
 
Use of SBI 
 Smooth progression from Street 
Football to academy programme. 
 Favoured and targeted by SBI staff in 
order to achieve annual organisational 
targets:  
 Hardworking; complete all work and 
actively seek employment 
 View the SBI as a ‘necessity’ for post-
industrial labour assimilation.  
Post-SBI Trajectories 
 Fail to progress through academy 
programme.  
 Excluded due to poor behaviour or 
failure to progress.  
 Continue to conform to ‘road’ 
lifestyles, eking profit from consumer 
based criminal opportunities (i.e. drug 
dealing, theft of mobile phones, bikes) 
Post-SBI Trajectories 
 Fail to find ambitious employment they 
hoped for 
 Progress into low paid, substandard 
service sector work.  
 Disillusioned with post-SBI work due 
to their ambitions to find high-paid, 




The level of importance that each participant typology ‘attached’ to the SBI should 
also be considered. For the neoliberal Conformers of Neighbourhood A, and the 
Aspirationists of Neighbourhood B, the SBI was seen as a key vehicle for entry into 
the post-industrial economy. Both ‘types’ of participant viewed the SBI with great 
importance, and as has been shown in the empirical data of the thesis, were attentive, 
punctual, and hard-working in sessions. Much like Willis’ (1977) ‘ear-oles’, in a West 
Midlands School, they valued forms of education, were enthusiastic about learning, 
and abided by SBI rules. Yet their commitment to the project, and adherence to the 
espoused neoliberal messages, values, and standards of the SBI effectively set them 
up for failure post-SBI; their hard work, dedication and commitment to the project, 
along with the continual neoliberal messages of self-responsibilization meant that 
these two typologies believed they could ‘achieve’ in the post-industrial society upon 
leaving the SBI. However, after graduating and seeking employment in two of the 
most economically deprived areas if the UK, they scrambled for jobs they were told 
they could get, yet had to settle for the alternative: low paid employment in the service 
sector, or worse, a reversion back to their initial social state, pre-SBI (Shildrick et al., 
2012. 
Conversely, the level of importance the Outcasts and Road Boys gave to the 
intervention was in direct contrast to the Conformists and Aspirationists. Again, this 
level of importance can be attributed to the post-SBI trajectories of these typologies. 
Here, the Outcasts and Road Boys actively rejected the help of the SBI; although they 
attended all classroom sessions, this tactic was essentially both a scheme to continue 
taking part in open football sessions and a temporary measure to continue receiving 
benefit payments83. The data in this thesis has described how the Outcasts and Road 
                                                          
83 The SBI met the ‘job search’ criteria needed for participants to receive unemployment benefits.  
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Boys operated as the ‘lads’ (Willis, 1977) in this particular educational milieu, 
subverting assistance, undermining authority, and being intentionally oppositional and 
disobedient to hegemonic ideals of ‘being’. For them, these methods operated as 
empowering alternatives to following the neoliberal rhetoric of self-help along 
authorised paths. A considerable lack of importance is  attributed to the SBI amongst 
these cultural typologies, and their post-SBI trajectories reflect this; a large proportion 
of Outcasts and Road Boys were ejected from the SBI before completion (and thus 
returned to their respective street-based criminal activities), or those that did complete 
the SBI simply disappeared; any potential post-SBI assistance with job searching was 
not needed or sought; and the Outcasts were resigned to stay in their unemployed state, 
knowing that their position in society meant that they could not be helped. The 
outcomes which these two typologies ‘achieved’ thus provides a more nuanced 
overview of how young men interact with SBIs, and as this conclusion suggests, 
highlights the inadequacies of SBIs adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
implementation.     
 
These findings have considerable implications: they challenge the assumptions and 
operational practices of SBIs that youthful experiences of unemployment are singular 
and homogeneous. I have uncovered empirically that youthful experiences of 
unemployment and transiting into post-industrial economies are heterogeneous and 
varied—a finding in line with contemporary work in the field of youth studies, which 
suggests that young men are ‘displaying very different characteristics, facing very 
different challenges, risks, and transitions in their lives, and with very different needs 
for intervention’ (Yates and Payne, 2006:334). To expand on this sociological 
argument, I suggest that there is not one ‘dominant’ type of participant that uses SBIs, 
despite the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to dealing with youth unemployment. As these 
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young men navigate their way out of the SBI, it is therefore no surprise that outcomes 
vary and diverge and ‘successful’ results are intermittent. The Neighbourhood A 
Outcasts’ confrontational oppositionality to hegemonic ‘indoctrination’ and 
Neighbourhood B’s Road Boys’ ‘street’ subjectivity and happiness to remain 
unemployed are empowering alternatives to perceiving oneself as a ‘moral failure’ (in 
neoliberal speak) and renders any help from the SBI redundant. In contrast, the 
ambitious Aspirationists of Neighbourhood B and the motivated and determined 
Conformists of Neighbourhood A display a willingness to adopt and assimilate into 
the surrounding post-industrial economy and therefore ‘make use’ of the SBI in their 
own unique, compliant way.  
What has been shown in this thesis is that there is no ‘standardised’ progression 
through SBIs and beyond. This is because the divergent youth groups that make use 
of them and the cultural contexts, labour markets, and habitus of Neighbourhoods A 
and B result in deviating and opposing post-SBI pathways. To draw on a realist 
evaluation perspective,84 this thesis has uncovered the variety of ‘cultural, social and 
economic circumstances’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:64), which influence the 
effectiveness of interventions as well as the ‘social rules, norms, values and 
interrelationships gathered in these places which sets limits on the efficacy of 
programme mechanisms’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:70). Hence, any discussions 
regarding the ‘impact’ of SBIs cannot be deemed ‘sociologically valid’ if researched 
                                                          
84Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue that the outcomes of interventions are the result of both mechanisms (that is, the specific 
mechanisms within a programme that contribute to its outcome) and contexts (the conditions within which the intervention 
operates in which affect the subsequent outcome). Outcomes are thus brought about not simply by the interventions; rather, 
interventions are a heterogeneous experience for individuals and, as such, distinct outcomes occur for individuals based on the 
differing contexts and mechanisms that they experience.  As Pawson and Tilley (1997:70) elucidate ‘programmes are always 
introduced into pre-existing social contexts…these prevailing social conditions are of crucial importance when it comes to 
explaining the successes and failures of social importance. Programmes work by introducing new ideas and/or resources into an 
existing set of social relationships. A crucial task of evaluation is to include investigation of the extent to which these pre-existing 




in isolation. Instead, this thesis has illustrated the need for contemporary SBI 
researchers and future research to consider (i) the social and ecological context in 
which the SBIs operate in and (ii) the ‘type’ of participant engaging and interacting 
with the SBI.  
Implications for Policy: Pragmatic, Short-Term Responses 
As a sociologist studying the contemporary effects of de-industrialisation, globalised 
neoliberalism, and consumer capitalism, I consider it imperative to link theory to 
practice. Otherwise, this thesis would have no real-world utility and would simply be 
considered an academic piece of sociological voyeurism. Hence, to reduce and 
alleviate the contemporary issues young men experience, it is necessary to apply these 
findings and engage with immediate policy options that can be implemented in both 
the short and long term, to address structurally imposed unemployment and 
marginalisation. Within the context of this next section, then, I will discuss the 
implications of my findings for SBI policy and argue that a diverse range of SBI work 
needs to be made available to young men experiencing unemployment in the UK, 
varying between culturally and ecologically sensitive work that considers local labour 
market variations—no-strings-attached open-access football sessions without 
neoliberal rhetoric or coercion into low-paid employment—and a more radical 
counter-hegemonic vision of SBI work that will allow SBIs to become a critical praxis 
for young people in recognising structures of inequality and enable them to construct 
their own futures (Darnell, 2010). To begin, I will document two significant 
implications, based on the findings of this research, for future SBI policy to consider.  
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1. Culturally specific responses and an appreciation that one-size-does-not-fit-all  
This thesis has traced the work of SBIs within two areas, whose modus operandi, is to 
alleviate the popular indicators of ‘advanced marginality’ (Wacquant, 2008), namely, 
unemployment, social exclusion, and crime. I have detailed how, despite the fluid, 
heterogeneous mixture of young unemployed people that it works with, the SBI 
continues to offer indistinguishable services to young people in Neighbourhoods A 
and B, with no consideration of the cultural and economic variations between the two 
areas that have been documented in this thesis. Bearing in mind the identification of 
four contrasting typologies of young people to exist then, I propose that different 
modalities of SBI work are likely to have more effectiveness for different people at 
different stages in their unemployment ‘careers’. In this section, I will detail the 
implications of this fallacy and document why the current ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
to SBI policy is culturally insensitive, hopelessly idealistic, and destined to fail in 
making a considerable impact on structural unemployment.  
 
Lumping the cultural groupings identified in this thesis under the catchall term of 
‘unemployed’ or one of its derivatives, such as ‘at risk’, ‘neet’ or the ‘socially 
excluded’, as many practitioners within the SBI scene tend to do, is neither 
sociologically uninformed nor particularly illuminating. The ‘combined resurgence of 
inequality’ (Wacquant, 2008:259) across nations and cities must not mean we lose 
sight of the differing trajectories of poverty, unemployment, and crime in different 
neighbourhoods. The established frameworks of these specific social environments 
are not homogeneous structures, even when they do produce comparable popular 
manifestations of poverty. The historically anchored structural differences of 
Neighbourhoods A and B infer that levels of poverty and unemployment and the scale 
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on which they manifest are always going to diverge. SBIs must therefore beware 
pursuing the current ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to SBIs, which encourages 
participants to pursue akin life strategies that are often oppositional to their immediate 
social and ecological environment as well as their own distinct subjectivities and 
cultural practices (Wacquant, 2008). By pursuing this agenda, SBIs risk perpetuating 
dominant and hegemonic power structures that maintain the institutionalisation of 
poverty and inequality (Kelly, 2011; Chamberlain, 2013). 
 
Adopting culturally specific responses, then, offers one method of transcending this 
weakness. Ultimately, the success of SBI and welfare to work programmes is 
dependent on local labour market conditions (Wacquant, 2008; Spaaij, 2012; Spaaij et 
al., 2012), and local specific readings of job markets that acknowledge the competitive 
post-industrial nature of the economy should therefore be pursued (Spaaij et al., 2012), 
especially in areas where labour market demand outstrips the level of labour positions 
available. Indeed, Neighbourhood A is one area where job demand hinders the 
‘success’ of SBIs, culminating in the reassignment of blame on young men for their 
worklessness (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009). Despite the demise of the local 
shipbuilding industry and passing of manual labour opportunities, the widespread 
misrecognition of these power differentials means that its youth are widely stigmatised 
and labelled. The Outcasts, for example, are viewed as a redundant, work-shy lumpen 
form of proletariat by employed members of the Neighbourhood A community for 
their reluctance to find employment and willingness to survive on state-sponsored 
benefits. And where work is available, it is likely to be substandard and low paid: the 
Conformists of Neighbourhood A were ashamed of their unemployed identities and 
scrambled to find low-paid substandard service sector jobs. Like most popular reading 
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of unemployment, they blamed themselves for their unemployment; and the neoliberal 
logic of SBIs makes their self-condemnation appear justified and commonsensical, 
masks the influence of structural forces, and vindicates punitive or retributory policies 
towards the marginal (Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011). 
 
In Neighbourhood B, the main issue is one of a post-industrial evolution into a hub of 
technological and creative industries and the quality of work available to young 
unemployed people rather than its availability. It is important to note that despite the 
aforementioned inadequacies of SBI work, almost half of my fieldwork network in 
Neighbourhood B entered employment, education, or training, and it is important to 
consider that many young people do respond positively to SBI treatment if attending 
with a sufficient level of intrinsic motivation and a desire to assimilate into post-
industrial labour markets. However, it is insufficient to still think that simply bringing 
people into contact with the labour market will reduce poverty and social marginality 
in the city. This should be clear from the findings of this thesis and the persisting bulk 
of young unemployed people across the UK today.   
Indeed, contemporary Neighbourhood B represents a polarised ‘dual city’ (Sassen, 
2000), and the influx of high-tech business, financial, and service sector employment 
opportunities that characterise contemporary global capitalism (Wacquant, 2008:264) 
have coincided with the expansion of low-paid flexible service sector work with little 
benefits and short-term temporary contracts, which ‘do not entail a collective 
mechanism of protection against material deprivation, illness or joblessness’ 
(Wacquant, 2008:267). This is particularly true of Neighbourhood B, where a large 
proportion of youth have left school without relevant qualifications or experience in 
the new financial and technological industries in the area and find themselves at the 
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bottom of the job ladder because of their lack of training, the structurally imposed 
inequality they are contained within, and their permanent residence in a particularly 
stigmatised area (Wacquant, 2008). By any measure, the young men of 
Neighbourhood B could not compete with the better educated, more skilled, and 
experienced workers for the jobs in their formerly industrial neighbourhood. The SBI, 
therefore, channelled the ambitious participants—such as the Aspirationists, a cultural 
grouping willing and actively seeking employment—into these low-paid insecure 
employment slots. Subsequently, they became a ‘surplus population’, a ‘reserve army’ 
of workers situated at the bottom of the social structure yet required for the effective 
functioning of post-industrial capitalist economy (Byrne, 1999:9). Hence, my findings 
concur with those of Wacquant (2008:267) who suggests that ‘whereas economic 
growth and the correlative expansion of the wage sector used to provide a universal 
cure for poverty, today they are part and parcel of the problem for those at the foot of 
the occupational ladder’. 
For those unwilling to become a social group ‘intrinsic’ to the functioning of the 
capitalist economy (Byrne, 1995:95), the other option is the street, an arena in which 
the clear cultural impacts of gentrification and middle-class infiltration have thrown 
up an array of entrepreneurial criminal activities ready for exploitation for the 
criminally inclined (Hobbs, 2013). In this sense, SBIs are merely reproducing the 
dominant social order of neoliberalism that continues to generate marginalised 
communities and social inequalities (Harvey, 2005) and does nothing to substantially 
alter ‘the institutions, policies, practices, and more fundamental conditions that have 




2. A reversal of neoliberal logic and target driven agendas 
Underpinned by neoliberal logic, SBIs provide the ‘perfect’ context for young men 
deemed ‘at risk’ to be transformed into ‘upstanding’ self-regulated and productive 
citizens of the future (Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011). They offer an environment in 
which life skills can be taught, knowledge can be transferred, and labour market 
qualities can be conveyed in attempts to socialise participants into contemporary post-
industrial life. This is believed to be achieved, somewhat organically, via the idealised 
beliefs associated with the intrinsic qualities and the competitive, disciplined nature 
of sport and associated education programmes (Darnell, 2010). In this sense, SBIs 
function as drivers of the cultural hegemony of neoliberalism, recalibrating youth in 
line with dominant visions of ‘acceptable’ behaviour (Kelly, 2012; Chamberlain, 
2013) related to individualism, personal responsibility, and competitive free enterprise 
(Rose, 1999). In aligning themselves with neoliberal visions in which participants are 
perceived as lacking in basic human capital and seen as impoverished, disempowered, 
problematic, and in need of discipline and some degree of social direction, SBIs 
resemble interventions and social policies governing the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Rose, 
2000) of targeted populations and communities. In this ‘new culture of crime control’ 
(Garland, 2001:167–192), SBIs are considered a realistic tool for the ‘regulation’ of 
inner city youth and now form a significant component ‘of the neoliberal policy 
repertoire … aimed at generating social order in disadvantaged inner city 
neighbourhoods’ (Spaaij, 2009:247).  
In chapter 6, I have applied insights from theory to appraise and critique the neoliberal 
underpinnings of SBI programmes, which attempt to recalibrate youth in line with 
dominant hegemonic behaviours and dispositions. In line with the neoliberal rhetoric 
of individual responsibilisation and self-help, the neoliberal underpinnings of 
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programmes make it appear as if the social ‘issues’ SBI participants face are their own 
doing rather than the consequence of structurally imposed impediments. Inadvertently, 
this has the effect of creating a dynamic of perpetual self-blame amongst these young 
men, who are led to conventionally misrecognise the relationships between structural 
inequality and unemployment that shape and contradict the post-SBI trajectories of 
many young men. This was found to result in further disillusionment and depression, 
as was the case of the Aspirationists and Conformists who failed to find the 
employment they anticipated post-SBI, or lead to a situation where being wilfully 
oppositional to forms of SBI help is an alternate pathway to considering oneself as an 
unemployed dole-dependent ‘loser’ who lacks social responsibility. This was the case 
with the outcasts and the Road Boys, who explored self-destructive criminal- based 
post-SBI pathways. 
In aligning themselves with neoliberal ideals that seek to shape cultural practices in 
line with dominant hegemonic notions of respectability, SBIs risk reproducing 
structures of inequality and preventing youth from experiencing personal and 
individual empowerment (Darnell, 2010; Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011 85; Kelly, 2011; 
Spaaij et al., 2013). SBI participants are channelled into a social world dominated and 
constructed by visions of dominant class ideals; and they must ‘adapt’ to this social 
world and attain the behaviours, norms, and dispositions of the hegemonic group to 
achieve ‘acceptance’ (Garland, 2001). As has been previously alluded to, this only 
                                                          
85 The arguments put forth by both Darnell (2010) and Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) are derived from the analysis of global 
sports-based interventions (primarily, sport for development, or plus sport programmes) operating in the Caribbean/the African 
continent and the Pacific Islands respectively. Hence, although I acknowledge that these arguments are directly applicable to the 
international sport for development field, I also believe that these arguments are equally applicable to plus sport programmes – 
like the SBI investigated in this thesis - operating in the UK. Indeed, Kelly (2011; 2012a; 2012b), Spaaij et al (2013) and 
Chamberlain (2013) have applied similar insights to UK based SBIs, arguing that not only do SBIs now function as broader 
components of neoliberal governance aimed at conducting the conduct of others, but also actively operate to obscure the broader 
structures of inequality that necessitate social interventions. Hence, although the ‘transformative’ model proposed by both 
Hartmann and Kwuak (2011) and Darnell (2010) is intended for global SBIs, I believe it to have utility in a domestic context. 
Kelly (2011) has previously noted this, using insights from both sport for development and youth justice to expand knowledge 
of SBIs operating in the UK context to highlight ‘the continued possibility of counter-hegemonic approaches within community 
organizations and state led services’ ( :17). 
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results in recalibrating youth into ‘models’ of the neoliberal world without the prospect 
of searching for why their recalibration is occurring.  
All typologies of participants described in this thesis would therefore benefit from SBI 
staff engaging directly with the social ecology of the area and more sociological 
informed readings of unemployment, worklessness, and structural disadvantage. I 
encountered many well-intentioned, enthusiastic, and devoted members of staff in 
both neighbourhoods. However, they had to function and operate within an 
environment constrained by the logics of neoliberal governance and punitive audit 
culture. Often, this involved making decisions about who they should work with, 
cherry-picking (Kelly, 2012) participants who they felt could be progressed into 
employment, education, or training at the expense of others who were arguably more 
in need of support. For example, those SBIs that work with similar groupings of gang-
affiliated youth such as the Road Boys need to take advantage of the ‘windows of 
opportunity’ that encourage young men to come forward to seek treatment. The 
majority of spontaneous disaster-driven ‘turning points’ (Laub and Sampson, 2003) 
are missed by these SBIs because of the PbR system that encourages SBIs to exclude 
‘risky’ participants if they fail to ‘recalibrate’ immediately into upstanding citizens in 
line with their neoliberal imaginings. When they did target and provide sustained work 
for those ‘most in need’, these participants were penalised and lamented for their 
‘social failures’, and sessions were closed down because of the lack of progressions 
occurring, as was the case in Neighbourhood A. Hence, SBI staff operate in an 
environment where economic incentives prevent them from working with the most ‘in 
need’, who require extended, sustained support. In maintaining a PbR service in which 
‘success’ is measured by outcomes, staff will continue to operate as financially and 
target-driven practitioners, selective of who they work with.  
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A Transformative Form of Intervention  
In their attempts to tackle contemporary forms of post-industrial marginality, SBIs 
operating within a plus sport model face policy choices that will essentially regulate 
the conduct of young men attempting to assimilate into the new post-industrial 
economy. In considering their options, then, the first approach, representing a 
continuation of the existing dominant vision, is to restructure and reorganise the 
existing frameworks of SBI programmes aimed at addressing structural 
unemployment. This can be achieved, for example, by responding to the critiques and 
implications listed above with short-term, immediate responses. This can include 
extending networks with training and education programmes, mobilising programmes 
with other social interventions to address the multi-faceted nature of exclusion and 
unemployment, and utilising a sophisticated targeting system that works in and with 
communities who would benefit most from the work of these SBIs.  
However, it is clear that these recommendations offer only piecemeal responses to 
stopping the spread of youth unemployment, and simply tweaking or providing new 
methods of SBI delivery will only further sustain the institutions, policies, practices, 
and labour market conditions that have produced and endured the marginality of post-
industrial youth (Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011).  
This thesis has provided empirical evidence that the current dominant vision of SBIs 
is not sufficient in addressing the issue of contemporary urban marginality and 
worklessness. Otherwise, the problems wrought by post-industrial living would not be 
persistent today, their accretion within urban inner city areas would have already been 
prevented, if not reversed, and there would be no need for this thesis. What is therefore 
required is a revolution in thinking that goes against the conventional grain of SBI 
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policy, and based on the findings of the thesis, I will suggest the only viable option is 
a ‘counter-hegemonic’ approach to development that ‘engage[s] directly with the 
political economy and the relations of dominance that produce the need for 
development in the first place’ (Darnell, 2010:71). 
This vision draws upon the radical work of Latin American theorists to development, 
notably Freire (1970), in response to the dominant adverse mode of neoliberal 
developmental vision that only meets the needs of Western hegemonic powers and 
institutions (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). From this view, some SBI services 
disregard the culturally specific sociocultural and economic ecologies in which they 
operate, alongside the individual needs of participants illustrated in this thesis. Hence, 
SBIs only offer a generalised vision that maintains a reproductive social structure that 
continues to spawn generations of marginalised unemployed populations (Byrne, 
1995, 1999; Wacquant, 2009). From this view, development also perceives 
participants as a problematic other, incapable of traversing the post-industrial 
landscape without external help and support. To accept the transformative vision of 
development, then, would mean adopting a radical model which focuses on the 
empowerment, emancipation, and liberation of subordinate communities through the 
recognition of structures of power and inequality rather than using SBIs as a 
conventional educational arena in which young people are socialised and recalibrated 
into a preordained social world without consultation.   
The work of Paulo Freire can illuminate, at micro level, how some SBIs can facilitate 
his notion of achieving ‘freedom’, that is ‘the indispensable condition for the quest for 
human completion’ (Freire, 1970:47). In utilising an approach that enables, in Freire’s 
terms, ‘the oppressed’ to recognise the hegemonic powers that engender and maintain 
marginality, SBIs can operate as a critical praxis for transforming the social structures 
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in which young men are enveloped and ‘create a new situation, one which makes 
possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity’ (Freire, 1970:47). 
Within this framework, plus sport SBIs will no longer function as ‘the oppressors’, 
who ‘deposit’ and ‘bank’ information into the mind-sets of participants, which Freire 
would argue ‘dehumanises’ human action and results in and maintains structures of 
oppression. Instead, SBI education would operate as a critical praxis that allows youth 
to become aware of their own ‘incompleteness’ and empower them to achieve 
‘conscientizaҫão’, or ‘critical consciousness’: a creative praxis which will enable a 
critical awareness and capability of transforming structures of oppression (Freire, 
1970). In this transformative vision, SBIs will become a transformative context in 
which its participants recognise and respond to structural impediments and become 
transposed citizens ready to challenge and transform society. 
During the third year of my fieldwork, I attended the Outcasts’ grassroots session for 
a total of three months. A number of participants, including Sonny, Max, and Kevin, 
formed the session on the back of the closure of an SBI because of the ‘failure’ of 
participants to progress into employment, education, or training. For some onlookers, 
the Outcasts’ session would appear to be a communal context of self-inflicted 
sociopaths engaging in a weekly football session. However, based on the findings of 
my research, I will argue that the transformative vision of development detailed above 
was a key feature of the Outcasts’ sessions. Their sociological ability to spot the 
structural forces that have enveloped them and rendered them as a residual class meant 
that they were aware that the SBI could not help them, and participants actively 
contributed to the development and maintenance of a new programme.  Sonny 
attracted the help of a number of social and drug interventions in and around 
Neighbourhood A, who flooded the session during the months I attended. The health 
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benefits of this were clear, particularly for those that suffered from drug abuse, mental 
health issues, and old age, and the session provided an opportunity for these outcasts 
to address their own individually specific problems, without coercive intervention or 
the neoliberal rhetoric of the SBI that they perceived to be ‘scammy’ or ‘coercive’. 
Participants were able to access a network of treatment, education, and employment 
prospects at times that were coordinated with external spontaneous ‘turning points’ 
(Laub and Sampson, 1993) that should be exploited by SBIs seeking to address 
unemployment amongst the most ‘at risk’.   
I uncovered firsthand how the Outcasts’ session enabled young men to understand the 
broader structures of inequality in which they are confined and participate ‘critically 
in the transformation of not only their own experiences in society but also of the world 
itself through a collective resistance against hegemonic structures and relations of 
inequality that get reproduced through sport’ (Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011:10). 
Indeed, for Sonny, the session offered a chance for individuals to empower themselves 
and engage in a praxis that offered a collective meaning, representation, and identity 
for all: 
This is what it [the SBI] used to be like before all the money 
came in … Its brilliant, the players love it more than they liked 
SBI. There is more freedom now and it’s more fun, there’s 
more participation, the players come and they feel like they’re 
contributing to the running of it.  There’s less hierarchy, that 
focus [to get a job] isn’t there, and, I’d like to reintroduce that 
maybe in a less controlled fashion though you know?  I think 
people need less indoctrination and more … more … 
accessibility to information.  
                     Sonny, Neighbourhood A, October 2012 
The outcasts were therefore, in a developmental sense, active in ‘unveil[ing] the world 
of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation … their 
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own example in the struggle for their redemption’ (Freire, 1970:54). Non-judgemental 
and non-coercive participants worked with one another and allowed previously 
excluded participants to attend sessions without any ‘pressure’ to move into 
employment, education, or training; and the networks of pooled interventions 
instigated by Sonny allowed individuals to address multiple medical, psychological, 
legal, and logistical issues associated with vulnerable and marginalised populations at 
times convenient to them. Participants were thus empowered to act on their own 
accord and access context-specific help that could address structural impediments. 
Participants contributed to the running of the session and were considered as capable 
citizens rather than ‘apparently inanimate things’ (Freire, 1970:59) in need of social 
support. Hence, this radical alternative involves more than simply community 
involvement in SBI programmes. Instead, it involves the active recognition of 
structural inequalities that can be established, challenged, and ultimately transformed. 
Towards a New Approach: The Role of SBIs 
If we are to draw upon the key research findings of this thesis, a counter-hegemonic 
approach would require SBI practitioners to create an environment in which this 
transformative vision can be implemented. Despite the good intentions of staff, the 
outcome-orientated environment in which they operated meant their work was guided 
and constrained by a policy agenda structured by neoliberal perceptions of 
development that relies on individual willpower and self-actualisation. 
Unintentionally, this resulted in a conventional misrecognition between structural 
impediments and unemployment, which contributed to a self-blame and self-
destructive culture amongst many participants. Adopting a radical approach to 
development would mean dismantling hegemonic forms of plus sport SBI work and 
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training and educating staff to encourage an environment in which young marginalised 
youth can act upon the structures of inequality and fashion their own lives. This returns 
to my earlier points regarding participants implementing and developing programmes 
that are culturally specific and attuned to their own cultural values, aspirations, and 
objectives and viewing them as capable citizens ready to challenge and redefine the 
world and construct their own futures (Darnell, 2010). Hence, training operational 
staff that represent and exemplify these counter-hegemonic values is a key priority.  
Within this inclusive environment, educational programmes that offer a praxis for 
liberation is a necessity. Here, sport will retain its use as an ever-useful hook. 
However, it needs to be integrated with an educational programme that enables 
participants to critically assess issues of structural power, inequality, and social 
change. To revisit the key findings of this research, many young men were unaware 
of the structural impediments that have destabilised the labour markets of 
Neighbourhoods A and B over recent years. They were sociologically ‘blind’ to issues 
of power and blamed themselves for their unemployment, justifying the dominant 
vision of unemployed inner city youth as work-shy, lazy, and unproductive. In 
countering this, a restructuring of education programmes to one that allows 
participants to ‘regain their humanity’ (Freire, 1970:68) via overcoming their 
condition of marginality is required. This would involve a restructuring of staff-
participant relationships, whereby educational programmes are no longer 
environments where ‘the coach, community organizer, or development worker 
subjects his or her gaze over marginalized youth as the expert policing those who are 
in need of re-education’ (Hartmann and Kwauk, 2011:14) but, instead, is a programme 
in which a dyadic relationship exists between coach and participant. Staff must come 
to realise their role as one where ‘those who authentically commit themselves to 
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people must re-examine themselves constantly’ (Freire, 1970:60) for true liberation to 
occur; and for participants, the educational environment should be an environment in 
which they can recognise, critically reflect, and act upon the social, economic, and 
political impediments that they face. This is not simply a case of plus sport SBIs 
becoming more student-centred. Rather, it is a complete overhaul, which will enable 
marginalised young men to realise one’s consciousness and how to take action against 
the marginality and oppression they face. In this transformative vision, SBIs will 
represent a collective praxis for social transformation.  
Implementing these transformations will not be easy, and I fully appreciate the 
difficulties plus sport SBIs will face in adopting this more radical approach. It may be 
that policy makers wish to adjust SBI programmes in line with some of the more 
conventional approaches documented in this thesis. However, based on the findings 
of this research, I hope policy makers will realise that until there is a refocus away 
from paid employment being equated with positive ‘outcomes’, a continuation of their 
current form will merely result in a prolongation and extension of the social issues 
documented in this thesis: the Outcasts will continue to maintain their dole-dependent 
lifestyles, pursuing ever ‘riskier’ leisure lives, receiving criticism, vilification and 
stigmatisation from labour-attached members of society. The Conformists will 
continue to be disillusioned and depressed at their failure to find stable employment 
in Neighbourhood B and resort to a cycle of self-blame and individual liability. In 
Neighbourhood B, the Aspirationists will continue the inevitable ‘churn’ between low-
paid insecure jobs that help sustain the new post-industrial capitalist economy of East 
London and periods of unemployment; and the Road Boys will follow along their self-
destructive path of tit-for-tat gang violence, continue to exploit the multiple 
opportunities for consumer-based criminality (and in the process, cause misery to 
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many innocent members of the public), and persist in peddling drugs—an 
entrepreneurial activity that offers a rational alternative to low-paid insecure work—
in our streets, parks, and neighbourhoods.  
Perhaps the only option, beyond the level of locally and regionally based SBI services, 
is a radical transformation relating to macro-level social and economic policies. For 
Wacquant (2008), the only strategy for reducing the deleterious effects of labour 
market restructuring is the creation of a ‘citizens wage’ or basic income grants 
accorded to all members of society (Wacquant, 1996), the assurance of widespread 
and inclusive admittance to ‘housing, health and transportation’, and access to ‘free 
education and job training’ (Wacquant, 2008:279). Certainly, this is a viable option 
that would address the issue of social marginality in the post-industrial moment and 
would reduce the need for SBIs that are not sufficient in making even a sizeable impact 
upon structural unemployment. These revisions, however, are, as Wacquant 
(1996:131) accepts, a ‘tall order that requires a thorough revision or our accepted 
conceptions of work, money, time, utility welfare and justice’, and this utopian vision 
would require a drastic revolution and overturn of current political ideals.  
Global Capitalism and the Need for Change 
Addressing these issues via the highly dubious assumption that an attachment to the 
labour market is a panacea for all is clearly inadequate, and SBI policies have a role 
to play in smoothing out the fragmented transitions that are occurring across post-
industrial communities today. Even if SBI policy makers decide that the 
recommendations of this thesis are unrealistic, impractical, or idealistic, one thing is 
certain: de-industrialisation, the political-economic model of neoliberalism, and the 
advent of globalisation have all exacerbated youth unemployment, crime, and social 
350 
 
inequality, and the current job creation schemes, social interventions, and SBIs are 
clearly insufficient in addressing these issues. Across many post-industrial cities in the 
world today, young men and women continue to become lumpenised as labour market 
restructuring destructs embedded employment prospects and flood the labour market 
with low-paid ‘flexible’ post-industrial labour. Young men continue to be relegated to 
the spatially concentrated inner city neighbourhoods and clumps of social housing, 
recognised as urban badlands where violence, crime, and marginalisation are the social 
order. They scramble and churn between low-paid insecure employment and periods 
of prolonged unemployment or take a diverging trajectory and explore the multitude 
of criminal opportunities spawned in the consumer capitalist era. As inequalities and 
social misery continue to exist, a profound reform is therefore required in policy that 
is truly radical and transformative.   
This thesis has attempted to project an image of these places and its people as a product 
of structural transformations and historically embedded habitus. This allows a 
consideration of young men and their collective experiences of unemployment without 
falling into the trap of perceiving the unemployed and marginalised as those who lack 
moral judgments of character, and instead, it has allowed me to consider the 
structurally imposed forces that manifest at micro level. It is the young men of 
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